via the SDF:
In the latest talkshow Yankee says:
1) J-36 will not be a Mach 3 capable aircraft.
3) Chief Designer care not much about hard specs such as top speed, max thrust, etc. The important criteria of the fighter is instead power generation capability.
4) J-36 can serve as EW and AWAC to some capacity.
Very interesting considerations.
In simple terms, we can define the J-36 as a specialized multirole fighter, considering that what the Yankee claims is true.
AWACS
Validation for AWACS-type employment deserves a Russian context. The Russians use a lot of BVR attack tactics using passive sensors for target detection (RWR and IRST) with datalink from a GCI or AWACS radar. A formation of four MiG-31 fighters, each 200 km apart, covers an 800 km front with the Foxhound radar. The four aircraft act as mini-AWACS in mutual support to create a large management picture of the air battlefield. Data is passed through the datalink and can be passed on to the AK-RLDN. They can attack the detected targets with 16 R-33 missiles available in the formation without worrying about engaging the same target. The MiG-31 can engage cooperatively by passing targets to the MiG-29 and other legacy Russian fighters. The leader can possibly "fly" other aircraft in the formation by sending guidance commands that are entered into the SAU-155M autopilots of the other three aircraft. The MiG-31 can also perform semi-automatic interception by a ground control officer (usually a qualified pilot), who passes guidance commands through the 5U15K-11 datalink. The tactic of the Russian MiG-31s is to have good lateral separation in areas without GCI or AWACS coverage. The expected targets were B-52, B-1B, F-111 bombers, cruise missiles and even P-3 or F-16 aircraft due to the area of operation. In these scenarios, the MiG-31s do not need maneuverability, but a good radar, long range and a good missile load. The rules of engagement favor long-range attacks because everything coming from the other side is enemy.
What seems to be implied here is that the J-36 could perform practically the same role as a mini-AWACS, but combined with a KJ-3000 AWACS + loyal wingman UCAVs.
The use of fighters as mini-AWACS is becoming more frequent with fighters equipped with better radars. Iran adapted some Tomcats for the mission and they were used to direct other fighters. The Israelis used the F-15 as a mini-AWACS in 1982 in the Bekaa Valley to provide a more detailed view of the surroundings of combat. It would stay at a distance and sanitize the combat area for the presence of fighters and AWACS blind spots. The F-22A was until then the new aircraft to have this capability because it had an excellent radar and had already tested it in exercises supporting the F-15 and F-16. Having a good radar is always good because in general there is no support from AWACS aircraft or ground radars in long-range penetration missions. Israel has created a ground-based radar network that has allowed it to replace the E-2 Hawkeye, but has purchased the G550 AEW to support offensive missions in enemy territory. It may be able to operate in enemy territory, which is rare for AWACS aircraft.
EW
In theory, an extremely stealthy form (VLO) could survive almost any type of threat. However, most air operations planning falls somewhere in the middle of the threat spectrum. As the radar threat capability expands, stealth and EW have a role to play in working together to increase survivability, especially when attacks on key points can reduce the enemy’s IADS capability. Electronic warfare can be used in the detection and engagement phase as well as stealth. Electronic warfare makes stealth more effective in two ways: it reduces the time for the system and operator to recognize and counter the jamming, and the weak echo from the target is easier to simulate or imitate with deception techniques.
Countermeasures are limited by the power of the aircraft, but not for a stealthy aircraft. The B-1B has 100 times less RCS than the B-52, or 1% of the echo, but even so the ALQ-161 jamming system weighs 2,250 kg versus the B-52’s 2,500 kg. The power output did not decrease, but it did improve its effectiveness by 100 times. The power for burnthrough drops in the same proportion. The B-1’s design concept assumes that it still has to get close to the target, even though it can deliver weapons at long range and has to deal with multiple threats at once.
While analysts have decided that the F-117 did not benefit from ECM support from a specialized aircraft like the EA-6B on the first night of a war, the data suggests that additional use of the EA-6B would have been welcome for F-117 and B-2 crews on subsequent missions. Delayed detection would be traded for no detection at all. In the Kosovo War, B-2s flew all missions with Electronic Warfare and Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) fighter escort. It is already clear that for aircraft without the F-117 signature, or for aircraft operating in other environments, ECMs can contribute significantly to survivability.
Electronic warfare emerged to defend aircraft from radar attack, first in the detection phase and later in the engagement phase. It has been estimated that the use of electronic countermeasures and chaff in World War II may have saved 800 Allied bombers and allowed them to attack lower and more accurately. Against North Vietnam, EB-66 aircraft were used for long-range jamming (SOJ) by the USAF. The US Navy used the EA-6B towards the end of the war in the same role. The USAF considered using the EA-6B as a escort aircraft as well, but found the fighter's performance inadequate and installed the detection and jamming systems on the F-111, which became the EF-111 Raven. During the Gulf War in 1991, the EF-111 and EA-6B jammed Iraqi early warning radars. SAM batteries had to turn on their own radars to search, which were later destroyed with AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missiles. The EF-111s did not directly support the F-117s in the Gulf War, but they helped to mislead the aircraft's actual target.
The USAF retired the EF-111 from service because it was more expensive to operate ($5,500 per flight hour versus $3,255 for the EA-6) and had a smaller fleet (40 versus 127). It was scheduled to operate until 2010. The USAF began using the EA-6 in a joint force with the US Navy.
The F-117 lost during the Kosovo conflict in 1999 was far from the coverage of the supporting EA-6B, or more than 180 km, to avoid missiles, and was unable to jam effectively. In 1999, the USAF studied the use of the B-52 for long-range jamming and the B-1 as an escort jammer. The EB-52 would operate at a range of 240 km for 12 hours with ALQ-99 jammers from the EA-6B. The EB-1 would operate together with the strike package and would jam the interceptor's search and control radars. The enemy would not be able to predict the direction and target of the package and the SAM batteries would have to search and would be vulnerable to attack by HARM missiles. Conventional aircraft and large aircraft return very large radar signatures. ECMs are limited by the power of the airborne jammers. A large and powerful aircraft would be ideal for carrying ECMs internally or externally due to the power output that could be provided and the small impact on external loads or internal space. It also has no problem carrying a second crew member, which generally increases the weight of the aircraft by up to 500 kg and reduces internal fuel. This aircraft would also have to be large.
This problem is more severe in interceptor aircraft that require a long-range radar. The wider the radar dish, the greater the range. A thin beam emitted by a narrow antenna is better for search, with a shorter range. A larger antenna diameter emits a wider beam, with a longer range, more suitable for search and target tracking functions. The trade-off comes from the need for a large aircraft that also has the necessary endurance for long-duration CAPs and supersonic flights for longer periods, and the presence of a second crew member (WSO - Weapon System Operator) to operate the radar and ECMs. The ability to carry a lot of external weapons increases RCS and is not an advantage.
Electronic warfare aircraft are dedicated to the mission of listening, detecting and neutralizing enemy emissions. The simplest method of jamming is to transmit on the same frequency as the enemy radar. This uses a lot of energy and is a heavy system. The jamming aircraft had to be as large as the B-66 and was also expensive. In the late 1960s, deception techniques appeared that used much less energy and were lighter systems. They could be carried in pods that had passive antennas to detect and change the information received. The pod retransmitted a similar signal and was used for tens of seconds and rarely for more than a minute. By the time the radar operator realized that he was being fooled, the aircraft was already out of range.
The F-35 will use an AESA radar that will also have jamming capabilities. It will be able to use pods to jam to the side and behind the aircraft, since the radar only interferes in front. It will be able to maintain jamming throughout the combat phase. The F-35 would have the ability to penetrate deep or get closer to the target, which is ideal for electronic jamming.
In modern warfare, simply “not being seen” is not enough. Stealth aircraft rely on advanced electronic systems to survive in a radar-saturated environment. Here, we highlight the technology of modern AESA radars, which have characteristics that make them one of the most important points of onboard avionics, as they are highly directional and difficult to detect, and are capable of operating as radars and electronic warfare systems, jamming enemy communications and sensors.
Continued developments in sensors, materials and electronic warfare will ensure that stealth technology remains a vital element in air combat, but will also highlight that true stealth is more than just “not being seen”, it is being efficient, adaptable and future-proof, a truly multidimensional approach.
The future of stealth technology lies in the ability to integrate multiple domains and technologies in a synergistic way. The fusion of data between onboard and external sensors will allow the aircraft to identify and neutralize threats before they are even detected. Advanced active jamming systems, such as ECMs and directional jamming, will be essential to blind enemy radars and disrupt their detection networks. In addition, intelligent navigation, which uses real-time data to avoid radar points and areas of greatest exposure, will maximize stealth. This combination of passive stealth, through design and materials, with active stealth, through electronic countermeasures and cyber warfare, will define next-generation stealth aircraft, making them even more lethal and efficient in the modern combat arena.
Stealth should be treated as an additional asset (like agility, avionics, speed, etc.) capable of contributing to mission success. And like any asset, it alone does not guarantee unconditional and overwhelming victory, but if the advantage over the adversary is considerable, it is halfway to victory.