Evidence is all there.
SAMs are supposed to defend Iranian assets but we are seeing they are highly ineffective.(Either Israelis are too smart or Iranian Air Defence crew is poorly trained)
Israel simply uses its drones to locate them and then hits them with highly accurate ALBMs.
The death of Air Defence Personnels indicates that these systems were not isolated but properly manned up when Israel hit them.
Iranian Air Force is literally non-existent to challenge the enemy.
Its like a man breaks your door,shoots you from door step and returns unchallenged.
Why do you think they cannot replicate this strategy for sustained compaign in doomsday scenario?
It's funny that I mentioned the lack of evidence of Israel sustaining a multi-wave campaign, but you're evading the subject of Iran's inability to defend itself. Is that self-affirmation or self-preservation? Is the flag on your profile where you were born and live? Because I'm not sure now. Anyway, that's beside the point.
The point is:
The IAF didn't attack in two or three waves, nor was it a "sustained air campaign," because they simply can't do that.
The Air Force's ability to adapt quickly to changing situations, using its Air Units to carry out different types of missions,
using, in each case, tactics and weapons appropriate to the operation to be carried out. This characteristic, inherent to the Air Force, results from the possibilities of multiple use that are normally peculiar to aircraft to a greater or lesser extent, from the application of varied tactics that respond to the needs and conveniences of each particular situation, and also from the diversity of weapons that can constitute the load of aircraft in different configurations.
In applying the Mass Principle, one must consider, among other things, the aspect of saturation of enemy defenses and objectives. Basically, a mass of resources is used that is capable of preventing or hindering an effective air, anti-aircraft and electronic reaction by the enemy. In addition, the resources used must be capable of irreparably destroying an objective, damaging it or neutralizing it to the point where it is not feasible to recover or operate it. The intended effect may also be interdiction or neutralization for a certain period of time.
Saturation plans must be carefully prepared, not only in terms of the resistance of the target and its defenses, but, above all, in terms of the intended strategic effects.
Thus, if the established goal is to achieve air superiority, maximum concentration should be planned against the enemy aerospace complex, with emphasis on its Air Force.
Israel has neither the mass nor the legal requirements to sustain multiple waves of attack for several reasons due to the limiting factor of range. Unfortunately, geography is still the deciding factor for Israel to sustain any major campaign against Iran, and this is completely independent of whether or not Iran is able to defend itself, which is really the least of Iran's concerns.
Unless you can give me concrete evidence that Israel can move its geographic territory closer to Iran, this is simply out of the question. Or do you really think they can do that?