A quiet military coup in Bangladesh

[MNZGamerX]

by Brahma Chellaney

Many media accounts have credited the toppling of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government almost entirely to a student-led uprising. Unmentioned are either the army’s role in the overthrow, including packing the “Iron Lady” off to India, or the military’s return as the final arbiter in Bangladeshi national politics.
In reality, the regime change in the world’s eighth most-populous country amounts to a quiet military coup behind a civilian facade.
By installing an interim civilian government made up of only “advisers,” the coup leaders have not only forestalled U.S.-led sanctions but also helped foster a romanticized Western media narrative of a student-led “revolution” in the country.
The appointment of Muhammad Yunus as the “chief adviser,” or the head of the interim administration, has only helped mask military rule. The 84-year-old Yunus, a longtime friend of Bill and Hillary Clinton, received the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize for pioneering microcredit, or giving small loans to rural families to help alleviate poverty.
With the duration and scope of powers of the interim administration undefined, its advisers work essentially at the direction of the military brass, especially the army chief, Gen. Waker-uz-Zaman, the power behind the throne. The advisers include two students who led the protests, a hardline Islamist leader and two retired army generals, one of them tasked with restoring law and order in the country.
To be clear, violent student-led, Islamist-backed protests against Hasina’s 15-year secular but increasingly undemocratic reign helped force her out of office. But the decisive factor that ended her rule was loss of support from the country’s powerful army. With protesters rampaging through the streets of the capital of Dhaka, the army’s refusal to enforce a government-ordered lockdown put Hasina’s own personal safety at risk, allowing the military to prevail upon her to flee the country.
No sooner had the 76-year-old Hasina departed for India aboard a military transport plane than mobs ransacked the prime minister’s sprawling official residence, looting every item that could be carried away, from paintings and furniture to fish from the pond.
Driving Hasina into exile appears not to have been a spur-of-the-moment military decision, but rather central to a well-thought-out plan for an indirect army takeover of the country. The international costs of killing a sitting prime minister in a coup, or putting her in prison without due process, were considered too high, making her forced banishment a better choice for the military brass.
Bangladesh’s decades-old cycle of political violence, after all, began with the predawn murder of Hasina’s father, the country’s charismatic founding leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, in a 1975 army coup. President Rahman, was killed by army officers in cold blood — along with his wife, three sons and their wives — while they were asleep at Rahman’s residence. Hasina, just 28 years old then, survived because she was abroad at that time.
What followed was prolonged political turmoil that prevented democracy from taking root. Coups and countercoups resulted in extended periods of military rule in the world’s most densely populated large country.
Bangladesh has no regional adversary, yet it has maintained a relatively large military with more than 200,000 personnel. Since external defense is not a major responsibility, the military has long pursued political machinations. When not ruling directly, it has sought to wield political power through pliant civilian-led governments.
Hasina kept the military and Islamist militancy in check, until the army chief used the student-led uprising to engineer her ouster by letting mob violence go beyond the control of police and paramilitary forces. Hasina had appointed Zaman as the army chief just weeks before her downfall, taking comfort in the fact that the general was married to her cousin.
Hasina’s fall, however, triggered a near-total collapse of the state, leading to widespread looting, vandalism, revenge killings and systematic attacks on the country’s small and long-persecuted Hindu minority. But with the mission accomplished by Hasina’s departure, the army chief finally pressed his troops into action to control the situation, including letting them fire on rioting protesters.
With its focus on profit and power, the military has a long history of abuses, as well as a nexus with radical Islamists. And like the military in Pakistan, from which Bangladesh seceded in 1971 after up to three million Bengalis died in a Pakistani genocide, the Bangladeshi armed forces maintain extensive commercial business interests, extending from real estate and hotels to banking, manufacturing and shipbuilding.
After this month’s silent coup, not only will democratization become more difficult, but already-weak civilian oversight over the military could evaporate.
Yet, with a U.S.-friendly interim administration having replaced the Hasina government, which the Biden administration openly targeted over democratic backsliding, Washington has little reason to impose coup-related aid restrictions on Bangladesh.
More than two dozen coups have occurred across the world since 2009, but the U.S. failed to formally condemn about half of those military takeovers because it saw them as favorable to American interests. Washington usually calls out a coup — an action legally necessitating a cutoff of U.S. foreign assistance — when the takeover is detrimental to American power and influence in the region.
Over the years, the U.S. has maintained cozy ties with military or military-backed regimes in Bangladesh. And it views the latest regime change as a positive development. But the White House and the State Department have denied Hasina’s allegation of U.S. involvement in her overthrow.
Still, with purges and crackdowns in full swing even as the nation remains in disarray, Bangladesh faces the daunting task of restoring the rule of law and reviving an economy battered by large-scale mob violence and destruction.

 

[MNZGamerX]

The Indians have been fuming over the fall of Hasina and clearly they are blaming the Americans for this. They may say it was Pakistan and China that orchestrated this whole thing but they are privately saying this was a CIA move.

 

[MNZGamerX]

This is an article by Amitabh Mathur. I am assuming this is the same Amit Mathur who was RAW station chief in Dhaka and Islamabad and advisor to Amit Shah. Clearly the Indians are looking for a pretext for some kind of intervention by focusing on the Jei and BNP ... Under current circumstances an intervention would be counterproductive and result in further anti-Indian sentiment that would be exploited by the Americans

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Fixing the neighborhood: Can Bangladesh crisis push India towards a long overdue course correction?

Both countries have work to do to recognise that good bilateral relations represent a win-win for both

By Amitabh Mathur, retired Special Secretary in the Government of India, and co-founder of the think tank Deepstrat

In fast-moving developments, the speed of which took everyone by surprise, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh resigned on 5 August and fled for safety to India. Her resignation followed more than a month of student protest against a policy of prioritizing the children of freedom fighters who participated in the war of liberation against Pakistan in 1971 for government jobs. The students’ agitation, spontaneous and peaceful to begin with, was soon joined by people from all walks of life and turned into a violent countrywide mass upsurge.

In the subsequent brutal crackdown by the police and armed cadres of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League’s Chhatra (students) League, over 400 people were killed, the majority of them students. There was extensive damage to public property as government buildings, police stations and buses were set on fire. With the police unable to contain the large-scale violence, looting and arson, the army was called in.

Under pressure from junior officers, army chief Gen Waqar uz Zaman conveyed to the PM his refusal to order his troops to fire on fellow citizens. Once he conveyed his inability to ensure her safety, Sheikh Hasina submitted her resignation to President Shahabuddin and availed of an army aircraft to flee.

Amidst continuing widespread violence, the ransacking of the PM’s official residence and the storming of Parliament, the army chief assumed responsibility. The president quickly dissolved Parliament and a caretaker interim government comprising 17 non-political persons was constituted under the leadership of Nobel Laureate Mohammad Yunus. It would be charged with reestablishing the writ of the government, restoring order, reviving the economy and holding free and fair elections.

Even as this interim government begins this challenging task, the targeted killings of Awami League leaders and workers continues unabated. The violence has also taken a communal turn with attacks on the minority Hindu community and Hindu temples across the country. Attacks on policemen and police stations have led to the strikes by security personnel and has further exacerbated the situation. High ranking officials including the Chief Justice, the Bangladesh central Bank Governor and others have been intimidated by rampaging mobs and forced into resigning. Anarchic conditions prevail in many parts of the country.

Public anger against the Awami League government had risen over the last few years and made her increasingly unpopular. The economy took a serious downturn following the Covid-19 pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine which made essential imports expensive.

Bangladesh depends on the garment export industry and remittances by the diaspora for its foreign exchange earnings and with the slowdown in the West, orders to garment exporters declined. Overcapacity led to retrenchment adding to a growing number of unemployed youth.

As foreign exchange reserves fell, the street price of the dollar outstripped the official rate of exchange, leading to remittances through unofficial channels putting further pressure on the reserves. Shortfall in revenue, an adverse balance of trade, high inflation, massive unemployment and rampant corruption also led to huge disaffection.

The autocratic authoritarian manner in which Sheikh Hasina functioned made the situation more combustible. In what has been described as a take-no-prisoners approach (practiced by both BNP and the Awami League), she embarked on completely obliterating the opposition political parties. No democratic space to express dissent was allowed and those who did so were jailed or forced into exile. There was no freedom of expression, or of assembly.

Elections to Parliament in 2014, 2019 and 2024 were boycotted by the opposition in the absence of a level playing field and were widely perceived to be rigged. Her calculation in conducting such farcical elections stemmed from her confidence that the state machinery remained firmly in her grip.

Sheikh Hasina was also emboldened by the backing of India, and was untroubled by the West’s occasional and cursory noises about human rights, etc. She felt that with the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) crippled, its former prime minister Khaleda Zia in jail and most of its leadership either incarcerated or in exile (including Khaleda Zia’s son and heir Tarique Rahman), there was no party to launch any effective movement against her regime.

The miscalculation seems to have been in misjudging the extent and intensity of public anger. The student movement provided the spark which set her house on fire.

The Jamaat-e-Islami cadre and BNP workers joined in the melee at this juncture and are perhaps responsible for some, if not most, of the targeted attacks. It would be erroneous, however, to think the movement was planned and orchestrated by the BNP or Jamat or by foreign intervention by China or Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency. No doubt, Pakistan would be happy with Sheikh Hasina’s departure and the US too would not be unhappy at her ouster, but it is difficult to believe any of the two organized this “coup”. It would be a slap on the face of the Indian establishment if it were so.

Sheikh Hasina has left her own party, the Awami League, a mass-based party, in disarray. Those leaders who were connected to the grassroots are long gone, and those who had potential were sidelined. Her legacy, despite the economic strides made under her leadership, seems besmirched as that of a tyrant.

The toppling of statues of her father Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, known as Bangabandhu (friend of Bengal), is much more than symbolic. Both Mujib and Hasina had tried to uphold the syncretic culture and pluralistic society of Bangladesh and there is no doubt this aspect will see further erosion. Despite this dismal scenario, the party still has an image of fighting for the poor, dispossessed and toiling masses. Its considerable following in rural areas means it does have the potential to bounce back under a fresh leadership.

The students’ movement having started against a quota in government jobs for children of freedom fighters has removed this hallowed lot from their special perch. With the fall of the party that was the torch bearer of the liberation war spirit, the political distinction between who stood where in 1971 has been obliterated by what the students are calling the second war of liberation. The term Razakar (as those supporting the West Pakistan army in 1971 were called) may not be as odious anymore and has in fact acquired a new meaning in the present scenario.

The turn of events represents a setback for India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi conveyed his best wishes to Prof Mohd Yunus on the latter’s assumption of the office of Chief Adviser, at the same time flagging India’s legitimate concern about the safety of the Hindu community in Bangladesh, an emotive political issue.

Relations between the two countries have been significantly affected by the turn of events and the way the people of the two nations perceive each other. At the moment, perception of India in Bangladesh is negative to say the least. Anti-India sentiment has been high for some time and Delhi’s unqualified support for Sheikh Hasina suggests complicity.

Bangladeshis see India’s hand in her persecuting political opponents who Dehli too considered enemies, and legitimizing repeated, rigged and farcical elections which enabled her to steal peoples’ fundamental rights through authoritarian rule. As an aggrieved party, there have been statements suggesting India needs to take the first steps to reestablish its relationship with the Bangladeshi people, not just with a preferred party or individual.

There is a lot at stake for India in having a friendly and stable neighbor on its eastern border with regard to legitimate security concerns. It doesn’t want Northeastern insurgents finding sanctuary in Bangladesh as they have in the past. Even more significantly, India would be wary of an increasing Chinese presence in a neighboring country.

There are also economic interests in trade, both in public and private sector investments in projects across different parts of Bangladesh, and in ensuring continued transit links to the Northeastern states on which India’s ‘look East, act East’ policy depends.

Discordant voices have been and will be raised on both sides. Important will be how these are ignored, and how the concerns of either side are conveyed and sorted out privately. While the new dispensation in Dhaka will eventually recognise the win-win outcome of cooperation with Delhi, for the latter this provides a great opportunity for a long-overdue course correction. Preferred parties in its neighborhood cannot always come to power in democratic electoral processes and it is impossible to sustain them in power by non democratic means. One will have to live with whoever people choose.

In Bangladesh, the time has come to understand not everyone who does not agree with you is an adversary. Relationships will have to be built across the political spectrum in Bangladesh. Only then will India’s interests be secured.

The Advisory Council headed by Prof Yunus faces the daunting task of restoring order, rebuilding the administrative machinery and reestablishing the writ of the state. It has to revive the economy which is in dire straits. It has to overhaul institutions to ensure rule of law and justice to the aggrieved in the cycle of violence, loot, arson and killings in the last couple of months. It has to effect conciliation in society and politics. Above all it has to achieve all of this to conduct free and fair participative and competitive elections.

The council of 17 non-political members is drawn from various backgrounds: civil society, NGOs, students, legal professionals, a retired army Brigadier and one former diplomat. Whether they will gel and be able to work cohesively, only time will tell. The presence of Naib Amir of the obscurantist Hefazat-e-Islam does raise eyebrows. The BNP connection with many of the appointees is a potentially troubling factor.

Most do not have any experience in administration but held positions during the BNP’s rule from 2001-2006. There is also opposition to the inclusion of diplomat Supradip Chakma on grounds he served under the outgoing regime. It is therefore hoped that the council will remain neutral in approach as well as execution.

What the council’s relations will be with the army is not known. The time-frame to hold elections has also not been disclosed. One can expect the BNP to push for early elections as its main competitor the Awami League is in disarray, at least for the time being.

One also hopes that in their enthusiasm to pose as staunch “nationalists” the council will not adopt a confrontationist posture with Delhi. At the same time, if Delhi wants Bangladesh to avoid a lurch to the right, the centrist parties should have the assurance that they will have a responsive partner. That will reduce, if not do away with, its dependence on Islamist forces.

Fixing the neighborhood: Can Bangladesh crisis push India towards a long overdue course correction?

The 1971 Liberation warriors, India are now seen by Bangladesh’s people as odious. Delhi must be reassuringly responsive to centrist parties

www.rt.com

 

[MNZGamerX]

This is possibly one of the clearest indication that the Indians know the Americans were behind the 'revolution' in Bangladesh. It is interesting that some Americans have termed the fall of the Hasina regime as the 'Monsoon revolution'

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A serious crisis is brewing on India’s doorstep, and the West has a role in it

Washington strategically pressured Sheikh Hasina, fully aware that her potential successors might be less democratic and have stronger Islamist ties

By Kanwal Sibal,

The forced ouster of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina from power by street agitators earlier this week has many dimensions, internal and external, all of which will be problematic in the near to medium term for Bangladesh itself, for India, and the entire region.

Bangladesh politics has been tumultuous, with Sheikh Hasina’s father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, considered the Father of the Nation, killed in 1975 in a military coup, along with all the members of his family – except Sheikh Hasina and her sister, who happened to be abroad at that time.

Since then, Bangladesh has had a series of military coups until the restoration of civilian rule in 1991. This, however, failed to stabilize the country’s politics because of the unending rivalry between Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League (AL) and Begum Khaled Zia, the widow of former coup leader General Ziaur Rahman, who heads the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

This has deeply polarized Bangladesh politics, making it virtually impossible for proper democratic processes to function. The BNP has not participated in the last two general elections. Khaleda Zia had been under house arrest since 2018 on corruption charges, but was released by the Bangladesh president hours after Hasina’s ouster.

Adding to this complexity of personal rivalry is the presence of radical Islamist forces in the body politic of Bangladesh, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), which is closely linked to the BNP. The JeI believes in an Islamic Bangladesh, unlike the more secular-minded AL.

These radical Islamist elements, which did not participate in the liberation struggle against the Pakistani military in the then East Pakistan, are pro-Pakistan and anti-India by orientation, given India’s role in Bangladesh’s liberation. With the ouster of Sheikh Hasina, her party in political disarray, and the BNP politically revitalized, the JeI and associated Islamist elements will wield much more influence and weaken the more secular-minded forces in the country.

According to reports, the Hindu minority in Bangladesh is already being targeted by radical Islamists. A disquieting sign is the toppling of the statue of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman by vandals in a copycat version of the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s statue in Baghdad. The residence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, which had been turned into a museum, has been set on fire, and the former prime minister’s residence vandalized, just like the Sri Lankan mobs did to the premier’s residence in Colombo and the Taliban did to the presidential palace in Kabul after Ashraf Ghani fled.

It bodes ill for the future of democracy in Bangladesh that the AL, the party of Bangladesh’s freedom struggle, was not invited by the army chief to the meeting to discuss the formation of the interim government in Bangladesh. Whether it can renew itself and what role it can play in Bangladesh politics in the future under a new leadership is unclear.

The BNP, the product of a military coup, has doubtful democratic credentials, especially because of its Islamist links. It has in the past supported terrorism and insurgency against India from its soil. When in power it opposed mutually beneficial cooperation with India in developing connectivity and transit links, with the clear objective of denying easier access to India’s northeastern states and impeding their development.

The West, especially the US, cynically sought to put political pressure on Sheikh Hasina on the democracy front, in full knowledge that the alternatives were even less democratic, with more Islamist influence to boot. The US played a role in de-legitimizing Sheikh Hasina’s rule with many of the steps it took, which no doubt indirectly encouraged her overthrow. This is not to say that there was no democracy deficit in Sheikh Hasina’s functioning, but that does not justify external interference, especially if it is selective.

Bangladesh was not invited to the Summit for Democracy in Washington, DC in 2021 to which, ironically, Pakistan was invited. The same year, the US sanctioned Bangladesh’s elite para-military force, the Rapid Action Battalion, for human rights violations. In 2016, the US opposed the trial by the AL government of local pro-Pakistan militias who had collaborated with the Pakistan military in murders and rapes during the liberation struggle.

In 2023, the State Department announced it was taking steps to impose visa restrictions on Bangladeshi individuals responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the democratic election process in Bangladesh. In May 2024, it sanctioned a former Bangladesh army chief for corruption.

Mohammed Yunus, the founder of the Grameen Bank, who was sentenced to six months in jail for violating labor laws in Bangladesh and had opposed Sheikh Hasina, has now been asked to head the interim government in Bangladesh. He is considered a protégé of the US. The corruption cases against him have been withdrawn by the new dispensation.

The bad blood between Sheikh Hasina and the US has been quite open. The former prime minister went to the extent of recently accusing Washington of seeking to carve a small Christian state out of parts of Bangladesh, Myanmar, and India’s Manipur (where the US has been provocative in its comments on the internal ethnic turmoil there) on the Timor-Leste model. It would be relevant to remember that the US opposed the creation of Bangladesh and militarily threatened India at that time. How much of this legacy has continued to influence US policy towards Sheikh Hasina and the AL is a matter of speculation.

It is clear, however, that US policy on Bangladesh has not been in consonance with the strategic partnership between the India and the US, or the objectives of the Quad group and the Indo-Pacific concept. India’s relations with Bangladesh were a notable success story of India’s neighborhood policy.

India-Bangladesh ties flourished under Sheikh Hasina, with numerous development, connectivity, and transit projects. She eliminated the anti-Indian insurgent groups operating from Bangladesh soil, as well terrorism directed at India by Islamist elements linked to Pakistan. However, she also cultivated ties with China at the same time, with China becoming the country’s biggest defense supplier. Bangladesh was the first country to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative, after Pakistan. India has been concerned about China
building a port in Bangladesh as part of the former’s Indian Ocean maritime strategy aimed at increasing its naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

The statements coming out of the US and the UK on the Bangladesh crisis take no note of India’s concerns, especially the security of the Hindu community there. Both countries, especially the US, liberally make statements about the security of minorities in India, but are silent on the issue of minorities in Bangladesh. The UK foreign secretary has called for a UN investigation into the events of recent weeks in Bangladesh, with the seeming intent of internationalizing the developments and targeting Sheikh Hasina on human rights issues.

India is rightfully concerned about the fall-out from the changes in Bangladesh, not only for the Hindu minority, but also because of the potential for the instability to spill over into India’s northeast, already under pressure due to the turmoil in Myanmar. New Delhi will also be concerned about the disruption to Indian projects in the country, especially those of connectivity and transit. With the insurgencies in Myanmar, instability in Bangladesh de-stabilizes India’s neighborhood in the east. India’s Act East policy has also been further disrupted.

In India’s view, both Pakistan and China will gain from the ouster of Sheikh Hasina. Pakistan will have anti-Indian Islamist elements as partners to disturb India-Bangladesh ties in the future. China seems to have distanced itself from Sheikh Hasina lately, judging from reports that during her very recent visit there she was not given a meeting with President Xi Jinping, besides not obtaining the amount of financial assistance she had in mind, which prompted her to cut short her visit. Anti-Indian sentiments in Bangladesh will open more doors for China there.

A serious crisis is brewing on India’s doorstep, and the West has a role in it

The US played a role in de-legitimizing Sheikh Hasina’s rule, knowing that the alternatives are far more dangerous

www.rt.com

 

[MNZGamerX]

Regime Change In Bangladesh: The Story Is Just Beginning And The Bulk Of The Script Will Be Written By India

Venu Gopal Narayanan

Swarajya - Aug 13, 2024

When Sheikh Hasina, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, hastily left the country on 5 August and flew to India, the only fact on hand was that a series of ugly designer protests conceived by unknown regime change artistes had worked.
Everything else — motives, objectives, and clarity on who the real winners and losers were — remains shrouded in miasmic shadows.
It was not the first time that Hasina found refuge in India; when her father, Mujib Ur Rehman, was assassinated in 1975, she was granted asylum in India until 1981, the year when General Zia Ur Rehman, husband of Bangladesh Nationalist Party's (BNP) Khaleda Zia, Hasina’s principal political opponent, was assassinated.
The dramatic events of July-August 2024 unfolded in the backdrop of sustained, intense engagement at the highest levels between India and Bangladesh. Look at the chronology:
The year began with general elections in Bangladesh, which were boycotted by the two main opposition parties, the BNP of Khaleda Zia (who had been imprisoned since 2018), and the Islamist Jamaat.
Naturally, then, the Awami League of Hasina won most of the seats in an acrimonious non-contest which was punctuated by her frequent complaints of foreign interference, particularly by the United States (US).
In early February 2024, Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval made a quiet visit to Dhaka. This was followed by a visit to New Delhi from 7-9 February by Dr Hasan Mahmud, the foreign minister of Bangladesh.
Then, there was a brief lull as the lengthy Indian general elections began.
Indian Foreign Secretary Vinay Kwatra was scheduled to visit Dhaka on 20 April, but the trip was cancelled. Instead, General Shafiuddin Ahmed, the Bangladeshi Army Chief, was in Delhi from 27-29 April. This was followed up by Kwatra’s visit to Dhaka on 8-9 May, and another lull as the Indian elections entered its final phases. Through it all, a persistent narrative kept repeating itself in the usual foreign circles, that Hasina ought to go.
June was a busy month. The so-called ‘student’ protests began in Bangladesh on 5 June, silent and peaceful at first, ostensibly against a Supreme Court ruling which reinstated a 30 per cent quota in government jobs for descendants of freedom fighters.
Hasina visited Delhi on 9 June to attend the third swearing-in ceremony of a Narendra Modi government. The very next day, the protests started to take an ominous turn. Try as one might, it was difficult to avoid drawing parallels with the pace and efficiency with which similar protests erupted in Manipur last year, not least because they were too spontaneous, and too well organised to be organic.
As Bangladesh descended into a well-engineered chaos, and Hasina grappled with a Damocles-like law-and-order problem, she returned to Delhi for the first state visit by a head of government in Modi’s third term, from 21-22 June.
The next day, 23 June, General Waker Us Zaman took over as the new Bangladeshi Army Chief. This was a significant power shift, which was certainly discussed at length beforehand, in multiple discussions at the highest level. And it was followed up by a visit to Dhaka on 3 July, by India’s new Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Dinesh Tripathi.
And, finally, Hasina visited Beijing from 8-10 July, a visit which she cut short by a day for reasons unexplained satisfactorily.
Police attacked student protesters in the town of Comilla on the day of Hasina’s return from Beijing, and the quota revolution irreversibly transmogrified into a month of ugly violence which ended only when she was forced to flee the country on 5 August.
It is, therefore, evident that the Indian government was intensely engaged with Dhaka at multiple levels for months, that we knew what was coming, and, that we sought to manage the fallout, which included making sure that Hasina was given a safe passage out of Bangladesh, and India granting her refuge.
But the big questions, still unanswered, are: who instituted this regime change, why, and what are the possible geopolitical dynamics of it? While the press is rife with wild speculation, the bottom line is that we still don’t quite know the who or the why.
According to a statement purportedly issued by Hasina, and retracted by her son, the entire imbroglio centred around Hasina’s refusal to cede St Martin’s Island, a strategic spot in the north-eastern Bay of Bengal, to the Americans. Their speculated objective (and this entire episode is rife with speculation) was to flank China from the south.
Some felt that Hasina was resisting American pressure with the help of the Chinese, while others pointed to Pakistani involvement in this regime change via their links to the Jamaat. But frankly, there is too much blunt talk floating around for such a serious matter as the fall of a government, so it is better to test these theses.
First, America: they may very well desire a base in the Bay of Bengal, close to China and adjacent to Myanmar; and the anti-Hasina narrative in the Western press stank of a put-up job. But really, would India countenance such a base well within the core of its sphere of influence, and what impact would such a push have on America’s broader quest for a QUAD?
When weighed in the balance, from an American standpoint, what is more valuable — a base which would wreck Indo-American relations, or a robust quasi-military formulation which (hopefully) incorporates Indian concerns and interests into its composition?
Next, China: yes, it is true that Beijing has long sought to bring Bangladesh closer to its orbit, and, that a non-Hasina government would be more amenable in distancing itself from India. But it is also true that there are limits to how much meddling of this sort can be engineered before India draws a line (which she will).
Regarding Hasina’s premature departure from Beijing in July, the easy analysis is that she did so because the Chinese demanded too high a price for keeping her in play (assuming Beijing could do that). But the chronology of events, and Occam’s Razor, suggest that Hasina may very well have returned to Dhaka a day early because of the rapidly deteriorating law and order situation there.
Third, Pakistan: whether they are supporting the Jamaat to destabilise the Hasina government on American orders, or whether those instructions came from Beijing, is a matter of trivial detail because Rawalpindi has always been the cat’s paw to only the highest bidder. That is how and why they have managed to serve multiple, conflicting interests simultaneously, without contradiction.
Fourth, Russia: not many realise the extent to which Russia is invested in Bangladesh. They have given a loan of $12 billion to Dhaka and are constructing a nuclear power plant at Rooppur. Many of the contracting companies are Indian. The first of the two units is expected to go critical later this year.
At a time when electricity consumption is rising in Bangladesh, and gas production is declining, neither the army, the BNP, or the Jamaat will do anything to rock this boat. As a result, Russian, and by extension, Indian influence, will remain undiminished in this critical sector.
Fifth, and finally, India: the chronology of diplomatic exchanges shows that India has been tracking and tackling the developments in Bangladesh very closely.
If we were unable to prevent the fall of the Hasina government, it is because we do not interfere physically in the domestic affairs of our neighbouring countries except in exceptional circumstances, like East Pakistan in 1971, or Sri Lanka in 1987.
And regime change? Well, it happens quite frequently in our neighbourhood, and we are structured to tackle it — be it the 2021 coup in Myanmar, or the ascendancy of the Taliban in Afghanistan when the Americans abruptly withdrew in mid-2021. This latest episode in Bangladesh is really no different.
Every colour revolution requires a victim. This round, it was Sheikh Hasina. But if analysts believe that the situation has stabilised with the appointment of Muhammad Yunus as the interim head of government, or, that the regime changers have won, they are sorely mistaken because, this story is just beginning, and the bulk of the script is going to be written by India, whether anyone likes it or not. In which case, it is possible that the St Martin's Island story could be a red herring.
Therefore, in conclusion, whatever the motivations and objectives behind the ousting of Sheikh Hasina, two things are nearly as certain as death and taxes: just as a few predicted in 2005, nuclear deal or no nuclear deal, that India would not acquire nuclear reactors from America, Hasina or no Hasina, the Americans are not getting a base in the Bay of Bengal any time soon.

 

[MNZGamerX]

A US Base On Bangladesh's St Martin's Island Would Be Uncomfortably Close To India's Nuclear Submarine Facility

Ujjwal Shrotryia

Swarajya - Aug 12, 2024

Just as Bangladesh's former prime minister Sheikh Hasina did not surrender Saint Martin's Island to the United States and suffered the fall for it, India too would not want a US base on the island.
Saint Martin's Island, located in the northeastern part of the Bay of Bengal, is a small coral island.
The three-square-kilometre coral island is situated very close to Bangladesh and Myanmar, both of which are going through internal political and military instability.
Last week on Saturday (10 August), excerpts of Hasina's alleged undelivered speech, which she had prepared before her resignation but was unable to read due to the threat to her life, were released in the media. The speech reportedly quoted Hasina as saying that she would have remained in power if she had surrendered Bangladesh's sovereignty over Saint Martin's Island to the US.
Her son, Sajeeb Wazed, on Sunday, (11 August), denied these claims, stating that "the statements attributed to my mother published in a newspaper are completely false and fabricated."
Regardless of the truth behind these allegations, India's strategic concerns are clear. It is a fact that India itself would not be too pleased with a US military presence on the island.
Many of India's most critical military infrastructures are on its eastern coastline. This includes the under-construction naval base — INS Varsha —that will house India's ballistic missile nuclear submarines. It is located at Rambili in Andhra Pradesh, just 50 kilometres away from Visakhapatnam, the Indian Navy's Eastern Naval Command headquarters.
Additionally, Abdul Kalam Island, from where India tests its tactical and strategic missiles, is situated off the coast of Odisha.
Having a US military base so close to the sea-borne leg of India's nuclear triad, a major weapons testing facility, and a Naval Command headquarters is a major red line for New Delhi.
The US military, when operating from Saint Martin's Island, could keep a close eye on India's relatively small nuclear deterrent posture, which in the near-to-mid term will only have two to three ballistic missile nuclear submarines, potentially rendering the deterrence redundant.
Moreover, the US could monitor Indian missile tests and gather data, which could help them predict or identify the capabilities of these missiles, giving them a potential advantage.
Furthermore, given that Indian submarine crews are not as experienced and its SSBNs relatively noisy, India is likely to adopt a bastion strategy — where its SSBNs operate close to its coastline, within a protective anti-access area created by other naval assets. This strategy would allow these submarines to launch their nuclear-tipped missiles from a relatively secure environment, minimising the risk of enemy retaliation.
This is unlike the open ocean patrol strategy where the SSBNs patrol in deep ocean water solely relying on its stealth.
A US base on Saint Martin's Island could jeopardise this bastion strategy by bringing surveillance capabilities uncomfortably close to India’s protected maritime zones.
Although the US and India are both democracies and allies, apart from being part of multiple global organisations, there are still several areas where India and the US do not see eye to eye.
This includes India's support of Hasina's government, which the US regards as dictatorial and tyrannical, India's neutral stance towards Russia, and India's tough stance towards Khalistani terrorists.
India and the US have publicly divergent stances on almost all of the above issues.
The US has a history of displaying a hostile attitude towards countries that do not toe its line. Saudi Arabia is a prime example of this. When the Saudis did not follow the American diktat to stop their assault on Yemen, the US blocked the sale of critical bombs and weapons to the country.
Many in India believe that India could also be slapped with similar measures, which is why the US military coming so close to India can be troubling for its security concerns.
Now that Hasina has been ousted and the new interim government is in place, whether the US can influence the new government to cede sovereignty over Saint Martin's Island in its favour remains to be seen.

 

[MNZGamerX]

Collateral Damage: India-US Conundrum In Bangladesh

By Samantha Azizi -August 18, 2024

The recent resignation of Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina marks a significant turning point in South Asian politics, particularly in the context of India-Bangladesh relations. Hasina, who fled Dhaka on August 5 following weeks of violent protests, has sought refuge in India, a country where she spent many years in exile after the assassination of almost her entire family in 1975. Her departure from Bangladesh is not only a personal tragedy but also a major diplomatic blow to India, which had long relied on Hasina as a strategic ally in the region.

However, the manner in which India has responded to the crisis in Bangladesh reveals a troubling pattern of interference and a misguided attempt to deflect responsibility for the unfolding chaos. India’s negative role in the events leading up to Hasina’s resignation has exacerbated tensions in the region and raised serious questions about New Delhi’s commitment to respecting the sovereignty of its neighbors.

For years, India has viewed Sheikh Hasina as a crucial partner in maintaining stability in South Asia. Under her leadership, Bangladesh and India enjoyed close diplomatic and economic ties, with Hasina going out of her way to accommodate India’s strategic interests. From re-establishing transportation links severed after the partition of 1947 to cracking down on insurgents in India’s northeastern states, Hasina was instrumental in fostering cooperation between the two countries.

However, this close relationship also came at a cost. Hasina’s willingness to align Bangladesh’s policies with India’s strategic objectives often placed her at odds with the domestic political landscape in Bangladesh. Her government’s close ties with India fueled accusations of subservience to New Delhi, particularly from the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and other nationalist groups. This perception of Hasina as an Indian puppet became a potent political weapon, exploited by her opponents to galvanize public sentiment against her administration. The final years of Hasina’s rule were marked by increasing authoritarianism, as she sought to suppress dissent and consolidate her hold on power. India, rather than encouraging democratic reforms, continued to support Hasina’s government, even as her regime became more repressive. This support was not just diplomatic but extended to allegations of Indian interference in Bangladesh’s internal affairs, particularly during the controversial 2018 elections, which were widely criticized as being neither free nor fair.

India’s involvement in Bangladesh’s internal politics reached a peak during the 2023 protests against Hasina’s government. As public anger grew over corruption, economic mismanagement, and the erosion of democratic norms, the Indian security establishment reportedly worked behind the scenes to shore up Hasina’s position. This interference, however, only served to deepen the crisis, as it reinforced the perception that Hasina was more accountable to New Delhi than to the Bangladeshi people.

One of the most glaring examples of India’s overreach was the controversy surrounding the Adani Group’s $1.7 billion power plant deal in Jharkhand, India. The agreement, which would have seen Bangladesh import coal-based power from India at higher tariffs than other sources, was widely viewed as a move to curry favor with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The deal sparked outrage in Bangladesh, with critics accusing Hasina of sacrificing national interests to benefit a politically connected Indian conglomerate. This controversy further eroded Hasina’s domestic support and fueled the protests that eventually led to her resignation.

India’s attempts to maintain influence in Bangladesh also extended to its response to the student-led demonstrations that erupted in 2024. When the protests against Hasina’s job quota system turned into a broader movement calling for her resignation, the Indian government remained conspicuously silent on the human rights abuses committed by Hasina’s security forces. Instead, Indian officials reportedly advised Hasina to use her control over the military to crush the dissent, believing that her hold on power could still be salvaged.

In the aftermath of Hasina’s resignation, India’s response took an even more troubling turn with the baseless accusations that the United States had intervened in Bangladesh’s internal affairs. Indian media and political figures pushed the narrative that the US was behind the protests that ousted Hasina, despite a lack of concrete evidence to support such claims. This unfounded accusation appears to be a calculated attempt by India to deflect blame for the crisis in Bangladesh and to distract from its own role in propping up an increasingly unpopular and authoritarian regime.

India’s negative role in Bangladesh’s political crisis also sends a worrying signal to other neighboring countries. As New Delhi continues to pursue a foreign policy that increasingly aligns with its domestic political agenda, there is a growing perception that India is willing to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbors to secure its interests. This approach risks creating further instability in the region and could lead to a loss of influence for India as neighboring countries seek to assert their independence and resist external interference.

The resignation of Sheikh Hasina marks the end of an era in Bangladesh, but it also highlights the detrimental impact of India’s overreach and interference in the country’s internal affairs. By supporting an increasingly authoritarian regime and ignoring the legitimate concerns of the Bangladeshi people, India has played a significant role in the crisis that led to Hasina’s downfall. As the dust settles in Dhaka, India must now contend with the consequences of its actions and the potential loss of influence in a region where it once held significant sway.

Collateral Damage: India-US Conundrum In Bangladesh

The recent resignation of Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina marks a significant turning point in South Asian politics, particularly in the context of India-Bangladesh relations. Hasin…

southasiajournal.net

 

[gangsta_rap]

by Brahma Chellaney

 

[MNZGamerX]

Bangladesh Army chief Waker-Uz-Zaman faced junior officers' ire in meet before Hasina's ouster

Taken aback by demeanour of a junior officer, Zaman could only respond with a 'Ameen'

By Sanjib Kr Baruah

It was a difficult situation that Bangladesh’s Chief of Army Staff General Waker-Uz-Zaman had to face on August 2 when young officers demonstrated their angst at the state of affairs when the Army had to be deployed to control the escalating situation sparked by the month-long student-led protest, an insider account of the meeting accessed by THE WEEK showed.
The meeting was called by the Bangladesh Army chief to address his officers regarding the ongoing situation in Bangladesh. To tone down the ire of the officers, the Army chief went to the extent of pointing out that “if the transition of power happened in a non-democratic way, then our country (Bangladesh) might become like Kenya or other African countries,” the account said.

Advising restraint, the General said “our country had never experienced such mass protests since 1970. So, it's a unique case. We all need to have patience.” But a lot was already brewing inside the Bangladesh Army.

The meeting ended with the ire of the younger officers coming to the fore, finally compelling the Bangladesh Army chief Waker-Uz-Zaman to concede to the frowning demand for Hasina’s ouster.

Three days later, on August 5, Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had to be whisked to a waiting military helicopter to fly her across the Indian border to Agartala, where a Bangladesh Air Force C130 transport aircraft was parked to ferry her to Hindon air base on the outskirts of Delhi.

General Waker-Uz-Zaman’s position was that of unease as he is an appointee of Hasina and was married to the PM’s second cousin, which possibly made him more wary of the volatile situation. Trying to justify the army's deployment amid the chaos to combat criminal activities and restore normalcy, the chief said that the Bangladesh Army “performed well” and “fired 1,719 rounds of live ammunition, 14,000 rounds of blank ammunition, and engaged in thirty-one 'hot situations' with violent mobs across various locations in Bangladesh”.

While inviting queries from the officers about the legitimacy of his actions, a young Major Md Ali Haider Bhuyan questioned the legitimacy of the Army's actions during the deployment. In support of his argument, Major Bhuyan quoted two verses from the Holy Quran, asking for divine help against oppression and not to be complicit in it. Taken aback by the ‘demeanour’ of a junior officer, General Waker-Uz-Zaman could only respond with a ‘Ameen’ (‘so be it’).

A lady officer Major Hajera Jahan voiced concern about the growing resentment of the public towards the Army, underlining “the pain of losing children and the need for justice” to which the General readily agreed.

Responding to an officer from the Bangladesh Military Academy, who reported unacceptable activities by some officers from the paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), General Waker-Uz-Zaman said that it would be addressed after the chaotic period subsides.

Lieutenant Colonel Mahbub, Commanding Officer of the 5 Air Defence Regiment suggested the withdrawal of the troops citing diminishing public support for the Army, while another officer from Chittagong suggested the army should work to regain its image by supporting injured students.

In his final remarks, General Waker-Uz-Zaman “expressed the burden of social pressure and harassment he was facing and quoted a lyric from Ayub Bachchu, indicating his frustration”. Rocker, composer and songwriter Bachchu is considered as one of the greatest singers ever in Bangladesh.

Now safely ensconced in a safe house in Delhi, top Indian security officials including NSA Ajit Doval reportedly met former PM Hasina. According to a security establishment source, Doval would have taken feedback on the developments as well as on the chain of events that led to Hasina’s unceremonious exit from power.

With murder and other charges being clamped against Hasina and her ministers who are mostly absconding, the ousted PM, breaking her silence on Tuesday, issued a statement, which was posted on ‘X’ by her US-based son that demanded investigation, identification and punishment of those involved in “killings and vandalism” in the past month.

More than 300 people are believed to have died in the nationwide protests that began as an anti-quota stir but transformed into a Hasina ouster movement. It is still not very clear as to whether the month-long student-led protest was an organic one or one that was engineered by foreign powers.

At the centre of a growing controversy is the idyllic Narikel Jinjira (‘coconut island’) or St Martin’s Island, Bangladesh’s only coral island. Just eight square kilometres in area, home to less than 4,000 people, mainly fishermen folk, its location couldn’t have been more strategic. Just about nine kilometres from the southern tip of Bangladesh’s Teknaf peninsula and also equidistant from the northwest coast of Myanmar’s restive Rakhine province, it is an ideal location to keep an eye on both Bangladesh and Myanmar. And by corollary, on the increasing Chinese activity in Myanmar.

Interestingly, in June 2023, Hasina had alluded to a foreign power seeking a military base in the Island in return for ensuring the continuation of her government in power in Dhaka. She had then said: “I have no intention to go to power by selling the country’s assets.” In January, before the national elections, Hasina had claimed that “a white man” had again made a similar offer.

On Monday, White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre denied accusations of US involvement: “We have had no involvement at all. Any reports or rumours that the United States government was involved in these—in these events are simply, simply false. That is not true.”

But the next line in the White House statement revealed the US stand on Hasina’s unceremonious ouster: “This is a choice for and by the Bangladeshi people. We believe that the Bangladeshi people should determine the future of the Bangladeshi government, and that’s where we stand.”

While the Arabian Sea is a familiar romping ground for its warships, the US has got a major naval support facility at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. It is only in the crucial Bay of Bengal that the US doesn't have much presence; a base in St Martin’s would have filled in the gap.

Dhaka-based political analyst and economist Dr Badiul Alam Mazumdar told THE WEEK: “What has happened is a mass upsurge. Concocted stories are doing the rounds that it has to do with St Martin’s Island. This island is too small to host a military base. It’s just an excuse playing out.”

At the same time, much to the disconcertment of the US, Hasina’s ties, particularly military, with Beijing, Moscow and New Delhi, had been warming over the years.

After a defence cooperation pact in 2002, Bangladesh-China military ties had grown manifold with Chinese weapons and systems accounting for 72 per cent of Bangladesh’s military equipment. Two Chinese Type-035G diesel-electric submarines—BN Nabajatra and BN Joyjatra—are doing service for the Bangladesh Navy. China is also helping Bangladesh build its submarine base at Pekua in Cox’s Bazar. Interestingly, the base is named BNS Sheikh Hasina.

Besides the main battle tank (MBT 2000) and the Type-69 medium tanks, Beijing has provided Dhaka with anti-tank missiles, rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, towed artillery, air defence systems, including MANPADS, anti-aircraft guns, radars, and Chengdu F-7 fighter aircraft.

Russia supplies 12 per cent of Bangladesh’s military hardware. Russia’s state-owned Rosatom is also helping Bangladesh build the first of its two nuclear power plants at Rooppur, with a soft loan of up to 90 per cent of the $12.65 billion project.

On the other hand, India-Bangladesh military ties have been on the upswing with India offering to modernize Bangladesh military and aid in capacity building. The ‘India-Bangladesh Shared Vision for Future’, signed on June 22 when Hasina visited New Delhi, is a comprehensive document that covers the entire ambit of the bilateral relationship including defence. Indian military hardware on offer includes the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft Tejas and Dhruv choppers among other equipment.

A military base for the US at St Martin’s, therefore, makes much military sense. But what is of concern for New Delhi is the prevalent anti-India narrative in Bangladesh where Hindus have been attacked and temples burnt.

Dr Debapriya Bhattacharya, a leading Bangladeshi economist and public policy analyst, told THE WEEK: “The Indian government gave unconditional and visible support to the erstwhile government notwithstanding the fact that the Hasina government did not have a democratic attitude. Obviously with the change of government, public discontent and public wrath has been directed to the neighbouring country.”

“Unfortunately, Hindus in Bangladesh are considered to be the proxy community for the Indian government. That is why they have been attacked. Moreover, many of the Hindus attacked are Awami League leaders and supporters. So they were attacked not necessarily because of their religion, but because of their political affiliation.”

On reports of statues of ‘Bangabandhu’ Mujibur Rahman being vandalized and overthrown, Bhattacharya said: “People are not yet distinguishing between the recent PM and the founding father. At the same time, we must not forget that there are extreme rightist groups in Bangladesh that look upon these statues as representations of idolatry and paganism.”

“So the rightist groups have got new space now. They have emerged much more powerful because of the lack of democracy and lack of competitive politics. Their resurgence can be attributed to the way the country was governed earlier,” adds Dhaka-based Bhattacharya. “But there is a broad-based agreement in Bangladesh that the relationship with India is a key element for future democratic progress and democratic evolution. I would look at it more as an opportunity”, says Bhattacharya.

Other than Prime Minister Narendra Modi congratulating the Muhammad Yunus-led ‘Interim Government’ on August 9 on its assumption of office in Dhaka and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar making a statement on Bangladesh in Parliament on August 6, New Delhi’s position on the developments in Bangladesh has been somewhat muted.

Said Sabyasachi Dutta, founder-director of ‘Asian Confluence’, a Shillong-based think tank: “It is but natural that there is some silence from the Indian government now. Honestly, the situation in Bangladesh is still very fluid. The interim government with a new set of people has just taken over and is trying to put on rail the basics of administration like law and order.”

Rajiv Kumar Bhatia, former Indian ambassador to Myanmar, told THE WEEK: “As New Delhi is dealing with the issue in all its manifestations through diplomatic and security channels, perhaps the government feels there is no need to say more at this stage. There may be a felt need to deal with the situation on a day-to-day basis without making any unnecessary comments.”

Foreign minister Jaishankar’s statement in Parliament indicated that India had been in the know and was counselling restraint on Hasina’s effort to stamp out the student-led protest using force. Obviously, the counsel fell on deaf ears.

The Indian expectation was also that India was to be a transit in Hasina’s departure for another country: “At very short notice, she requested approval to come for the moment to India,” Jaishankar had stated.

While the fact that India chose to side with Hasina and her Awami League very strongly at the cost of maintaining nil contact with the political opposition led by Khaleda Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) may have been a glaring mistake, Hasina’s stay in India may yet be a golden opportunity.

Although the Indian establishment may have been overwhelmed by the stunning speed with which the Bangladesh situation evolved and Hasina may have been ousted, the Awami League and its support ecosystem are far from being wiped out and Hasina may yet be India’s main asset in Bangladesh.

But what would add to Indian concerns is the strong possibility that Pakistan will find greater play in Bangladesh because of its proximity to the Bangladeshi chapter of the Jamaat-i-Islami and its close ally the Khaledia Zia-led Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). It makes sense therefore to build bridges with the BNP which is the other important political constituent in Bangladesh after the Awami League.

Says Dr Mazumdar: “The Indian government should absolutely interact with the interim government. On the other hand, Hasina should just stay quiet. Many cases have been filed against her. And if she is found guilty after an inquiry, India should hand over Hasina to Dhaka. So a lot depends on the response of the Indian government.”

Says Dutta: “Bangladesh has always been a pivotal country in the Bay of Bengal. It definitely has a key role in India’s Act East Policy. It is good for them too. It gives them connectivity to a huge market just next door.” He adds, “This perhaps is a good time to activate the ‘Act East Policy’ all the more. India needs to engage with the neighbourhood even more. Not as a counter to anybody but for the growth and geostrategic trajectory. It is time to recalibrate and re-strategise on how it can be a win-win situation for all.”

There are quite a few possible fallouts of the developments in Bangladesh. Insurgent groups from Northeast India, like the ULFA from Assam and the UNLF from Manipur, may find a new favourable geography and a political dispensation to set up safe havens from where they could operate.

Among the prime reasons why there have been mass-scale surrenders from the ULFA and the UNLF is pressure from the Hasina-led regime and the Myanmar ‘Tatmadaw’ or military that operated in tandem with the Indian forces. But a Bangladeshi regime with no love lost for India may offer a new lease of life for the insurgents. That means a big headache for New Delhi, just when it thought it had the Northeast insurgents up against the wall.

The problem of infiltration and refugees from Bangladesh to India’s Northeast and to West Bengal may become a challenge for the Indian establishment. In the possibility of a not-so-friendly government being installed at Dhaka, there could be another challenge with the narrow ‘Chicken’s Neck’ or the Siliguri corridor becoming much more vulnerable from the military standpoint.

Only 2 per cent of the land border of the Northeast region is connected to the mainland, while 98 per cent of the border stretch is encircled by foreign countries. That would call for major recalibration and reorientation of Indian military tactics and strategies.

At the moment, many important questions remain on the dizzily-paced Bangladesh power changeover. Involvement of foreign powers, Hasina’s fate, the direction of the interim government, and whether democracy triumphs, are all questions that will have to wait for the time being.

Bangladesh Army chief Waker-Uz-Zaman faced junior officers' ire in meet before Hasina's ouster

Taken aback by demeanour of a junior officer, Zaman could only respond with a 'Ameen'

www.theweek.in

 

[Alter_Ego]

These indian reports are so one-sided and full of deceptions. Canot take them seriously. It obvious Indians are sad and angry for their loss.

Things could have gone differently if Hasina didnt go full retard. Cannot supress a nation of 170 million people, indefinately. India did a major mistake by using Hasina to strangle BD society. India angered and estranged a country which really wasnt India-unfriendly in the first place. Thats a big time own goal.

 

[Strider]

This Chellaney is a clown. Don't pay any heed to him or any of these so-called 'defense analysts'.

 

[Strider]

These indian reports are so one-sided and full of deceptions. Canot take them seriously. It obvious Indians are sad and angry for their loss.

Things could have gone differently if Hasina didnt go full retard. Cannot supress a nation of 170 million people, indefinately. India did a major mistake by using Hasina to strangle BD society. India angered and estranged a country which really wasnt India-unfriendly in the first place. Thats a big time own goal.

The collapse of the AL was inevitable. This revolution only accelerated that.

 

[MNZGamerX]

Young Officers in Bangladesh’s Army Persuaded Chiefs to Back Protesters​

Army is playing a muted role and supporting a civilian interim government but the situation remains fragile​

By Syed Zain Al-Mahmood
Updated Aug. 29, 2024




DHAKA, Bangladesh—As murmurs of discontent rippled through Bangladesh’s army after Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina deployed troops to help subdue intensifying protests, the country’s new army chief convened an internal town hall.

At the meeting on Aug. 3, Gen. Waker-Uz-Zaman defended the army deployment, but also called on junior officers to speak their mind, according to people with knowledge of the gathering.

One after another, officers ranking from major to colonel spoke against the use of force, an infantry major who was present said. The meeting ended with Waker declaring that the army would stand by the people of Bangladesh, according to a statement from the armed forces.

Two days after the meeting, Waker appeared on television to announce that the prime minister had resigned and had left the country.

A younger generation of officers that tracked the protesters and public sentiment on social media played a crucial role in persuading the top rungs of the army to pull support for Hasina’s government, said Maj. Gen. Nayeem Ashfaque Chowdhury, a retired officer who has held senior posts in the Bangladeshi army. Waker is married to a cousin of Hasina, and was initially seen as a confidant of the autocratic leader.

“As the crisis dragged on, there was soul-searching within the Bangladesh army,” Chowdhury said. “The army chief saw the unprecedented unity among the people, understood Hasina’s unpopularity among the midranking officers and was aware of international condemnation of the use of excessive force against unarmed protesters.”

The army has since closely coordinated with student protest leaders and thrown its support behind Nobel Peace laureate Muhammad Yunus, the demonstrators’ choice to lead the interim government.

The high level of sympathy for the protesters among younger army officers, as well as international pressure, means the army is likely to prefer to maneuver behind-the-scenes, rather than seek to govern directly, say political experts.

Protests erupted in Bangladesh in July over a court ruling that reinstated an unpopular quota system for government jobs, in high demand in a country where the youth unemployment rate is in the double digits. As the government cracked down harshly on demonstrators, the protests grew into a broader uprising against Hasina, who had ruled since 2009.

More than 500 people were killed after the demonstrations intensified in mid-July.

Waker was opposed to “shedding blood to prop up the regime,” Chowdhury said. “By Aug. 4, he was secretly trying to convince Hasina to step down, citing threats to her own safety.”

Waker was in a tricky position, Chowdhury added, because some senior army officials were close to Hasina. The army chief has since sidelined some officials from top roles and fired one officer seen as particularly close to Hasina.

It is unclear how long the army’s current hands-off stance will hold.

Yunus’s government is facing significant challenges and law and order remains fragile, with police and many government agencies in disarray.

On Aug. 25, the army intervened to maintain security around the Secretariat complex, where government ministries are housed, after students clashed with members of an auxiliary security force demanding a pay raise and job security.

Zahed Ur Rahman, a political analyst in Dhaka, said the army has now taken a back seat and is allowing the student-backed interim government to run things, but may soon find it needs to get more closely involved in the detail of governance.

“We cannot expect the students to provide security or deliver services that are the state’s responsibility,” he said. “If the security situation deteriorates, the army may be forced to play a more hands-on role.”

Chowdhury and others said the army decided not to take power on its own because it understood doing so wouldn’t be well received at home or abroad. “The pragmatic decision was taken not to declare martial law,” he said.

Yunus is widely respected globally and the army is likely to be eager to use the chance to repair diplomatic rifts with the U.S. that emerged under Hasina by supporting his government.

Although many Bangladeshis regard the army as one of the few institutions to retain some degree of independence during Hasina’s 15 years of continuous rule, critics say the force’s senior leadership had been steadily politicized over the past decade.

The U.S. this year blacklisted Gen. Aziz Ahmed, a former army chief, for alleged corruption. The general has denied any wrongdoing.

In 2021, the U.S. also blacklisted the country’s Rapid Action Battalion, a law-enforcement unit that includes army officers, citing involvement in serious rights abuses, including cases of enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings. The Bangladesh Police Association, which represents police officers, said at the time that the sanctions were “unwarranted.”

The interim government on Tuesday formed a five-member inquiry commission, headed by a retired high court judge, to investigate allegations of enforced disappearances and killings during the Hasina administration.

Inter Services Public Relations, the armed forces press wing, told The Wall Street Journal that the army would provide its full support to the commission. Anyone found guilty would be dealt with according to the law, an army spokesman said.

Political experts believe the army faced pressure from the United Nations as the crackdown on protests worsened.

Bangladesh is one of the biggest contributors of troops to U.N. peacekeeping operations. Deployment as a U.N. peacekeeper remains a lucrative source of income for midranking officers in the Bangladesh army.

When some armored personnel carriers marked with U.N. insignia appeared on Dhaka’s streets in late July, the U.N. secretary-general’s office said the body had voiced “serious concern” to Bangladesh over the use of such insignia outside of mandated peacekeeping operations.

In the days before Hasina’s departure, the U.N. also joined human rights groups, the U.S. and the European Union in criticizing the government’s use of deadly force to quell the protests. Volker Türk, the U.N. High Commissioner for human rights, called for accountability for human-rights violations, including for those with “command responsibility.”

Bangladesh’s retired army officers also called for the armed forces to be withdrawn from the streets.

By then, protesters in Dhaka had already started to see a change in the army’s posture. Arifur Rahman, a law student in Dhaka who took part in the protests, said the soldiers moved to the main street corners and no longer accompanied the police on patrols.

On Aug. 4, the ruling Awami League called on its supporters to resist what it said was a conspiracy against the government. More than a hundred people died after Hasina’s supporters clashed with protesters across the country.

That night, a young naval officer in full uniform posted a video on Facebook where he pledged to join protesters the next day. “Enough is enough,” he said, calling on fellow officers in the armed forces to “resist.”

Heavily armed troops were still manning barricades on Aug. 5 as two main groups of protesters—consisting of tens of thousands of people—marched toward the prime minister’s residence. The columns of students paused and tried to negotiate with the soldiers, waving flags and offering flowers and water.

“We weren’t sure the soldiers were on our side, but it seemed like something happened that changed the army’s mindset,” Rahman, the protester, said. “We decided to do a bit of emotional blackmail to remind the soldiers they were sons of the soil.”

In the early afternoon, the soldiers suddenly stood aside, Rahman and other protesters said. The crowds surged past the barricades and rushed forward. The news was already filtering out that Hasina had fled the country.

“The Bangladesh army faced a historic decision,” said Zahed Ur Rahman, the political analyst. “After plenty of uncertainty, they finally came through.”

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/young-officers-in-bangladeshs-army-persuaded-chiefs-to-back-protesters-30be9fc5

 

[lee123]

India is crying so loudly because it has lost its dear puppet.

 

[MNZGamerX]

The West’s Stealthy Assault on Democracy

Sep 3, 2024

Brahma Chellaney

Regime change brought about by popular uprisings rarely leads to democratic breakthroughs. Yet Western powers have often supported coups and takeovers – regardless of the new regime's democratic credentials – in order to advance their own geopolitical and economic interests.

NEW DELHI – With great-power rivalries again at the center of international relations, democratic governments have been relying on secret statecraft to shape or sway regimes in weaker states, including by supporting or aiding regime change. Far from advancing democracy globally, these efforts are exacerbating its vulnerabilities at a time when authoritarianism is on the rise.

To be sure, local militaries – with or without external backing – remain the leading drivers of regime change. In Pakistan, for example, the military reasserted its traditional dominance over government in 2022, when it engineered the ouster of Prime Minister Imran Khan. In Bangladesh, the military recently took advantage of a violent student-led uprising to compel Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to flee the country, before installing an interim civilian-led administration headed by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus.

But external powers also often play a key role in driving regime change. Yes, the mechanisms remain murky. Since strategic skullduggery rarely leaves any political fingerprints, intervening powers can plausibly deny involvement, leaving independent analysts struggling to distinguish fact from fiction.

Nonetheless, it is usually fairly easy to see where an external power gets its leverage. China, for example, is the world’s largest trading economy and official creditor for developing countries. While the details of China’s loan agreements are far from transparent, there is no doubt that it attaches many strings to its funding, which increase its leverage over borrowers, possibly even driving them into sovereignty-eroding debt traps.

The United States, for its part, dominates the international financial architecture, enjoys considerable leverage over traditional lenders like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and issues the world’s main reserve currency. With these levers, it has significant power to reward or punish countries, including by imposing painful economic sanctions.

The US has long been accused of – and sometimes admitted to – helping to topple or prop up foreign regimes, including by meddling in elections or aiding uprisings, such as the “color revolutions” in some post-Soviet states. Some have even alleged that the US played a role in the recent overthrow of Khan in Pakistan and Hasina in Bangladesh, though US officials have denied any involvement.

The question is what a democracy like the US hopes to achieve by contributing to regime change. The answer cannot be lasting democratic breakthroughs, which rarely arrive in the wake of popular uprisings. Instead, countries are likely to face political instability, social disorder, and economic disruption. That is certainly the case in Bangladesh, which is now facing chaos and violence, with mobs burning down factories, hospitals, hotels, and homes.

A more likely explanation – for which there is ample evidence – is that Western powers are seeking to advance their own geopolitical and economic interests by supporting “friendly” regimes and driving out “unfriendly” ones. The regimes’ democratic credentials (or lack thereof) seem to matter little here, though Western powers do prefer that there is a pretense of democracy.

This helps to explain why military takeovers are often followed by elections or the installation, as in Bangladesh, of a government with a civilian face: military leaders hope to bolster the new government’s international legitimacy and, in many cases, retain access to Western financial assistance. After all, the US is legally required to cut off aid to a country after a coup. After the military junta returned to power in Myanmar in 2021, US President Joe Biden’s administration imposed stringent sanctions on the country and, later, began providing non-lethal aid to anti-junta forces.

But US leaders take great care in deciding which military takeovers to label as “coups.” Of the more than two dozen military coups or indirect takeovers that have taken place in the last 15 years, the US refrained from condemning about half, because it considered the regime change favorable to its regional interests. In this sense, the US has often sacrificed democracy at the altar of geopolitics.

Elections alone – even if competitive – do not guarantee popular empowerment or adherence to constitutional rules, especially when the military holds decisive power. While the international community might view a civilian-led government positively – even if it is merely a façade for continued military control – domestic legitimacy may well be lacking, even when the coup-makers shed their uniforms and rebrand themselves “civilian” leaders, as the Thai army chief did after seizing power in 2014. (He remained in office as the country’s “civilian” prime minister for nine years.)

Democracy is in retreat globally. Many populations are facing the erosion of their political rights and civil liberties. Even the world’s leading democracies are suffering from low public trust in governments and bitterly polarized politics. And closed autocracies now outnumber liberal democracies. By accepting or tolerating military rule – even behind a civilian façade – Western powers will only accelerate this trend.

The West’s Stealthy Assault on Democracy | by Brahma Chellaney - Project Syndicate

Brahma Chellaney decries leading powers' tacit acceptance of military regimes masked by civilian façades.

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