Iranian Nuclear Doctrine

Albright has been focusing on Iran's nuclear program for decades and has personally studied large amounts of the nuclear archive.

this Shabani guy has not. for starters he doesn't even mention Fordow but talks about the above-ground Natanz, which everyone knows is defenceless

Iranian way of having hidden/secret nuclear facilities is proven by the case of Parchin and that's 15-20 years ago. It would be irrational to think that in all these years, the only strategic line of defense against US+Israel+NATO attack on known nuclear sites, Iranian planners came up with is just getting a facility underground.

A few KGs of WGU (You said 1KG, I said 5KG) at 20-40 micro-assembly sites means 20-40 tactical warheads ready .... and such a widespread system is very hard to target by enemy compared to few handpicked facilities well known by the entire world (Saddam's mistake).
 
A few KGs of WGU (You said 1KG, I said 5KG) at 20-40 micro-assembly sites means 20-40 tactical warheads ready .... and such a widespread system is very hard to target by enemy compared to few handpicked facilities well known by the entire world (Saddam's mistake).

You would need IR-6 or IR-4 at the minimum. Let’s say both have an SWU of 5. That means with one single cascade (170-200 centrifuges) they could do the work of 1,000 IR-1’s.

Now the only hurdle to your theory is that every centrifuge workshop (only a few exist) are observed by IAEA and all of the West intelligence services. While it’s not out of realm of possibility iran has hidden 1 or 2 centrifuge production workshops, there is no evidence of that. These sites would also need to be completely sealed off and known to just a handful of leaders inside Iran to prevent detection from moles and spies within Iran’s power structure from leaking to West.

Again not impossible, but not an easy feat either given the massive intelligence leaks Iran has had happened in the last 20 years.
 
وجود امثال طورقوز آباد ها با نشانه های اورانیوم‌ غنی شده که از بیست مورد در مسایل پادمانی‌‌ رد شده یعنی کارهایی انجام شده

شاید یک‌ درصد مجموعه مخفی لو‌ رفته ‌یا پنجاه درصد
ما‌‌ نمیدونیم


متن‌جالب طورقوزاباد

ارزیابی آژانس براساس شباهت‌های بین کامیون‌های مختلف مشاهده شده در مریوان و تورقوز آباد در اواسط ژوئیه و اواسط اوت ۲۰۱۸ از طریق تحلیل تصاویر ماهواره‌ای تجاری موجود در مورد این ادعا که اقلام مورد اشاره از تورقوز آباد برداشته شدند صرفاً نادقیق و غیرحرفه‌ای است. چنین تصاویر ماهواره‌ای تجاری نمی‌تواند مبنای معتبری برای استنتاجی مانند آن را فراهم نماید. ایران کشور پهناوری است؛ تعداد زیادی از کامیون‌های مشابه در حال حرکت در سراسر این کشور می‌باشند. با کمال تعجب، آژانس شباهت‌های کامیون‌ها را در این دو مکان مختلف از طریق تصاویر ماهواره‌ای تجاری به عنوان دلیلی برای این ادعا که کامیون مشخصی از یک مکان به مکان دیگر حرکت کرده است نشان داده است.

کامیونهایی بین مراکز‌حرکت کرده و‌کل آبشار سانتریفیوژ جابجا شده!!!
 
آیا میشه ۳۲ سانتریفیوژ با تریلر جابجا بشه محل دیگه؟
ده تریلر میتونه ۳۲۰ سو غنی کنن


وجود امثال طورقوز آباد ها با نشانه های اورانیوم‌ غنی شده که از بیست مورد در مسایل پادمانی‌‌ رد شده یعنی کارهایی انجام شده

شاید یک‌ درصد مجموعه مخفی لو‌ رفته ‌یا پنجاه درصد
ما‌‌ نمیدونیم


متن‌جالب طورقوزاباد

ارزیابی آژانس براساس شباهت‌های بین کامیون‌های مختلف مشاهده شده در مریوان و تورقوز آباد در اواسط ژوئیه و اواسط اوت ۲۰۱۸ از طریق تحلیل تصاویر ماهواره‌ای تجاری موجود در مورد این ادعا که اقلام مورد اشاره از تورقوز آباد برداشته شدند صرفاً نادقیق و غیرحرفه‌ای است. چنین تصاویر ماهواره‌ای تجاری نمی‌تواند مبنای معتبری برای استنتاجی مانند آن را فراهم نماید. ایران کشور پهناوری است؛ تعداد زیادی از کامیون‌های مشابه در حال حرکت در سراسر این کشور می‌باشند. با کمال تعجب، آژانس شباهت‌های کامیون‌ها را در این دو مکان مختلف از طریق تصاویر ماهواره‌ای تجاری به عنوان دلیلی برای این ادعا که کامیون مشخصی از یک مکان به مکان دیگر حرکت کرده است نشان داده است.

کامیونهایی بین مراکز‌حرکت کرده و‌کل آبشار سانتریفیوژ جابجا شده!!!
 
You would need IR-6 or IR-4 at the minimum. Let’s say both have an SWU of 5. That means with one single cascade (170-200 centrifuges) they could do the work of 1,000 IR-1’s.

Now the only hurdle to your theory is that every centrifuge workshop (only a few exist) are observed by IAEA and all of the West intelligence services. While it’s not out of realm of possibility iran has hidden 1 or 2 centrifuge production workshops, there is no evidence of that. These sites would also need to be completely sealed off and known to just a handful of leaders inside Iran to prevent detection from moles and spies within Iran’s power structure from leaking to West.

Again not impossible, but not an easy feat either given the massive intelligence leaks Iran has had happened in the last 20 years.

Why would there be "evidence" for secret sites? The journalist who propagated this theory was saying that there is a possibility that a handful of known facilities could be a bait and diversion. Only a FOOL would rely upon IADS or a few layers of concrete to stop a mad US/NATO+Israeli attack on Natanz, Bushehr, Fordow etc.

If the words of people from IAEA, Israel, US are gospel then Iran in 2003 already had neutron guns ready for installation on fission core, Parchin was a secret facility so there is considerable evidence that Iran is not playing a sincere game either. There is secrecy in motives from Iranian side because no country on earth otherwise produces 60% U235 in masses.

As for the feasibility of such micro-sites as the guy tweeted. Here is a very possible scenario (pure mathematics):

Trump takes office and settles Iran will have something like 285 KG of 60% enriched U235. IAEA reported the last quantity of 183 KG in November with a 34 KG/month addition rate. By February (3 months) it will be 285 KG. Hypothetically if there are 40 such micro sites spread across Iran, some in mountains, some in plain sight in urban centers (Shabani's theory) etc then there will barely be small buildings or underground compounds of 100 m^2 area having 3-4 x cascades of IR-4 (5 SWU/year) that can bring 8 KG of 60% U235 to WGU (>90%) within a week to yield a 5 KT device worth 90% WGU. 285 KG means roughly 40 such devices can be made in February. If they start using the extremely efficient C-fiber IR-8 (20-24 SWU/year) then this conversion will take 2-4 days with a single cascade. There are IR-8 at Natanaz.

That was pure mathematics. Considering politics and everything else can it actually happen? Like I said no one knows.

2-6 KT device can annihilate entire Industrial towns, ports, Large military bases, the largest of aircraft carriers, etc. With a powerful missile force like that of Iran, 40 such devices are enough deterrent to push enemies back but mullahs are pu$$ies so they would rather talk with US and keep on cursing Israel in the press.
 
Why would there be "evidence" for secret sites? The journalist who propagated this theory was saying that there is a possibility that a handful of known facilities could be a bait and diversion. Only a FOOL would rely upon IADS or a few layers of concrete to stop a mad US/NATO+Israeli attack on Natanz, Bushehr, Fordow etc.

If the words of people from IAEA, Israel, US are gospel then Iran in 2003 already had neutron guns ready for installation on fission core, Parchin was a secret facility so there is considerable evidence that Iran is not playing a sincere game either. There is secrecy in motives from Iranian side because no country on earth otherwise produces 60% U235 in masses.

As for the feasibility of such micro-sites as the guy tweeted. Here is a very possible scenario (pure mathematics):

Trump takes office and settles Iran will have something like 285 KG of 60% enriched U235. IAEA reported the last quantity of 183 KG in November with a 34 KG/month addition rate. By February (3 months) it will be 285 KG. Hypothetically if there are 40 such micro sites spread across Iran, some in mountains, some in plain sight in urban centers (Shabani's theory) etc then there will barely be small buildings or underground compounds of 100 m^2 area having 3-4 x cascades of IR-4 (5 SWU/year) that can bring 8 KG of 60% U235 to WGU (>90%) within a week to yield a 5 KT device worth 90% WGU. 285 KG means roughly 40 such devices can be made in February. If they start using the extremely efficient C-fiber IR-8 (20-24 SWU/year) then this conversion will take 2-4 days with a single cascade. There are IR-8 at Natanaz.

That was pure mathematics. Considering politics and everything else can it actually happen? Like I said no one knows.

2-6 KT device can annihilate entire Industrial towns, ports, Large military bases, the largest of aircraft carriers, etc. With a powerful missile force like that of Iran, 40 such devices are enough deterrent to push enemies back but mullahs are pu$$ies so they would rather talk with US and keep on cursing Israel in the press.
Exactly. "Evidence of secret sites" is an obvious contradiction in terms. Most people continue to not get the very basics of Iran's nuclear program. What we see, above or far below the ground, has two purposes:

1. genuine strategic and independent fuel cycle ownership and reactor supply.
2. demonstration of tech capacity. "this is what we're showing you and already have. Guess what we have and we don't show?" THAT is top of the mind of opponents and the crux of the friction.

For a country as large as Iran, hiding a few IR-X's with super high SWU productivity is far too simple. The trigger mechanism is also not radioactive, well within Iranian tech, and easily hidden. The rocketry is already in place. So....

1734181059487.png
 
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وجود امثال طورقوز آباد ها با نشانه های اورانیوم‌ غنی شده که از بیست مورد در مسایل پادمانی‌‌ رد شده یعنی کارهایی انجام شده

شاید یک‌ درصد مجموعه مخفی لو‌ رفته ‌یا پنجاه درصد
ما‌‌ نمیدونیم


متن‌جالب طورقوزاباد

ارزیابی آژانس براساس شباهت‌های بین کامیون‌های مختلف مشاهده شده در مریوان و تورقوز آباد در اواسط ژوئیه و اواسط اوت ۲۰۱۸ از طریق تحلیل تصاویر ماهواره‌ای تجاری موجود در مورد این ادعا که اقلام مورد اشاره از تورقوز آباد برداشته شدند صرفاً نادقیق و غیرحرفه‌ای است. چنین تصاویر ماهواره‌ای تجاری نمی‌تواند مبنای معتبری برای استنتاجی مانند آن را فراهم نماید. ایران کشور پهناوری است؛ تعداد زیادی از کامیون‌های مشابه در حال حرکت در سراسر این کشور می‌باشند. با کمال تعجب، آژانس شباهت‌های کامیون‌ها را در این دو مکان مختلف از طریق تصاویر ماهواره‌ای تجاری به عنوان دلیلی برای این ادعا که کامیون مشخصی از یک مکان به مکان دیگر حرکت کرده است نشان داده است.

کامیونهایی بین مراکز‌حرکت کرده و‌کل آبشار سانتریفیوژ جابجا شده!!!

در پاراگراف ۱۱ گزارش اسفند ۱۳۸۶ (GOV/2008/4) این مواد در آزمایشگاهی در نزدیکی میدان ونک گزارش شده و رد آنها در ۲۴ شهریور ۱۳۸۶ در دانشکده فنی (پاراگراف ۲۴ گزارش GOV/2007/58) مشاهده شده‌بود.

این شواهد نشان می‌دهد که جمهوری اسلامی، علاوه بر مواد و تجهیزات هسته‌ای که در گزارش‌های قبل از برجام به آژانس ارائه کرده‌بود، مواد و تجهیزات دیگری هم در مکان دیگری داشته‌است.

گزارش سپتامبر ۲۰۲۱ (GOV/2021/42) آژانس همچنین شامل جزئیات بیشتری در مورد کانتینرهایی بود که زمانی در سایت حضور داشتند و بیان می‌کرد که نشانه‌هایی وجود دارد که «درون کانتینرهایی که در این مکان انبار شده‌اند مواد و یا تجهیزاتی است که آلودگی هسته‌ای سطح بالایی دارند.»

برخی از کانتینرها در تورقوز آباد، بر اساس آخرین گزارش خرداد ۱۴۰۱ (GOV/2022/26) آژانس، از سایت ورامین، با نام مستعار «کارخانه تهران» (مکان ۳) به این مکان منتقل شده‌بودند. با این حال، فعالیت‌های هسته‌ای انجام شده در ورامین مبدا همه ایزوتوپ‌های اورانیوم تغییر یافته در تورقوزآباد را توضیح نمی‌دهد.

آژانس بین‌المللی انرژی اتمی به این نتیجه رسید که این ایزوتوپ‌ها باید از مکان ناشناخته دیگری (یک سایت هسته‌ای که هرگز آشکار نشده است؟) آمده‌ باشند.
 
Today, I noticed that the usually reserved political and military experts on Iranian matters are, for the first time, in agreement assess that Iran has made the deliberate decision to acquire nuclear capabilities as quickly as possible. The focus is on tactical nuclear weapons, more than capable of causing extensive devastation to cities or heavily fortified targets. For Israel more than enough to wipe out.

The experts' said that Iran is closer to realizing this goal than previously thought. The development and deployment of such weapons represent a significant development in the region's geopolitical tensions, with consequences that extend far beyond Iran's borders.
 
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Ray McGovern & Larry C. Johnson: Iran DETERMINED To BUILD NUKES!



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Why would there be "evidence" for secret sites? The journalist who propagated this theory was saying that there is a possibility that a handful of known facilities could be a bait and diversion. Only a FOOL would rely upon IADS or a few layers of concrete to stop a mad US/NATO+Israeli attack on Natanz, Bushehr, Fordow etc.

If the words of people from IAEA, Israel, US are gospel then Iran in 2003 already had neutron guns ready for installation on fission core, Parchin was a secret facility so there is considerable evidence that Iran is not playing a sincere game either. There is secrecy in motives from Iranian side because no country on earth otherwise produces 60% U235 in masses.

As for the feasibility of such micro-sites as the guy tweeted. Here is a very possible scenario (pure mathematics):

Trump takes office and settles Iran will have something like 285 KG of 60% enriched U235. IAEA reported the last quantity of 183 KG in November with a 34 KG/month addition rate. By February (3 months) it will be 285 KG. Hypothetically if there are 40 such micro sites spread across Iran, some in mountains, some in plain sight in urban centers (Shabani's theory) etc then there will barely be small buildings or underground compounds of 100 m^2 area having 3-4 x cascades of IR-4 (5 SWU/year) that can bring 8 KG of 60% U235 to WGU (>90%) within a week to yield a 5 KT device worth 90% WGU. 285 KG means roughly 40 such devices can be made in February. If they start using the extremely efficient C-fiber IR-8 (20-24 SWU/year) then this conversion will take 2-4 days with a single cascade. There are IR-8 at Natanaz.

That was pure mathematics. Considering politics and everything else can it actually happen? Like I said no one knows.

2-6 KT device can annihilate entire Industrial towns, ports, Large military bases, the largest of aircraft carriers, etc. With a powerful missile force like that of Iran, 40 such devices are enough deterrent to push enemies back but mullahs are pu$$ies so they would rather talk with US and keep on cursing Israel in the press.

1) I didn’t say evidence of secret sites, I said evidence for centrifuge workshops. The entire supply chain has been under observance since 2003(?) when Rouhani and Khatami disclosed all production sites.

Centrifuge aren’t just pieces of metal you can build in any workshop, they are very sensitive delicate machines that need to be carefully calibrated and chained together to run in a harmonic cascade.

2) 40 micro enrichment sites? Come on brother why not 400? 4000?

This government cannot even keep Fakhrizadeh and Haniyeh’s location a secret you think they could keep 40 enrichment sites a secret?

Think about it:

Every engineer, every worker, every scientist, every official, every soldier, every truck driver, every janitor, etc. that each site requires all of them have to never utter a single word even to their friends one night when they are drunk. Or to their wife or family member. Because NSA/Mossad are tapping every phone line and cellphone in Iran and collecting metadata as supercomputers shift thru and flag anything remotely of interest. Add in AI models that unit 8020 of Mossad is famous for and you will get caught with that number of sites.

40 is way too high a number. 1 or 2 sites….maybe

And that assumes that there is no mole in Khamenai’s inner circle, which looking at the penetration of spies that the west was able to get into Soviet Union during Cold War you have to assume there are some moles/spies in upper leadership.

Not impossible, but given Iran’s massive intelligence failures, it doesn’t seem like a likely scenario.
 
1) I didn’t say evidence of secret sites, I said evidence for centrifuge workshops. The entire supply chain has been under observance since 2003(?) when Rouhani and Khatami disclosed all production sites.

And why exactly would secret sites be disclosed by anyone from Iran if the intention throughout this IAEA-Iran dealing has been to keep the actual weaponisation program separate from what is known at known sites? That is what the journalist was saying that there is a huge possibility that known sites are a bait because like I said only a fool will rely upon IADS and few blocks of concrete to save the billions of USD worth of nuclear program. Iran is many things but not a foolish country when it comes to strategic planning.

Centrifuge aren’t just pieces of metal you can build in any workshop, they are very sensitive delicate machines that need to be carefully calibrated and chained together to run in a harmonic cascade.

I am well aware of what they are and how they are run. Running 2-3 cascades in a 1000-1500 m2 underground site in an urban center is nothing out of the ordinary. Apartheid South Africa used this strategy very well in 1970s-1980s. DPRK had undeclared sites. What makes you think Iran will be a beacon of honesty ? Iran had been tight-lipped before about Parchin and about trigger guns as an example.

2) 40 micro enrichment sites? Come on brother why not 400? 4000?

This government cannot even keep Fakhrizadeh and Haniyeh’s location a secret you think they could keep 40 enrichment sites a secret?

Think about it:

Every engineer, every worker, every scientist, every official, every soldier, every truck driver, every janitor, etc. that each site requires all of them have to never utter a single word even to their friends one night when they are drunk. Or to their wife or family member. Because NSA/Mossad are tapping every phone line and cellphone in Iran and collecting metadata as supercomputers shift thru and flag anything remotely of interest. Add in AI models that unit 8020 of Mossad is famous for and you will get caught with that number of sites.

40 is way too high a number. 1 or 2 sites….maybe

You are missing the point completely. Even if I go by your numbers that only 2 such secret enrichment sites exist then 2 such units comprising of 5-8 Cascades of IR-4M means 8 x 5 KT devices/per month. Is that a bad number?

And that assumes that there is no mole in Khamenai’s inner circle, which looking at the penetration of spies that the west was able to get into Soviet Union during Cold War you have to assume there are some moles/spies in upper leadership.

Not impossible, but given Iran’s massive intelligence failures, it doesn’t seem like a likely scenario.

Such a level of intelligence penetration still failed to stop Iran from building a world-class delivery system that defeated worlds most advanced IADS/ABM shield. How did that happen?
 
You are missing the point completely. Even if I go by your numbers that only 2 such secret enrichment sites exist then 2 such units comprising of 5-8 Cascades of IR-4M means 8 x 5 KT devices/per month. Is that a bad number?
a variable is missed from your calculation and its raw material , you must have undeclared raw materials to divert to such facilities
 
You are missing the point completely. Even if I go by your numbers that only 2 such secret enrichment sites exist then 2 such units comprising of 5-8 Cascades of IR-4M means 8 x 5 KT devices/per month. Is that a bad number?
I think that 8 X 5kT devices are adequate to give any attacker serious reason for pause.
Imagine even a large country suffering even just 4 hits to counter-value targets. Meaning large population centers.

... Such a level of intelligence penetration still failed to stop Iran from building a world-class delivery system that defeated worlds most advanced IADS/ABM shield.

So, how does this happen? ...

I think this could be a case of seeing what you see, and after a while become complacent - such as the establishment of say Iran's own because an IADS/ABM. This is something that progresses at its own pace across the Mid-Plus timeframe..

However, when it comes to nukes, if I was a betting man, I would say that Iran will suffer a debilitating and massive attack if it even tries to breakout. It won't be allowed to even get to the end of such a 'breakout' period. Why, because there will inevitably be a leak somewhere.

I posit that Russia is unlikely to give Iran nukes. North Korea *might* be so persuaded, because they do not give a dime about international sensitivities or sentiments. A nominal number (8?) will not dent their inventory.

Piet
 
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a variable is missed from your calculation and its raw material , you must have undeclared raw materials to divert to such facilities

IAEA gets numbers from the logbooks of SEA (Sazmane Energy Atomi Iran), they are not constantly monitoring the enrichment process otherwise they would have discovered the 60% enrichment of 35 KG/month much earlier than Grossi's visit few weeks ago.

How many centrifuges are running in Iran producing what % enriched content is not known to IAEA unless SEA lets them know it.
 

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