Today, 22 Years Ago, Indonesian Air Force F-16s Nearly “Dogfight” with F/A-18 Hornets Over Bawean
03/07/2025
Many netizens may have forgotten that on this date, July 3, twenty-two years ago, a historic event occurred in the world of Indonesia’s air defense. On July 3, 2003, there was a near aerial duel between F-16s from Air Squadron 3, Iswahjudi Air Base, Madiun, and a group of F/A-18 Hornets from the nuclear aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70).
The incident, which took place over the Java Sea northwest of Bawean Island, later became known as the Bawean Incident. At that time, two Indonesian Air Force F-16s faced off against nine US Navy F/A-18 Hornets. The event began when the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, accompanied by two frigates and a destroyer, sailed from Singapore toward Australia via the Karimata Strait (ALKI I) and into the Java Sea. As the formation passed Bawean’s waters, the F/A-18s, part of the carrier’s air wing, conducted routine flight training and maneuvers that were deemed dangerous to civil air traffic within Indonesian airspace.
Detection of this unauthorized flight was first reported at 11:41 AM Western Indonesian Time (WIB). The Sector Operations Center (Posek) Hanudnas II in Makassar received a report from the Military Civil Coordination (MCC) in Ngurah Rai, Bali, about unidentified flights over Bawean Island. Five aircraft were detected at altitudes between 15,000 and 35,000 feet, flying at approximately 450 knots with squawk number (IFF mode 3/A) 1200.
There was no communication heard between these five unidentified aircraft and Air Traffic Control (ATC) in Bali or Surabaya. The information was then forwarded to the National Air Defense Operations Center (Popunas) in Jakarta for monitoring. Posek Hanudnas II instructed MCC Rai and MCC Juanda to keep tracking the flights and requested confirmation from Popunas on whether security clearance had been issued for the aircraft involved.
Two hours later, at 2:50 PM WIB, a number of unidentified aircraft reappeared near Bawean. Commander of Sector Operations II, Air Commodore Panji Utama, immediately reported the incident to the National Air Defense Commander, Air Vice Marshal Wresniwiro, who ordered visual identification using F-16 interceptor jets on standby at Iswahjudi Air Base. This marked the start of what became known as the Bawean Incident.
At 3:40 PM WIB, Lieutenant Colonel Tatang Harlyansyah, Commander of Air Squadron 3, was instructed to prepare F-16s for visual identification along radial bearings of 340–015 degrees, flight levels 15,500–25,000 feet, at distances of 113–135 nautical miles from Surabaya (the Bawean area). At 3:53 PM, the National Air Defense Commander reported the operation plan to the Chief of General Staff and Air Force Chief of Staff, Air Chief Marshal Chappy Hakim.
By 4:40 PM WIB, the pilots had started the engines of the two twin-seat F-16s. Falcon 1 (TS-1603) was crewed by Captain Ian Fuadi and Captain Fajar Adriyanto, while Falcon 2 (TS-1602) was crewed by Captain Tonny Haryono and Captain Satriyo Utomo. At 5:04 PM, both F-16s (Falcon Flight), each armed with two AIM-9P4 missiles and 450 rounds of 20mm ammunition, took off.
At 5:16 PM WIB, Falcon Flight appeared on Surabaya radar and was monitored by MCC Rai. Two minutes later, Falcon Flight made contact on the SBY Director frequency, acting as Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI), and received information on the positions and number of unidentified aircraft. Four minutes after that, Falcon Flight was informed that two other planes were quickly approaching them.
At 5:22 PM WIB, Falcon Flight made radar contact with the targets. At this point, both sides’ radar ECCM (electronic counter-countermeasures) systems began jamming each other, with each side’s electronic warfare equipment broadcasting radio waves in an attempt to disrupt the other. Both F-16s activated their anti-jamming systems and set them to auto mode, making the F/A-18s’ jamming attempts ineffective. According to the F-16s’ radar warning receivers (RWR), Falcon 1 was locked onto by the radar and missiles of an F/A-18.
At 5:25 PM WIB, Falcon 1 visually identified an F/A-18 and both jets engaged in mutual turning maneuvers, with Falcon 1 positioning itself behind the F/A-18. Falcon 2 immediately took a supporting position but was chased by another F/A-18. To indicate that the Indonesian F-16s were not hostile, Falcon 2 rocked its wings—a standard “no threat” signal.
Cockpit recordings from Falcon 2 (TS-1602, with Captain Tonny and Captain Satriyo) showed Falcon 1 executing a hard bank, nearly 90 degrees, while closely tailed by Hornet 1. Meanwhile, the second Hornet shadowed its partner. Falcon 2 also had a tactical advantage over Hornet 2, so if the encounter had escalated, Captain Tonny and Captain Satriyo could have assisted Falcon 1. While maneuvering sharply to avoid a potential Sidewinder missile, Captain Fajar managed to spot a US Navy destroyer below and immediately reported it.
Both Indonesian F-16s came very close to a dogfight with the Hornets but refrained from offensive action. Their orders were strictly to intercept and visually identify—finding out the aircraft type, nationality, and the purpose of their maneuvers.
The Indonesian Falcon Flight leader then informed the US Navy F/A-18s that they were in Indonesian airspace, explained the F-16s were on visual ID patrol, and instructed the F/A-18s to contact the local ATC, as Bali Control (responsible for the area’s air traffic) was unaware of their presence.
At 5:22 PM WIB, the Hornets turned away while Falcon Flight returned to Iswahjudi Air Base, landing safely at 6:15 PM. Sector Operations II continued monitoring under the supervision of Popunas. MCC Rai reported to Popunas that after the F-16s’ visual identification, the F/A-18s finally established contact with Ngurah Rai Airport ATC as directed by the Indonesian pilots.
(Gilang Perdana – Quoted from the book “Incident Over Bawean” by Air Vice Marshal Wresniwiro)
