Yemen Civil War News and Discussion.. an evolving situation

[Persian Gulf]

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35 ballistic missiles and 10 drones launched from Yemen since Israel violated the ceasefire and attacked Gaza (again) 2 months ago

 

[Persian Gulf]

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[Persian Gulf]

seems the missile was intercepted by Arrow-3 outside the atmosphere

the warhead broke up into dozens of fragments which burnt up on re-entry

looks like Israel used 3+ interceptors. very expensive

 

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Israel admits Yemen is producing ballistic missiles itself inside Yemen and the only solution is to fund armed groups inside Yemen to fight Ansarallah

 

[Yolo986]

How bout you start off with Djibouti no?

After yous sorted that, wes can discuss further.

Irans in sudan and Ethiopia now, as confirmed by @Homajon

So if the US and Israel leave Africa alone, so would Iran no?

Djibouti is neutral and rents out its space for military bases. Its how the country gets its money. Personally im not a fan of the military bases there but they do not dictate the countries internal affairs and politics so its not that deep.

Sudan is being used as a proxy for middle eastern wars. Ethiopia is about to fragment and balkanise into 6 or more different states and its politics is in absolute tatters so of course Iran would take advantage of that.

At the end of the day if africa doesnt sort itself out its just going to be swallowed up by these unfriendly states who use their land as a playground to to conduct shady business.

That being said I do not agree with any of them and as I said africa should stay neutral in the affairs of countries in other continents. One example is south africa in the palestinian issue. It shouldnt have even been brought up

But yea sorry to derail this whole thread its just a bit crazy that another country is now involved in yemens mess and despite being innocent it will probably backfire on somalia

 

[Persian Gulf]

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[Sultan Baybars]

This Houthi guy is threathening for days now but i didnt see a rocket or a blast.

Meanewhile, shame on all 56 islamic countries.

56 countries!

If the populations of those countries only fart alone, Israel would die by a biochemic bomb.

 

[Sultan Baybars]

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[Persian Gulf]

This Houthi guy is threathening for days now but i didnt see a rocket or a blast.

psychological warfare. Israel did the same thing a few times to Yemen (announcing imminent strikes advising people to leave the area then not striking for days)

 

[FHN]

It is quite interesting that the Houthi armed forces' air defense missiles locked onto the F-35...it is worth taking a closer look.

What do the Houthis have?

Barq-1/2 Missiles: The Barq-1 and Barq-2 missiles (meaning "Lightning" series) displayed by the Houthi armed forces in 2023 evolved from the Soviet-made SA-6 (2K12) system. They are essentially medium-range surface-to-air missiles with a range of about 50 to 70 kilometers. They are usually deployed on truck platforms to protect coastal and inland targets.

Soviet Legacy: They control old anti-aircraft weapons left over from the Yemeni government, including fixed S-75 "Scud" missiles (SA-2) and mobile 2K12 "Cuba" (SA-6) systems, as well as portable "Needle" infrared missiles. Some of these old missiles have been converted to short-range ballistic weapons (Qaher series), but their anti-aircraft use remains.

Modified air-to-air missiles: The Houthis also converted Russian-made air-to-air missiles into surface-to-air missiles: for example, R-73 ( AA-11) was converted into Thaqib-1, and the R-27 (AA-10) was converted into Thaqib-2, which were used as close-range infrared air defense weapons.

In addition, they are equipped with Iranian-made Saqr-358 infrared-guided missiles (also known as Saqr-1), which the Houthis have used to actively counter U.S. drones, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency. The passive homing characteristics of these infrared-guided missiles make it difficult for the F-35 to detect incoming missiles through its radar early warning system.

How did the Houthis lock on to the F-35?

The F-35 fighter was designed with a focus on reducing its radar cross-section. Its flat fuselage and coating make it difficult to detect under common X-band radars, but stealth is not effective in all frequency bands: the F-35's tail and side structures are relatively bulky (being fat is its original sin), and its RCS is significantly increased in front of some lower-frequency radars (such as the L-band).

In addition, the F-35's F135 turbofan engine still produces strong infrared radiation, especially at full thrust and afterburner. If the bomb bay is opened or weapons are dropped during flight, its radar cross section will increase temporarily, giving enemy radars a chance to capture it. Although the F-35 is equipped with advanced AN/ASQ-239 electronic warfare pods to interfere with enemy radars and suppress threats, "stealth is only a means to increase survivability, not an absolute guarantee." In other words, in a complex battlefield environment, the F-35 may still be detected and attacked.

During the recent operation in Yemen, a US F-35 was locked and forced to take evasive action. Reports indicate that the aircraft was spotted and targeted by a Houthi anti-aircraft missile while performing a mission, and the pilot immediately performed an emergency maneuver to avoid the incoming missile.

To get rid of the missile threat, the F-35 quickly changed its course (such as sharp turns, dives or climbs), while releasing a variety of countermeasures and electronic jammers: the aircraft fired flares to attract infrared missiles, released chaff to confuse radar-guided missiles, and activated electronic jamming signals to interfere with enemy radar and guidance systems. In this case of being locked by a missile at close range, the F-35 successfully avoided the shooting through the above evasive actions and was ultimately not hit.

The Houthis’ infrared-guided anti-aircraft missiles went for the F-35’s obvious infrared signature… and then the fighter jets used conventional evasive tactics to evade infrared missiles and evaded them. This is very old-fashioned, and still at the level of last century’s air combat.

 

[FHN]

The F-35 was able to dodge it, but the MQ-9 had no such luck... According to official Houthi statistics, the Houthi armed forces have shot down a total of 22 US MQ-9 drones.

The MQ-9 drone is particularly vulnerable to the multi-source sensing and flexible Houthi air defense network due to its long flight time, low-altitude flight and relatively large infrared and radar characteristics.

The Houthi armed forces have built a cross-band, multi-means air defense system using VHF low-frequency radar, passive infrared/photoelectric detection, electronic reconnaissance equipment and surface-to-air missiles modified from air-to-air missiles. It can detect and lock on when the MQ-9 is performing continuous surveillance missions, and intercept with infrared-guided missiles or medium-range SAMs at the end.

 

[SolarWarden]

It is quite interesting that the Houthi armed forces' air defense missiles locked onto the F-35...it is worth taking a closer look.

What do the Houthis have?

Barq-1/2 Missiles: The Barq-1 and Barq-2 missiles (meaning "Lightning" series) displayed by the Houthi armed forces in 2023 evolved from the Soviet-made SA-6 (2K12) system. They are essentially medium-range surface-to-air missiles with a range of about 50 to 70 kilometers. They are usually deployed on truck platforms to protect coastal and inland targets.

Soviet Legacy: They control old anti-aircraft weapons left over from the Yemeni government, including fixed S-75 "Scud" missiles (SA-2) and mobile 2K12 "Cuba" (SA-6) systems, as well as portable "Needle" infrared missiles. Some of these old missiles have been converted to short-range ballistic weapons (Qaher series), but their anti-aircraft use remains.

Modified air-to-air missiles: The Houthis also converted Russian-made air-to-air missiles into surface-to-air missiles: for example, R-73 ( AA-11) was converted into Thaqib-1, and the R-27 (AA-10) was converted into Thaqib-2, which were used as close-range infrared air defense weapons.

In addition, they are equipped with Iranian-made Saqr-358 infrared-guided missiles (also known as Saqr-1), which the Houthis have used to actively counter U.S. drones, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency. The passive homing characteristics of these infrared-guided missiles make it difficult for the F-35 to detect incoming missiles through its radar early warning system.

How did the Houthis lock on to the F-35?

The F-35 fighter was designed with a focus on reducing its radar cross-section. Its flat fuselage and coating make it difficult to detect under common X-band radars, but stealth is not effective in all frequency bands: the F-35's tail and side structures are relatively bulky (being fat is its original sin), and its RCS is significantly increased in front of some lower-frequency radars (such as the L-band).

In addition, the F-35's F135 turbofan engine still produces strong infrared radiation, especially at full thrust and afterburner. If the bomb bay is opened or weapons are dropped during flight, its radar cross section will increase temporarily, giving enemy radars a chance to capture it. Although the F-35 is equipped with advanced AN/ASQ-239 electronic warfare pods to interfere with enemy radars and suppress threats, "stealth is only a means to increase survivability, not an absolute guarantee." In other words, in a complex battlefield environment, the F-35 may still be detected and attacked.

During the recent operation in Yemen, a US F-35 was locked and forced to take evasive action. Reports indicate that the aircraft was spotted and targeted by a Houthi anti-aircraft missile while performing a mission, and the pilot immediately performed an emergency maneuver to avoid the incoming missile.

To get rid of the missile threat, the F-35 quickly changed its course (such as sharp turns, dives or climbs), while releasing a variety of countermeasures and electronic jammers: the aircraft fired flares to attract infrared missiles, released chaff to confuse radar-guided missiles, and activated electronic jamming signals to interfere with enemy radar and guidance systems. In this case of being locked by a missile at close range, the F-35 successfully avoided the shooting through the above evasive actions and was ultimately not hit.

The Houthis’ infrared-guided anti-aircraft missiles went for the F-35’s obvious infrared signature… and then the fighter jets used conventional evasive tactics to evade infrared missiles and evaded them. This is very old-fashioned, and still at the level of last century’s air combat.
View attachment 122111

How do you know F-35 was locked?

This should be good.

 

[LeGenD]

It is quite interesting that the Houthi armed forces' air defense missiles locked onto the F-35...it is worth taking a closer look.

What do the Houthis have?

Barq-1/2 Missiles: The Barq-1 and Barq-2 missiles (meaning "Lightning" series) displayed by the Houthi armed forces in 2023 evolved from the Soviet-made SA-6 (2K12) system. They are essentially medium-range surface-to-air missiles with a range of about 50 to 70 kilometers. They are usually deployed on truck platforms to protect coastal and inland targets.

Soviet Legacy: They control old anti-aircraft weapons left over from the Yemeni government, including fixed S-75 "Scud" missiles (SA-2) and mobile 2K12 "Cuba" (SA-6) systems, as well as portable "Needle" infrared missiles. Some of these old missiles have been converted to short-range ballistic weapons (Qaher series), but their anti-aircraft use remains.

Modified air-to-air missiles: The Houthis also converted Russian-made air-to-air missiles into surface-to-air missiles: for example, R-73 ( AA-11) was converted into Thaqib-1, and the R-27 (AA-10) was converted into Thaqib-2, which were used as close-range infrared air defense weapons.

In addition, they are equipped with Iranian-made Saqr-358 infrared-guided missiles (also known as Saqr-1), which the Houthis have used to actively counter U.S. drones, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency. The passive homing characteristics of these infrared-guided missiles make it difficult for the F-35 to detect incoming missiles through its radar early warning system.

How did the Houthis lock on to the F-35?

The F-35 fighter was designed with a focus on reducing its radar cross-section. Its flat fuselage and coating make it difficult to detect under common X-band radars, but stealth is not effective in all frequency bands: the F-35's tail and side structures are relatively bulky (being fat is its original sin), and its RCS is significantly increased in front of some lower-frequency radars (such as the L-band).

In addition, the F-35's F135 turbofan engine still produces strong infrared radiation, especially at full thrust and afterburner. If the bomb bay is opened or weapons are dropped during flight, its radar cross section will increase temporarily, giving enemy radars a chance to capture it. Although the F-35 is equipped with advanced AN/ASQ-239 electronic warfare pods to interfere with enemy radars and suppress threats, "stealth is only a means to increase survivability, not an absolute guarantee." In other words, in a complex battlefield environment, the F-35 may still be detected and attacked.

During the recent operation in Yemen, a US F-35 was locked and forced to take evasive action. Reports indicate that the aircraft was spotted and targeted by a Houthi anti-aircraft missile while performing a mission, and the pilot immediately performed an emergency maneuver to avoid the incoming missile.

To get rid of the missile threat, the F-35 quickly changed its course (such as sharp turns, dives or climbs), while releasing a variety of countermeasures and electronic jammers: the aircraft fired flares to attract infrared missiles, released chaff to confuse radar-guided missiles, and activated electronic jamming signals to interfere with enemy radar and guidance systems. In this case of being locked by a missile at close range, the F-35 successfully avoided the shooting through the above evasive actions and was ultimately not hit.

The Houthis’ infrared-guided anti-aircraft missiles went for the F-35’s obvious infrared signature… and then the fighter jets used conventional evasive tactics to evade infrared missiles and evaded them. This is very old-fashioned, and still at the level of last century’s air combat.
View attachment 122111

The F-35 is VLO in frequency bands ranging from L to V and more stealthy than J-20. This is why advanced air defense systems in Syria such as S-300 and S-400 could not detect the F-35 and the jet fighter would also have detected them well in advance. However, the Houthi use EO/IR technology to detect and ambush jet fighters from certain spots.

Unlike active radars, infrared sensors and seekers are passive in nature. This means they do not emit signals that an electronic warfare suite like the AN/ASQ-239, or other RF warning sensors, can detect to alert pilots that a threat is present, and especially that their aircraft has been spotted and is being targeted before and after a missile is launched. This presents challenges to stealthy and non-stealth aircraft alike.

At launch, an F-35 should be able to detect the incoming missile using its AN/AAQ-37 Distributed Aperture System (DAS), which consists of an array of six infrared cameras installed in various locations around the aircraft. However, the time available for the pilot to react could be very short at that point, especially if there was little to no advance warning. An aircraft without electro-optical and/or infrared missile launch detection/approach warning capabilities would have to rely first on visually spotting the incoming infrared-guided threat before even attempting any evasive action.
Link

The Houthi are able to punch above their weight with ingenuity and selection of technology that is difficult to offset without boots on the ground. The Houthi demonstrated significant anti-shipping capability in Red Sea with use of drones, low RCS cruise missiles, and ASBM. The US Navy is the only force to have intercepted numerous airborne threats in Red Sea and respond to attacks of the Houthi inside Yemen. Russian Navy fared poorly in similar threat environment of the Black Sea. The Houthi have also developed advanced drones and ballistic missiles to attack Israel which is also impressive in view of distance between Yemen and Israel. The Houthi have fought regional enemies for a long time and have learned much from them.

However, there is also the need to check the hype. The Houthi were able to ambush one F-35 by using EO/IR technology from a certain spot as per recent disclosures but not every F-35 that was used inside Yemen. The Houthi were not able to ambush any B-2A bomber as it is very stealthy even in the EO/IR spectrum. Pete Hegseth did not consider a large-scale military operation to defeat the Houthi in recent escalation. The objective was limited to bringing the Houthi to the negotiation table to discourage anti-shipping activity in Red Sea. The Houthi have not attacked ships in Red Sea like in the past in a while. Trump is not interested in war but deal(s), but he made his point.

Nevertheless, there is always the possibility of losses in war particularly when up against a well-armed and experienced opponent.

 

[Persian Gulf]

Pete Hegseth did not consider a large-scale military operation to defeat the Houthi in recent escalation. The objective was limited to bringing the Houthi to the negotiation table to discourage anti-shipping activity in Red Sea.

this seems like generous speculation. news reports suggest US plans to move to 'phase 2' were impeded by unexpected Yemeni successes and Trump called a premature stop as a result.

I agree with everything else you wrote