JF-17 - Updates, News & Discussion

Unless we are having translation problems - The assertion that access to “source code” is a prerequisite for full weapon integration (Level 4 capability) is technically flawed and reflects a misunderstanding of modern avionics architectures.

You do not need the source code of a radar or mission computer to integrate a weapon. You need the Interface Control Document (ICD) and compliant drivers. In modern avionics, the Mission Computer (MC) and Radar are “black boxes” that communicate via standardized buses (MIL-STD-1553B, ARINC 429) using defined protocols. As long as the Prime Contractor (CAC) provides the Weapon Interface Standard (which is effectively an ICD), the integrator writes a software “driver” that translates the missile’s data into the format the MC expects.

The assertion that “source code” is required for full weapon integration (what you call “Level 4”) is incorrect and is equating proprietary vendor locks with software architecture.

Btw - just so we are all clear - There is no “Level 1-4” standard in global military aviation.

If the JF-17 uses an Open Architecture as claimed then it is specifically designed to decouple the weapon from the flight software. Since Pakistan has the Weapon Interface Standards (ICDs) now from CAC and access to the Store Management System (SMS), they can write native drivers for any weapon. The radar simply outputs track data to the bus; it doesn’t know or care what missile receives it. No radar source code is required. The WMMC (Weapon Mission Management Computer) was specifically designed to be “open” to allow Pakistan to integrate Western weapons (like the Ra’ad ALCM) and avionics (like Aselsan targeting pods) without asking CAC to create a “driver” every time.

Turkey uses tablets on Block 40/50 F-16s because Lockheed Martin digitally signs the Mission Computer software. Turkey cannot install new missile drivers because they lack the Crypto Keys, not because they lack the radar’s source code. This is a misunderstanding and a misnomer you are repeating.

This might have been true in the 1970s with the AWG-9 to Phoenix combo on the F-14 physically generated the guidance signal and sent it directly to the missile. If you didn’t have the radar’s schematics, you couldn’t fire the missile.Your suspicion that the radar could have a “firmware whitelist” or “lock” that prevents it from tracking targets for non-Chinese weapons is applying 1970s hardware logic (like the F-14’s AWG-9) to a 2000s bus-based architecture.

Today the radar is just a sensor on a network. It broadcasts “Target at X, Y, Z” to the Mission Computer (WMMC) via the bus. The Mission Computer then reads that data and sends a separate command to the missile station via the Store Management System (SMS).The weapon never “talks” directly to the radar. It talks to the SMS. Since the PAF controls the SMS software and the 1553 bus messaging, they can integrate any weapon that speaks the bus language, regardless of what the radar “wants” to do.

You dont need the radar’s source code to tell the missile where the target is.You only need the Message Format (e.g., “Target Azimuth” is bits 1-16 on Word 3 of the 1553B bus). As long as the Prime Contractor (CAC) provides the Weapon Interface Standard (the ICD), the integrator writes a “driver” or “wrapper” that translates missile data into the format the MC expects.

There is no physical wire between the KLJ-7 radar and the missile pylon. They are on separate “addresses” on the data bus. The radar sends data to the Mission Computer; the Mission Computer re-packages it and sends it to the missile.For a “lock” to work, Chengdu would have to program the radar to stop tracking targets entirely if it somehow sensed a foreign missile was on the wing. But since the radar isn’t connected to the Store Management System, it has no way of knowing what’s on the wing.

Turkey uses UBAS and tablets on legacy F-16s because those specific jets have closed, proprietary architectures (legacy Block 40/50) where the OEM (Lockheed Martin) refuses to update the OFP. Lockheed Martin effectively “locks the bootloader” on legacy F-16s. The tablet is a workaround for a legal/administrative block, not a technical need for source code.

Furthermore, even with this restriction, Turkey successfully integrated the SOM-J and other munitions using UBAS. The “limitations” you listed (mid-course updates, anti-jamming) are functions of the Datalink implementation, not the radar source code. If the external pod can broadcast Link-16 or proprietary datalink signals, the missile receives updates just fine - NO CAPABILITY IS LOST.

For the Özgür Project (Block 30 modernization), Turkey replaced the Mission Computer entirely. By owning the computer, they gained the ability to install native drivers for Gökdoğan/Bozdoğan missiles. They achieved this without needing the Northrop radar source code and they simply read the radar’s output from the bus.

The limitations on the Su-35 (lack of mid-course updates for PL-15) exist because Russia did not provide the ICD (API access) to the fire control system, nor the Data Link Protocol.

True high-level integration (mid-course updates, DLZ calculations) is achieved via Store Description Files (SDF).
• When a new missile is integrated, engineers load a data file containing the missile’s ballistics, drag coefficients, and seeker field-of-view into the aircraft’s Store Management System (SMS).
• The SMS uses this data to calculate launch parameters. The radar software remains untouched; it simply outputs track data to the bus, which the SMS reads.

Btw - Israel did something on the F-35 which further disproves your argument - They didn’t ask for the radar source code.They installed a “Man-in-the-Middle” C4I computer on top of the F-35’s avionics. This computer translates Israeli weapon data into a format the F-35 understands.
Weapon integration outside the fighter jet's system doesn't necessarily require radar developers to provide radar source code to weapon developers (this is impossible). Instead, it requires redeveloping/adjusting weapon integration interface information based on the source code.

Generally, there are two scenarios:
1. The weapon developer modifies the weapon information based on the fighter jet's already released weapon integration interface. (This is rare.)
2. The weapon developer provides its own weapon's "black box interface" to the fighter jet developer, who then redevelops/adjusts the weapon integration interface information. This is relatively common.

For general weapon payloads, the fighter jet developer only needs to redevelop a dedicated weapon payload adapter pylon to solve coherence issues (the pylon contains the relevant information conversion module). However, for high-end weapon payloads (such as BVR missiles), the collaboration mode with the radar has higher requirements. Therefore, this requires collaboration between the weapon developer, the fighter jet mission computer developer, and the radar developer. Typically, the radar developer resubmits a technical document based on the radar source code information to the fighter jet mission computer developer, who then redevelops the weapon interface information.

Throughout the three-party communication process, "black box" interfaces are used, and none of the parties disclose their source code. Of course, different parties may use different technical terms to describe access restrictions on their own systems.
 
Weapon integration outside the fighter jet's system doesn't necessarily require radar developers to provide radar source code to weapon developers (this is impossible). Instead, it requires redeveloping/adjusting weapon integration interface information based on the source code.

Generally, there are two scenarios:
1. The weapon developer modifies the weapon information based on the fighter jet's already released weapon integration interface. (This is rare.)
2. The weapon developer provides its own weapon's "black box interface" to the fighter jet developer, who then redevelops/adjusts the weapon integration interface information. This is relatively common.

For general weapon payloads, the fighter jet developer only needs to redevelop a dedicated weapon payload adapter pylon to solve coherence issues (the pylon contains the relevant information conversion module). However, for high-end weapon payloads (such as BVR missiles), the collaboration mode with the radar has higher requirements. Therefore, this requires collaboration between the weapon developer, the fighter jet mission computer developer, and the radar developer. Typically, the radar developer resubmits a technical document based on the radar source code information to the fighter jet mission computer developer, who then redevelops the weapon interface information.

Throughout the three-party communication process, "black box" interfaces are used, and none of the parties disclose their source code. Of course, different parties may use different technical terms to describe access restrictions on their own systems.
Honestly, you ought to be banned. You are shameless.
 
Weapon integration outside the fighter jet's system doesn't necessarily require radar developers to provide radar source code to weapon developers (this is impossible). Instead, it requires redeveloping/adjusting weapon integration interface information based on the source code.

Generally, there are two scenarios:
1. The weapon developer modifies the weapon information based on the fighter jet's already released weapon integration interface. (This is rare.)
2. The weapon developer provides its own weapon's "black box interface" to the fighter jet developer, who then redevelops/adjusts the weapon integration interface information. This is relatively common.

For general weapon payloads, the fighter jet developer only needs to redevelop a dedicated weapon payload adapter pylon to solve coherence issues (the pylon contains the relevant information conversion module). However, for high-end weapon payloads (such as BVR missiles), the collaboration mode with the radar has higher requirements. Therefore, this requires collaboration between the weapon developer, the fighter jet mission computer developer, and the radar developer. Typically, the radar developer resubmits a technical document based on the radar source code information to the fighter jet mission computer developer, who then redevelops the weapon interface information.

Throughout the three-party communication process, "black box" interfaces are used, and none of the parties disclose their source code. Of course, different parties may use different technical terms to describe access restrictions on their own systems.
I do not know about defence especially this fighter and weapons integration. But i have 9 years of experience developing APIs for different scanners and printer hardwares based on their provided firmware. We would develop an end user API interface based on requirements from hardware and their firmware interface. Then using those APIs users can integrate those scannars and printers in their respective applications and domains. If i am not wrong the same kind of procedure can be followed for the weapons integration on JFs. If there is something new needed by any.weapons i think as we would request to the hardware/firmware makers in europe the same can b done by CEC from its subsystem OEMs
 
I do not know about defence especially this fighter and weapons integration. But i have 9 years of experience developing APIs for different scanners and printer hardwares based on their provided firmware. We would develop an end user API interface based on requirements from hardware and their firmware interface. Then using those APIs users can integrate those scannars and printers in their respective applications and domains. If i am not wrong the same kind of procedure can be followed for the weapons integration on JFs. If there is something new needed by any.weapons i think as we would request to the hardware/firmware makers in europe the same can b done by CEC from its subsystem OEMs
The example you gave is very interesting.

For modern inkjet printers or laser printers, users can use either universal drivers or drivers independently developed by the manufacturer. Both will allow the printer to work properly. But you should know that there is a difference between the two.

At the same time, users can use either the manufacturer’s original printer consumables (ink cartridges/toner cartridges) or non-original substitutes. But there are differences between the two.

The real profits of printer manufacturers come from printer consumables, not from selling the printer itself. The same is true for fighter platforms. The real biggest profit point for any fighter jet manufacturer comes from weapons sales. But people often overlook this.

In reality, printer manufacturers will use various means to get users to buy original printer consumables, and fighter jet manufacturers will also use various means to get users to buy original matching ammunition. This is the simplest business logic.
In real-life games, it is often difficult for fighter manufacturers to completely prohibit users from using non-original matching ammunition, but they will take many technical means to restrict non-original matching ammunition. This is a common practice among all manufacturers around the world.
 
The example you gave is very interesting.

For modern inkjet printers or laser printers, users can use either universal drivers or drivers independently developed by the manufacturer. Both will allow the printer to work properly. But you should know that there is a difference between the two.

At the same time, users can use either the manufacturer’s original printer consumables (ink cartridges/toner cartridges) or non-original substitutes. But there are differences between the two.

The real profits of printer manufacturers come from printer consumables, not from selling the printer itself. The same is true for fighter platforms. The real biggest profit point for any fighter jet manufacturer comes from weapons sales. But people often overlook this.

In reality, printer manufacturers will use various means to get users to buy original printer consumables, and fighter jet manufacturers will also use various means to get users to buy original matching ammunition. This is the simplest business logic.
In real-life games, it is often difficult for fighter manufacturers to completely prohibit users from using non-original matching ammunition, but they will take many technical means to restrict non-original matching ammunition. This is a common practice among all manufacturers around the world.
I got your point. there is definitely alot of difference in these two. I have always implemented APIs based on type c universal driver and i know if i have to work on some specific driver than the game changes totally and i am totally dependent on the driver development team.
 
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Unless we are having translation problems - The assertion that access to “source code” is a prerequisite for full weapon integration (Level 4 capability) is technically flawed and reflects a misunderstanding of modern avionics architectures.

You do not need the source code of a radar or mission computer to integrate a weapon. You need the Interface Control Document (ICD) and compliant drivers. In modern avionics, the Mission Computer (MC) and Radar are “black boxes” that communicate via standardized buses (MIL-STD-1553B, ARINC 429) using defined protocols. As long as the Prime Contractor (CAC) provides the Weapon Interface Standard (which is effectively an ICD), the integrator writes a software “driver” that translates the missile’s data into the format the MC expects.

The assertion that “source code” is required for full weapon integration (what you call “Level 4”) is incorrect and is equating proprietary vendor locks with software architecture.

Btw - just so we are all clear - There is no “Level 1-4” standard in global military aviation.

If the JF-17 uses an Open Architecture as claimed then it is specifically designed to decouple the weapon from the flight software. Since Pakistan has the Weapon Interface Standards (ICDs) now from CAC and access to the Store Management System (SMS), they can write native drivers for any weapon. The radar simply outputs track data to the bus; it doesn’t know or care what missile receives it. No radar source code is required. The WMMC (Weapon Mission Management Computer) was specifically designed to be “open” to allow Pakistan to integrate Western weapons (like the Ra’ad ALCM) and avionics (like Aselsan targeting pods) without asking CAC to create a “driver” every time.

Turkey uses tablets on Block 40/50 F-16s because Lockheed Martin digitally signs the Mission Computer software. Turkey cannot install new missile drivers because they lack the Crypto Keys, not because they lack the radar’s source code. This is a misunderstanding and a misnomer you are repeating.

This might have been true in the 1970s with the AWG-9 to Phoenix combo on the F-14 physically generated the guidance signal and sent it directly to the missile. If you didn’t have the radar’s schematics, you couldn’t fire the missile.Your suspicion that the radar could have a “firmware whitelist” or “lock” that prevents it from tracking targets for non-Chinese weapons is applying 1970s hardware logic (like the F-14’s AWG-9) to a 2000s bus-based architecture.

Today the radar is just a sensor on a network. It broadcasts “Target at X, Y, Z” to the Mission Computer (WMMC) via the bus. The Mission Computer then reads that data and sends a separate command to the missile station via the Store Management System (SMS).The weapon never “talks” directly to the radar. It talks to the SMS. Since the PAF controls the SMS software and the 1553 bus messaging, they can integrate any weapon that speaks the bus language, regardless of what the radar “wants” to do.

You dont need the radar’s source code to tell the missile where the target is.You only need the Message Format (e.g., “Target Azimuth” is bits 1-16 on Word 3 of the 1553B bus). As long as the Prime Contractor (CAC) provides the Weapon Interface Standard (the ICD), the integrator writes a “driver” or “wrapper” that translates missile data into the format the MC expects.

There is no physical wire between the KLJ-7 radar and the missile pylon. They are on separate “addresses” on the data bus. The radar sends data to the Mission Computer; the Mission Computer re-packages it and sends it to the missile.For a “lock” to work, Chengdu would have to program the radar to stop tracking targets entirely if it somehow sensed a foreign missile was on the wing. But since the radar isn’t connected to the Store Management System, it has no way of knowing what’s on the wing.

Turkey uses UBAS and tablets on legacy F-16s because those specific jets have closed, proprietary architectures (legacy Block 40/50) where the OEM (Lockheed Martin) refuses to update the OFP. Lockheed Martin effectively “locks the bootloader” on legacy F-16s. The tablet is a workaround for a legal/administrative block, not a technical need for source code.

Furthermore, even with this restriction, Turkey successfully integrated the SOM-J and other munitions using UBAS. The “limitations” you listed (mid-course updates, anti-jamming) are functions of the Datalink implementation, not the radar source code. If the external pod can broadcast Link-16 or proprietary datalink signals, the missile receives updates just fine - NO CAPABILITY IS LOST.

For the Özgür Project (Block 30 modernization), Turkey replaced the Mission Computer entirely. By owning the computer, they gained the ability to install native drivers for Gökdoğan/Bozdoğan missiles. They achieved this without needing the Northrop radar source code and they simply read the radar’s output from the bus.

The limitations on the Su-35 (lack of mid-course updates for PL-15) exist because Russia did not provide the ICD (API access) to the fire control system, nor the Data Link Protocol.

True high-level integration (mid-course updates, DLZ calculations) is achieved via Store Description Files (SDF).
• When a new missile is integrated, engineers load a data file containing the missile’s ballistics, drag coefficients, and seeker field-of-view into the aircraft’s Store Management System (SMS).
• The SMS uses this data to calculate launch parameters. The radar software remains untouched; it simply outputs track data to the bus, which the SMS reads.

Btw - Israel did something on the F-35 which further disproves your argument - They didn’t ask for the radar source code.They installed a “Man-in-the-Middle” C4I computer on top of the F-35’s avionics. This computer translates Israeli weapon data into a format the F-35 understands.

Very good reply and tallies with my experience of software and hardware architecture! Thanks for the effort - more energy than I have to answer it.

Nice article on the use of tablets to integrate new weapons on closed loop platforms : https://www.twz.com/air/turkish-f-16s-are-using-tablets-to-control-locally-made-weapons
 
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The example you gave is very interesting.

For modern inkjet printers or laser printers, users can use either universal drivers or drivers independently developed by the manufacturer. Both will allow the printer to work properly. But you should know that there is a difference between the two.

At the same time, users can use either the manufacturer’s original printer consumables (ink cartridges/toner cartridges) or non-original substitutes. But there are differences between the two.

The real profits of printer manufacturers come from printer consumables, not from selling the printer itself. The same is true for fighter platforms. The real biggest profit point for any fighter jet manufacturer comes from weapons sales. But people often overlook this.

In reality, printer manufacturers will use various means to get users to buy original printer consumables, and fighter jet manufacturers will also use various means to get users to buy original matching ammunition. This is the simplest business logic.
In real-life games, it is often difficult for fighter manufacturers to completely prohibit users from using non-original matching ammunition, but they will take many technical means to restrict non-original matching ammunition. This is a common practice among all manufacturers around the world.
So then your original post is fundamentally wrong about source code being the lockout mechanism. The printer driver analogy fails because weapons integration is not about “universal vs proprietary drivers,” it is about whether you have the ICD, whether you have done the integration work, and whether you have the crypto keys for networked functions. Once those are satisfied, the weapon works at the level you integrated it to, period.

Israel integrating Derby and Python onto F-16s is the textbook example. Derby has been the standard radar guided weapon on Israeli F-16s since the 1990s, carried on the same pylon as Python 4. Israel has also integrated Python onto their F-16I Sufa variants, which are basically customized F-16D Block 52s with Israeli EW suites, helmet mounted displays, and full compatibility with Python 4/5 and Derby. Chile integrated Derby onto Israeli upgraded F-5s. Singapore flies F-16 Block 52s with Python missiles and is adding Python 5 to their upgraded fleet.

None of those countries needed Lockheed Martin’s F-16 source code to make it happen. What they needed was the mechanical interface (standard NATO pylons and lugs in many cases), the electrical interface per MIL-STD-1760, the ICD defining the message protocol between aircraft stores management system and the weapon, and then flight test certification proving safe carriage and separation. The ICD defines mechanical attachments, electrical signal sets, data structures, timeline of state transitions, environmental data, aerodynamic data, everything needed for the aircraft to operate the weapon. That is an interface contract negotiated between the aircraft side and the weapon side, not “hand over your source code.”

Take a hypothetical like Pakistan trying to integrate PL-15 onto F-16. The technical path is clear but the support requirements from both sides show why this is not a driver problem. From the Lockheed/US side, Pakistan needs the F-16 stores management system ICD so they understand what message formats, timing, and state machines the jet expects. (If Pakistan has this it can integrate ANY WEAPON).

From the Chinese side, Pakistan needs the PL-15 weapon ICD defining the electrical pinout, the datalink message formats for midcourse updates, the weapon’s state machine behavior, and the physical/aerodynamic data needed for safe carriage and employment. If PL-15 uses encrypted datalink for anti jam or ECCM, Pakistan also needs the crypto keys and the specifications for how to load and synchronize those keys between aircraft and missile. Without the keys, the F-16 cannot send commands the missile will accept and the missile cannot send status back, even if the electrical connection and message formatting are perfect.

This is fundamentally a protocol translation and certification problem, not “install a driver.” Rafael markets Derby as compatible with multiple platforms specifically because they provide the weapon side ICD and work with integrators to implement the aircraft side changes.

If you know the interface contract (the printer protocol or ICD), you can write your own driver and use compatible cartridges, and the remaining issues are quality and support, not magic lockouts. The weapons equivalent is that if you have the aircraft store interface definition, the weapon ICD, and any required crypto keys, then the weapon is either integrated or it is not, and performance depends on how completely you implemented the protocols and tested the result
 
Is this Azerbaijan insignia?

Yes. This is the main base that will host JF-17Cs, I think the reconstruction is nearing completion.

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So then your original post is fundamentally wrong about source code being the lockout mechanism. The printer driver analogy fails because weapons integration is not about “universal vs proprietary drivers,” it is about whether you have the ICD, whether you have done the integration work, and whether you have the crypto keys for networked functions. Once those are satisfied, the weapon works at the level you integrated it to, period.

Israel integrating Derby and Python onto F-16s is the textbook example. Derby has been the standard radar guided weapon on Israeli F-16s since the 1990s, carried on the same pylon as Python 4. Israel has also integrated Python onto their F-16I Sufa variants, which are basically customized F-16D Block 52s with Israeli EW suites, helmet mounted displays, and full compatibility with Python 4/5 and Derby. Chile integrated Derby onto Israeli upgraded F-5s. Singapore flies F-16 Block 52s with Python missiles and is adding Python 5 to their upgraded fleet.

None of those countries needed Lockheed Martin’s F-16 source code to make it happen. What they needed was the mechanical interface (standard NATO pylons and lugs in many cases), the electrical interface per MIL-STD-1760, the ICD defining the message protocol between aircraft stores management system and the weapon, and then flight test certification proving safe carriage and separation. The ICD defines mechanical attachments, electrical signal sets, data structures, timeline of state transitions, environmental data, aerodynamic data, everything needed for the aircraft to operate the weapon. That is an interface contract negotiated between the aircraft side and the weapon side, not “hand over your source code.”

Take a hypothetical like Pakistan trying to integrate PL-15 onto F-16. The technical path is clear but the support requirements from both sides show why this is not a driver problem. From the Lockheed/US side, Pakistan needs the F-16 stores management system ICD so they understand what message formats, timing, and state machines the jet expects. (If Pakistan has this it can integrate ANY WEAPON).

From the Chinese side, Pakistan needs the PL-15 weapon ICD defining the electrical pinout, the datalink message formats for midcourse updates, the weapon’s state machine behavior, and the physical/aerodynamic data needed for safe carriage and employment. If PL-15 uses encrypted datalink for anti jam or ECCM, Pakistan also needs the crypto keys and the specifications for how to load and synchronize those keys between aircraft and missile. Without the keys, the F-16 cannot send commands the missile will accept and the missile cannot send status back, even if the electrical connection and message formatting are perfect.

This is fundamentally a protocol translation and certification problem, not “install a driver.” Rafael markets Derby as compatible with multiple platforms specifically because they provide the weapon side ICD and work with integrators to implement the aircraft side changes.

If you know the interface contract (the printer protocol or ICD), you can write your own driver and use compatible cartridges, and the remaining issues are quality and support, not magic lockouts. The weapons equivalent is that if you have the aircraft store interface definition, the weapon ICD, and any required crypto keys, then the weapon is either integrated or it is not, and performance depends on how completely you implemented the protocols and tested the result
Very good explanation. Except that the key decryption might be baked into the code so software update is needed to update the key decryption. That would be a controlling weapons provider.
 
Yes. This is the main base that will host JF-17Cs, I think the reconstruction is nearing completion.

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This plane would be a big hit to the global south. Is LCA a competition to this plane?🤣
 
Beyond the integration of new weapons from a software point of view, would all new stores require some sort of work with other closed systems for aircraft like the fbw code?
Also testing around vibration/drag or safe release parameters or just interfacing the new weapons with other systems like targeting pods, and internal displays.
 
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i wonder what part of his post made you go boinkers?
The part where he took Oscar's point and presented it as his own. He often patronisingly appropriates others' points and refuses to concede that he's wrong or at least acknowledge the nuance added by other posters.
 

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