Pakistan-Af: Operation Khyber Storm

[Distant_Observer]

Hezbollah exists, Hamas exists, and again, Pakistan can’t use the same approach as Israel of bombing without concern for civilian casualties. The Israelis have also essentially walled off their territory (easier to do with their geography and size), which is not feasible for Pakistan.

This is not a conventional war, its COIN, and while attacks such as these help, its not going to end the TTP or Baloch insurgencies without sustained, non-kinetic measures.

Again, since people seem to have trouble understanding what we mean when we caution about the future - not arguing against the strikes, merely pointing out that kinetic strikes alone aren’t enough in the long term.

Agreed. This must be a sustained campaign for weeks and months in order to be effective.

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[hasssanali8998]

aren’t enough in the long term

ok then lets hear your solution pls tell us what Pakistan should do

 

[hasssanali8998]

RAW now has the Afghan Taliban as a new direct proxy.

they already had them

 

[Yasser76]

If Kabul has indeed been struck, RAW now has the Afghan Taliban as a new direct proxy.

You didnt. I was responding to those who said this would hurt India very badly.

RAW had them already. Look at the what is going on in Delhi right now

 

[hasssanali8998]

Hezbollah exists

in only name . its dead . it cant to anything meaningfull

 

[Tariq Habib Afridi]

This is not true. The border has never been hard sealed.

Theoretically, if we could put a wall down, remove all Afghan nationals, and disarm or arrest any militias (and outlaw jirgas but that is just my personal preference), I don't see why locals should object. Indeed, it would remove a tremendous social burden on society - these actions would benefit the local population of Pakistanis.

The border between Afghanistan and Pakistan spans 2,670 kilometers, making it impractical to build a wall, especially in mountainous regions where construction is extremely challenging. A more effective and cost-efficient strategy is to gain the support of local communities. By earning their trust, these communities can serve as vigilant allies, acting as your eyes and ears to prevent terrorists from crossing into Pakistan. However, there is a significant challenge: many locals distrust the establishment. They claim that some individuals act as Taliban at night, raiding homes, only to appear in army uniforms during the day, accusing residents of aiding terrorists by providing food or water. While I don’t believe these claims, this perception is widespread among locals. To address terrorism effectively and with minimal casualties, we must prioritize building trust with the local communities. This approach is not only the most affordable but also the most sustainable way to tackle the issue.

 

[SiliconBit (silicon0000)]

This is called maintaining tactical dominance in the information sphere. Problem is a lot of people want Hollywood graphics. Yaar, our guys aren't selling channay and papad, they know what they are doing.

People often forget this part.

Lesson for India to manage big picture

 

[Tariq Habib Afridi]

i think what we need is to first eliminate the root cause of why these people even become terrorists. and thats by development

totally agree win people trust then everything is easy.

 

[Zarvan]

ok then lets hear your solution pls tell us what Pakistan should do

Eventually you have to address the political issues causing these. Military operations are exact reason TTP was born. Yes state has to strike back but before 2006 there was no TTP. The way military entered in 2003 and three years of operation gave birth to TTP. Now the solution is not simple. It has to be multi layered strategy.

 

[Mighty_Dragon_Strike]

Hezbollah exists, Hamas exists, and again, Pakistan can’t use the same approach as Israel of bombing without concern for civilian casualties. The Israelis have also essentially walled off their territory (easier to do with their geography and size), which is not feasible for Pakistan.

This is not a conventional war, its COIN, and while attacks such as these help, its not going to end the TTP or Baloch insurgencies without sustained, non-kinetic measures.

Again, since people seem to have trouble understanding what we mean when we caution about the future - not arguing against the strikes, merely pointing out that kinetic strikes alone aren’t enough in the long term.

Thank you, sir , you told us the same points we already knew. But this also shows that your thinking is confined within a box, because if you actually had a solution, such a statement would not have been made in the first place.

On the contrary, you said something that won’t make any difference even if it’s explained! So my counter-question to you is: was your thinking genuine, ever?

I dont mean to be rude, but, some one has to say!


So the problem is that a mind which has neither solutions nor the ability to generate genuine thoughts, will such a mind even accept anything if you try to explain it?

Or has that mind already become its own agent?


looking forward to your response!

 

[Agnostic Muslim]

ok then lets hear your solution pls tell us what Pakistan should do

This has been repeated ad nauseam by COIN experts over the years - you can’t just fight your way out of a COIN, there is local support and that support has to be weaned away via non-military actions such as development, improved governance, economic opportunities etc etc.

There is no quick easy ‘bomb our way to victory’ solution, as much as all of us want one.

 

[Owaiz]

RAW had them already. Look at the what is going on in Delhi right now

It is a matter of degree. There was a time not long ago when Gen Faiz Hamid was strutting around Kabul as a great conqueror and Indian influence in Afghanistan was considered finished. Look how far we have come now. An attack on Kabul is a major escalation and things can get even worse.

 

[ARMalik]

The head of the snake is India. In May Pakistan had the opportunity to decapacitate these Indian douche bags. They should have destroyed IAF when they had the chance.

Also it is very clear that these Taliban are in india plotting something - what the fuk is Paksitan military waiting for?? They should level all Military installation in Afghanistan specially any Airforce bases like Bagram.

Also, if KPK Govt is security risk, impose Governor rule there, and arrest the traitors there. What is the federal govt waiting?

 

[Distant_Observer]

This has been repeated ad nauseam by COIN experts over the years - you can’t just fight your way out of a COIN, there is local support and that support has to be weaned away via non-military actions such as development, improved governance, economic opportunities etc etc.

There is no quick easy ‘bomb our way to victory’ solution, as much as all of us want one.

Afghans hate you because they are a landlocked country and wants what's yours. They want your KPK and they want your balochistan. That's why they are both on fire.

taliban and raw started ttp to attack Pakistan. Which is why when now there is no reason to fight, they are still attacking Pakistan. They are paid by India to attack.

Every reason they gave is a ruse.

Pakistan's security does not run through Kabul. Development and bullets cannot mix.

 

[RescueRanger]

Again, how exactly and specifically does attacking Afghanistan hurt India very badly ? Were RAW agents targetted in the attack ?

India would love nothing more than open war between Pakistan and Afghanistan and fighting Pakistan to the last Afghan in exchange for a few hundred million dollars of funding.

Okay lets look at some ground realities that people are ignoring here:

Since mid-2024–2025 Afghanistan remains a major source of illicit opiates and other contraband; trans-border smuggling routes through Pakistan (Khyber, Balochistan/Makran, and Sindh coast) continue to be exploited by criminal networks and sometimes taxed/leveraged by local armed actors.

[Source: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR_2025/WDR25_B1_Key_findings.pdf?]

Cross-border militant violence has increased in 2025 with high-profile ambushes and clashes in frontier areas, highlighting an upsurge in capability and activity by groups such as TTP and other insurgents operating along/from Afghan border areas. Islamabad has publicly blamed sanctuaries across the border; Kabul faces international pressure to act.

[Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-...ved-attack-that-killed-11-soldiers-2025-10-10]

The drug economy remains a major enabler — rising opium/heroin prices and high profits create powerful incentives for smuggling and corruption that indirectly sustain militant logistics. UNODC and other agencies note sharply elevated prices and continued flows.

[Source: https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_Drug_Insights_V4.pdf]

Current Picture - factual anchors:

Recent violence: Pakistani forces reported operations after an ambush that killed soldiers in early October 2025; security operations and cross-border rhetoric have intensified. [Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-...ed-attack-that-killed-11-soldiers-2025-10-10/]

Narcotics context: UNODC’s 2025 reporting documents continued dominance of Afghan opiates in regional trafficking, with higher prices increasing smuggling incentives; Pakistan remains a major transit route. [Source: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR_2025/WDR25_B1_Key_findings.pdf]

Insurgent landscape: TTP has re-emerged as a major national security threat inside Pakistan, while ISIS-K and various local networks remain active in the border region—multiplicity of actors complicates attribution of attacks and links to smuggling networks. [Source: https://acleddata.com/report/battle-borderlands-tehreek-i-taliban-pakistan-challenges-states-control]

Key drivers:
Economic incentives from illicit economies — record/high opium and heroin prices create financial rewards for smugglers and intermediaries; proceeds can be taxed/used by armed groups. [Source: https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2025/unisnar1495.htm]

Security vacuums and sanctuary dynamics — porous border areas, uneven control, and local alliances enable militant groups to regroup and operate across the frontier. Recent spikes in attacks indicate these sanctuaries are being exploited.[Source:https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-...ved-attack-that-killed-11-soldiers-2025-10-10]

Organizational overlap — criminal smuggling networks, patronage networks, and some militant groups have transactional relationships (safe passage, finance, logistics). This blurs lines between pure “criminal” and “terrorist” flows. [Source:https://www.state.gov/wp-content/up...otics-Control-Strategy-Volume-1-Accessible.pd]

Regional geopolitics — shifting diplomatic relations (e.g., greater external engagement with Kabul) and interstate tensions affect cooperation on border control and counterterrorism.[Source: https://apnews.com/article/india-afghanistan-taliban-muttaqi-899bac27dee2422e88a54372bdd9efaa]

Timeline and Evidence:




Heat Mapping:

Historic Trend analysis:


Analysis:
Although terrorist attacks were recorded in all four provinces and the federal capital
in 2024, over 95% of them were concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and
Balochistan.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa recorded the highest number of terrorist incidents in the country in 2024, with 295 attacks that also included five sectarian-related attacks. These attacks claimed 509 lives and left 517 others injured.

Compared to the previous year, the number of terrorist incidents in the province increased by 69%, while fatalities rose by 21%. This indicates that militants not only escalated the frequency of their attacks but also carried out more intense and high-impact attacks during the year under review.

Most of the terrorist activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was concentrated in six southern
districts—North and South Waziristan, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, and Dera Ismail
Khan—which collectively accounted for 171 attacks, or 58% of the total incidents in
the province.

Other significant hotspots included Bajaur, with 34 attacks largely attributed to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K), and the provincial capital, along with the neighbouring Khyber district, which together witnessed 36 attacks.

Overall, terrorist activity was reported in 22 districts across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in
2024. Security and law enforcement personnel, particularly from the army and police,
were the primary targets, accounting for over 68% of the total reported attacks in the
province.

Cross referencing the above attacks with most likely smuggling routes based on data provided by UNODC:


The above schematic is very important to provide a quick snapshot of the main transit and interdictions routes from cross-border smuggling routes - it is also the main route for movement of terrorists into Pakistan.

Borders are managed by "two nations" - Afghanistan as a state has the responsibility to manage her side of the border, a task her "government" has failed at multiple times as the officials inside Kabul do not recognise the Durand line nor the Pakistan/Afghanistan border.

Based on demands by Islamabad they are two main models to be examined here in examining any conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan:

• Scenario A: Strong Afghan action against TTP
• Scenario B: Afghanistan maintains the status quo

What would Scenario A look like: Afghan authorities move from public denials/limited measures to sustained, visible counter-TTP operations — arrests of senior TTP figures, disruption of logistics and training grounds, plus joint security steps or intelligence-sharing with Pakistan.
Likelihood based on Analysis from Brookings: Low-Moderate (Source: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-talibans-three-years-in-power-and-what-lies-ahead)


What would Scenario B look like: continued Afghan denials, limited or symbolic actions, constrained enforcement in border areas, and TTP continues to operate with some sanctuary/access to Afghan territory.
Likelihood based on historic monitoring and reporting: Moderate-High - Reasoning: current reporting and repeated cycles of accusation/limited cooperation point to this being the baseline trajectory. (Source Cited: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024...ns-ties-with-the-afghan-taliban-turned-frigid)

Second-order effects & risks:
Escalation: Pakistan may increase unilateral military actions (air or cross-border strikes), raising the risk of a sustained cross-border confrontation. (Source: https://warontherocks.com/2025/03/decoding-pakistans-2024-airstrikes-in-afghanistan)

Regional consequences: Increased instability may draw in China (protecting projects/ nationals), or see international pressure on Afghanistan; refugee flows or cross-border displacement could rise. (Source: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45122)

TTP consolidation: Continued safe haven enables TTP to recruit, plan larger attacks, and potentially coordinate with other militant groups, raising the long-term threat level. (Source: https://acleddata.com/report/battle-borderlands-tehreek-i-taliban-pakistan-challenges-states-control)

Escalation Trigger timeline:
0–3 months: Status quo continues; occasional big attacks in Pakistan draw loud diplomatic protests. Islamabad signals readiness for action; Kabul issues denials. (Baseline seen repeatedly through 2024–2025 reporting).
3–9 months: If external pressure + incentives rise (or a political decision in Kabul), limited cooperation or targeted Afghan actions may appear (Scenario A partial realization). Otherwise, continued tit-for-tat (Scenario B).
9–18 months: Path diverges: successful Afghan sustained action could reduce attacks and open security channels; failure or persistence of status quo increases risk of sustained Pakistani unilateral measures and regional friction.
^ We are here!

Key triggers for widening escalation:
1. A major inside-Pakistan attack with high civilian or foreign national casualties — raises pressure for drastic action.
2. A sudden policy pivot within the Taliban leadership
^ We are here!

TLDR: The status quo within Afghanistan is unsustainable for Pakistan from a security perspective.