I need to remind you.
Please think about this question first:
How did Pakistan come to be? What does the word "Pakistan" mean?
Your solution isn't reform, it's revolution! These are two completely different levels of issues. In essence, it's equivalent to China changing from a ROC to a PRC. You can conduct an in-depth analysis to verify this.
This solution isn't unworkable. However, you need to consider dealing with a "revolutionary" level event, not a "reform" level event.
Especially crucially, a "revolutionary" level event will cause massive social unrest. And outside of Pakistan, there's India, watching with predatory eyes. It won't give you that opportunity.
I’ll be honest, trying to reform Pakistan under the post-18th Amendment setup sometimes feels impossible. People keep calling it “decentralization,” but for most ordinary citizens nothing really became decentralized. Power didn’t move to neighborhoods, districts, or even properly functioning city governments. It mostly shifted from Islamabad to provincial capitals, where the same political families, bureaucratic circles, and connected elites became even harder to challenge.
That’s why local government still feels weak almost everywhere. A city can generate billions in revenue and still wait on provincial approval for basic infrastructure or policing decisions. District officials often have little real authority. So yes, Islamabad lost some power after the amendment, but average citizens didn’t suddenly gain meaningful control over governance. In many ways, the center of gravity just changed locations.
And that creates another problem nobody likes talking about. Any serious structural reform now immediately becomes political warfare. Mention new provinces, stronger city governments, or administrative restructuring and people react like you’re threatening their entire kingdom. Provinces guard authority very aggressively because political influence, jobs, contracts, and resources all flow through those systems.
At the same time, Pakistan’s current provincial structure clearly has problems. The population is far larger than it was decades ago. Some provinces are so huge that governing them efficiently is difficult even in theory. Development is wildly uneven. Entire regions feel disconnected from decision-making. Smaller provinces could improve administration in some cases, but simply dividing everything along ethnic lines won’t magically solve corruption or bad governance either. Pakistan has already seen how ethnic politics can spiral into long-term instability.
And honestly, the history behind all of this is much more complicated than the simplified patriotic version taught in schools.
The Bengalis were not some secondary force in the Pakistan Movement. They were central to it. East Bengal gave enormous support to the Muslim League in the 1946 elections. Bengali students, workers, intellectuals, and political activists mobilized heavily for Pakistan. At independence, East Pakistan actually represented the demographic majority of the new country.
Punjab’s political history before partition looked different. A large section of the Punjabi elite was aligned with the Unionist Party for years, which preferred a cross-communal political arrangement over partition politics. A lot of influential landlords only fully shifted once partition started looking inevitable. Later, Punjab became dominant because of military influence, bureaucracy, and geography, but the political momentum during the Pakistan Movement was not identical across all provinces.
Sindh also had a more mixed political environment than people admit today. Yes, Sindh passed an early resolution supporting Pakistan, but many Sindhi politicians were deeply concerned about provincial autonomy from the beginning. G. M. Syed is probably the best example of that contradiction. He initially supported Pakistan, then later became one of the harshest critics of centralized rule after independence. Those tensions didn’t suddenly appear later; they existed from the start.
That’s part of why 1971 still matters so much. The province that gave some of the strongest support to Pakistan eventually broke away after years of political frustration, economic grievances, and the denial of democratic representation. Pakistan never fully processed that lesson. Instead, people reduced it to slogans and moved on.
A lot of the tensions Pakistan faces today are really the same old debates repeating themselves who gets representation, who controls resources, how much power should stay in the center, and how much authority provinces or local regions should actually have.
Personally, I think administrative reform should be based more on governance realities than ethnic slogans. Regions should be designed around population size, infrastructure, economics, and administrative efficiency. Industrial regions have different needs than agricultural belts. Port cities operate differently from remote border districts. Trying to force completely different realities under oversized provincial structures creates dysfunction.
That’s why ideas like the “34 EZ” concept are interesting to some people. The argument is not really about dividing ethnic groups. It’s about creating governance units that are actually manageable and economically functional instead of relying on huge provinces dominated by a handful of political centers.
And if we’re being realistic, most resistance to reform is political, not philosophical. The PPP does not want Sindh divided because it weakens their influence. Major parties in Punjab are cautious about splitting Punjab for similar reasons. Politicians talk about administrative efficiency all the time, but when reforms threaten established power structures, enthusiasm disappears very quickly.
Pakistan still carries the shadow of 1971 whether people admit it or not. Bengalis helped build Pakistan, supported the movement, voted for it, and sacrificed for it. Then over time they felt increasingly sidelined politically and economically, and eventually the system collapsed under that pressure.
That history should have taught Pakistan that overly centralized power creates resentment, especially when people feel ignored or excluded from decision-making. Real stability probably won’t come from louder slogans or endless constitutional debates. It will come from governance that actually feels local, accountable, and responsive to ordinary people instead of only serving entrenched political networks.