I wrote this rather long post on the old PDF on the 2nd of March 2022 at the start of the hostilities, seems like its rather prophetic wouldn't you agree?
War, guns and egos - A dangerous mix:
Before I start this article, I just want to talk about how we got here. Europe has been suffering from a lack of integration and lack of engagement from its member states. To quote Jean Claude Junker
"Our Europe is not in a good state, there is not enough Europe in this union, and there is not enough union in this union".
This epigrammatic message underlines perhaps one of the greatest challenges facing the European union, which is how will France and Germany manage their cooperation and the role Germany will play in the new Europe.
Internal power struggles and discord among Western, Central and Eastern European member states and their internal interests provides a glimpse into the general lack of political will to achieve the EU's objectives of building stability in Europe and along its strategic borders, in line with the European Neighborhood Policy, 2004.
Security: On the security front, with threats from hybrid warfare and frozen conflicts along the crucial eastern border with Balkan states, uncontrolled migration, risk of returning foreign fighters, asymmetric warfare and individual self-radicalization; Europe faces some considerable security challenges over the coming years.
Furthermore, the European Union's membership of NATO means that Russia sees the Union as a strategic buffer for NATO and a challenge to its long-term interests to exert Russian influence in the region bordering eastern Europe.
Russia has been engaged in testing the E.Us boundary lines and response times through snap exercises. Moscow's doctrine of Anti access and area denial seeks to deny NATO forces any access in key areas bordering Russia such as the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, the far north and eastern Mediterranean by deploying missile batteries and anti-air defenses.
The hardening of Moscow's posture towards the EU has come as a result of the EU's stance towards Russia, which mirrors NATO policy of maintaining deterrence through superiority.
The E.U's reliance on NATO's deterrence mantra is ultimately no guarantee against small scale surprise Russian offensives such as the one seen in South Ossetia, Georgia in 2008 and the support of partisan forces as witnessed in the Crimea, ultimately due to Russia's ability to leverage its nuclear assets to its tactical advantage.
Russia's ambition is to regain the strategic depth it lost with the dissolution of the Soviet Union should be a cause for concern for Europe.
In recent years, considering political uncertainty in Europe and U.S frustrations in Afghanistan and Syria, Russia has capitalized on the chaos to showcase its role as a major power broker.
Russia has engaged China and Pakistan to host talks with the Taliban in Afghanistan in at attempt gain importance in the international relations arena as a broker for peace and regional stability.
Russia continues to see the Georgian NATO membership bid as expansionism and thus will continue to pose a risk to E.U ambitions of stability and greater integration.
With frozen conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine, the risk of a flashpoint along the eastern border is a risk that the EU must address by taking the Visegrad group of nations into confidence on EUs future stance on Russia.
Another area of concern for Europe comes from the growing instability the Mediterranean along the border of Greece and Turkey. The slow return of irregular migrants to Turkey from Greece has frustrated EU efforts to strengthen border controls.
The Curiosity of foreign fighters:
Foreign fighters are people who fight in a foreign conflict mainly for non-financial reasons, meaning they are not mere mercenaries, and yet also are not members of a country’s regular armed forces.
What motivates foreign fighters:
Fighter Types Scheme – Adopted from [Foreign Fighters in History Maria Galperin Donnelly Et Al CSIS 2017
Afghanistan: - Observations:
- Defending Muslims against a non-Muslim invader motivated volunteers to travel to Afghanistan
- US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistani assistance allowed recruiting networks to develop
- The evolution of volunteers from international humanitarian workers to fighters helped establish credibility and militant networks that would drive future conflict.
- In 2001 the presence of foreign fighters before the start of the US-led campaign in October 2001 and promotion of the so called GWOT concept re-established Afghanistan as a key supranational struggle.
Bosnia – Observations:
- Migrant fighters from Afghanistan brought funding networks, credibility, and military experience to the conflict.
- The influx of foreign fighters shifted the conflict from a national struggle to a supranatural jihad.
- Foreign fighters began filming and distributing videos and using media more extensively as a recruiting tool.
Chechnya - Observations:
- A local struggle for autonomy wad co-opted by an inter-connected well-financed and growing group of mobile violent extremists.
- The fighters extensive combat experience made them more military effective than in prior conflicts and sped acceptance among local forces.
- Enhanced information technology facilitated wider and more effective recruiting, the first example of "jihad through the TV".
"In the modern age, the media has become more important than rifles and guns." - Emir Khattab
Iraq – Observations:
- GWOT rhetoric and practices inflamed Muslim public opinion against the US and promoted recruitment
- AQN brought its networks and brand identity. Veteran fighters offered experience, credibility and funding.
- Sectarian conflict deepened the humanitarian crisis, pulling in more fighters.
- *Unlike many local fighters who fought for tribal, local or national aims, foreign fighters brought global ideologies to the conflict.
Syria - Observations:
- Pre-existing networks regrouped for the anti-Assad battle
- Sectarian conflict, and a severe humanitarian crisis attracted foreign volunteers, shifting the struggle from a purely national civil war to a supranational jihadist conflict.
- The regime fomented militancy to justify a brutal crackdown.
Islamic state – Observations:
- The declaration of a caliphate enabled the Islamic state to recruit more broadly based on a narrative of statehood.
- Territorial control provided for new revenue sources: ushur (taxation), oil proceeds and extortion
- The internet and social media expanded networks and recruitment globally
- Extraordinary numbers of foreign fighter recruits served as force multipliers
- Proto statehood made the Islamic state an easier target to degrade, reducing the space for foreign fighters to operate.
Present day and Foreign fighters in Ukraine and Russia conflicts:
In none of the conflicts in the post-Soviet area have so many foreign fighters participated than in the conflict in eastern Ukraine since 2014. It is estimated that more than 17,000 fighters from 55 countries have fought there on either side.
More than 17,000 of these fighters probably have participated on both sides of the conflict in Ukraine, this number is likely to increase subsequently in the coming weeks and months.
The largest group among them are Russians who are not members of the Russian armed forces. These number more than 15,000, including 3,000 on the Ukrainian side. More than 2,000 fighters have come from 54 other countries around the world, including:
- Belarus (800)
- Germany (160)
- Georgia (150)
- Serbia (100)
- Poland (20)
Most of the fighters are Europeans but others are from the U.S. (30), Canada (10), Australia (10), Brazil (4), Colombia (4), Chile (3), India (2), and New Zealand (1).
About 75% of the total number of fighters have fought on the side of the pro-Russia separatists. Some have been new to combat but many in Ukraine had experience from other conflicts, military service, or even the French Foreign Legion.
The fighters’ motivations have included various ideologies, historical memory (grievance), political attitude, nationalism, or ethnic or religious factors. Even on opposite sides, some fighters have held similar views, such as beliefs in pan-Slavism, far-right ideology, racism, or fascination with authoritarian systems.
Foreign fighters entered on the Ukrainian side in 2014 when state defense structures were weak and some defensive functions were taken over by paramilitary units open to foreign fighters, with the consent of the new authorities. The inflow of fighters on the opposing side was stimulated by Russia, which organized the separatists’ militias, recruited and transported foreign fighters to Ukraine, and conducted propaganda.
Certain formations such as the Azov Regiment, Aidar Battalion, Donbas Battalion, or Right Sector have played a significant role in the fight against the pro-Russia separatists. While foreign fighters themselves have had limited impact on the course of the conflict (only amounting to about 1% of those involved in the fighting), their experience has been important for recruiting new volunteers, conducting paramilitary training, intelligence operations, and propaganda activities.
Azov Battalion has direct links and inspired from the banned far-right terrorist group Combat 18. The symbol adopted by the Azov Battalion is the Horizontally aligned Wolfsangel which was used by then 2nd SS panzer Div.
In 2018 Time magazine published a detailed article on Azov Battalion. In his report Simon Shuster wrote
“Its fighters resemble the other para-military units—and there are dozens of them—that have helped defend Ukraine against the Russian military over the past six years. But Azov is much more than a militia. It has its own political party; two publishing houses; summer camps for children; and a vigilante force known as the National Militia, which patrols the streets of Ukrainian cities alongside the police. Unlike its ideological peers in the U.S. and Europe, it also has a military wing with at least two training bases and a vast arsenal of weapons, from drones and armoured vehicles to artillery pieces.
Outside Ukraine, Azov occupies a central role in a network of extremist groups stretching from California across Europe to New Zealand, according to law enforcement officials on three continents. And it acts as a magnet for young men eager for combat experience.”
Click to expand...
The threat posed by foreign fighters linked with extremist groups such as Azov is highlighted by Ali Soufan, a security consultant and former FBI agent who has studied Azov, estimates that more than 17,000 foreign fighters have come to Ukraine over the past six years from 50 countries.
This Ukrainian militant group’s use of social media has been key to their international growth
Furthermore, units in which foreign fighters participated were not part of the chain of command of the Ukrainian armed forces, which gave them broad freedom of action.
Some which draw on neo-Nazi ideology developed contacts with other radical organisations in Europe (such as the British National Action, the German National Democratic Party, the Italian CasaPound, and the Polish Stormtroopers), organising training, conducting propaganda activities, and recruiting other fighters in Ukraine and abroad (e.g., Azov Regiment recruited volunteers during neo-Nazi festivals in the UK and Germany). Some of the units have been involved in criminal activities, including arms smuggling, and in war crimes, such as the dissolved Tornado Group. Some have decided to live in Ukraine and apply for Ukrainian citizenship.
Notable Far Right extremist groups in Europe with links directly or indirectly to Azov Movement:
To limit the threats related to paramilitary forces, these units were subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Defence, or incorporated into the National Guard. Initially, not all agreed, and some were dissolved, but some retained broad autonomy, only coordinating their activities with Ukraine’s army (including Right Sector and formations subordinated to it that include foreign fighters).
Russia’s Use of Foreign Fighters
During the annexation of Crimea and in its aggression in eastern Ukraine, Russia has used irregular units, including foreign fighters, employed through private military companies (PMCs), special services, “patriotic organizations,” and criminal groups operating in Russia and other countries, such as Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Serbia. On the separatist side, units with foreign fighters, including Bryanka SSSR, the Oplot Brigade, the Ghost Brigade (Prizrak), the Rusich Company, and Vostok Battalion, were directly involved in the fight against Ukrainian forces.
The influx of foreign fighters on the separatist side internationalized the conflict and was intended to provide support by fighters experienced in military tactics. At the same time, foreign fighters on the Ukrainian side have been the subject of Russian propaganda, especially the participation of neo-Nazis in the Azov Regiment or ISIS veterans in Tatar battalions.
Stimulation of the inflow of foreign fighters has become a permanent element of hybrid operations conducted by Russia, including in other countries. Foreign fighters from Ukraine (sometimes also those fighting on the Ukrainian side) have been recruited by Russian PMCs, including the famous Wagner Group. As mercenaries, they took part in other conflicts, including in Syria, Libya, Sudan, Central Africa, and Mozambique.
Russian security services—notably, the special unit GRU 29155—has used foreign fighters for subversive activities and as agents of influence in other countries (including the preparation of a coup in Montenegro in 2016). Some of the foreign fighters leaving Ukraine have infiltrated the security institutions of their home countries.
Guillaume Cuvelier, one of the leaders of the foreign fighters on the separatist side in Ukraine, was awarded a medal of bravery by Igor Girkin, a GRU officer and the creator of the separatist military structures. Cuvelier concealed his past and joined the U.S. Army in 2017 before being discharged a few months later.
Risks for other countries:
Beyond individuals operating in theaters in the Middle East and North Africa, Foreign fighters on both sides of the conflict in Ukraine have taken part in subsequent conflicts, including fighting on the side of the Kurds against ISIS in Syria and Iraq or working as mercenaries.
Some have also been involved in radical activities in their own countries (militant activity within the yellow-vest protests in Paris, which started in 2018), building radical organizations, or trading arms on EU territory.
On 15 July, Italian police, investigating far-right groups that had fighters who had been in Ukraine, arrested three suspects, during which an arsenal intended for sale to Libya was discovered, including an air-to-air missile, 26 firearms, and 20 bayonets. Foreign fighters have also engaged in terrorist activities—the perpetrator of the attacks on 15 March in Christchurch, New Zealand, had been involved in the conflict in Ukraine.
Polish territory has been used by foreign fighters, including for transit to Ukraine, some involving illegal crossings—in 2014, a group of Chechens from Denmark crossed the “green” border with Ukraine in the Carpathian Mountains (Eastern Beskids).
Chetniks Bratislav Živković
In Poland, foreign fighters have organized lectures (one by the leader of the pro-Russian Serbian Chetniks Bratislav Živković in 2016), given interviews, raised funds, and organized paramilitary exercises (Tactical Group Belarus in Warsaw in 2017).
Benjamin Fisher
Foreign fighters have been arrested in Poland (Austrian Benjamin Fisher in April 2017), however, a huge number of them freely conducted their activities in Poland and in other EU countries.
On 27 February 2022, Ukraine invited foreign nationals to join its armed forces as it seeks to repel Russia’s invasion. Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine, announced the establishment of the “International Legion of Territorial Defence in Ukraine” in a written statement on Sunday.
The move is reminiscent of the International Brigades that fought during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) with the Republicans. Foreign ministers in Canada and the United Kingdom voiced support for any of its citizens joining Ukraine’s armed forces. However, critics say this would be "reckless and illegal".
Lessons not learned:
A common related concern is that the returnees will serve as heroic examples and recruit, or help the recruiters attract, new fighters for the cause. This seems to be a somewhat valid risk in Ukraine, albeit it seems to be most pronounced while the fighters are still on the battlefield rather than upon their return. Namely, most foreign fighters claim to have been inspired by social media posts by other fighters on the battlefield and have found their way to Ukraine through social networks – reaching out to the fighters they knew or approaching unfamiliar prominent fighters.
For instance, Malet (2015) has found that the heroic effect of foreign fighters serving as inspiration to others through social media is much greater while they are still active in the conflict, compared to when they return home.
A noteworthy example here would be the Christchurch shooter – an Australian extremist, who claims to have visited Ukraine (although does not appear to have participated in the fighting) and references the conflict in the infamous manifesto he distributed as justification for shooting up a mosque in New Zealand in 2019.
With the growing international prevalence of lone-wolf terrorism (as opposed to organized terrorist groups), the concerns about self-radicalization are justifiably on the rise – but it seems yet again that radicalism is feeding into the conflict in Ukraine more so than the other way around: the Christchurch manifesto has been promptly translated into Russian, Ukrainian, and other less-common languages and was reportedly making the rounds among the far right fighters, including the Azov battalion (Bellingcat 2019).
Another example is that of "Mosque Bomb teen" Pavlo Lapshyn A Ukrainian student who travelled to the UK and murdering 82-year-old man and plotted explosions near mosques..
Conclusion:
Foreign volunteers intensify the conflicts to which they travel and can destabilize the countries to which they travel next. With the increasingly complexity of the humanitarian crisis on the borders of Ukraine and diversity of combat experience, weapons proliferation and converging risks, nations in Europe need to consider the genuine and ever-present risk promoting and supporting foreign fighters within its borders poses to local, regional and global security.
References:
BBC News. 2022. Italy seizes 'combat-ready' missile in raids on far right. [online] Available at: <
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-48987723> [Accessed 2 March 2022].
Time. 2022.
How a White-Supremacist Militia Uses Facebook to Radicalize and Train New Members. [online] Available at: <
https://time.com/5926750/azov-far-right-movement-facebook/> [Accessed 2 March 2022].
Beliakova, P., 2022.
Volunteer troops can be a curse, not a blessing. But Ukraine may be figuring it out. [online] Revista de Prensa. Available at: <
https://www.almendron.com/tribuna/v...-blessing-but-ukraine-may-be-figuring-it-out/> [Accessed 2 March 2022].
Beliakova, P., 2022.
Volunteer troops can be a curse, not a blessing. But Ukraine may be figuring it out. [online] Revista de Prensa. Available at: <
https://www.almendron.com/tribuna/v...-blessing-but-ukraine-may-be-figuring-it-out/> [Accessed 2 March 2022].
Vilniusinstitute.lt. 2022. [online] Available at: <
https://vilniusinstitute.lt/wp-cont...TERS-IN-UKRAINE-ASSESSING-POTENTIAL-RISKS.pdf> [Accessed 2 March 2022].
Donnelly, Maria Galperin, et al.
Foreign Fighters in History. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2017,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep23304.
Arkansas Online. 2022.
Army ousts soldier with militant past. [online] Available at: <
https://www.nwaonline.com/news/2017/may/30/army-ousts-soldier-militant-past/> [Accessed 2 March 2022].
Unodc.org. 2022. [online] Available at: <
https://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/FTF SSEA/Foreign_Terrorist_Fighters_Asia_Ebook.pdf> [Accessed 2 March 2022].
Boutin, B., Chauzal, G., Dorsey, J., Jegerings, M., Paulussen, C., Pohl, J., Reed, A. and Zavagli, S., 2016. The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union.
International Centre for Counter Terrorism,.
Link to original post on OLD Forum:
https://pdf.defence.pk/threads/russia-ukraine-war-news-and-developments.706984/post-13599376
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