Watandar
Trusted Member
An excellent Economist article from earlier this month. It illustrates the pitfalls of a foreign policy run by incompetent Generals, instead of foreign service professionals. Pakistan spent 20 years to replace the Taliban with the Taliban.
Instead, the powerful unelected generals who run Pakistan have mostly received a middle finger.
In December, 16 Pakistani soldiers were killed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani wing of the Taliban, in a border attack. Pakistan’s armed forces responded by bombing TTP hideouts in Afghanistan. That prompted the Taliban to defend the TTP as “guests” and vow revenge. That month the Taliban attacked Pakistani troops on the border.
Pakistan’s anger at its vexatious ally is well founded. Violence is up: in 2024 there were 521 terrorist attacks in Pakistan, a 70% increase on the year before, according to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, an Islamabad-based think-tank. This resulted in nearly 2,000 casualties. Militant violence, which had been in decline in Pakistan since 2014, has increased every year since the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, following America’s withdrawal of troops from the country in 2021.
Much of the violence last year, with over 300 attacks, can be attributed to the TTP. Pakistani officials estimate 10,000 of its fighters now roam along the border between the two countries. The TTP has narrowed its focus and its goals: it mostly attacks military targets, and is demanding a reversal of the merger in 2018 between Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a province of Pakistan, and British-era tribal areas.
“Pakistan miscalculated in assuming the Taliban would be a reliable and pliable ally once in power,” says Andrew Wilder at the United States Institute of Peace, a think-tank. Pakistan’s lopsided relations among the Afghan Taliban factions have added to the problem. Pakistan’s army is close to the Haqqani network, with its strongholds in eastern Afghanistan. By contrast, the TTP pledges allegiance to the Taliban’s leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada. Relations between him and Pakistan’s generals are far cooler.
Wizened Afghan hands have known the Taliban to be stubborn allies since inception. In the 1990s they gave sanctuary to Pakistani sectarian militants who tormented the country’s Shias. They refused to hand over the leaders Pakistan demanded. But Pakistan’s dysfunctional politics also complicates the relationship between the two countries. The province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where there were 295 militant attacks last year, is governed by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, the party founded by Imran Khan, the jailed former prime minister. Its chief minister insists on negotiating unilaterally with the Taliban, incensing the federal government. The army, which opposes such talks, wants Mr Khan’s provincial government to beef up its police resources to fight the TTP.
The government is trying other negotiating tactics. Since September 2023 some 815,000 Afghans have been evicted from Pakistan. (The United Nations estimates another 3m, fleeing Afghanistan’s long wars, remain.) Trade between the two countries has nosedived. Even so, the Afghan Taliban are unmoved. They know Pakistan’s arm-twisting has its limits.
Last month the Taliban hosted the Iranian foreign minister in Kabul, a first since 2017. Trade was on the agenda. Earlier in January India’s foreign secretary met the Taliban’s foreign minister in Dubai, to Pakistan’s annoyance. “We ask them to start acting and behaving like a state [and to] understand [their] obligations,” a senior Pakistani security official complains. “But nothing changes.” So much for that ally
Pakistan is furious with the Afghan Taliban
It is a humbling admission for an old ally. “They don’t listen to us,” General Asim Munir, Pakistan’s army chief, complained about the Afghan Taliban last month. In General Munir’s reckoning Pakistan is not asking for much. All the country needs from its “brotherly neighbour” is to stop the “spread of terrorism in Pakistan from across the border”. A helping hand, as it were, from the Afghan Taliban.Instead, the powerful unelected generals who run Pakistan have mostly received a middle finger.
In December, 16 Pakistani soldiers were killed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani wing of the Taliban, in a border attack. Pakistan’s armed forces responded by bombing TTP hideouts in Afghanistan. That prompted the Taliban to defend the TTP as “guests” and vow revenge. That month the Taliban attacked Pakistani troops on the border.Pakistan’s anger at its vexatious ally is well founded. Violence is up: in 2024 there were 521 terrorist attacks in Pakistan, a 70% increase on the year before, according to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, an Islamabad-based think-tank. This resulted in nearly 2,000 casualties. Militant violence, which had been in decline in Pakistan since 2014, has increased every year since the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, following America’s withdrawal of troops from the country in 2021.
Much of the violence last year, with over 300 attacks, can be attributed to the TTP. Pakistani officials estimate 10,000 of its fighters now roam along the border between the two countries. The TTP has narrowed its focus and its goals: it mostly attacks military targets, and is demanding a reversal of the merger in 2018 between Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, a province of Pakistan, and British-era tribal areas.
“Pakistan miscalculated in assuming the Taliban would be a reliable and pliable ally once in power,” says Andrew Wilder at the United States Institute of Peace, a think-tank. Pakistan’s lopsided relations among the Afghan Taliban factions have added to the problem. Pakistan’s army is close to the Haqqani network, with its strongholds in eastern Afghanistan. By contrast, the TTP pledges allegiance to the Taliban’s leader, Haibatullah Akhundzada. Relations between him and Pakistan’s generals are far cooler.
Wizened Afghan hands have known the Taliban to be stubborn allies since inception. In the 1990s they gave sanctuary to Pakistani sectarian militants who tormented the country’s Shias. They refused to hand over the leaders Pakistan demanded. But Pakistan’s dysfunctional politics also complicates the relationship between the two countries. The province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where there were 295 militant attacks last year, is governed by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, the party founded by Imran Khan, the jailed former prime minister. Its chief minister insists on negotiating unilaterally with the Taliban, incensing the federal government. The army, which opposes such talks, wants Mr Khan’s provincial government to beef up its police resources to fight the TTP.
The government is trying other negotiating tactics. Since September 2023 some 815,000 Afghans have been evicted from Pakistan. (The United Nations estimates another 3m, fleeing Afghanistan’s long wars, remain.) Trade between the two countries has nosedived. Even so, the Afghan Taliban are unmoved. They know Pakistan’s arm-twisting has its limits.
Last month the Taliban hosted the Iranian foreign minister in Kabul, a first since 2017. Trade was on the agenda. Earlier in January India’s foreign secretary met the Taliban’s foreign minister in Dubai, to Pakistan’s annoyance. “We ask them to start acting and behaving like a state [and to] understand [their] obligations,” a senior Pakistani security official complains. “But nothing changes.” So much for that ally
