PAF Future Acquisition Plans

[Yasser76]

Who this is? What are you talking about? Why are you trying to pick a fight with me for no reason, first you edit in your fantasies on my profile and then you accuse me of being somebody

@Waz @Musings I reported his original post with the foul language @maxpane also saw it and reacted. The point was to insult me and then quickly delete. Can I suggest IP check of this poster as I have received such vile attacks previously that were very similar

 

[maxpane]

@Waz @Musings I reported his original post with the foul language @maxpane also saw it and reacted. The point was to insult me and then quickly delete. Can I suggest IP check of this poster as I have received such vile attacks previously that were very similar

looks like old enmity

 

[Distant_Observer]

Priority should be to indigenously design an unmanned hypersonic nuclear capable jet.

The entire design needs to be in-house including the engine.

They should aim high, in the age of AI they have access to LLM's that can do the heavy lifting.

PAF also needs to create a Space Force division and begin research on drone warfare in space.

 

[RAMPAGE]

Priority should be to indigenously design an unmanned hypersonic nuclear capable jet.

Zarvan will approve.

 

[Oscar]

IMO.

I do not believe that acquiring LIFT aircraft is a "priority" for the PAF, let alone a higher priority than fifth-generation fighter jets. ------ We need to distinguish between LIFT capability and the possession of LIFT aircraft; they are two completely different things.

The situation is as follows:
Whether it is the PAF or the Uzbekistan Air Force—which recently acquired the J-10CE fighter—pilots operating these aircraft complete their relevant familiarization and adaptation flights in China. This is part of the support services included in the procurement program. Furthermore, reports regarding the Bangladesh Air Force's prospective purchase of J-10CE fighters explicitly outline the cost plan for pilot training to be conducted in China.

4.5-generation or 5th-generation fighter jets have completely moved beyond traditional air combat paradigms. They rely more heavily on the support of an integrated air combat ecosystem than on one-on-one dogfighting between individual aircraft.

This implies that for many economically disadvantaged nations, establishing a simulation-based training environment for 4.5-generation or 5th-generation fighter pilots is virtually impossible. These countries face significant deficiencies in their actual aerial combat support infrastructure, making the allocation of funds for such simulation systems even less feasible. Furthermore, economic constraints limit the scale of their 4.5-generation or 5th-generation fighter fleets, resulting in a low demand for pilots; beyond the initial cohort, the number of new pilots added annually is in the single digits. Consequently, setting up such a training system for such a small number of pilots is clearly not a rational choice.

CATIC provides comprehensive pilot training services to customers for both the J-10CE and FC-31/J-35 fighter jets; in fact, virtually all fighter jet exporters offer such training. Even in the case of Pakistan, when PAC sells JF-17 series fighters to foreign customers, it includes pilot training services. Furthermore, PAC offers the JF-17B variant, enabling customers to conduct their own pilot training—much like the J-10S option available for China's J-10CE.

LIFT aircraft are unlikely to be a top priority for the PAF. While procurement remains a possibility, it is not a primary concern. Modern LIFT aircraft possess genuine combat capabilities rather than serving merely as trainers; should the PAF acquire them, the deciding factor would be their combat utility, not their training functions.

Moreover, LIFT aircraft are not a central consideration in the PAF's future acquisition of fifth-generation fighters. The PAF lacks the resources to sustain a standalone, comprehensive training system specifically for fifth-generation fighter pilots.

You are right to distinguish LIFT capability from ownership of a dedicated LIFT aircraft. But the rest of your argument is combining and equating, three separate things: lead-in fighter training, conversion onto a particular aircraft, and advanced operational training.

The fact that an exporter provides initial familiarization and conversion training does not establish that the customer depends on that exporter for its continuing training system. Nor does it answer whether the customer needs a better lead training stage. Those are different requirements.

Little to none CATIC training services for JF-17 are in operation today.
It is completely in house at this point.
CATIC training services for the J-10 will be phased out barring the simulators that have been delivered.

Pakistan sourced its F-16 simulation infrastructure from L-3for networked F-16C Block 52 training implemented since 2013. Those devices supported new-pilot training, conversion and advanced tactical training.

The JF-17 simulator experience also contradicts the assumption that Pakistan simply relies on whatever training infrastructure CATIC supplies. The simulators delivered with the initial batch were found inadequate and inaccurate in representing the aircraft. When CATIC quoted a price for developing an accurate simulator, the PAF considered it prohibitively expensive which was effectively price gouging, and pursued its own development instead.

You can criticize the failure to negotiate that requirement earlier, but the resulting decision was to develop domestic capability, not accept permanent dependence. Pakistan has also developed full-fidelity Mirage III/V simulators and augmented-reality training systems for the F-16. Its approach has involved both indigenous development and mixed external sources.

More fundamentally, LIFT is not a capability exclusive to 4.5-generation fighters. Pakistan’s interest in modern lead-in trainers was already being discussed in 2015 in relation to preparing pilots for the F-16 and JF-17. It was not something that suddenly became relevant with the J-10CE or prospective fifth-generation acquisitions.

This was based on 2 gaps documented in PAF interviews including those in Air Forces monthly and other places.

- A speed & performance gap: progressively bringing pilots from slower training aircraft into the speed brackets, handling demands and workload of high-performance fighters.

- A technology & training gap: preparing pilots for modern cockpit interfaces, sensors, weapons employment and tactical workflows before they reach frontline conversion units.

Neither gap is exclusive to 4.5-generation aircraft. Similarly, having a LIFT platform capable of preparing pilots for 4.5-generation fighters does not make its usefulness exclusive to those fighters.

So you are incorrect in:

-Establishing the absence of a LIFT requirement.
- Reducing Pakistan’s training demand to the intake for one small, newly acquired fighter fleet.

The PAF’s training system serves a mixed fleet, not merely the initial J-10 conversion cohort.

Your claim is resting on exporter-provided familiarization flights and nothing more.

You can argue that it is not the highest priority without claiming that its training function is incidental, that it depends on Chinese input, or that combat utility would necessarily be the deciding reason to acquire it.

 

[Starlord]

Still no word on Additional J-10CE's? guess the PAF and I have one thing in common, we are both broke lol

 

[Michael]

You are right to distinguish LIFT capability from ownership of a dedicated LIFT aircraft. But the rest of your argument is combining and equating, three separate things: lead-in fighter training, conversion onto a particular aircraft, and advanced operational training.

The fact that an exporter provides initial familiarization and conversion training does not establish that the customer depends on that exporter for its continuing training system. Nor does it answer whether the customer needs a better lead training stage. Those are different requirements.

Little to none CATIC training services for JF-17 are in operation today.
It is completely in house at this point.
CATIC training services for the J-10 will be phased out barring the simulators that have been delivered.

Pakistan sourced its F-16 simulation infrastructure from L-3for networked F-16C Block 52 training implemented since 2013. Those devices supported new-pilot training, conversion and advanced tactical training.

The JF-17 simulator experience also contradicts the assumption that Pakistan simply relies on whatever training infrastructure CATIC supplies. The simulators delivered with the initial batch were found inadequate and inaccurate in representing the aircraft. When CATIC quoted a price for developing an accurate simulator, the PAF considered it prohibitively expensive which was effectively price gouging, and pursued its own development instead.

You can criticize the failure to negotiate that requirement earlier, but the resulting decision was to develop domestic capability, not accept permanent dependence. Pakistan has also developed full-fidelity Mirage III/V simulators and augmented-reality training systems for the F-16. Its approach has involved both indigenous development and mixed external sources.

More fundamentally, LIFT is not a capability exclusive to 4.5-generation fighters. Pakistan’s interest in modern lead-in trainers was already being discussed in 2015 in relation to preparing pilots for the F-16 and JF-17. It was not something that suddenly became relevant with the J-10CE or prospective fifth-generation acquisitions.

This was based on 2 gaps documented in PAF interviews including those in Air Forces monthly and other places.

- A speed & performance gap: progressively bringing pilots from slower training aircraft into the speed brackets, handling demands and workload of high-performance fighters.

- A technology & training gap: preparing pilots for modern cockpit interfaces, sensors, weapons employment and tactical workflows before they reach frontline conversion units.

Neither gap is exclusive to 4.5-generation aircraft. Similarly, having a LIFT platform capable of preparing pilots for 4.5-generation fighters does not make its usefulness exclusive to those fighters.

So you are incorrect in:

-Establishing the absence of a LIFT requirement.
- Reducing Pakistan’s training demand to the intake for one small, newly acquired fighter fleet.

The PAF’s training system serves a mixed fleet, not merely the initial J-10 conversion cohort.

Your claim is resting on exporter-provided familiarization flights and nothing more.

You can argue that it is not the highest priority without claiming that its training function is incidental, that it depends on Chinese input, or that combat utility would necessarily be the deciding reason to acquire it.

Uh, alright. You caught a small tail.

The Lead-In Fighter Training (LIFT) is a concept originating from Western military systems. There is no direct equivalent to this concept within the PLA system; instead, the corresponding stages are referred to as "战斗入门训练" and "改装训练阶段." The former primarily refers to tactical flight training courses for new fighter pilots, while the latter mainly refers to transition training courses for experienced fighter pilots switching to a different type of fighter aircraft. ------ This is similar to the Western LIFT system, but there are some differences.

* There are no significant differences between the two systems regarding the progression from basic to advanced trainers, nor in the ground-based simulator training; these aspects are not the focus of our discussion.

However, the two systems begin to diverge when it comes to the aircraft used during the tactical training phase. A dedicated LIFT trainer or a twin-seat combat trainer of the same type? Both methods have their respective advantages and disadvantages.

Prior to the advent of fifth-generation fighter jets, the PLA favored twin-seat fighter-trainer versions of the same aircraft models. The advantage of a two-seat combat trainer of the same model is that pilot adaptation training more closely mirrors real-world conditions, and the aircraft itself can be integrated into combat operations. Its drawbacks include higher training costs and the fact that it is compatible only with the corresponding fighter model. In comparison, dedicated LIFT trainer aircraft have lower flight training costs and can simulate a variety of aircraft types.

However, by the 5th-Gen era, the cost difference between this model and the dedicated LIFT trainer model had increased dramatically due to their high manufacturing and flight costs. It rendered the military unable to sustain large-scale pilot training. ------ Although the J-20 series has introduced the twin-seat J-20S variant, the PLAAF has clarified that this model is not intended as a combat trainer, but rather as a MUM-T command aircraft.

So, the core of this issue remains a matter based on considerations of military economics.

As far as the PAF is concerned, the JF-17 series remains its core frontline fighter force (primarily in terms of fleet size), and the existing JF-17B combat-capable trainer is already well-suited to this training role.

Regarding the J-10CE, the future FC-31/J-35, or the KAAN fighter, Pakistan's economic constraints make large-scale procurement difficult; consequently, opting for adaptive flight training services provided by the manufacturer is a more rational choice.

Whether the PAF acquires the JL-10/L-15, the Hürjet, or other similar aircraft, no single platform can perfectly cover the full spectrum of tactical training required for all its fighter types. It is essential to distinguish between an AJT (Advanced Jet Trainer) and a LIFT (Lead-In Fighter Trainer). Alternatively, to put it another way, a dedicated LIFT aircraft represents a hybrid between an AJT (Advanced Jet Trainer) system and a training system based on a twin-seat combat trainer variant of the same aircraft type. Both models have their respective advantages and disadvantages. Countries make different choices based on their own circumstances.

 

[Pakistan First]

Priority should be to indigenously design an unmanned hypersonic nuclear capable jet.

The entire design needs to be in-house including the engine.

They should aim high, in the age of AI they have access to LLM's that can do the heavy lifting

Foreign publicly available LLMs won't do "heavy lifting" for your advanced military-grade engineering / solutions. No foreign publicly available LLM can be capable or trusted to aid in a sensitive national security project. Yes you can take help in small steps. But nowhere near "heavy lifting".

BTW, our hurdle isn't at that surface layer. Even if we have our own super advance AI. The problem is at hardware / industrial level. That's where we need dedication and finances. The supporting infra needs lot of finances. PAC / NASTP has limited capabilities to build a 4.5 gen with imported engines.

Getting into Fighterjet Engine domain solo would be a mistake at this stage. Partner with any other country. OR I would say just import the engines and focus at the other parts, the weapons, the sensors etc.

 

[user]

Have we deployed forum AI?

 

[Yasser76]

Priority should be to indigenously design an unmanned hypersonic nuclear capable jet.

The entire design needs to be in-house including the engine.

They should aim high, in the age of AI they have access to LLM's that can do the heavy lifting.

PAF also needs to create a Space Force division and begin research on drone warfare in space.

This is the issue, even if the in house design was there,, how many aircraft will the PAF actually buy? Anymore then 40? Will that be enough to justify a new project? Also exprts will be tough, its a very crowded market out there for advanced trainers.

Just not really feasible, although now with what happened to India last year, the Makkah pact and renewed Arab enthusiasm for the PAF, one may conceivably argue that Pakistan with its varied terrain, massive airspace, IP pool and CCS/Air Power centre would be in a good position to set up something very similar to ITTC in Canada or even NATO Joint Training centre at Shepard AFB.
Already there is a lot of cross training with Saudis and Turks at all levels (From PAF Academy to CCS), all three countries use MF-17 as basic/screener plane, so one could conceivably take this one step forward and have all 3 nations fund a base for this (Mianwali may be a good candidate here)

3-4 Squadrons of Hurjet. This can act as a place for spill over as even now Turks and Saudis have a shortage of IPs. In case of Saudis their large Hawk fleet is becoming quite old so they will be facing similar problem as PAF

 

[Michael]

My feeling is PAF will soldier on without a LIFT for some time. I know it is a different subject but also very inetresting F-22, F-35, J-20 and J-35 none have two seater training variants (J-20 2 seat being a specialised aircraft)
USAF is still, to this day, sending pilots from a T-38 to F-35 units. They must seem to think the simulators can now carry much of the burden, not saying LIFT concept is redundant, not at all, but many the major air forces with 5th Gen are either out sourcing or simply skipping the LIFT part to a very large extent, it may be that experiance is shwoing simulators may do the job.

Only issue with PAF is regardless of concept or philisophy in terms of advanced training, we have very old airframes in this role, but then again, so does USAF and it is coping (admittedly they have T-7 roadmap)

In pilot training, AJT (Advanced Jet Training) and LIFT (Lead-In Fighter Training) are effectively two distinct stages: the former focuses on general knowledge, while the latter emphasizes specialized, mission-specific training. In practice, however, many modern trainer aircraft integrate both AJT and LIFT capabilities into a single platform.
The PLA has long employed a "three-aircraft, three-stage" system, where AJT and LIFT are conducted on separate aircraft. In contrast, Western nations tend to favor a "two-aircraft, three-stage" system, combining AJT and LIFT into a single aircraft type.

When a nation's fighter fleet operates as a unified system, the "two-aircraft, three-stage" approach offers a superior, faster, and more cost-effective solution.

For PLA pilots flying fifth-generation fighters, the "two-aircraft, three-stage" system is the primary method; conversely, for pilots of fourth- and 4.5-generation fighters, the "three-aircraft, three-stage" system remains the preferred approach.

"Three-aircraft, three-stage" system: Basic trainer, advanced trainer, and twin-seat combat trainer (of the same type as the operational fighter), followed by direct transition to the operational fighter.​

"Two-aircraft, three-stage" system: Basic trainer and LIFT trainer, followed by direct transition to the operational fighter.​

For the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), there are indeed issues surrounding the procurement of dedicated Lead-In Fighter Trainer (LIFT) aircraft.

The JF-17 constitutes the bulk of its frontline fighter fleet. However, the availability of the JF-17B reduces the need for dedicated LIFT aircraft for this specific platform.

It is important to note that the simulation capabilities of LIFT aircraft are closely tied to the specific combat aircraft ecosystem they support. The JL-10/L-15 cannot effectively simulate Western-style fighters like the F-16 or KAAN, while the Hürjet cannot effectively simulate Chinese-style fighters such as the J-10CE or FC-31/J-35. When used for cross-system training, they essentially function as Advanced Jet Trainers (AJTs) rather than true LIFT aircraft.

While it is essential for the PAF to acquire AJTs, the necessity of procuring aircraft specifically for the LIFT role is a matter worth considering.

Many modern AJT aircraft can actually perform some of the LIFT training for fighter jets. This is a point that is easily misunderstood by the media.

 

[Yasser76]

In pilot training, AJT (Advanced Jet Training) and LIFT (Lead-In Fighter Training) are effectively two distinct stages: the former focuses on general knowledge, while the latter emphasizes specialized, mission-specific training. In practice, however, many modern trainer aircraft integrate both AJT and LIFT capabilities into a single platform.
The PLA has long employed a "three-aircraft, three-stage" system, where AJT and LIFT are conducted on separate aircraft. In contrast, Western nations tend to favor a "two-aircraft, three-stage" system, combining AJT and LIFT into a single aircraft type.

When a nation's fighter fleet operates as a unified system, the "two-aircraft, three-stage" approach offers a superior, faster, and more cost-effective solution.

For PLA pilots flying fifth-generation fighters, the "two-aircraft, three-stage" system is the primary method; conversely, for pilots of fourth- and 4.5-generation fighters, the "three-aircraft, three-stage" system remains the preferred approach.

"Three-aircraft, three-stage" system: Basic trainer, advanced trainer, and twin-seat combat trainer (of the same type as the operational fighter), followed by direct transition to the operational fighter.​

"Two-aircraft, three-stage" system: Basic trainer and LIFT trainer, followed by direct transition to the operational fighter.​

For the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), there are indeed issues surrounding the procurement of dedicated Lead-In Fighter Trainer (LIFT) aircraft.

The JF-17 constitutes the bulk of its frontline fighter fleet. However, the availability of the JF-17B reduces the need for dedicated LIFT aircraft for this specific platform.

It is important to note that the simulation capabilities of LIFT aircraft are closely tied to the specific combat aircraft ecosystem they support. The JL-10/L-15 cannot effectively simulate Western-style fighters like the F-16 or KAAN, while the Hürjet cannot effectively simulate Chinese-style fighters such as the J-10CE or FC-31/J-35. When used for cross-system training, they essentially function as Advanced Jet Trainers (AJTs) rather than true LIFT aircraft.

While it is essential for the PAF to acquire AJTs, the necessity of procuring aircraft specifically for the LIFT role is a matter worth considering.

Many modern AJT aircraft can actually perform some of the LIFT training for fighter jets. This is a point that is easily misunderstood by the media.

For sure a major issue for PAF right now is having to service dual Western/Chinese systems, but if things go fully down the JF-17C/J-10/J-35 route (not saying that is a certainty), then the problem will solve itself. I dont see PAF investing in anything for the future to service an increasingly old F-16 fleet. If KAAN is on the roadmap that is a different matter

 

[Michael]

For sure a major issue for PAF right now is having to service dual Western/Chinese systems, but if things go fully down the JF-17C/J-10/J-35 route (not saying that is a certainty), then the problem will solve itself. I dont see PAF investing in anything for the future to service an increasingly old F-16 fleet. If KAAN is on the roadmap that is a different matter

I am not going to weigh in on the PAF issue; it is too controversial.

Regarding the K-8: I am not sure how Pakistan classifies it, but its Chinese counterpart—the JL-8—is categorized in China as an intermediate trainer, whereas the JL-9 is classified as an AJT (Advanced Jet Trainer).

Based on this classification, the PAF indeed lacks an AJT for the relevant training requirements.

Under your proposed scenario, procuring the JL-10/L-15 would certainly be a sound choice. Of course, the Hürjet would also be a perfectly viable option if the requirement is simply for an AJT. However, if the requirement calls for both AJT and LIFT (Lead-In Fighter Trainer) capabilities, then the JL-10/L-15 stands as the only option. That said, I am not certain whether your line of thinking aligns with the PAF's decision-making.

 

[Yasser76]

I am not going to weigh in on the PAF issue; it is too controversial.

Regarding the K-8: I am not sure how Pakistan classifies it, but its Chinese counterpart—the JL-8—is categorized in China as an intermediate trainer, whereas the JL-9 is classified as an AJT (Advanced Jet Trainer).

Based on this classification, the PAF indeed lacks an AJT for the relevant training requirements.

Under your proposed scenario, procuring the JL-10/L-15 would certainly be a sound choice. Of course, the Hürjet would also be a perfectly viable option if the requirement is simply for an AJT. However, if the requirement calls for both AJT and LIFT (Lead-In Fighter Trainer) capabilities, then the JL-10/L-15 stands as the only option. That said, I am not certain whether your line of thinking aligns with the PAF's decision-making.

Yes, hard to know what the PAF is exactly thinking (although some on here will claim they do).

This got me thinking though, as technology developments and software advances, if you remove the language issue, will future 6th Gen US v Chinese be very different for pilots?

 

[Michael]

This got me thinking though, as technology developments and software advances, if you remove the language issue, will future 6th Gen US v Chinese be very different for pilots?

There are certainly significant differences between the two. But exactly where do those differences lie? It is hard to say right now.

My speculation is that China might release further details—or even officially unveil the sixth-generation fighter—around Army Day (August 1st) next year. However, some on Chinese social media even suggest that the aircraft could make an appearance at the Zhuhai Airshow this December.

Very little information has been publicly released regarding the United States' sixth-generation fighter jet; a physical prototype is still under development, making it difficult to speculate on the aircraft's specifics.

Based on the limited information currently available, there appear to be significant technical divergences between China and the U.S. regarding the development of sixth-generation fighters. However, it will be a long time before the actual results become clear.