Iranian Air Defence Systems | News and Discussions

[Flotilla]

Again where is proof that it was 200KM+ away?

No proof of that of that. And the fact it hasn’t been replicated sense points to a lottery shot at best. Iran doesn’t have the AD stockpiles Russia has, it cannot be firing AD missiles with a lottery chance of hitting a target or it will soon find itself completely depleted and defenseless.

AFAIK you don´t need to illuminate continuously the enemy aircraft. An illuminator radar would alert the incoming missile to the enemy aircraft and it would turn on all jammers/ECM and start maneouvers to avoid the missile at such distances would be easy to avoid the missile.

But TSARH missiles guided by another radar would follow the route marked by a third radar (AEW/AWACS or even another S400 batteries), the missile would follow that direction. In the F16 cockpit the pilot would know that 1 or 2 or even 3 search radars have detected him, thanks to RWR, but he would be unaware that an incoming missile is flying towards him because there is no continous illumination wave radars following him. Just some seconds before impact the N40/48 missile

TSARH missiles use inertial guidance for most of their flight, only activating their SARH system for the final attack. This can keep the target from realising it is under attack until shortly before the missile strikes. Since the missile only requires guidance during the terminal phase, each radar emitter can be used to engage more targets. Some of these weapons, like the SM-2, allow the firing platform to update the missile with mid-course updates via datalink.

Semi-active radar homing - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Flotilla]

I have said it many times before that being 'stealth' is not a license to be careless. That is where mission planning comes in. Even with 'stealth', the plan is to avoid radar nets as much as possible. Being low radar observable means that if you must be inside a radar beam, your inconsistent reflections will give you time to exit the beam, however you want to do it.

Agree.
That is the reason, for example, why they try to penetrate contested airspaces at the weakest point (less radar coverage). RQ170 Sentinel entered Iran via eastern frontier (Afganistán). But as you suggest, at any point that aircraft (it was stealth) was detected, and even was properly sabotaged.

...Not 'always'. You do not know the exercise's parameters to make such a blanket statement. If the F-22 or F-35 or B-2 fly WITHOUT enhancement and with tactical avoidance, no one will be able to get a lock on them to gather any kind of EM intelligence. So you are already immediately wrong about the use of the luneburg lens.

I don´t agree.

While the nature of a military exercise varies a lot (it is not the same a Red Flag in Nevada that a Tactical Leadership Programme in Albacete, Spain), we know that in international exercises, specially those multimodal (which includes SAM systems and naval long range SAM systems, like "Nube Gris" in Spain), the participants use different frequencies to hide real signals;

F-35 Inability to Detect Russian S-300 Frequencies "Alarming" - Defence Security Asia

At the outset of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States deployed its fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets to Baltic countries such as Estonia, Lithuania, and Romania to patrol the borders with Russia.

defencesecurityasia.com

While such measures have not much sense (specially when an allied country like Spain or Germany are using same Patriot systems) there is a real necessity to do it when your platform are operating highly sensitive system like airborne radars (new ERCS MK1 radars for Tranche 3 eurofigthers) or newer long range primary radars. So in reality Luneburg lenses are used mainly in international exercises to hide real RCS;

Llamó mucho la atención en el pasado Aero India 2025 la presentación del Sukhoi Su-57 Felon, que realizó vuelos de demostración en los que no se observó un dispositivo para enmascarar su firma radar. Entre las hipótesis que se barajaron, la que cobró más fuerza es que el avión de demostración es un prototipo que no tiene la misma RCS que el avión de producción.

Lente de Luneburg: el secreto detrás del camuflaje y detección de aviones furtivos

La lente de Luneburg manipula ondas electromagnéticas mediante un índice de refracción variable. Desde su aplicación en pruebas de radar hasta su uso estratégico en el sigilo militar, el dispositivo evoluciona como una herramienta esencial en el camuflaje y la detección de aeronaves.

www.aviacionline.com

The Luneburg lenses are not designed to make "trackable" stealth aircraft in civil airspaces for security reasons. Specially when you can just have the SSR (or secondary radar) commonly known as "transporder" switched on, as you are suggesting in your post.

So IMO the more time USAF/US Navy and others (NSA) are using stealth aircrafts close iranian airspace, the more knowledge IRGC/Artesh are gaining. At the point they´re just deploying 6 B2 at Diego Garcia and 2 CSG out of the Persian Gulf and reactivating secondary sanctions in a clear signal that Pentagon, in reality are discarding military way to finish iranian nuclear program. So magic works... to a certain point.

 

[gambit]

Agree.
That is the reason, for example, why they try to penetrate contested airspaces at the weakest point (less radar coverage). RQ170 Sentinel entered Iran via eastern frontier (Afganistán). But as you suggest, at any point that aircraft (it was stealth) was detected, and even was properly sabotaged.

If the RQ was actually in Iranian airspace, why not just shot it down, either by by SAM or by the Iranian F-4s?

But...

Let us assume that the RQ and the F-22s were actually in Iranian airspace, that still does not negate the fact that Iranian ground control intercept (GCI) radar did not detect the F-22s. The RQ drone is not 'stealth' as many internet comments suggested.

I don´t agree.

While the nature of a military exercise varies a lot (it is not the same a Red Flag in Nevada that a Tactical Leadership Programme in Albacete, Spain), we know that in international exercises, specially those multimodal (which includes SAM systems and naval long range SAM systems, like "Nube Gris" in Spain), the participants use different frequencies to hide real signals;

I been to two Red Flags, first in the F-111, my first assignment, and second in the F-16.

The RCS of every participant, including the 'stealth' platforms, does not matter in the sense that we wanted to make the exercise as realistic as possible, with only a hard deck (altitude) and live weapons exceptions. The argument that 'stealth' platforms would use radar enhancers to 'mask' their true RCS does not make sense.

F-35 Inability to Detect Russian S-300 Frequencies "Alarming" - Defence Security Asia

At the outset of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States deployed its fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets to Baltic countries such as Estonia, Lithuania, and Romania to patrol the borders with Russia.

defencesecurityasia.com

While such measures have not much sense (specially when an allied country like Spain or Germany are using same Patriot systems) there is a real necessity to do it when your platform are operating highly sensitive system like airborne radars (new ERCS MK1 radars for Tranche 3 eurofigthers) or newer long range primary radars. So in reality Luneburg lenses are used mainly in international exercises to hide real RCS;

Llamó mucho la atención en el pasado Aero India 2025 la presentación del Sukhoi Su-57 Felon, que realizó vuelos de demostración en los que no se observó un dispositivo para enmascarar su firma radar. Entre las hipótesis que se barajaron, la que cobró más fuerza es que el avión de demostración es un prototipo que no tiene la misma RCS que el avión de producción.

Lente de Luneburg: el secreto detrás del camuflaje y detección de aviones furtivos

La lente de Luneburg manipula ondas electromagnéticas mediante un índice de refracción variable. Desde su aplicación en pruebas de radar hasta su uso estratégico en el sigilo militar, el dispositivo evoluciona como una herramienta esencial en el camuflaje y la detección de aeronaves.

www.aviacionline.com

The Luneburg lenses are not designed to make "trackable" stealth aircraft in civil airspaces for security reasons. Specially when you can just have the SSR (or secondary radar) commonly known as "transporder" switched on, as you are suggesting in your post.

So IMO the more time USAF/US Navy and others (NSA) are using stealth aircrafts close iranian airspace, the more knowledge IRGC/Artesh are gaining. At the point they´re just deploying 6 B2 at Diego Garcia and 2 CSG out of the Persian Gulf and reactivating secondary sanctions in a clear signal that Pentagon, in reality are discarding military way to finish iranian nuclear program. So magic works... to a certain point.

The transponder is NOT radar. This is a huge misconception due to language.

Technically, we attached an additional antenna to the usual air traffic control radar and all this additional antenna does is transmit a query 'Who/what/where are you?'. Because this antenna is attached to the main air traffic detection radar, its transmissions are directional, just like the main radar.

Then as each airplane is swept by the main air traffic control radar, it is queried at the same time, and automatically respond at the same time.

On the ground, ATC combined the two signals together and produced a display of each return on the scope.

But ultimately, there is no amount of technical info I can give that will change your mind ONCE you decided that Iranians can detect US 'stealth' platforms. The US F-22s to Iranian F-4s event is the best we have other than actual combat. Essentially, a Red Flag event. And am %100 positive the Iranians would not want to find out the hard way.

Personally, I want the Iranians to believe you.

 

[Flotilla]

Let us assume that the RQ and the F-22s were actually in Iranian airspace, that still does not negate the fact that Iranian ground control intercept (GCI) radar did not detect the F-22s. The RQ drone is not 'stealth' as many internet comments suggested.

No, in the case of RQ entered via eastern frontier. But in the case of the F22 was outside of Iranian airspace. That would explain why GCI tracked the RQ but probably not the F22. My statement it is not if that F22 that day was detected or not. Probably was not. But I believe that F22 can now be tracked.

My words were exactly these;

Using the full stealth capability of the F22 just to freighten a pair of F4s pilots was probably a mistake. If there was any "blip" or false/spurious radar bounce over the receptor and that signal has been recorded you can be sure IRGC/IRIAF has tracked the F22 waste signal, and that would help Iran to develop better frequencies and power signals, refresh rates and recording systems to amplify that waste signal.

If there is any record of that track, Iran can filter those waste signals and record the radar signature even if it so small at such frequency. Nowadays probably it is even worse. AFAIK Iran has developed and put in service PESA Radars (Joshan) AESA Radars (Meraj) and VHF radars. So same airspace is being scanned 07/24 by different wavelength radars, all of them long range. Using F22/35 or other assets (Stealth israeli UAV spotted) would generate enough "waste" signals to be recorded and tracked and used in future if not enough to guide a homing missile, at least to reveal the presence of such aircrafts and use another guided SAM.

The argument that 'stealth' platforms would use radar enhancers to 'mask' their true RCS does not make sense.

Even if I accept your argument, the reality it is that they do it. And whenever there is an internationa fair or international exercise they use this kind of devices. And in the case of Su57 at China people were surprised about that specific pre-series Su57 without them.

The transponder is NOT radar. This is a huge misconception due to language.

We all know those are not radar. Transponder it is just a Radio control device like a universal IFF. It just emit "i am here" when it receives a radio signal. But, again, if luneburg lenses are not designed to hide RCS signal why use them when transporder would be enough?.

But ultimately, there is no amount of technical info I can give that will change your mind ONCE you decided that Iranians can detect US 'stealth' platforms. The US F-22s to Iranian F-4s event is the best we have other than actual combat. Essentially, a Red Flag event. And am %100 positive the Iranians would not want to find out the hard way.

Whatever I believe it is not relevant. The most important is why not to use them?. USAF has nearly 200 F22, hundreds of F35 between USAF/US Navy/Marines and nearly 2 dozens B21.

Why not to use them?. IMO because invisibility it is not invulnerability. Good radars, trained CGI crews and a bad day can down some of them entering or getting out of Iran.

And IRGC doctrine is fearful. The design of medium/long range SAM systems mounted in vehicles (TELARs). They can be between two mountains, waiting that B2/21 F22/35 going and coming back and ambush them as F117 was.

US military corps and Israel can knock out long range search radars, and even long range or FCR of PMU2 (SAM 300) but it is impossible to sanitize all Iran soil of Talash/Khordad/Arman. They have been modernized adding IR/EO guidance channels, and they even have been suggesting (I didn´t have see them) long range missiles with ARH/SARH+IR like SM-2IIIB.

Nobody believes that Iran would beat USAF or US Navy fighters. But... are you sure US would accept another show of downed pilots marching in Tehran like Hanoi Hilton?.

Hey, I really appreciate your time spent at me. Thanks

 

[gambit]

No, in the case of RQ entered via eastern frontier. But in the case of the F22 was outside of Iranian airspace. That would explain why GCI tracked the RQ but probably not the F22. My statement it is not if that F22 that day was detected or not. Probably was not. But I believe that F22 can now be tracked.

Just an FYI...Radars can 'see' beyond borders.

Again, assuming the American side of the event is correct, that the F-22 pilots can distinguish the Iranian F-4s' armament, that mean ALL airplanes were in close proximity to each other. Not Thunderbirds or Blue Angels close, but close enough.

My words were exactly these;

Using the full stealth capability of the F22 just to freighten a pair of F4s pilots was probably a mistake. If there was any "blip" or false/spurious radar bounce over the receptor and that signal has been recorded you can be sure IRGC/IRIAF has tracked the F22 waste signal, and that would help Iran to develop better frequencies and power signals, refresh rates and recording systems to amplify that waste signal.

If there is any record of that track, Iran can filter those waste signals and record the radar signature even if it so small at such frequency. Nowadays probably it is even worse. AFAIK Iran has developed and put in service PESA Radars (Joshan) AESA Radars (Meraj) and VHF radars. So same airspace is being scanned 07/24 by different wavelength radars, all of them long range. Using F22/35 or other assets (Stealth israeli UAV spotted) would generate enough "waste" signals to be recorded and tracked and used in future if not enough to guide a homing missile, at least to reveal the presence of such aircrafts and use another guided SAM.

Even if I accept your argument, the reality it is that they do it. And whenever there is an internationa fair or international exercise they use this kind of devices. And in the case of Su57 at China people were surprised about that specific pre-series Su57 without them.

I have no problems with anyone believing their countries can detect/track our 'stealth' fighters. In fact, as I have often said on this forum since 2009, I want people to believe their countries can detect/track our 'stealth' platforms. The true verification is thru combat. And we are ready.

We all know those are not radar. Transponder it is just a Radio control device like a universal IFF. It just emit "i am here" when it receives a radio signal. But, again, if luneburg lenses are not designed to hide RCS signal why use them when transporder would be enough?.

Let us look again at the current preference of air traffic control:

1. Radar is ATC ownership
2. Radio responses are airplane ownership

Together, the two create an automatic representation of a target.

Being low radar observable, or 'stealth', cancels item one. So would YOU, an air traffic controller, be satisfied with only item 2? Most ATC do not. So if I fly with enhancers, everyone will be satisfied.

Nobody believes that Iran would beat USAF or US Navy fighters. But... are you sure US would accept another show of downed pilots marching in Tehran like Hanoi Hilton?.

If 'Nobody' believes that Iran can beat US airpower, then the answer is 'Yes'.

Hey, I really appreciate your time spent at me. Thanks

You are welcome.

 

[Mr Iran Eye]

Iran is in a fascinating position with the US and Israeli attacks on Yemen and now the war between Pakistan and India.

Iran is an excellent strategic position for monitoring war strategies, weapons used, air defense functions, and much more. Excellent practice for their intelligence and radar networks.

A wealth of information at all levels, a godsend.

 

[Persian Gulf]

stay on topic

 

[Persian Gulf]

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[OldTwilight]

look like Russian air defense systems are useless against modern threats and can not work correctly in area with competent adversary....

waste of time and money ...

 

[Persian Gulf]

look like Russian air defense systems are useless against modern threats and can not work correctly in area with competent adversary....

waste of time and money ...

that is a bit exaggerated. still better to have it than not have it

 

[Arash]

look like Russian air defense systems are useless against modern threats and can not work correctly in area with competent adversary....

waste of time and money ...

Your "source" ?

 

[Tornado]

What is the best weopon or combo Iran has to defeat something like bhramos?

 

[Garcia Sea]

Looking at how China has overwhelmed the United States in the electronics industry, its technological superiority is a foregone conclusion.
It was a painful mistake to have been deceived by U.S. propaganda for years and to have underestimated Chinese-made equipment.
The Pakistani military, fortified with Chinese fighter jets and air defense systems, brilliantly shattered the prestige of the Indian military, leaving India unilaterally humiliated.
Israel’s prized drones were rendered meaningless in the face of Chinese technology.
I hope that Iran’s leadership will reconsider their stance, even now.

 

[MS Sandhu]

look like Russian air defense systems are useless against modern threats and can not work correctly in area with competent adversary....

waste of time and money ...

S400 did not allow PAF to fu#k around .Your Fighter Fleet can't be airborne 24/7
So Systems Like S400 & HQ9B complicate all the calculations for enemy.
To hit deep inside ,PAF urgently needs NGFA.
With J-35 ,J10C and JF17 B3 fleet combined with Pl-15, PAF can secure its future well throughout 2050s.

 

[muhammed45]

look like Russian air defense systems are useless against modern threats and can not work correctly in area with competent adversary....

waste of time and money ...

India is a menace to military hardwares and the counries of origin.

You cannot judge their AD assets by Activity of Indian army. They are losers, worse than their Arab buddies