Pakistan-Saudi Arabia mutual defense pact: News & Discussion

[Dalit]

Considering what has happened over the last 4 months and UAE’s exit from OPEC, as well as UAE and India’s desire to build an undersea pipeline via Oman and Pakistan’s EEZ to transport oil or gas to India, Pakistan should propose a pipeline from Saudi via Oman to Pakistan and then onwards to India to undercut UAE’s plan.

Getting Saudi petrochemicals out of the two choke points and securely to the two closest and growing markets while getting Oman on board to not build the UAE pipeline would go a long way to not letting UAE leaving OPEC undercut Saudi financial plans.

A modern refinery on the Pakistani coast, most probably near Karachi (near the electrical grid and labor force and other potential industrial parks) could help Pakistan utilize this Saudi resource and bring opportunities for both nations.

Pakistan could also reserve an industrial area near a port to house Saudi crude oil and petrochemical products for re-export to other markets.

I wasn't even aware of this pipeline.

The Route and Pakistan's EEZ​

The planned pipeline corridor stretches roughly 2,000 kilometers from the coast of Oman (and potentially connecting back into the wider Gulf/UAE network) directly to the coast of Gujarat, India.

The core motivation behind the deep-sea pipeline is simple: to bypass land routes entirely. India’s previous overland pipeline attempts—such as the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) "Peace Pipeline" and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline—continually collided with geopolitical hurdles, regional instability, and security concerns. Bypassing the land route by dropping thousands of meters under the Arabian Sea offers a way to establish a continuous "Common Carrier" energy corridor.

To find the shortest and most geologically stable path across the Arabian Sea, the pipeline's path intersects portions of Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Under international maritime law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the rules for this are distinct:

• The Right to Lay Pipelines: UNCLOS Article 79 stipulates that all states are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf and through the EEZ of other states. The coastal state (in this case, Pakistan) cannot entirely prohibit the laying or maintenance of such a pipeline.
• The Caveat of Consent: While the coastal state cannot flatly refuse the pipeline itself, the delineation of the specific path (the routing) is subject to its consent. Furthermore, the coastal state retains jurisdiction over activities like environmental impact assessments, potential pollution prevention, and drilling.

To mitigate potential diplomatic or transit friction, SAGE's routing studies have focused on navigating the deep-sea bed as far south as possible, balancing the legal realities of UNCLOS with a desire to keep the pipeline free from third-country political leverage.

Unprecedented Technical Hurdles​

While the deep-sea route solves land-based political blockades, it trades them for some of the most daunting engineering challenges in the world:

• Extreme Depth and Pressure: The pipeline is projected to sit at depths reaching 3,450 to 3,500 meters below sea level. At these depths, the water pressure is immense, requiring highly specialized heavy-walled steel pipe manufacturing, specialized anti-corrosion coatings, and cutting-edge deep-water welding.
• Geological Hazards: The seabed path must cross volatile underwater topography, specifically the Owen Fracture Zone (a seismically active fault line) and the complex, shifting underwater canyon networks of the Indus Fan (sediment run-offs from the Indus River).
• Maintenance and Intervention: If an onshore pipeline leaks, a repair crew is dispatched. If a pipeline cracks 3.5 kilometers underwater, repairs require highly advanced, deep-sea remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) and dedicated subsea intervention vessels. A major repair could take weeks or months, posing a significant risk to continuous supply stability.

Current Status​

While the concept has existed for nearly two decades, the project has transitioned from a long-term aspiration into an active strategic evaluation.

The consortium (which involves Indian public sector undertakings like GAIL, Engineers India Limited, and Indian Oil Corporation) has commissioned updated engineering and feasibility studies to explore expanding the corridor's utility. These recent evaluations are investigating the technical feasibility of running deep-water oil pipelines along the same corridor in addition to natural gas, attempting to hedge against volatile global shipping lanes and secure India's long-term energy architecture.
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India can keep dreaming of passing this pipeline through Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

 

[FuturePAF]

I wasn't even aware of this pipeline.

The Route and Pakistan's EEZ​

The planned pipeline corridor stretches roughly 2,000 kilometers from the coast of Oman (and potentially connecting back into the wider Gulf/UAE network) directly to the coast of Gujarat, India.

The core motivation behind the deep-sea pipeline is simple: to bypass land routes entirely. India’s previous overland pipeline attempts—such as the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) "Peace Pipeline" and the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline—continually collided with geopolitical hurdles, regional instability, and security concerns. Bypassing the land route by dropping thousands of meters under the Arabian Sea offers a way to establish a continuous "Common Carrier" energy corridor.

To find the shortest and most geologically stable path across the Arabian Sea, the pipeline's path intersects portions of Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Under international maritime law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the rules for this are distinct:

• The Right to Lay Pipelines: UNCLOS Article 79 stipulates that all states are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf and through the EEZ of other states. The coastal state (in this case, Pakistan) cannot entirely prohibit the laying or maintenance of such a pipeline.
• The Caveat of Consent: While the coastal state cannot flatly refuse the pipeline itself, the delineation of the specific path (the routing) is subject to its consent. Furthermore, the coastal state retains jurisdiction over activities like environmental impact assessments, potential pollution prevention, and drilling.

To mitigate potential diplomatic or transit friction, SAGE's routing studies have focused on navigating the deep-sea bed as far south as possible, balancing the legal realities of UNCLOS with a desire to keep the pipeline free from third-country political leverage.

Unprecedented Technical Hurdles​

While the deep-sea route solves land-based political blockades, it trades them for some of the most daunting engineering challenges in the world:

• Extreme Depth and Pressure: The pipeline is projected to sit at depths reaching 3,450 to 3,500 meters below sea level. At these depths, the water pressure is immense, requiring highly specialized heavy-walled steel pipe manufacturing, specialized anti-corrosion coatings, and cutting-edge deep-water welding.
• Geological Hazards: The seabed path must cross volatile underwater topography, specifically the Owen Fracture Zone (a seismically active fault line) and the complex, shifting underwater canyon networks of the Indus Fan (sediment run-offs from the Indus River).
• Maintenance and Intervention: If an onshore pipeline leaks, a repair crew is dispatched. If a pipeline cracks 3.5 kilometers underwater, repairs require highly advanced, deep-sea remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) and dedicated subsea intervention vessels. A major repair could take weeks or months, posing a significant risk to continuous supply stability.

Current Status​

While the concept has existed for nearly two decades, the project has transitioned from a long-term aspiration into an active strategic evaluation.

The consortium (which involves Indian public sector undertakings like GAIL, Engineers India Limited, and Indian Oil Corporation) has commissioned updated engineering and feasibility studies to explore expanding the corridor's utility. These recent evaluations are investigating the technical feasibility of running deep-water oil pipelines along the same corridor in addition to natural gas, attempting to hedge against volatile global shipping lanes and secure India's long-term energy architecture.
--

India can keep dreaming of passing this pipeline through Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

This is why Pakistan should work with the Saudis to get the Omanis onboard to only supporting an alternative pipeline. One that limits the undersea portion to just enough to cross from muscat to Gwadar or thereabouts, and then onwards to India, with the understanding that Oman would not join in the UAE-India pipeline.

Oman could be enticed by host of incentives which the Saudis could offer and which UAE could not, due to Saudis geography; that is to create a rail port in muscat that transits Saudi and continues onward to Jordan, Syria, Turkey and then Europe. Putting Oman at the heart of a major trade route. Gwadar being just across the sea from Muscat could form the “Asian” side of a railway network, onward to Central Asia, and then to East Asia (via China or Afghanistan, depending on how things turn out and how much Saudi Funding could be arranged).

Being at the heart of this diversified commodities transit network could put Saudis and Omanis in a prime location to shift towards more industrialization, and economic growth.

Pakistan needs to think big and see if the Saudis want to back a bigger vision. Just look at the poorly planned IMEC. Bringing Oman into a Saudi-Pak vision has greater prospects, especially for Oman, and which is what they should be lobbied to join.

 

[Falcon26]

In exchange for ensuring Saudi security, can anyone clearly explain what Pakistan is getting out of this arrangement?

 

[Watandar]

In exchange for ensuring Saudi security, can anyone clearly explain what Pakistan is getting out of this arrangement?

1. Jobs for the boys
2. Oil on deferred payment
3. Rescheduling of Saudi debt and management of international debt
4. Presence in the Mideast that could lead to further security related work eg Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Libya, Sudan ?

 

[Falcon26]

1. Jobs for the boys
2. Oil on deferred payment
3. Rescheduling of Saudi debt and management of international debt
4. Presence in the Mideast that could lead to further security related work eg Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Libya, Sudan ?

The Saudis got the deal of the century but some generals will get a handsome retirement package.

 

[FuturePAF]

1. Jobs for the boys
2. Oil on deferred payment
3. Rescheduling of Saudi debt and management of international debt
4. Presence in the Mideast that could lead to further security related work eg Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, Libya, Sudan ?

Both the Saudi and Pakistanis are thinking small because there is a limitation in how much each side seems to want to commit to the defense arrangement.

Pakistan for its part has to serious show the Saudis what it potentially do if it didn’t hold back; A comprehensive defense-economic relationship. A comparison would be all the capabilities the arrangement with Britain provided the Saudis with the Al-Yamahah deal in the 80s; such as the intelligence capabilities of MI6, the Covert ops capacities of the SAS, the technical support of British military and civilian industry, etc.

Both nations are thinking too small, especially Pakistan. For Saudi, a regional “Pax Saudia” with Pakistani muscle could stabilize the region and maximize the utilization of resources (mineral and human) before the move away from fossil fuels and during Saudi and Pakistan’s demographic window. With work split between factories across industries in both nations, along supply lines, smart diversification would be set.

With the acceptance of the foley of NOEM, the realization from the Iran war that without security there is no economy, and the need to diversify the economy, both nations could seize the moment if they are ready to transform their nations to meet the challenge. Saudis seem ready, but Pakistan seems to be locked in a penny wise dollar foolish mindset. (This is not about confront Iran directly on behalf of the Saudis btw)

 

[Watandar]

Both the Saudi and Pakistanis are thinking small because there is a limitation in how much each side seems to want to commit to the defense arrangement.

Pakistan for its part has to serious show the Saudis what it potentially do if it didn’t hold back; A comprehensive defense-economic relationship. A comparison would be all the capabilities the arrangement with Britain provided the Saudis with the Al-Yamahah deal in the 80s; such as the intelligence capabilities of MI6, the Covert ops capacities of the SAS, the technical support of British military and civilian industry, etc.

Both nations are thinking too small, especially Pakistan. For Saudi, a regional “Pax Saudia” with Pakistani muscle could stabilize the region and maximize the utilization of resources (mineral and human) before the move away from fossil fuels and during Saudi and Pakistan’s demographic window. With work split between factories across industries in both nations, along supply lines, smart diversification would be set.

With the acceptance of the foley of NOEM, the realization from the Iran war that without security there is no economy, and the need to diversify the economy, both nations could seize the moment if they are ready to transform their nations to meet the challenge. Saudis seem ready, but Pakistan seems to be locked in a penny wise dollar foolish mindset. (This is not about confront Iran directly on behalf of the Saudis btw)

I do agree with your basic criticism that both countries are thinking too small. For a Pakistan that is run by generals and bureaucrats, this is the limits of their capability and vision. It's one huge reason why countries should ideally be run by civilians who live among the common people.

For Saudis, they still lust primarily after the West and see Pakistan as one of many poor brown countries, albient one with labor and military capabilities that can be useful to them in some tasks.

There is still the possibility that this could turn into something big but it requires a person or team from Pakistan that is thinking everyday about how to turn this into something big , then come up with some concrete ideas and sell them to the Saudis.

 

[FuturePAF]

I do agree with your basic criticism that both countries are thinking too small. For a Pakistan that is run by generals and bureaucrats, this is the limits of their capability and vision. It's one huge reason why countries should ideally be run by civilians who live among the common people.

For Saudis, they still lust primarily after the West and see Pakistan as one of many poor brown countries, albient one with labor and military capabilities that can be useful to them in some tasks.

There is still the possibility that this could turn into something big but it requires a person or team from Pakistan that is thinking everyday about how to turn this into something big , then come up with some concrete ideas and sell them to the Saudis.

This is why Pakistan needs to settle its internal problems in a sustainable way (acceptable to all major stakeholders holders and can allow stability to be built for decades to come), and then use its new found clarity to show what an undistracted nation could do.

Pakistan is like shogun era Japan in many ways (has a civilian emperor but the military leader, the shogun, is the real leader) , pre-Meiji restoration.