Pakistan's New Provinces Plan ?

[hydrabadi_arab]

Karachi's two largest industrial zones SITE and Korangi span 18,100 acres and house 6,400 factories. Their combined economic output as well as revenue/tax dwarf all of Punjab's puny 100 acres industrial estates/revenue. Come back when people in Punjab stop free loading on rest of Pakistan's especially Karachi's lunch and not have the chokidars of GHQ Pindi commision death, destruction and misrey on Karachi through it's biggest proxy of PPP/Zardari.

PTI supporter just made up number from his ass

Province / Territory	Reported Manufacturing Units
Punjab	~770,000
Sindh	~300,000
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)	~150,000
Balochistan	~40,000
Islamabad (ICT)	~14,000

 

[mythbuster]

Karachi's two largest industrial zones SITE and Korangi span 18,100 acres and house 6,400 factories. Their combined economic output as well as revenue/tax dwarf all of Punjab's puny 100 acres industrial estates/revenue. Come back when people in Punjab stop free loading on rest of Pakistan's especially Karachi's lunch and not have the chokidars of GHQ Pindi commision death, destruction and misrey on Karachi through it's biggest proxy of PPP/Zardari.

Pak army murdabad , Punjab murdabad.....Altaf Bhai jindabad , IK jindabad.

 

[SteppeWolff]

Karachi's two largest industrial zones SITE and Korangi span 18,100 acres and house 6,400 factories. Their combined economic output as well as revenue/tax dwarf all of Punjab's puny 100 acres industrial estates/revenue.

Nga what? Punjab’s organized industrial estate footprint exceeds 15,000+ acres.

Come back when people in Punjab stop free loading on rest of Pakistan's especially Karachi's lunch and not have the chokidars of GHQ Pindi commision death, destruction and misrey on Karachi through it's biggest proxy of PPP/Zardari.

Pakistan’s primary food and livestock engine is Punjab. Plus Faisalabad and Sialkot are the true exporting hubs, relative to their size. Also, Karachi houses the corporate headquarters of nearly all major multinational corporations, banks, and national conglomerates. When a company like a telecom provider or a national bank pays its corporate tax, the revenue is collected and logged in Karachi, even if 80% of its customers, factories, and sales occur in Punjab, KPK, or Balochistan. Also, Karachi handles roughly 95% of Pakistan's foreign trade. Customs duties, sales taxes on imports, and withholding taxes are collected at the Karachi ports. However, these taxes are ultimately paid by the consumers across the entire country who buy those imported raw materials and finished goods.

No idea whats up with Karachi folks spitting racism against rest of Pakistan's ethnicities. Starlord and others against Baloch and Pashtuns and you against Punjabis. Who did a number on yall Muhajirs to be actin like this?

 

[Blueishere]

I understand why people worry about federal overreach. Pakistan’s history is full of examples where outsiders from Islamabad were pushed into local areas, and every one of those experiments ended badly. But that fear doesn’t really apply here, because the model being proposed is doing something very different.

To start, the structure itself needs to be understood properly. This is not an attempt to rewrite the provincial system, and it does not interfere with provincial rights. It functions as a second tier of governance built around 34 Economic Zones. The idea is to move away from centralized political decision‑making and toward localized, tightly focused economic management. No one is sending a bureaucrat from Islamabad to run a province. Instead, each zone is managed by professionals who understand the economic cluster they are responsible for.

Technocrats in this system are not rulers appointed from above. They are managers hired to run specific systems. Think of how a hospital brings in a trained administrator rather than a politician to run daily operations. Local zones need that same level of technical competence.

Real decentralization only works when local institutions are strong and professionally run. Local police, digital land registries, and municipal systems must be insulated from political families who traditionally hijack local governance.

The fear of corruption is justified. Pakistan’s current political structure is built on loopholes and personal networks. That is exactly why this model relies on digitized, automated systems that reduce human discretion as much as possible.

Consider how this plays out in different zones.

In agricultural or textile regions like Faisalabad or Multan, farmers should not have to chase politicians for water access or subsidies. A digital allocation system can handle that. Industrial approvals follow a strict, automated 30‑day timeline. If an official tries to delay a file to extract a bribe, the system flags it and routes around them.

In mining regions like Chaghi or Mohmand, lease records and mineral rights belong on a transparent digital registry. When everything is visible, no one can quietly rewrite a lease or grab land. The local community’s share of royalties becomes a rule rather than a favor.

In industrial or port zones like Karachi or Gwadar, logistics experts should be running operations. Automated customs, warehousing permits, and utility connections mean a business owner does not need political connections to function.

This is the difference between a system built around powerful individuals and a system built around transparent rules. Without professional structures, “local rule” simply becomes “local corruption.”

You are right that federal outsiders cannot run provinces. People reject that immediately. But this model is not about federal control. It is about fixing local governance so that locals actually have power, and that power is exercised through professional systems rather than political favoritism.

To break the cycle we are stuck in, the old provincial boundaries have to be dismantled. Power must flow directly to the 34 Economic Zones. Once that happens, the administrative hierarchy flattens. There is no chief minister’s secretariat sitting on billions, and no provincial assembly burning money on helicopters, foreign trips, or perks for friends and relatives.

The new structure works through three layers: the Zone, the City, and the District.

Zone Management functions as a regulatory hub. It is not a political government. It is a small, technical board responsible for economic policy, infrastructure pipelines, and system integrity. It tailors trade and investment rules to the zone’s strengths. It runs the automated 30‑day industrial setup system. It maintains the digital land registry. It oversees highways, freight rail, ports, and the power grid.

City Management becomes the engine of urban growth. Cities are run by municipal administrators rather than political mayors. Their job is to manage density, utilities, and human capital. Local police are recruited locally and evaluated through digital performance systems. Utilities are automated. Zoning, transit, and vertical housing follow professional planning. Cities retain a share of their own revenue to fund their own development.

District Management handles the rural and resource‑driven side of the economy. It manages feeder roads, farm‑to‑market routes, and mine‑to‑rail logistics. It oversees grain silos, cold storage, and mineral processing hubs. It protects rural supply routes and land rights. It runs basic healthcare, vocational training, and primary education.

This is how corruption collapses. Under the old system, districts begged provinces for money, and most of it disappeared into political kickbacks. In the new model, the Zone sets the rules, and Cities and Districts execute them through automated systems. If someone tries to delay a project or demand a bribe, the system escalates it automatically.

Revenue collection follows the same principle. There are no exceptions and no favorites. Every individual and business pays taxes. Everything is digitized. Nothing depends on personal discretion. The money stays inside the zone and funds the infrastructure that keeps the zone running.

This brings us to the question of military taxation.

If Article 25 means anything, it must mean that no institution, including the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, or Coast Guard, stands above income tax. Military personnel should pay income tax on their salaries unless they are deployed in a formally declared combat zone.

A combat zone, in simple terms, is a place where soldiers are actually in danger. It is where they face enemy fire, direct combat, or frontline operations. If bullets are flying and lives are at risk, it is a combat zone. If troops are stationed abroad in peaceful bases, it is not.

The entire purpose of this model is to build a system where rules matter more than personalities, where local governance is professional rather than political, and where no institution, civilian or military, is exempt from the standards everyone else must follow.

Can someone please ban this AI Bot? Provides nothing to any conversation, I dare you to reply without AI.

 

[Michael]

I understand why people worry about federal overreach. Pakistan’s history is full of examples where outsiders from Islamabad were pushed into local areas, and every one of those experiments ended badly. But that fear doesn’t really apply here, because the model being proposed is doing something very different.

To start, the structure itself needs to be understood properly. This is not an attempt to rewrite the provincial system, and it does not interfere with provincial rights. It functions as a second tier of governance built around 34 Economic Zones. The idea is to move away from centralized political decision‑making and toward localized, tightly focused economic management. No one is sending a bureaucrat from Islamabad to run a province. Instead, each zone is managed by professionals who understand the economic cluster they are responsible for.

Technocrats in this system are not rulers appointed from above. They are managers hired to run specific systems. Think of how a hospital brings in a trained administrator rather than a politician to run daily operations. Local zones need that same level of technical competence.

Real decentralization only works when local institutions are strong and professionally run. Local police, digital land registries, and municipal systems must be insulated from political families who traditionally hijack local governance.

The fear of corruption is justified. Pakistan’s current political structure is built on loopholes and personal networks. That is exactly why this model relies on digitized, automated systems that reduce human discretion as much as possible.

Consider how this plays out in different zones.

In agricultural or textile regions like Faisalabad or Multan, farmers should not have to chase politicians for water access or subsidies. A digital allocation system can handle that. Industrial approvals follow a strict, automated 30‑day timeline. If an official tries to delay a file to extract a bribe, the system flags it and routes around them.

In mining regions like Chaghi or Mohmand, lease records and mineral rights belong on a transparent digital registry. When everything is visible, no one can quietly rewrite a lease or grab land. The local community’s share of royalties becomes a rule rather than a favor.

In industrial or port zones like Karachi or Gwadar, logistics experts should be running operations. Automated customs, warehousing permits, and utility connections mean a business owner does not need political connections to function.

This is the difference between a system built around powerful individuals and a system built around transparent rules. Without professional structures, “local rule” simply becomes “local corruption.”

You are right that federal outsiders cannot run provinces. People reject that immediately. But this model is not about federal control. It is about fixing local governance so that locals actually have power, and that power is exercised through professional systems rather than political favoritism.

To break the cycle we are stuck in, the old provincial boundaries have to be dismantled. Power must flow directly to the 34 Economic Zones. Once that happens, the administrative hierarchy flattens. There is no chief minister’s secretariat sitting on billions, and no provincial assembly burning money on helicopters, foreign trips, or perks for friends and relatives.

The new structure works through three layers: the Zone, the City, and the District.

Zone Management functions as a regulatory hub. It is not a political government. It is a small, technical board responsible for economic policy, infrastructure pipelines, and system integrity. It tailors trade and investment rules to the zone’s strengths. It runs the automated 30‑day industrial setup system. It maintains the digital land registry. It oversees highways, freight rail, ports, and the power grid.

City Management becomes the engine of urban growth. Cities are run by municipal administrators rather than political mayors. Their job is to manage density, utilities, and human capital. Local police are recruited locally and evaluated through digital performance systems. Utilities are automated. Zoning, transit, and vertical housing follow professional planning. Cities retain a share of their own revenue to fund their own development.

District Management handles the rural and resource‑driven side of the economy. It manages feeder roads, farm‑to‑market routes, and mine‑to‑rail logistics. It oversees grain silos, cold storage, and mineral processing hubs. It protects rural supply routes and land rights. It runs basic healthcare, vocational training, and primary education.

This is how corruption collapses. Under the old system, districts begged provinces for money, and most of it disappeared into political kickbacks. In the new model, the Zone sets the rules, and Cities and Districts execute them through automated systems. If someone tries to delay a project or demand a bribe, the system escalates it automatically.

Revenue collection follows the same principle. There are no exceptions and no favorites. Every individual and business pays taxes. Everything is digitized. Nothing depends on personal discretion. The money stays inside the zone and funds the infrastructure that keeps the zone running.

This brings us to the question of military taxation.

If Article 25 means anything, it must mean that no institution, including the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines, or Coast Guard, stands above income tax. Military personnel should pay income tax on their salaries unless they are deployed in a formally declared combat zone.

A combat zone, in simple terms, is a place where soldiers are actually in danger. It is where they face enemy fire, direct combat, or frontline operations. If bullets are flying and lives are at risk, it is a combat zone. If troops are stationed abroad in peaceful bases, it is not.

The entire purpose of this model is to build a system where rules matter more than personalities, where local governance is professional rather than political, and where no institution, civilian or military, is exempt from the standards everyone else must follow.

I need to remind you.

Please think about this question first:

How did Pakistan come to be? What does the word "Pakistan" mean?

Your solution isn't reform, it's revolution! These are two completely different levels of issues. In essence, it's equivalent to China changing from a ROC to a PRC. You can conduct an in-depth analysis to verify this.

This solution isn't unworkable. However, you need to consider dealing with a "revolutionary" level event, not a "reform" level event.

Especially crucially, a "revolutionary" level event will cause massive social unrest. And outside of Pakistan, there's India, watching with predatory eyes. It won't give you that opportunity.

 

[Pakistanithinktank]

Can someone please ban this AI Bot? Provides nothing to any conversation, I dare you to reply without AI.

I referenced Article 25 for a reason. It is the one place in the Constitution that says, in plain language, that every citizen is equal before the law. No exceptions. No special categories. No quiet loopholes for powerful institutions. If we actually believe in that principle, then the military cannot float above the tax net. They are citizens too. They earn salaries from public money. They live under the same Constitution as everyone else. They do not get to step outside it.

People sometimes act like mentioning the Army in a tax conversation is some kind of attack. It is not. It is simply acknowledging reality. If a teacher, a nurse, a software engineer, a shopkeeper, and a factory worker all pay income tax, then a soldier who is not in a combat zone should pay it too. That is not disrespect. That is equality. And equality is exactly what Article 25 demands.

The only fair exemption is for those who are actually in danger. A real combat zone. A place where people are taking fire, not sitting in a peaceful base abroad. If someone is risking their life on the frontline, of course they should not be taxed. That is common sense. But the rest of the institution cannot hide behind that shield forever.

Pakistan cannot keep pretending that some groups are too sacred to be part of the tax system. The country is drowning in debt. Ordinary people are squeezed dry. And yet the largest salaried institution in the country sits outside the tax net. That is not sustainable. It is not fair. And it is not constitutional.

Article 25 is very clear. Equality before the law. Equal protection of the law. No citizen above the law. If we take that seriously, then the military joins the tax net like everyone else. Not because we dislike them. Not because we want to weaken them. But because the Constitution does not allow anyone to stand above accountability.

That is the whole point. A country cannot function when rules apply to some and not to others. If we want a fair system, then everyone contributes. Everyone follows the same law. Everyone stands on the same ground.

That is what Article 25 was written for.


• Army: 600,000
• Air Force: 72,000
• Navy: 28,000
• Marines: 7,000
• Coast Guard + MSA: 9,000
• Paramilitary under military command: 170,000

Grand Total: ~886,000 active personnel

These people must be added to federal taxnet.

 

[Pakistanithinktank]

I need to remind you.

Please think about this question first:

How did Pakistan come to be? What does the word "Pakistan" mean?

Your solution isn't reform, it's revolution! These are two completely different levels of issues. In essence, it's equivalent to China changing from a ROC to a PRC. You can conduct an in-depth analysis to verify this.

This solution isn't unworkable. However, you need to consider dealing with a "revolutionary" level event, not a "reform" level event.

Especially crucially, a "revolutionary" level event will cause massive social unrest. And outside of Pakistan, there's India, watching with predatory eyes. It won't give you that opportunity.

I’ll be honest, trying to reform Pakistan under the post-18th Amendment setup sometimes feels impossible. People keep calling it “decentralization,” but for most ordinary citizens nothing really became decentralized. Power didn’t move to neighborhoods, districts, or even properly functioning city governments. It mostly shifted from Islamabad to provincial capitals, where the same political families, bureaucratic circles, and connected elites became even harder to challenge.

That’s why local government still feels weak almost everywhere. A city can generate billions in revenue and still wait on provincial approval for basic infrastructure or policing decisions. District officials often have little real authority. So yes, Islamabad lost some power after the amendment, but average citizens didn’t suddenly gain meaningful control over governance. In many ways, the center of gravity just changed locations.

And that creates another problem nobody likes talking about. Any serious structural reform now immediately becomes political warfare. Mention new provinces, stronger city governments, or administrative restructuring and people react like you’re threatening their entire kingdom. Provinces guard authority very aggressively because political influence, jobs, contracts, and resources all flow through those systems.

At the same time, Pakistan’s current provincial structure clearly has problems. The population is far larger than it was decades ago. Some provinces are so huge that governing them efficiently is difficult even in theory. Development is wildly uneven. Entire regions feel disconnected from decision-making. Smaller provinces could improve administration in some cases, but simply dividing everything along ethnic lines won’t magically solve corruption or bad governance either. Pakistan has already seen how ethnic politics can spiral into long-term instability.

And honestly, the history behind all of this is much more complicated than the simplified patriotic version taught in schools.

The Bengalis were not some secondary force in the Pakistan Movement. They were central to it. East Bengal gave enormous support to the Muslim League in the 1946 elections. Bengali students, workers, intellectuals, and political activists mobilized heavily for Pakistan. At independence, East Pakistan actually represented the demographic majority of the new country.

Punjab’s political history before partition looked different. A large section of the Punjabi elite was aligned with the Unionist Party for years, which preferred a cross-communal political arrangement over partition politics. A lot of influential landlords only fully shifted once partition started looking inevitable. Later, Punjab became dominant because of military influence, bureaucracy, and geography, but the political momentum during the Pakistan Movement was not identical across all provinces.

Sindh also had a more mixed political environment than people admit today. Yes, Sindh passed an early resolution supporting Pakistan, but many Sindhi politicians were deeply concerned about provincial autonomy from the beginning. G. M. Syed is probably the best example of that contradiction. He initially supported Pakistan, then later became one of the harshest critics of centralized rule after independence. Those tensions didn’t suddenly appear later; they existed from the start.

That’s part of why 1971 still matters so much. The province that gave some of the strongest support to Pakistan eventually broke away after years of political frustration, economic grievances, and the denial of democratic representation. Pakistan never fully processed that lesson. Instead, people reduced it to slogans and moved on.

A lot of the tensions Pakistan faces today are really the same old debates repeating themselves who gets representation, who controls resources, how much power should stay in the center, and how much authority provinces or local regions should actually have.

Personally, I think administrative reform should be based more on governance realities than ethnic slogans. Regions should be designed around population size, infrastructure, economics, and administrative efficiency. Industrial regions have different needs than agricultural belts. Port cities operate differently from remote border districts. Trying to force completely different realities under oversized provincial structures creates dysfunction.

That’s why ideas like the “34 EZ” concept are interesting to some people. The argument is not really about dividing ethnic groups. It’s about creating governance units that are actually manageable and economically functional instead of relying on huge provinces dominated by a handful of political centers.

And if we’re being realistic, most resistance to reform is political, not philosophical. The PPP does not want Sindh divided because it weakens their influence. Major parties in Punjab are cautious about splitting Punjab for similar reasons. Politicians talk about administrative efficiency all the time, but when reforms threaten established power structures, enthusiasm disappears very quickly.

Pakistan still carries the shadow of 1971 whether people admit it or not. Bengalis helped build Pakistan, supported the movement, voted for it, and sacrificed for it. Then over time they felt increasingly sidelined politically and economically, and eventually the system collapsed under that pressure.

That history should have taught Pakistan that overly centralized power creates resentment, especially when people feel ignored or excluded from decision-making. Real stability probably won’t come from louder slogans or endless constitutional debates. It will come from governance that actually feels local, accountable, and responsive to ordinary people instead of only serving entrenched political networks.

 

[Michael]

I’ll be honest, trying to reform Pakistan under the post-18th Amendment setup sometimes feels impossible. People keep calling it “decentralization,” but for most ordinary citizens nothing really became decentralized. Power didn’t move to neighborhoods, districts, or even properly functioning city governments. It mostly shifted from Islamabad to provincial capitals, where the same political families, bureaucratic circles, and connected elites became even harder to challenge.

That’s why local government still feels weak almost everywhere. A city can generate billions in revenue and still wait on provincial approval for basic infrastructure or policing decisions. District officials often have little real authority. So yes, Islamabad lost some power after the amendment, but average citizens didn’t suddenly gain meaningful control over governance. In many ways, the center of gravity just changed locations.

And that creates another problem nobody likes talking about. Any serious structural reform now immediately becomes political warfare. Mention new provinces, stronger city governments, or administrative restructuring and people react like you’re threatening their entire kingdom. Provinces guard authority very aggressively because political influence, jobs, contracts, and resources all flow through those systems.

At the same time, Pakistan’s current provincial structure clearly has problems. The population is far larger than it was decades ago. Some provinces are so huge that governing them efficiently is difficult even in theory. Development is wildly uneven. Entire regions feel disconnected from decision-making. Smaller provinces could improve administration in some cases, but simply dividing everything along ethnic lines won’t magically solve corruption or bad governance either. Pakistan has already seen how ethnic politics can spiral into long-term instability.

And honestly, the history behind all of this is much more complicated than the simplified patriotic version taught in schools.

The Bengalis were not some secondary force in the Pakistan Movement. They were central to it. East Bengal gave enormous support to the Muslim League in the 1946 elections. Bengali students, workers, intellectuals, and political activists mobilized heavily for Pakistan. At independence, East Pakistan actually represented the demographic majority of the new country.

Punjab’s political history before partition looked different. A large section of the Punjabi elite was aligned with the Unionist Party for years, which preferred a cross-communal political arrangement over partition politics. A lot of influential landlords only fully shifted once partition started looking inevitable. Later, Punjab became dominant because of military influence, bureaucracy, and geography, but the political momentum during the Pakistan Movement was not identical across all provinces.

Sindh also had a more mixed political environment than people admit today. Yes, Sindh passed an early resolution supporting Pakistan, but many Sindhi politicians were deeply concerned about provincial autonomy from the beginning. G. M. Syed is probably the best example of that contradiction. He initially supported Pakistan, then later became one of the harshest critics of centralized rule after independence. Those tensions didn’t suddenly appear later; they existed from the start.

That’s part of why 1971 still matters so much. The province that gave some of the strongest support to Pakistan eventually broke away after years of political frustration, economic grievances, and the denial of democratic representation. Pakistan never fully processed that lesson. Instead, people reduced it to slogans and moved on.

A lot of the tensions Pakistan faces today are really the same old debates repeating themselves who gets representation, who controls resources, how much power should stay in the center, and how much authority provinces or local regions should actually have.

Personally, I think administrative reform should be based more on governance realities than ethnic slogans. Regions should be designed around population size, infrastructure, economics, and administrative efficiency. Industrial regions have different needs than agricultural belts. Port cities operate differently from remote border districts. Trying to force completely different realities under oversized provincial structures creates dysfunction.

That’s why ideas like the “34 EZ” concept are interesting to some people. The argument is not really about dividing ethnic groups. It’s about creating governance units that are actually manageable and economically functional instead of relying on huge provinces dominated by a handful of political centers.

And if we’re being realistic, most resistance to reform is political, not philosophical. The PPP does not want Sindh divided because it weakens their influence. Major parties in Punjab are cautious about splitting Punjab for similar reasons. Politicians talk about administrative efficiency all the time, but when reforms threaten established power structures, enthusiasm disappears very quickly.

Pakistan still carries the shadow of 1971 whether people admit it or not. Bengalis helped build Pakistan, supported the movement, voted for it, and sacrificed for it. Then over time they felt increasingly sidelined politically and economically, and eventually the system collapsed under that pressure.

That history should have taught Pakistan that overly centralized power creates resentment, especially when people feel ignored or excluded from decision-making. Real stability probably won’t come from louder slogans or endless constitutional debates. It will come from governance that actually feels local, accountable, and responsive to ordinary people instead of only serving entrenched political networks.

Friend!

As a researcher of "new planning," complaining about historical issues is pointless.

I told you before that I also worked on a similar "34-EZ" plan. However, my plan was much bolder, comprising 60 first-level administrative units. But this is a very sensitive issue, and I cannot elaborate on my plan in the forum.

Back to your question.

Your problem is that you haven't prepared for the potentially drastic upheavals your plan might cause. Pakistan is a federal state composed of multiple independent closed-loop entities. Any plan that significantly adjusts the first-level administrative units will trigger severe disruptions.

If you don't change the first-level administrative units and simply redefine economic zones across them, these functional economic zones will be impossible to manage or operate. The reason is simple: each administrative unit is a relatively independent closed loop (de facto small countries). Their internal rules and operating mechanisms are completely incompatible. If an economic zone spans two administrative units, it will inevitably create a de facto division, making effective operation impossible. Establishing multiple economic zones within the same administrative unit would further exacerbate internal conflicts in Pakistan, while also preventing interaction between the zones.

You need to prioritize how to respond to such severe upheaval.

 

[PakAl]

Friend!

As a researcher of "new planning," complaining about historical issues is pointless.

I told you before that I also worked on a similar "34-EZ" plan. However, my plan was much bolder, comprising 60 first-level administrative units. But this is a very sensitive issue, and I cannot elaborate on my plan in the forum.

Back to your question.

Your problem is that you haven't prepared for the potentially drastic upheavals your plan might cause. Pakistan is a federal state composed of multiple independent closed-loop entities. Any plan that significantly adjusts the first-level administrative units will trigger severe disruptions.

If you don't change the first-level administrative units and simply redefine economic zones across them, these functional economic zones will be impossible to manage or operate. The reason is simple: each administrative unit is a relatively independent closed loop (de facto small countries). Their internal rules and operating mechanisms are completely incompatible. If an economic zone spans two administrative units, it will inevitably create a de facto division, making effective operation impossible. Establishing multiple economic zones within the same administrative unit would further exacerbate internal conflicts in Pakistan, while also preventing interaction between the zones.

You need to prioritize how to respond to such severe upheaval.

People forget during independence 1947 we had different states, with different languages, cultures. All decided to be part of one state with a federal system and also provisional assemblies in place for local power. The people do not want to give too much power to the centre, because nobody wants to be ruled by iron hand like during British time. The provinces are also entitled for royalties if resources are taken from their areas, this is because or else the mafia in centre will steal everything, atleast this way some kind of balance is projected.

 

[Michael]

@Pakistanithinktank @PakAl

Regardless of the vast differences in secular cultures, values, and religious beliefs across the world, we will always find many striking similarities.

If we study history, we will discover a very interesting phenomenon:

Modern Pakistan bears a striking resemblance to the early Republic of China.

I won't elaborate further; you can consult historical records.

 

[KingQamaR]

this stupid proposed of smashing up there province introducing more of the same f*kin bureaucracy now will be in 4 new parts not big one as before . And how much is that going cost a struggling PAK exchequer in creating this mess it’s unworkable plan.

 

[Hopefully Pessimistic]

Karachi's two largest industrial zones SITE and Korangi span 18,100 acres and house 6,400 factories. Their combined economic output as well as revenue/tax dwarf all of Punjab's puny 100 acres industrial estates/revenue. Come back when people in Punjab stop free loading on rest of Pakistan's especially Karachi's lunch and not have the chokidars of GHQ Pindi commision death, destruction and misrey on Karachi through it's biggest proxy of PPP/Zardari.

Muhajir retardism is truly one of a kind, pulled straight out their ass lmao.

100 acres lmao

 

[Pakistanithinktank]

Friend!

As a researcher of "new planning," complaining about historical issues is pointless.

I told you before that I also worked on a similar "34-EZ" plan. However, my plan was much bolder, comprising 60 first-level administrative units. But this is a very sensitive issue, and I cannot elaborate on my plan in the forum.

Back to your question.

Your problem is that you haven't prepared for the potentially drastic upheavals your plan might cause. Pakistan is a federal state composed of multiple independent closed-loop entities. Any plan that significantly adjusts the first-level administrative units will trigger severe disruptions.

If you don't change the first-level administrative units and simply redefine economic zones across them, these functional economic zones will be impossible to manage or operate. The reason is simple: each administrative unit is a relatively independent closed loop (de facto small countries). Their internal rules and operating mechanisms are completely incompatible. If an economic zone spans two administrative units, it will inevitably create a de facto division, making effective operation impossible. Establishing multiple economic zones within the same administrative unit would further exacerbate internal conflicts in Pakistan, while also preventing interaction between the zones.

You need to prioritize how to respond to such severe upheaval.

I have spent a lot of time working on this 34 EZ governance model. More than I expected, to be honest. I even put out a full pilot version. But people often miss the basic point. You cannot just announce something like this and start building zones the next day. It has to come in phases. And the first phase is mostly legal work. The government has to pass the laws that create the EZ structure. Without that legal foundation, nothing moves.

And the bigger irony is hard to ignore. For decades we kept repeating that our friendship with China is higher than the sky and deeper than the ocean. Yet we somehow failed to learn anything from China in the last fifty years. China built discipline, planning, exports and a functioning state. We kept repeating slogans. Today we are sitting with an empty bank and running to friendly countries just to keep a few billion dollars parked so the reserves do not collapse. And instead of fixing the system or taxing the powerful, the state keeps squeezing ordinary people. More taxes on the public while big corporations and the elite get exemptions. It is the same cycle again and again.

This is exactly why the 34 EZ model matters. The current system mostly benefits the powerful. The EZ structure is designed to serve the public. Clean administration. No provincial bottlenecks. No manual signatures. No cash counters. Everything digital. Compliance handled through a digital registry and AI checks. Each zone is run by an EZ Authority that reports directly at the federal level. It is a clean administrative layer that cuts leakage and overhead.

And the idea is not random. It is shaped by what already works in China, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Singapore. They used zone based or similar governance to modernize their systems, attract investment and speed up decision making. I adapted the concept to our reality and made it structured.

Once the legal foundation is in place, then the pilot begins. And the pilot should be small and controlled. Two zones only. EZ 12 Pindi Islamabad and EZ 01 Karachi. These two areas give you a good mix of population, industry and administrative challenges. You run them for twelve to thirty six months. Long enough to see what breaks, what works and what needs rewriting.

If the numbers look right and the governance model holds up in real life, then you move to Phase Two. No shortcuts. No political rush jobs. Just a steady rollout that actually works.

And let’s be honest about one more thing… The establishment and their cronies will never allow a system like this because it would be the end of political engineering and the end of the corruption networks that keep them powerful. A clean system is a threat to the people who survive on chaos.

 

[Michael]

I have spent a lot of time working on this 34 EZ governance model. More than I expected, to be honest. I even put out a full pilot version. But people often miss the basic point. You cannot just announce something like this and start building zones the next day. It has to come in phases. And the first phase is mostly legal work. The government has to pass the laws that create the EZ structure. Without that legal foundation, nothing moves.

And the bigger irony is hard to ignore. For decades we kept repeating that our friendship with China is higher than the sky and deeper than the ocean. Yet we somehow failed to learn anything from China in the last fifty years. China built discipline, planning, exports and a functioning state. We kept repeating slogans. Today we are sitting with an empty bank and running to friendly countries just to keep a few billion dollars parked so the reserves do not collapse. And instead of fixing the system or taxing the powerful, the state keeps squeezing ordinary people. More taxes on the public while big corporations and the elite get exemptions. It is the same cycle again and again.

This is exactly why the 34 EZ model matters. The current system mostly benefits the powerful. The EZ structure is designed to serve the public. Clean administration. No provincial bottlenecks. No manual signatures. No cash counters. Everything digital. Compliance handled through a digital registry and AI checks. Each zone is run by an EZ Authority that reports directly at the federal level. It is a clean administrative layer that cuts leakage and overhead.

And the idea is not random. It is shaped by what already works in China, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Singapore. They used zone based or similar governance to modernize their systems, attract investment and speed up decision making. I adapted the concept to our reality and made it structured.

Once the legal foundation is in place, then the pilot begins. And the pilot should be small and controlled. Two zones only. EZ 12 Pindi Islamabad and EZ 01 Karachi. These two areas give you a good mix of population, industry and administrative challenges. You run them for twelve to thirty six months. Long enough to see what breaks, what works and what needs rewriting.

If the numbers look right and the governance model holds up in real life, then you move to Phase Two. No shortcuts. No political rush jobs. Just a steady rollout that actually works.

And let’s be honest about one more thing… The establishment and their cronies will never allow a system like this because it would be the end of political engineering and the end of the corruption networks that keep them powerful. A clean system is a threat to the people who survive on chaos.

Friend!

I don't know your background. I myself worked in full-time political work for many years, followed by over 20 years in management, and now I work in business project planning. Military and political studies are my hobbies.

The number one enemy of politics is "emotion"!
Your outward behavior can be driven by emotion. That's just a means and a strategy.
Your inner self must be sufficiently calm, sufficiently neutral, and devoid of emotion.

Your plan itself is not important! What's important is, who is the leader?
Sharif? Munir? Imran Khan? Or someone else?
Why are they doing this? ------ What do they need to sacrifice? What will they gain?

Back to my original question:

What are you willing to sacrifice for your ideal Pakistan?

If this goal requires you to sacrifice your life, are you willing?
Think about this logic with this mindset. How many people's interests are threatened by your plan?

There is a saying in Chinese philosophy: 存在即合理(If something exists, there must be a reason for its existence)!

Pakistan's current situation has existed for many years. You need to first find the logical basis for its existence. Only then can you find the true causal relationship.

 

[Pakistanithinktank]

Friend!

I don't know your background. I myself worked in full-time political work for many years, followed by over 20 years in management, and now I work in business project planning. Military and political studies are my hobbies.

The number one enemy of politics is "emotion"!
Your outward behavior can be driven by emotion. That's just a means and a strategy.
Your inner self must be sufficiently calm, sufficiently neutral, and devoid of emotion.

Your plan itself is not important! What's important is, who is the leader?
Sharif? Munir? Imran Khan? Or someone else?
Why are they doing this? ------ What do they need to sacrifice? What will they gain?

Back to my original question:

What are you willing to sacrifice for your ideal Pakistan?

If this goal requires you to sacrifice your life, are you willing?
Think about this logic with this mindset. How many people's interests are threatened by your plan?

There is a saying in Chinese philosophy: 存在即合理(If something exists, there must be a reason for its existence)!

Pakistan's current situation has existed for many years. You need to first find the logical basis for its existence. Only then can you find the true causal relationship.

Your plan itself is not important! What's important is, who is the leader?
Sharif? Munir? Imran Khan? Or someone else?

I completely disagree with this idea that everything depends on the leader. This is exactly the mindset that has kept Pakistan stuck for decades. We keep waiting for the perfect person to show up and fix everything, but the truth is simple. No leader can fix a broken structure. A country only moves forward when the system is strong enough to protect the public even when the people in charge are average.

If you look at history, Rome is the perfect example. In its later years, Rome was basically run by a tiny elite class that controlled land, money and political power. Everyone else, the peasants and workers, carried the weight of the empire but got almost nothing in return. The system was built to serve the elite, not the public. And once the system stopped working, no leader could save it. Not even the strong ones.

Pakistan today feels painfully similar. We have a small group that benefits from the way things are. They get exemptions, influence, protection and access. And then we have the rest of the country, the ordinary people, who pay the taxes, stand in the lines, deal with the broken services and carry the burden of a structure that was never designed for them. The system survives because it benefits the powerful, not because it is logical or fair.

This is why I keep saying the system matters more than the people running it. A functional system protects the public. A broken system protects the elite. We have had every type of leader. Civilian, military, popular, unpopular, honest, corrupt. Nothing changed because the structure underneath them stayed the same.

Countries like China, Singapore, the UAE and Saudi Arabia did not rise because of one magical leader. They rose because they built systems that outlast individuals. Systems that keep working even when the top person changes. Systems that do not collapse every time someone new sits in the chair.

That is exactly what the 34 Zones idea is about. It is not about me. It is not about any leader. It is about building a clean, predictable, digital, rules based structure that benefits the public instead of the elite. A structure that cuts bottlenecks, reduces corruption and removes the need for political engineering. A structure that keeps working no matter who is in charge.

People resist it because it threatens the old order. It threatens the networks that survive on chaos. It threatens the comfort of the elite class. But that does not make it wrong. It only proves why it is needed.

Rome collapsed because it refused to reform. Pakistan still has a chance. But that chance will not come from another personality. It will come from a system that finally puts the public first.