Opinion: Russia enters Indian Ocean

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Finally, Russia enters Indian Ocean

Farhat Ali
Published December 13, 2025


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Russia’s century-old dream of reaching warm waters quietly materialised during President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to India. For generations, Russian strategists—from the Tsars to the Soviet admiralty—sought reliable access to the Indian Ocean, the gateway to global trade and energy. That ambition had always been blocked by geography, rival powers, or political constraints.

The agreement termed ‘RELOS’ changed that in one stroke. With India opening its ports and logistics network to the Russian Navy, Putin’s trip to New Delhi early this month effectively turned a historic aspiration into operational reality. Russia is now no longer confined to the frigid northern seas—it has finally secured a southern maritime foothold in the world’s most strategic ocean.

What looks like a bureaucratic logistics pact is, in fact, the breaking of a strategic monopoly.

The ‘RELOS’ logistics pact between India and Russia has triggered one of the most profound shifts in the global power architecture since the end of the Cold War. For the first time, Moscow now gains routine naval access to the Indian Ocean through India’s ports, airfields, and maintenance facilities. This breaks the long-standing US monopoly over the world’s most strategic maritime space—the artery of global oil, energy routes, and Asia–Middle East shipping.

‘RELOS’ is not a routine military agreement. It hands Russia the ability to refuel and repair thousands of kilometres from home, opening a new front in great-power competition.

In return, which is hardly a counterbalance, India’s navy and air force gain reliable access to Russian facilities across the Arctic and Pacific, including ports along the Northern Sea route, enhancing sustained maritime presence and operations in previously inaccessible waters.

The reaction across capitals is unprecedented: panic in Washington, calculation in Beijing, alertness in Moscow, and pressure on New Delhi. The Indian Ocean is becoming the frontline of the next great-power contest, and India faces the most consequential strategic dilemma of its century: remain the anchor of a US-led Indo-Pacific strategy, or emerge as the southern pillar of a Russia-centered Eurasian arc.

The United States has three core interests in the Indian Ocean: control of energy routes, dominance of chokepoints, and denial of access to rival navies. ‘RELOS’ undermines all three.

Washington’s alarm was immediate. The sudden dispatch of US Deputy Trade Representative Rick Switzer this week to New Delhi is not about tariffs; it is about strategic retrieval. It is a strategic intervention aimed at pulling India back into the American orbit at the very moment when New Delhi and Moscow are knitting together deeper military, naval, and energy architecture beyond Western oversight.

At stake is America’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which depends on India serving as the democratic counterweight to China and the southern anchor of US maritime dominance.

Now that assumption is collapsing. Washington’s concern goes far beyond military logistics. ‘RELOS’ coincides with India’s purchase of discounted Russian oil, the expansion of India–Russia defence ties, and the quiet emergence of a Eurasian energy-security bloc that excludes Western influence.

Will the US attempt containment? Yes—through diplomatic urgency, economic incentives, and subtle threats. India will face pressure on arms purchases, oil imports, technology access, and strategic cooperation within the Quad. But India understands that the US needs India to balance China far more than India needs exclusive alignment with Washington. That could give New Delhi rare leverage.

China’s reaction could be complex—but far from hostile. It is likely to be pragmatic

A more independent India—one that is not fully under US influence—helps Beijing by preventing the encirclement strategy Washington envisions through the Quad.

It could benefits from any development that prevents the Indian Ocean from becoming a US-controlled lake. A Russian naval footprint makes the region multipolar, which suits Beijing’s long-term calculus.

However, China will interpret ‘RELOS carefully’.

A Russian naval footprint in the Indian Ocean introduces another big-power actor in China’s maritime backyard. Beijing will want assurances that Russia’s presence does not drift into an anti-China coalition subsidized by India.

Beijing will watch Indian ambitions carefully, but Russia’s entry serves as a balancing force, ensuring India does not emerge as the sole gatekeeper of the Indian Ocean.

‘RELOS’ reshapes the region well beyond India. Central Asian republics already tethered to Moscow may align more closely. ‘RELOS’ has created a gravitational pull toward a broader Eurasian coalition. South Asia and Asia Pacific now have options to play within the multipolar maritime order evolving in its proximity.

Pakistan faces both concern and opportunity. On one hand, India-Russia naval alignment raises concerns about enhanced Indian reach in the Arabian Sea.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s own proximity to Russia and China allows it to benefit from a broader Eurasian realignment. Moscow’s interest in warm waters is not limited to India. Russia’s larger push toward warm waters could bring Moscow closer to Pakistan, especially through Karachi and Gwadar. Islamabad can benefit if it positions itself as an alternative or complementary maritime partner for Russia.

‘RELOS’, most likely, would not undermine CPEC or Gwadar port. If anything, Russia’s southward search for access could breathe new life into Gwadar as an additional logistical node. The region’s shift toward multipolarity reduces US surveillance over Chinese projects.

Iran is arguably the biggest winner.
‘RELOS’ strengthens the north–south axis linking Russia, Iran, and India. Tehran’s Chabahar Port gains new relevance, and Russia’s need for diversified southern access expands Iran’s geopolitical value—especially as it pushes back against Western pressure.

Afghanistan becomes an unavoidable transit node for Eurasian connectivity. Any stable future in Afghanistan strengthens the Russia–India–Iran corridor, giving the landlocked state fresh relevance despite its internal challenges.

Middle Eastern states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, would welcome the diversification. A Russian naval presence reduces exclusive US dominance and gives Gulf monarchies more strategic bargaining power in energy and security affairs.

The Indian Ocean is no longer unipolar. Russia is in. China is entrenched. The US feels cornered. India is emerging as the pivot between continental Eurasia and maritime Asia.

‘RELOS’ marks the start of a new maritime century—one in which no single power controls the Indian Ocean and the global energy routes. India redraws the maritime map.

The decisions New Delhi makes in the next decade will define Asia’s balance of power for the next fifty years.

The challenges for India are severe and several. ‘RELOS’ is India’s biggest strategic gamble — Russia enters a maritime earthquake India cannot reverse. Whereas, India is at the crossroads: US pressure vs Eurasian alignment.

Farhat Ali
The writer is a former President - Overseas Investors Chamber of Commerce & Industry and a noted analyst on current affairs
 
This "Russia wants to reach warm waters" was first propagandize by Disraeli in reference to the Mediterranean and people in the subcontinent have been mindlessly and erroneously repeating it since then for the Indian Ocean. The Suez Canal is there and open to all international carriers, Russia does not have any goods or population even near the Indian Ocean to care.
 
So, Russia is measuring up to similar US naval agreement with India earlier. It will be interesting to see in the end which one Russia or US that India puts on higher priority or India is going to play the balancing act between the two, tight rope to walk ?
 

Finally, Russia enters Indian Ocean

Farhat Ali
Published December 13, 2025

View attachment 165199

Russia’s century-old dream of reaching warm waters quietly materialised during President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to India. For generations, Russian strategists—from the Tsars to the Soviet admiralty—sought reliable access to the Indian Ocean, the gateway to global trade and energy. That ambition had always been blocked by geography, rival powers, or political constraints.

The agreement termed ‘RELOS’ changed that in one stroke. With India opening its ports and logistics network to the Russian Navy, Putin’s trip to New Delhi early this month effectively turned a historic aspiration into operational reality. Russia is now no longer confined to the frigid northern seas—it has finally secured a southern maritime foothold in the world’s most strategic ocean.

What looks like a bureaucratic logistics pact is, in fact, the breaking of a strategic monopoly.

The ‘RELOS’ logistics pact between India and Russia has triggered one of the most profound shifts in the global power architecture since the end of the Cold War. For the first time, Moscow now gains routine naval access to the Indian Ocean through India’s ports, airfields, and maintenance facilities. This breaks the long-standing US monopoly over the world’s most strategic maritime space—the artery of global oil, energy routes, and Asia–Middle East shipping.

‘RELOS’ is not a routine military agreement. It hands Russia the ability to refuel and repair thousands of kilometres from home, opening a new front in great-power competition.

In return, which is hardly a counterbalance, India’s navy and air force gain reliable access to Russian facilities across the Arctic and Pacific, including ports along the Northern Sea route, enhancing sustained maritime presence and operations in previously inaccessible waters.

The reaction across capitals is unprecedented: panic in Washington, calculation in Beijing, alertness in Moscow, and pressure on New Delhi. The Indian Ocean is becoming the frontline of the next great-power contest, and India faces the most consequential strategic dilemma of its century: remain the anchor of a US-led Indo-Pacific strategy, or emerge as the southern pillar of a Russia-centered Eurasian arc.

The United States has three core interests in the Indian Ocean: control of energy routes, dominance of chokepoints, and denial of access to rival navies. ‘RELOS’ undermines all three.

Washington’s alarm was immediate. The sudden dispatch of US Deputy Trade Representative Rick Switzer this week to New Delhi is not about tariffs; it is about strategic retrieval.
It is a strategic intervention aimed at pulling India back into the American orbit at the very moment when New Delhi and Moscow are knitting together deeper military, naval, and energy architecture beyond Western oversight.

At stake is America’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which depends on India serving as the democratic counterweight to China and the southern anchor of US maritime dominance.

Now that assumption is collapsing. Washington’s concern goes far beyond military logistics. ‘RELOS’ coincides with India’s purchase of discounted Russian oil, the expansion of India–Russia defence ties, and the quiet emergence of a Eurasian energy-security bloc that excludes Western influence.

Will the US attempt containment? Yes—through diplomatic urgency, economic incentives, and subtle threats. India will face pressure on arms purchases, oil imports, technology access, and strategic cooperation within the Quad. But India understands that the US needs India to balance China far more than India needs exclusive alignment with Washington. That could give New Delhi rare leverage.

China’s reaction could be complex—but far from hostile. It is likely to be pragmatic

A more independent India—one that is not fully under US influence—helps Beijing by preventing the encirclement strategy Washington envisions through the Quad.

It could benefits from any development that prevents the Indian Ocean from becoming a US-controlled lake. A Russian naval footprint makes the region multipolar, which suits Beijing’s long-term calculus.

However, China will interpret ‘RELOS carefully’.

A Russian naval footprint in the Indian Ocean introduces another big-power actor in China’s maritime backyard. Beijing will want assurances that Russia’s presence does not drift into an anti-China coalition subsidized by India.

Beijing will watch Indian ambitions carefully, but Russia’s entry serves as a balancing force, ensuring India does not emerge as the sole gatekeeper of the Indian Ocean.

‘RELOS’ reshapes the region well beyond India. Central Asian republics already tethered to Moscow may align more closely. ‘RELOS’ has created a gravitational pull toward a broader Eurasian coalition. South Asia and Asia Pacific now have options to play within the multipolar maritime order evolving in its proximity.

Pakistan faces both concern and opportunity. On one hand, India-Russia naval alignment raises concerns about enhanced Indian reach in the Arabian Sea.



‘RELOS’, most likely, would not undermine CPEC or Gwadar port. If anything, Russia’s southward search for access could breathe new life into Gwadar as an additional logistical node. The region’s shift toward multipolarity reduces US surveillance over Chinese projects.

Iran is arguably the biggest winner.
‘RELOS’ strengthens the north–south axis linking Russia, Iran, and India. Tehran’s Chabahar Port gains new relevance, and Russia’s need for diversified southern access expands Iran’s geopolitical value—especially as it pushes back against Western pressure.

Afghanistan becomes an unavoidable transit node for Eurasian connectivity. Any stable future in Afghanistan strengthens the Russia–India–Iran corridor, giving the landlocked state fresh relevance despite its internal challenges.

Middle Eastern states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, would welcome the diversification. A Russian naval presence reduces exclusive US dominance and gives Gulf monarchies more strategic bargaining power in energy and security affairs.

The Indian Ocean is no longer unipolar. Russia is in. China is entrenched. The US feels cornered. India is emerging as the pivot between continental Eurasia and maritime Asia.

‘RELOS’ marks the start of a new maritime century—one in which no single power controls the Indian Ocean and the global energy routes. India redraws the maritime map.

The decisions New Delhi makes in the next decade will define Asia’s balance of power for the next fifty years.

The challenges for India are severe and several. ‘RELOS’ is India’s biggest strategic gamble — Russia enters a maritime earthquake India cannot reverse. Whereas, India is at the crossroads: US pressure vs Eurasian alignment.

Farhat Ali
The writer is a former President - Overseas Investors Chamber of Commerce & Industry and a noted analyst on current affairs
This is a typical misinterpretation/exaggeration.

Russia's primary task right now is to get its naval fleet operational. This is already a very difficult task for Russia at the moment.

Having ambition is one thing, but having the ability is another.

Their so-called military technology cooperation with India is nothing more than a scheme to get India, the unsuspecting patsy, to provide funding to rescue their own struggling and nearly bankrupt military industry.
 
This "Russia wants to reach warm waters" was first propagandize by Disraeli in reference to the Mediterranean and people in the subcontinent have been mindlessly and erroneously repeating it since then for the Indian Ocean. The Suez Canal is there and open to all international carriers, Russia does not have any goods or population even near the Indian Ocean to care.
While the Suez Canal does provide access, maritime strategy is not only about transit routes it is also about logistics and sustained presence. Russia's interest historically has been less about immediate commercial necessity and more about avoiding chokepoint dependence and maintaining strategic reach beyond enclosed seas like the Black Sea.
 
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This is a typical misinterpretation/exaggeration.

Russia's primary task right now is to get its naval fleet operational. This is already a very difficult task for Russia at the moment.

Having ambition is one thing, but having the ability is another.

Their so-called military technology cooperation with India is nothing more than a scheme to get India, the unsuspecting patsy, to provide funding to rescue their own struggling and nearly bankrupt military industry.
The agreement is symbolic as of now. It opens up many possibilities in the Great Game for major powers though. Both the Western powers and the Russians have the same agreement with India now.

It's the Americans who would be scratching their heads and hoping to reach some alternative agreement with India.

Russia - India - Iran Troika is another thing which will play an important role here.
 
Their so-called military technology cooperation with India is nothing more than a scheme to get India, the unsuspecting patsy, to provide funding to rescue their own struggling and nearly bankrupt military industry.
Russian are very keen on pitching the Su57 with significant proprietary rights transfer. I don't think India has shown much interest in the offer yet though. There was a reason we pulled out of the co development of the plane.

Russia made billions and revitalized their own almost bankrupt industries by the Su30MKI and T90MS deals. It's no wonder they are looking for a similar deal again.

What we do need from them is their Air defence (S400s) and their BVR missiles in the short term. In the next 10-20yrs India will overcome it's majority dependence on Russian arms, it has already come done sharply compared to 2010.
 
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In the next 10-20yrs India will overcome it's majority dependence on Russian arms, it has already come done sharply compared to 2010.
Unfortunately, this gene is not present in the Indian genetic makeup. This is merely a result of your propaganda. India will never be able to break free from its dependence on foreign arms suppliers. It simply chooses to rely on different suppliers at different times.
 
Unfortunately, this gene is not present in the Indian genetic makeup. This is merely a result of your propaganda. India will never be able to break free from its dependence on foreign arms suppliers. It simply chooses to rely on different suppliers at different times.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia's share of India's major arms imports has declined sharply over time from around 70-75% in the early 2010s to roughly one third in the 2020-2024 period. SIPRI's trend analysis shows India deliberately diversifying its suppliers toward France, Israel, and the United States, while simultaneously reducing overall import volumes.

Source : https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf

Many international publications have noted that India has transitioned from pure buyer status to licensed production, co-development, and indigenous manufacture in multiple categories, including artillery, missiles, naval platforms, and aircraft subsystems. While India still imports high end components, the nature of dependence has shifted from complete imports make in India deals with technology transfer.

Even China, despite its scale, still imports critical aero engine technology, advanced semiconductors, and specialised materials.
 
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According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia's share of India's major arms imports has declined sharply over time from around 70-75% in the early 2010s to roughly one third in the 2020-2024 period. SIPRI's trend analysis shows India deliberately diversifying its suppliers toward France, Israel, and the United States, while simultaneously reducing overall import volumes.

Source : https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Many international publications have noted that India has transitioned from pure buyer status to licensed production, co-development, and indigenous manufacture in multiple categories, including artillery, missiles, naval platforms, and aircraft subsystems. While India still imports high end components, the nature of dependence has shifted from complete systems to selective technologies a trajectory similar to that followed earlier by countries like South Korea and Turkey.
This is the charm of Indian-style propaganda. Of course, countries around the world are happy to cooperate with this Indian propaganda model because they earn huge profits from India every year.

Let me give you an example:
India's proudly touted "generic drug" industry.
1. Drug formulas.​
2. Instruments and equipment used for testing and analysis during the drug manufacturing process.​
3. Production line equipment for drug manufacturing and packaging.​
4. Raw materials needed to manufacture the drugs.​
Guess what percentage of these aspects are imported by India?
The Indian government and media will tell you how much profit India earns from exporting pharmaceuticals to the world every year. But they won't tell you that the vast majority of these profits are taken by other countries. They also won't tell you that the entire supply chain is completely controlled by foreign suppliers.

When it comes to the defense industry, instead of studying media reports and data, you should take a good look at your soldiers.

To date, has the Indian army deployed any standard equipment on a large scale that is entirely (100%) manufactured in India?
 
Their so-called military technology cooperation with India is nothing more than a scheme to get India, the unsuspecting patsy, to provide funding to rescue their own struggling and nearly bankrupt military industry.
I don't think we are going to pay Russians to maintain their fleet by repairing them in our yards.
 
To date, has the Indian army deployed any standard equipment on a large scale that is entirely (100%) manufactured in India?
When you get bombed by some LGBs you wouldn't care of it's Israeli made or American made. You simply get bombed and die. Similarly we wouldn't care of the LGBs are made in India or Israel as long as it can kill.
 
I don't think we are going to pay Russians to maintain their fleet by repairing them in our yards.
You should carefully study this news report. Rybar is a well-known Russian military blogger with close ties to the Russian military, and his credibility is very high.
This deal is expected to be worth $2 billion.
 
You should carefully study this news report. Rybar is a well-known Russian military blogger with close ties to the Russian military, and his credibility is very high.
This deal is expected to be worth $2 billion.
This 10 yrs lease deal has been in talks for years now, it was confirmed during Putin's visit.

India only has SSBNs as of now. This SSN will fulfill both criteria as of a strategic weapon and as a training and operational experience hub.
 
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You should carefully study this news report. Rybar is a well-known Russian military blogger with close ties to the Russian military, and his credibility is very high.
This deal is expected to be worth $2 billion.
Yeah great info. But nowhere it says we are going to pay Russians to maintain their fleet. You believe what you like it believe.
 

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