This is merely routine training for the PLA—nothing out of the ordinary.
To determine whether the PRC has truly decided to use force against Taiwan, there is one crucial yet often overlooked indicator: whether the mobile units of the PAP (People's Armed Police) stationed within mainland China have begun unusual movements, specifically massing along the southeastern coast.
Internationally, observers typically base their analyses on the movements of the PLA. However, this approach is, in reality, of limited utility.
The PLA forces deployed in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait are extraordinarily large, and their routine training is exceptionally intensive. These standing forces already far exceed the response capabilities of the ROC military. Even if one were to factor in the forces from the U.S. and Japan that could be rapidly mobilized in the surrounding region, they would still be insufficient to counter the PLA's current standing forces in the Taiwan Strait. From the PLA's perspective, should the Central Military Commission issue the order, they could launch an assault on the island of Taiwan at any moment—requiring a preparation time of merely a few hours.
The true critical factor lies in the mobilization and assembly of the PAP.
Once the PLA has struck key military bases on Taiwan, executed a landing, and begun its advance, it will inevitably face the brutal reality of urban warfare. Such combat scenarios, however, constitute the PAP's specific area of expertise. Furthermore, given the PRC's consistent assertion that Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory, the deployment of the PAP to address "internal security issues" is deemed a legal and jurisdictional necessity. Conversely, utilizing the PLA to resolve such "internal security issues" would carry a significantly higher risk of inflicting heavy civilian casualties.