Pakistan-Saudi Arabia mutual defense pact: News & Discussion

[Dalit]

Considering what has happened over the last 4 months and UAE’s exit from OPEC, as well as UAE and India’s desire to build an undersea pipeline via Oman and Pakistan’s EEZ to transport oil or gas to India, Pakistan should propose a pipeline from Saudi via Oman to Pakistan and then onwards to India to undercut UAE’s plan.

Getting Saudi petrochemicals out of the two choke points and securely to the two closest and growing markets while getting Oman on board to not build the UAE pipeline would go a long way to not letting UAE leaving OPEC undercut Saudi financial plans.

A modern refinery on the Pakistani coast, most probably near Karachi (near the electrical grid and labor force and other potential industrial parks) could help Pakistan utilize this Saudi resource and bring opportunities for both nations.

Pakistan could also reserve an industrial area near a port to house Saudi crude oil and petrochemical products for re-export to other markets.

I wasn't even aware of this pipeline.

The Route and Pakistan's EEZ​

The planned pipeline corridor stretches roughly 2,000 kilometers from the coast of Oman (and potentially connecting back into the wider Gulf/UAE network) directly to the coast of Gujarat, India.

The core motivation behind the deep-sea pipeline is simple: to bypass land routes entirely. India’s previous overland pipeline attempts—such as the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) "Peace Pipeline" and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline—continually collided with geopolitical hurdles, regional instability, and security concerns. Bypassing the land route by dropping thousands of meters under the Arabian Sea offers a way to establish a continuous "Common Carrier" energy corridor.

To find the shortest and most geologically stable path across the Arabian Sea, the pipeline's path intersects portions of Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Under international maritime law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the rules for this are distinct:

• The Right to Lay Pipelines: UNCLOS Article 79 stipulates that all states are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf and through the EEZ of other states. The coastal state (in this case, Pakistan) cannot entirely prohibit the laying or maintenance of such a pipeline.
• The Caveat of Consent: While the coastal state cannot flatly refuse the pipeline itself, the delineation of the specific path (the routing) is subject to its consent. Furthermore, the coastal state retains jurisdiction over activities like environmental impact assessments, potential pollution prevention, and drilling.

To mitigate potential diplomatic or transit friction, SAGE's routing studies have focused on navigating the deep-sea bed as far south as possible, balancing the legal realities of UNCLOS with a desire to keep the pipeline free from third-country political leverage.

Unprecedented Technical Hurdles​

While the deep-sea route solves land-based political blockades, it trades them for some of the most daunting engineering challenges in the world:

• Extreme Depth and Pressure: The pipeline is projected to sit at depths reaching 3,450 to 3,500 meters below sea level. At these depths, the water pressure is immense, requiring highly specialized heavy-walled steel pipe manufacturing, specialized anti-corrosion coatings, and cutting-edge deep-water welding.
• Geological Hazards: The seabed path must cross volatile underwater topography, specifically the Owen Fracture Zone (a seismically active fault line) and the complex, shifting underwater canyon networks of the Indus Fan (sediment run-offs from the Indus River).
• Maintenance and Intervention: If an onshore pipeline leaks, a repair crew is dispatched. If a pipeline cracks 3.5 kilometers underwater, repairs require highly advanced, deep-sea remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) and dedicated subsea intervention vessels. A major repair could take weeks or months, posing a significant risk to continuous supply stability.

Current Status​

While the concept has existed for nearly two decades, the project has transitioned from a long-term aspiration into an active strategic evaluation.

The consortium (which involves Indian public sector undertakings like GAIL, Engineers India Limited, and Indian Oil Corporation) has commissioned updated engineering and feasibility studies to explore expanding the corridor's utility. These recent evaluations are investigating the technical feasibility of running deep-water oil pipelines along the same corridor in addition to natural gas, attempting to hedge against volatile global shipping lanes and secure India's long-term energy architecture.
--

India can keep dreaming of passing this pipeline through Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

 

[FuturePAF]

I wasn't even aware of this pipeline.

The Route and Pakistan's EEZ​

The planned pipeline corridor stretches roughly 2,000 kilometers from the coast of Oman (and potentially connecting back into the wider Gulf/UAE network) directly to the coast of Gujarat, India.

The core motivation behind the deep-sea pipeline is simple: to bypass land routes entirely. India’s previous overland pipeline attempts—such as the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) "Peace Pipeline" and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline—continually collided with geopolitical hurdles, regional instability, and security concerns. Bypassing the land route by dropping thousands of meters under the Arabian Sea offers a way to establish a continuous "Common Carrier" energy corridor.

To find the shortest and most geologically stable path across the Arabian Sea, the pipeline's path intersects portions of Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Under international maritime law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the rules for this are distinct:

• The Right to Lay Pipelines: UNCLOS Article 79 stipulates that all states are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf and through the EEZ of other states. The coastal state (in this case, Pakistan) cannot entirely prohibit the laying or maintenance of such a pipeline.
• The Caveat of Consent: While the coastal state cannot flatly refuse the pipeline itself, the delineation of the specific path (the routing) is subject to its consent. Furthermore, the coastal state retains jurisdiction over activities like environmental impact assessments, potential pollution prevention, and drilling.

To mitigate potential diplomatic or transit friction, SAGE's routing studies have focused on navigating the deep-sea bed as far south as possible, balancing the legal realities of UNCLOS with a desire to keep the pipeline free from third-country political leverage.

Unprecedented Technical Hurdles​

While the deep-sea route solves land-based political blockades, it trades them for some of the most daunting engineering challenges in the world:

• Extreme Depth and Pressure: The pipeline is projected to sit at depths reaching 3,450 to 3,500 meters below sea level. At these depths, the water pressure is immense, requiring highly specialized heavy-walled steel pipe manufacturing, specialized anti-corrosion coatings, and cutting-edge deep-water welding.
• Geological Hazards: The seabed path must cross volatile underwater topography, specifically the Owen Fracture Zone (a seismically active fault line) and the complex, shifting underwater canyon networks of the Indus Fan (sediment run-offs from the Indus River).
• Maintenance and Intervention: If an onshore pipeline leaks, a repair crew is dispatched. If a pipeline cracks 3.5 kilometers underwater, repairs require highly advanced, deep-sea remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) and dedicated subsea intervention vessels. A major repair could take weeks or months, posing a significant risk to continuous supply stability.

Current Status​

While the concept has existed for nearly two decades, the project has transitioned from a long-term aspiration into an active strategic evaluation.

The consortium (which involves Indian public sector undertakings like GAIL, Engineers India Limited, and Indian Oil Corporation) has commissioned updated engineering and feasibility studies to explore expanding the corridor's utility. These recent evaluations are investigating the technical feasibility of running deep-water oil pipelines along the same corridor in addition to natural gas, attempting to hedge against volatile global shipping lanes and secure India's long-term energy architecture.
--

India can keep dreaming of passing this pipeline through Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

This is why Pakistan should work with the Saudis to get the Omanis onboard to only supporting an alternative pipeline. One that limits the undersea portion to just enough to cross from muscat to Gwadar or thereabouts, and then onwards to India, with the understanding that Oman would not join in the UAE-India pipeline.

Oman could be enticed by host of incentives which the Saudis could offer and which UAE could not, due to Saudis geography; that is to create a rail port in muscat that transits Saudi and continues onward to Jordan, Syria, Turkey and then Europe. Putting Oman at the heart of a major trade route. Gwadar being just across the sea from Muscat could form the “Asian” side of a railway network, onward to Central Asia, and then to East Asia (via China or Afghanistan, depending on how things turn out and how much Saudi Funding could be arranged).

Being at the heart of this diversified commodities transit network could put Saudis and Omanis in a prime location to shift towards more industrialization, and economic growth.

Pakistan needs to think big and see if the Saudis want to back a bigger vision. Just look at the poorly planned IMEC. Bringing Oman into a Saudi-Pak vision has greater prospects, especially for Oman, and which is what they should be lobbied to join.

 

[Falcon26]

In exchange for ensuring Saudi security, can anyone clearly explain what Pakistan is getting out of this arrangement?

 

[Watandar]

In exchange for ensuring Saudi security, can anyone clearly explain what Pakistan is getting out of this arrangement?

1. Jobs for the boys
2. Oil on deferred payment
3. Rescheduling of Saudi debt and management of international debt
4. Presence in the Mideast that could lead to further security related work eg Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Libya, Sudan ?

 

[Falcon26]

1. Jobs for the boys
2. Oil on deferred payment
3. Rescheduling of Saudi debt and management of international debt
4. Presence in the Mideast that could lead to further security related work eg Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Libya, Sudan ?

The Saudis got the deal of the century but some generals will get a handsome retirement package.

 

[FuturePAF]

1. Jobs for the boys
2. Oil on deferred payment
3. Rescheduling of Saudi debt and management of international debt
4. Presence in the Mideast that could lead to further security related work eg Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Libya, Sudan ?

Both the Saudi and Pakistanis are thinking small because there is a limitation in how much each side seems to want to commit to the defense arrangement.

Pakistan for its part has to serious show the Saudis what it potentially do if it didn’t hold back; A comprehensive defense-economic relationship. A comparison would be all the capabilities the arrangement with Britain provided the Saudis with the Al-Yamahah deal in the 80s; such as the intelligence capabilities of MI6, the Covert ops capacities of the SAS, the technical support of British military and civilian industry, etc.

Both nations are thinking too small, especially Pakistan. For Saudi, a regional “Pax Saudia” with Pakistani muscle could stabilize the region and maximize the utilization of resources (mineral and human) before the move away from fossil fuels and during Saudi and Pakistan’s demographic window. With work split between factories across industries in both nations, along supply lines, smart diversification would be set.

With the acceptance of the foley of NOEM, the realization from the Iran war that without security there is no economy, and the need to diversify the economy, both nations could seize the moment if they are ready to transform their nations to meet the challenge. Saudis seem ready, but Pakistan seems to be locked in a penny wise dollar foolish mindset. (This is not about confront Iran directly on behalf of the Saudis btw)

 

[Watandar]

Both the Saudi and Pakistanis are thinking small because there is a limitation in how much each side seems to want to commit to the defense arrangement.

Pakistan for its part has to serious show the Saudis what it potentially do if it didn’t hold back; A comprehensive defense-economic relationship. A comparison would be all the capabilities the arrangement with Britain provided the Saudis with the Al-Yamahah deal in the 80s; such as the intelligence capabilities of MI6, the Covert ops capacities of the SAS, the technical support of British military and civilian industry, etc.

Both nations are thinking too small, especially Pakistan. For Saudi, a regional “Pax Saudia” with Pakistani muscle could stabilize the region and maximize the utilization of resources (mineral and human) before the move away from fossil fuels and during Saudi and Pakistan’s demographic window. With work split between factories across industries in both nations, along supply lines, smart diversification would be set.

With the acceptance of the foley of NOEM, the realization from the Iran war that without security there is no economy, and the need to diversify the economy, both nations could seize the moment if they are ready to transform their nations to meet the challenge. Saudis seem ready, but Pakistan seems to be locked in a penny wise dollar foolish mindset. (This is not about confront Iran directly on behalf of the Saudis btw)

I do agree with your basic criticism that both countries are thinking too small. For a Pakistan that is run by generals and bureaucrats, this is the limits of their capability and vision. It's one huge reason why countries should ideally be run by civilians who live among the common people.

For Saudis, they still lust primarily after the West and see Pakistan as one of many poor brown countries, albient one with labor and military capabilities that can be useful to them in some tasks.

There is still the possibility that this could turn into something big but it requires a person or team from Pakistan that is thinking everyday about how to turn this into something big , then come up with some concrete ideas and sell them to the Saudis.

 

[FuturePAF]

I do agree with your basic criticism that both countries are thinking too small. For a Pakistan that is run by generals and bureaucrats, this is the limits of their capability and vision. It's one huge reason why countries should ideally be run by civilians who live among the common people.

For Saudis, they still lust primarily after the West and see Pakistan as one of many poor brown countries, albient one with labor and military capabilities that can be useful to them in some tasks.

There is still the possibility that this could turn into something big but it requires a person or team from Pakistan that is thinking everyday about how to turn this into something big , then come up with some concrete ideas and sell them to the Saudis.

This is why Pakistan needs to settle its internal problems in a sustainable way (acceptable to all major stakeholders holders and can allow stability to be built for decades to come), and then use its new found clarity to show what an undistracted nation could do.

Pakistan is like shogun era Japan in many ways (has a civilian emperor but the military leader, the shogun, is the real leader) , pre-Meiji restoration.

 

[hydrabadi_arab]

So UAE paid Iran to not bomb it. If you were wondering why UAE was left alone in recently.

Same UAE that was barking at Pakistan for mediating ceasefire.

 

[Oscar]

Pakistan is like shogun era Japan in many ways (has a civilian emperor but the military leader, the shogun, is the real leader) , pre-Meiji restoration.

Pakistan has actually had several near Black Ship moments:
1971 and the loss of East Bengal
repeated IMF crises
Kargil
TTP insurgency
Balochistan etc.

and each time, the shogunate absorbed the shock, blamed civilians, and carried on.

 

[FuturePAF]

Pakistan has actually had several near Black Ship moments:
1971 and the loss of East Bengal
repeated IMF crises
Kargil
TTP insurgency
Balochistan etc.

and each time, the shogunate absorbed the shock, blamed civilians, and carried on.

1971 was the largest shock for them, as an institution, so I figure after recovering from that, every other crisis pales in comparison.

They have indeed built up a resilience to what they would perceive as civilian interlopers but it has been at the cost of the economy.

Sure, they could work on a new strategy to offer a comprehensive and robust protection plan to the Saudis and other GCC countries, but they also have to realize they have a large civilian population and underdeveloped nation which could give them the leverage in global affairs.

They still seem to operate as a small firm when they could work with the Saudis to economic develop themselves and friendly nations in West Asia, centered around Saudi, to really make use of their collective potential.

For example, the Turks and Saudis are bringing back the Hijaz railway, so the western half of the Oman to Turkey freight railway is taking shape. Pakistan with the help of Saudis and Qataris should leverage their influence and economic offerings to get the Afghans to reach a working and stable long term relationship, to open up a railway link to Central Asia (and its resources) and onwards link to East Asia via China. This is where domestic tranquility and political inclusion necessitates reconciliation, even if the military finds the figures distasteful and boorish to be frank.

This would play into Saudis long term diversification, and help Pakistan be on the route (via Main line 1) of flows from Europe to China via Saudi of major resource/mineral development. For Pakistan this would be especially along the route of our population centers and help employ tens of millions. This would also help make economic sense (with the fast rail shipping) for the Saudis to help us develop our agricultural sector and boost food exports to them, and perhaps have us have our expensive and often under utilized electricity go into things like pumped hydro. Especially for an ambitious project like pumped hydro to the Baluchistan plateau and developing that province, with its milder weather, for cities for our growing population, harnessing its potential for national growth, and getting out of economic constructive necessities due to our poor planning like the IMF.

Mismanagement of the political and economic domains are holding back the nation, while diplomatic and military domains are moving forward well. A two legged table of D.I.M.E. Won’t stand. It seems to leaning on short term supports, but for how long?

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P.s. this may seem off topic, and I will try to stick back to more guns than butter, but the Pakistani side has to paint a picture like this to show the Saudi what the full extent of what Pakistan can support them in, and realize that economic security/diversification is vital to them as well. (this is not even to mention the possibility of Saudi-Pak forces, once adequately built up, being a decisive supporting force, especially with Pakistan’s UN peacekeeping experience, in helping to end the instability on some of Saudis western conflicts, such as in Sudan or Somalia, perhaps even Libya, down the line). Before taking any missions outside of Pakistan and Saudi, if the Saudis support a modernization of the Pakistan navy and shipbuilding industry (to build warships but also Pakistan flagged; neutral cargo/tanker ships), Pakistan can be better able to support the Saudis in defense of their SLOCs along with a careful diplomatic efforts to allow Pakistani flagged vessels to move freely through the oceans.

This is also not to mention, greater Pakistani “access” into Afghanistan and Central Asia would be a check on Iranian influence on Iran’s eastern flank and traditional Persian influences regions. Alongside the Turks, Pakistan could open up avenues of choice to the regions of central Asia. But for this Pakistan, should leverage the defense agreement to have Saudi help resolve some long term problems Pakistan has in diplomatic and economic ways. Opening up vast opportunities for both nations and the region, without being directly confrontational with any power.

 

[RealNapster]

200 personnel from Federal Constabulary's diplomatic protection unit to receive training in Saudi Arabia​

News Desk
May 28, 2026

View attachment 199131

Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi meets his Saudi counterpart Abdulaziz bin Saud Al Saud in Mina, Saudi Arabia on May 28, 2026. — screengrab via video from MOIofficialGoP/X

Two hundred personnel from the Federal Constabulary’s Special Diplomatic Protection Unit will receive training in Saudi Arabia, the interior ministry said on Thursday.

The decision was taken during a meeting between Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi and his Saudi counterpart Abdulaziz bin Saud Al Saud in Mina, Saudi Arabia.

In a social media post on X, the ministry said both ministers exchanged Eidul Azha greetings, while the Saudi minister congratulated Naqvi on performing Haj.

Ye din b dekhna tha ham Pakistanio ne....