Agnipath context: Border forces may recruit Agniveers, send them to Army, and take them back
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Sharma Ji
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Raoul don't deserve SPG
Cryptonian
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Traitor Gandhi is using grieving gullible parents by making them lie.
Agniveer's father says received Rs 98 lakh from Army, wants martyr status for son
Speaking to India Today TV, the father of Agniveer Ajay Kumar admitted that he has received Rs 98 lakh as compensation from the Army. This comes a day after he claimed in a video, which was shared by Rahul Gandhi, that he hadn't received any compensation.
Cryptonian
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Employees can actually fukc off if they want to. There is no compulsion. Army is not your unemployment scheme.
The one who is thankless is the father of dead soldier who sat on the lap of traitor Gandhi .
Agniveer's father says received Rs 98 lakh from Army, wants martyr status for son
Speaking to India Today TV, the father of Agniveer Ajay Kumar admitted that he has received Rs 98 lakh as compensation from the Army. This comes a day after he claimed in a video, which was shared by Rahul Gandhi, that he hadn't received any compensation.
Bagheera0084
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Drawbacks of Agnipath scheme far outweigh its benefit
If the scheme is designed to inculcate discipline in the country’s youth, as some have said, this can be achieved through less risky options.
Updated At: Jul 05, 2024 06:52 AM (IST) 1076
Lt Gen Raj Kadyan (Retd)
Former Deputy Chief of Army Staff
THE Agnipath scheme came under scrutiny during the just-concluded session of Parliament. It also made headlines during the recent Lok Sabha elections. In a traditional army like ours, the introduction of a scheme that changes its basic structure must be backed by strong and cogent reasons.
Even though not so stated, the main reason for the change was to reduce the pension expenditure, thus saving money for the modernisation of the defence forces. That is understandable, since over 70 per cent of the defence Budget currently goes into meeting the revenue needs. Pensions have been singled out as a major drain. The One Rank One Pension (OROP) scheme has been vilified, though unfairly. There are many other categories of pensioners who have been beneficiaries of the OROP or its equivalent. Soldiers only started getting benefits of the scheme in 2015, after over three decades of struggle. The number of pensioners is on the rise because of their longer life span. But this trend is temporary. Statistically, the numbers entering the pension scheme and those exiting it are likely to plateau soon.
Unfortunately, India does not have a defence culture. An average citizen has scant knowledge of or interest in the subject. There is an age-old wish for the defence forces: ‘may there never be wanting, and may they never be wanted’. A good army does not keep the country secure by fighting a war, but by preventing one. It does this through deterrence by remaining fully equipped, trained and ready. To keep it thus ever ready entails costs.
When an annual review is done, all ministries and departments show a tangible utilisation of the allocated funds. This is done by counting additional highways, universities, hospitals, airports, etc. But those entrusted with keeping the country safe have nothing to show in physical terms. The fact that every other development has been possible because of them is often overlooked. Their contribution is not perceptible, and their expenses are liable to be misconstrued as being wasteful. Consequently, they are the first to come in the crosshairs of the cost-cutting measures.
The Army’s manpower is internally reviewed regularly. However, it needs to be remembered that weapons and technology per se do not win wars; it is the soldier who does. If that were not true, Israel, with far superior weapons and technology, would have achieved its avowed aim of finishing the ragtag Hamas a long time ago. But Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant is desperately asking for 10,000 additional soldiers.
India has over 15,000 km of land borders. These run through the toughest terrain in the world. The situation on some 7,000 km of the land border remains perpetually active, calling for the deployment of troops. It is debatable whether the 12 lakh-strong Army is too large. Although Pakistan is no pole star, it is pertinent to remember that our western neighbour — with less than one-fourth of our size and nearly one-seventh of our population and an economy in a shambles — is maintaining 6.5 lakh personnel. By that yardstick, our defence forces’ strength should be around 33 lakh instead of the present more than 14 lakh personnel. With our booming economy, the incessant drumbeat of our Army being too large and causing a burgeoning expenditure needs to be muted.
Maintaining peace and security is not the purview of the Army alone. It requires a synergy of diplomatic, economic, political and other factors. Unfortunately, our relations with our immediate neighbours have remained strained over the years. It falls to the Army to ‘manage’ those relations by keeping the adversaries at bay. This underscores the need for keeping a strong army.
As a result of the suspension of recruitment in the Covid-19 years, while retirements continued, the Army manpower had come down by nearly two lakh. Luckily, there was no war during the period. If considered prudent by the security policymakers, that reduced strength can be institutionalised. But whatever is retained must be homogenous. A hybrid army comprising a mix of regular and contractual soldiers cannot match a cohesive force.
After controversy erupted, certain benefits of the Agnipath scheme were put forward. One is the lowering of the age profile by two/three years. It may be mentioned that after the 1962 war debacle, the Army had sent out teams to different theatres to carry out physical tests at varying altitudes. Based on their findings, mandatory standards were prescribed for annual battle physical efficiency tests. Interestingly, the standards for all aged from 18 to 35 years were exactly the same. The age factor, therefore, is more of a post-event justification than a factor in favour of the continuation of the scheme.
It is true that the short service commission officers who served for five or 10 years performed laudably well in wars. But officers serve as leaders, where they take individual decisions at the cutting edge. The soldiers, on the contrary, always work as a team in which esprit de corps is their glue. This is difficult to achieve in a disparate group.
It has also been reported that an internal survey of the Army found the scheme to have merit. The reality, however, is that the system does not allow the Army to publicly express disagreement with a government scheme. All internal analyses get dovetailed into support for the decision that has already been taken; it is not examined critically.
If the scheme is designed to inculcate discipline in the country’s youth, as some have said, this can be achieved through less risky options. For one, the NCC (National Cadet Corps) scheme can be expanded and more Army personnel can be involved in the training than at present.
The only known benefit of the scheme is bringing down the pension expenditure. This is clearly and quotably visible. The serious drawbacks of the scheme will only be known in the event of a war. But it will be too late by then.
If the scheme is designed to inculcate discipline in the country’s youth, as some have said, this can be achieved through less risky options.
Updated At: Jul 05, 2024 06:52 AM (IST) 1076
Lt Gen Raj Kadyan (Retd)
Former Deputy Chief of Army Staff
THE Agnipath scheme came under scrutiny during the just-concluded session of Parliament. It also made headlines during the recent Lok Sabha elections. In a traditional army like ours, the introduction of a scheme that changes its basic structure must be backed by strong and cogent reasons.
Even though not so stated, the main reason for the change was to reduce the pension expenditure, thus saving money for the modernisation of the defence forces. That is understandable, since over 70 per cent of the defence Budget currently goes into meeting the revenue needs. Pensions have been singled out as a major drain. The One Rank One Pension (OROP) scheme has been vilified, though unfairly. There are many other categories of pensioners who have been beneficiaries of the OROP or its equivalent. Soldiers only started getting benefits of the scheme in 2015, after over three decades of struggle. The number of pensioners is on the rise because of their longer life span. But this trend is temporary. Statistically, the numbers entering the pension scheme and those exiting it are likely to plateau soon.
Unfortunately, India does not have a defence culture. An average citizen has scant knowledge of or interest in the subject. There is an age-old wish for the defence forces: ‘may there never be wanting, and may they never be wanted’. A good army does not keep the country secure by fighting a war, but by preventing one. It does this through deterrence by remaining fully equipped, trained and ready. To keep it thus ever ready entails costs.
When an annual review is done, all ministries and departments show a tangible utilisation of the allocated funds. This is done by counting additional highways, universities, hospitals, airports, etc. But those entrusted with keeping the country safe have nothing to show in physical terms. The fact that every other development has been possible because of them is often overlooked. Their contribution is not perceptible, and their expenses are liable to be misconstrued as being wasteful. Consequently, they are the first to come in the crosshairs of the cost-cutting measures.
The Army’s manpower is internally reviewed regularly. However, it needs to be remembered that weapons and technology per se do not win wars; it is the soldier who does. If that were not true, Israel, with far superior weapons and technology, would have achieved its avowed aim of finishing the ragtag Hamas a long time ago. But Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant is desperately asking for 10,000 additional soldiers.
India has over 15,000 km of land borders. These run through the toughest terrain in the world. The situation on some 7,000 km of the land border remains perpetually active, calling for the deployment of troops. It is debatable whether the 12 lakh-strong Army is too large. Although Pakistan is no pole star, it is pertinent to remember that our western neighbour — with less than one-fourth of our size and nearly one-seventh of our population and an economy in a shambles — is maintaining 6.5 lakh personnel. By that yardstick, our defence forces’ strength should be around 33 lakh instead of the present more than 14 lakh personnel. With our booming economy, the incessant drumbeat of our Army being too large and causing a burgeoning expenditure needs to be muted.
Maintaining peace and security is not the purview of the Army alone. It requires a synergy of diplomatic, economic, political and other factors. Unfortunately, our relations with our immediate neighbours have remained strained over the years. It falls to the Army to ‘manage’ those relations by keeping the adversaries at bay. This underscores the need for keeping a strong army.
As a result of the suspension of recruitment in the Covid-19 years, while retirements continued, the Army manpower had come down by nearly two lakh. Luckily, there was no war during the period. If considered prudent by the security policymakers, that reduced strength can be institutionalised. But whatever is retained must be homogenous. A hybrid army comprising a mix of regular and contractual soldiers cannot match a cohesive force.
After controversy erupted, certain benefits of the Agnipath scheme were put forward. One is the lowering of the age profile by two/three years. It may be mentioned that after the 1962 war debacle, the Army had sent out teams to different theatres to carry out physical tests at varying altitudes. Based on their findings, mandatory standards were prescribed for annual battle physical efficiency tests. Interestingly, the standards for all aged from 18 to 35 years were exactly the same. The age factor, therefore, is more of a post-event justification than a factor in favour of the continuation of the scheme.
It is true that the short service commission officers who served for five or 10 years performed laudably well in wars. But officers serve as leaders, where they take individual decisions at the cutting edge. The soldiers, on the contrary, always work as a team in which esprit de corps is their glue. This is difficult to achieve in a disparate group.
It has also been reported that an internal survey of the Army found the scheme to have merit. The reality, however, is that the system does not allow the Army to publicly express disagreement with a government scheme. All internal analyses get dovetailed into support for the decision that has already been taken; it is not examined critically.
If the scheme is designed to inculcate discipline in the country’s youth, as some have said, this can be achieved through less risky options. For one, the NCC (National Cadet Corps) scheme can be expanded and more Army personnel can be involved in the training than at present.
The only known benefit of the scheme is bringing down the pension expenditure. This is clearly and quotably visible. The serious drawbacks of the scheme will only be known in the event of a war. But it will be too late by then.
Bagheera0084
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Sushant Sareen: 'India can't be spending huge amounts on pensions'
Excerpts from the article:
In November 2020, India Today reported that the government spent more on paying pensions than on purchasing military hardware. The 2020 defence budget allocated Rs 1.3 lakh crore to defence pensions and Rs 1.1 lakh crore to buying military hardware like fighter jets, tanks and warships.
Sushant Sareen, a noted security analyst and senior fellow at ORF, however, said economics cannot be entirely divorced from national security. While admitted there were some issues with the new scheme, he suggested that the government can't afford higher pension bills anymore.
"A balance has to be found," he said, "else you end up without an economy and with no nation to secure - ask the Soviets." "There are issues, serious ones with Agnipath. These need to be fixed. But we can't be spending huge amounts on pensions that will bankrupt the state," Sareen said.
A social media user asked Sareen what exactly was the definition of "huge amounts for a $5 trillion economy", suggesting that India can afford the current level of pension.
Sareen responded, saying the size of the economy and the fiscal space are two different things. The metric to watch out for is how much is the outgo on pensions and the future projections, he said. "Also, compare pension spends with how much of the defence budget is being spent on salaries. Finally, we are still not a $5 trillion economy. Even if we were, it wouldn't change the fundamental economics numbers of pension burden which will become unaffordable if not reformed."
In November 2020, India Today reported that the government spent more on paying pensions than on purchasing military hardware. The 2020 defence budget allocated Rs 1.3 lakh crore to defence pensions and Rs 1.1 lakh crore to buying military hardware like fighter jets, tanks and warships.
A research paper published by Manohar Parrikar Defence Institute in February 2020 said that the share of the defence pension had increased the most, and together with P&A (Pay and Allowances) accounted for 61 per cent of the Defence Ministry's total budget in 2020-21, up from 49 per cent in 2011-12.
More significantly, the paper stated, nearly the entire increase in the pension's share had come at the cost of capital procurement, which together with stores had dwindled by 11 percentage points from 36 per cent in 2011-12 to 25 per cent in 2020-21.
"In other words, the fast rise in the pension expenditure has a significant crowding out effect on the stores and modernisation, two major components that determine a nation’s war-fighting ability. This does not augur well for India's defence preparedness," said the paper, authored by Group Captain (Retd.) Vinay Kaushal and Laxman Kumar Behera, Research Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies.
Under the Agnipath scheme, the defence ministry has been recruiting youth in the armed forces for four years. Those recruited under the Agnipath scheme is called Agniveers. After four years, 25% of each batch of Agniveers will be enrolled in a regular cadre, while 75% will return to civilian jobs. The Centre has promised that 10% of all vacancies in the central armed police forces or the paramilitary will be reserved for Agniveers.
@vsdoc @Sharma Ji @Circadian Rhythm @Faceless @Nilgiri @Cryptonian @JaneBhiDoYaaron @pikku @pikkuboss @Guru Dutt @harpy1 @Justin TruDont @Raj-Hindustani @Magadh @vikNerv @panzerfaust 3 @Pataliputra @MirageBlue @Krptonite
Excerpts from the article:
In November 2020, India Today reported that the government spent more on paying pensions than on purchasing military hardware. The 2020 defence budget allocated Rs 1.3 lakh crore to defence pensions and Rs 1.1 lakh crore to buying military hardware like fighter jets, tanks and warships.
Sushant Sareen, a noted security analyst and senior fellow at ORF, however, said economics cannot be entirely divorced from national security. While admitted there were some issues with the new scheme, he suggested that the government can't afford higher pension bills anymore.
"A balance has to be found," he said, "else you end up without an economy and with no nation to secure - ask the Soviets." "There are issues, serious ones with Agnipath. These need to be fixed. But we can't be spending huge amounts on pensions that will bankrupt the state," Sareen said.
A social media user asked Sareen what exactly was the definition of "huge amounts for a $5 trillion economy", suggesting that India can afford the current level of pension.
Sareen responded, saying the size of the economy and the fiscal space are two different things. The metric to watch out for is how much is the outgo on pensions and the future projections, he said. "Also, compare pension spends with how much of the defence budget is being spent on salaries. Finally, we are still not a $5 trillion economy. Even if we were, it wouldn't change the fundamental economics numbers of pension burden which will become unaffordable if not reformed."
In November 2020, India Today reported that the government spent more on paying pensions than on purchasing military hardware. The 2020 defence budget allocated Rs 1.3 lakh crore to defence pensions and Rs 1.1 lakh crore to buying military hardware like fighter jets, tanks and warships.
A research paper published by Manohar Parrikar Defence Institute in February 2020 said that the share of the defence pension had increased the most, and together with P&A (Pay and Allowances) accounted for 61 per cent of the Defence Ministry's total budget in 2020-21, up from 49 per cent in 2011-12.
More significantly, the paper stated, nearly the entire increase in the pension's share had come at the cost of capital procurement, which together with stores had dwindled by 11 percentage points from 36 per cent in 2011-12 to 25 per cent in 2020-21.
"In other words, the fast rise in the pension expenditure has a significant crowding out effect on the stores and modernisation, two major components that determine a nation’s war-fighting ability. This does not augur well for India's defence preparedness," said the paper, authored by Group Captain (Retd.) Vinay Kaushal and Laxman Kumar Behera, Research Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies.
Under the Agnipath scheme, the defence ministry has been recruiting youth in the armed forces for four years. Those recruited under the Agnipath scheme is called Agniveers. After four years, 25% of each batch of Agniveers will be enrolled in a regular cadre, while 75% will return to civilian jobs. The Centre has promised that 10% of all vacancies in the central armed police forces or the paramilitary will be reserved for Agniveers.
@vsdoc @Sharma Ji @Circadian Rhythm @Faceless @Nilgiri @Cryptonian @JaneBhiDoYaaron @pikku @pikkuboss @Guru Dutt @harpy1 @Justin TruDont @Raj-Hindustani @Magadh @vikNerv @panzerfaust 3 @Pataliputra @MirageBlue @Krptonite
Guru Dutt
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Though i in Principal love the Idea of a younger armed forces with younger infantry and fighting force with younger JCOs till Major Rank while guided by a mature officer there after in back office
and using the ones who could not make into regulararmy/navy air force into intellegence & paramitarry and police services and goverment run tranportation or ration & Fast moving consumer essential supplies or beurocracy
but the only thing i do not agree or want an amendment is penssion scheme cause you have to give penssion to the dependents or the same person if he losses life or a limb or gets some saught of medical dissabillity deu to fighting for nation he desrves a penssion ... thugh he will be treted and gets medical insurence but most of that ammount dose not helps much while a little penssion every month is way more effective than a huge sum in one go ... i ight be wrong but just my opinion
These are the the direct consequences of employing a out of date military concept and doctrine of massive armies for decades .
The rest of the world have moved on to
Smaller armies but reserves when needed in war
Better force multipliers
Air power and stand off weapons
Special forces
Real time intel.
We are trying to developed modern military with massive manpower
India needs to lose 250000 men asap
And rely on modern equipment surveillance drones artificial intelligence streams
It will take a generation to lose the massive pensions budget maybe two
The rest of the world have moved on to
Smaller armies but reserves when needed in war
Better force multipliers
Air power and stand off weapons
Special forces
Real time intel.
We are trying to developed modern military with massive manpower
India needs to lose 250000 men asap
And rely on modern equipment surveillance drones artificial intelligence streams
It will take a generation to lose the massive pensions budget maybe two
The size of the Air Force and Navy should increase. But, unless India plans to invade other countries, as USA did in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, such a large Army is unnecessary. India historically invested in a large Army with the philosophy of invading Pakistan if needed, and then vacating after achieving objectives, as seen in 1971. This doctrine is now outdated. What India needs now is a massive Air Force and Navy for sea denial to Pakistan and for targeted precision strikes to eliminate terrorist hideouts or nuclear installations inside Pakistan. To ensure nuclear weapons are never exchanged in this subcontinent, the only way is to eliminate Pakistan's nuclear installations.
JaneBhiDoYaaron
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Basically socialist Nehru his khanddan and his coterie made government jobs such a big deal by nationalizing industries. People started depending on government including army jobs as sure ticket to wealth. Also ridicules pay commision keeping government job on par with private sectors and retirement benefits made It even worse.
Guru Dutt
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War Doctroine always changes
in WW1 it was trench warfare and hordes perished by introduction of Machine Gun and Mustard Gas and proper use of Artilarry
in WW2 use of fast moving Tanks with infantry given top cover by Air Force "blitzkrieg" and Use of Radar and air craft carrier made manpower and infantry almost useless to overpower enemy if not impractickle
in 1960s during 6 day war and later during Iran Iraq Wars and later two Gulf Wars use of air power showed how tactically both Infantry and armoured divissions are useless against a potent and accurate use of air power
now after almost two decades of afghan war and then Russia Ukraine war use of Hit and run tactcks and Drone warfare had complityly changed all the previous uses of Infantry or tanks or airpower or missiles as we knew them
and Indian army also is making its own adjustment and you dont prepair for war during or just before the war you perpair for it during the peacetime
this AGNIVEER scheme though looks very unpopular by older standards and since we mostly see Armed forces as a RESPECTABLE JOB/PROFESSION it needs to change other wise we should stop calling it defnce forces but defnce profession
in WW1 it was trench warfare and hordes perished by introduction of Machine Gun and Mustard Gas and proper use of Artilarry
in WW2 use of fast moving Tanks with infantry given top cover by Air Force "blitzkrieg" and Use of Radar and air craft carrier made manpower and infantry almost useless to overpower enemy if not impractickle
in 1960s during 6 day war and later during Iran Iraq Wars and later two Gulf Wars use of air power showed how tactically both Infantry and armoured divissions are useless against a potent and accurate use of air power
now after almost two decades of afghan war and then Russia Ukraine war use of Hit and run tactcks and Drone warfare had complityly changed all the previous uses of Infantry or tanks or airpower or missiles as we knew them
and Indian army also is making its own adjustment and you dont prepair for war during or just before the war you perpair for it during the peacetime
this AGNIVEER scheme though looks very unpopular by older standards and since we mostly see Armed forces as a RESPECTABLE JOB/PROFESSION it needs to change other wise we should stop calling it defnce forces but defnce profession
You definitely don't need one million man army to defeat Pakistan
Half that size is more than enough
You don't even need to cross deep into
the country
So much of their infrastructure military complex can be destroyed by sea and air using stand off weapons
Drones are going to get deadlier
Missles like brahmos or nirbhay scalp and drones like sea guardian and predator will.inflict massive damage
But we need a manned airforce of fifth gen.and 4th generation fighters and helicopters but especially drones and long range missles
Imagine trying to cross loc with India having
six regiments of s400
100 Rafale with meteore bvrs
100Tejas Astra bvrs
100 super mki with Astra and derby bvrs
Predator drones
12/18 Awacs
Satalite linked real time network for all three Armed services under the new three theatres command which is all about rapid combined forces movement
The attackng force is mine meat potentially...They won't even try
Half that size is more than enough
You don't even need to cross deep into
the country
So much of their infrastructure military complex can be destroyed by sea and air using stand off weapons
Drones are going to get deadlier
Missles like brahmos or nirbhay scalp and drones like sea guardian and predator will.inflict massive damage
But we need a manned airforce of fifth gen.and 4th generation fighters and helicopters but especially drones and long range missles
Imagine trying to cross loc with India having
six regiments of s400
100 Rafale with meteore bvrs
100Tejas Astra bvrs
100 super mki with Astra and derby bvrs
Predator drones
12/18 Awacs
Satalite linked real time network for all three Armed services under the new three theatres command which is all about rapid combined forces movement
The attackng force is mine meat potentially...They won't even try
Pataliputra
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The Indian Air Force should be equipped to take out all nuclear installations in Pakistan in the event of a full-blown war. Having this capability will also ensure the continued existence of Pakistan, as Currently, India's policy is to launch a nuclear strike on Pakistan as soon as it realizes that Pakistan is deploying its nuclear arsenal.
Bagheera0084
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Agnipath Scheme Can Be Improved, But Critics Who Don't Have Better Ideas Should Shut Up
It is fair to call for a review of the Agnipath scheme, and recommend some viable tweaks, but going back to the old scheme makes no economic or even strategic sense.
R JAGANNATHAN
Jul 05, 2024, 11:14 AM | Updated 11:13 AM IST
The Agnipath scheme to induct younger people into the armed forces, but on a shorter tenure of four years, has come under political attack. It has also been opposed by some retired members of the armed forces.
While Rahul Gandhi wants to scrap the scheme fully, recently two former Navy chiefs have questioned it. Some time back, a retired army general also called for tweaking the scheme to make it better.
Former Chief of Naval Staff Arun Prakash set the ball rolling recently, suggesting that economics should take a back seat when it comes to national security. The sole criterion to be used while allocating resources for personnel and equipment should be “Does it enhance or degrade combat effectiveness?"
Another former navy chief, Karambir Singh, backed him, and said that "The only motivation driving the Agnipath is reducing the pension bill. The fact that this scheme will degrade combat effectiveness is known to all who understand national security."
Now, let us take these criticisms at face value. The main point they are making is that the Agnipath scheme will debase combat effectiveness. Is then the only solution to go back to the old process of selection to the armed forces, with all its attendant costs, including a future heavy pension bill?
Currently, 24 per cent of the defence budget goes to paying pensions, up from less than 13 per cent 15 years ago (see here). Overall personnel costs, including pensions, account for more than 53 per cent of the defence budget, which takes up just over 13 per cent of the overall central budget.
This share has been falling, just as defence expenditure as a share of GDP has been falling and is now well below 2 per cent.
So, Karambir Singh’s claim that rising pension bills are the reason for the government’s launch of the Agnipath scheme may indeed be true, though another aim was to lower the age profile of future recruits into the army.
Under Agnipath, some 25 per cent of Agniveers are to be absorbed into the armed forces after they complete their four-year tenure. Some of the rest may be absorbed in central armed forces and public sector undertakings, but many will be forced to seek private sector employment, possibly at lower emoluments.
The critics cannot have it both ways. You cannot demand higher pensions for retirees, which is what the OROP (one-rank-one-pension) scheme was all about, and still demand that armed forces recruitment must continue as before.
It is fair to call for a review of the Agnipath scheme, and recommend some viable tweaks, but going back to the old scheme makes no economic or even strategic sense.
Reason: even the armed forces need to shift the focus away from mass recruitments to a mix of specialists and a smaller contingent of regular foot-soldiers. This is because future wars will be hybrid in nature, and they will use more technology and equipment, including those powered by artificial intelligence and robots.
The overall numbers in the army need down-sizing, even while the quality of recruits is upgraded to work more with technology and sophisticated equipment, even robots.
This cannot happen if the old recruitment process continues, which can constrict the resources available for buying hardware and software, and for recruiting more specialists in areas like cyber warfare, use of drones, and war robots.
Just in case navy commanders Karambir and Arun Kumar are unaware, this has to happen not only in the armed forces, but other arms of government too. The government simply cannot afford to recruit so many lower level office staff like peons and despatch personnel as in the past.
The private sector is already using more technology and fewer people. One example: consider how many middle positions in bank branches are being eliminated as customers use UPI and other digital modes of banking and payments. Even software services companies are recruiting fewer freshers, and focusing on upskilling existing staff, and inducting more experts laterally.
If these shifts in the private sector and the software services industry are not impacting their business effectiveness, ex-armed forces chiefs must ask themselves why the armed forces cannot maintain or improve their combat readiness even under the new economic realities?
To say that warfare readiness cannot be subjected to normal standards of economic viability is silly. In fact, this is one reason why many armed forces in the world, including the US, use mercenaries and private contractors to aid the war effort, when required. We don’t need to go so far, but we have to think bang for the buck.
The point is not that Agnipath is a good scheme, but maybe the thing to do is to tweak it, and make it more sensible. Maybe, as retired Maj Gen GD Bakshi has suggested, Agniveers should have an extended term of seven years, and the absorption rate increased to 50 per cent instead of the current 25 per cent.
These are possible compromise solutions. If former leaders in the armed forces think Agnipath is bad for combat effectiveness, they must come up with economically viable alternatives.
If OROP is eating into defence budgets, why did they not flag this issue before it was implemented? Why were some former defence staff, including some ex-generals, sitting in dharna on Delhi’s Jantar Mantar demanding an even more generous OROP?
Former generals, air marshals and navy commanders cannot speak with forked tongues. They cannot have their cake and eat it too. They must come up with viable solutions without reducing combat effectiveness.
Just as future wars cannot be fought using tactics that worked in previous wars, the armed forces cannot be run like they were in the past. In any case, the armed forces are not an employment generation scheme.
@vsdoc @Sharma Ji @Circadian Rhythm @Faceless @Nilgiri @Cryptonian @JaneBhiDoYaaron @pikku @pikkuboss @Guru Dutt @harpy1 @Justin TruDont @Raj-Hindustani @Magadh @vikNerv @panzerfaust 3 @Pataliputra @MirageBlue @Krptonite
It is fair to call for a review of the Agnipath scheme, and recommend some viable tweaks, but going back to the old scheme makes no economic or even strategic sense.
R JAGANNATHAN
Jul 05, 2024, 11:14 AM | Updated 11:13 AM IST
The Agnipath scheme to induct younger people into the armed forces, but on a shorter tenure of four years, has come under political attack. It has also been opposed by some retired members of the armed forces.
While Rahul Gandhi wants to scrap the scheme fully, recently two former Navy chiefs have questioned it. Some time back, a retired army general also called for tweaking the scheme to make it better.
Former Chief of Naval Staff Arun Prakash set the ball rolling recently, suggesting that economics should take a back seat when it comes to national security. The sole criterion to be used while allocating resources for personnel and equipment should be “Does it enhance or degrade combat effectiveness?"
Another former navy chief, Karambir Singh, backed him, and said that "The only motivation driving the Agnipath is reducing the pension bill. The fact that this scheme will degrade combat effectiveness is known to all who understand national security."
Now, let us take these criticisms at face value. The main point they are making is that the Agnipath scheme will debase combat effectiveness. Is then the only solution to go back to the old process of selection to the armed forces, with all its attendant costs, including a future heavy pension bill?
Currently, 24 per cent of the defence budget goes to paying pensions, up from less than 13 per cent 15 years ago (see here). Overall personnel costs, including pensions, account for more than 53 per cent of the defence budget, which takes up just over 13 per cent of the overall central budget.
This share has been falling, just as defence expenditure as a share of GDP has been falling and is now well below 2 per cent.
So, Karambir Singh’s claim that rising pension bills are the reason for the government’s launch of the Agnipath scheme may indeed be true, though another aim was to lower the age profile of future recruits into the army.
Under Agnipath, some 25 per cent of Agniveers are to be absorbed into the armed forces after they complete their four-year tenure. Some of the rest may be absorbed in central armed forces and public sector undertakings, but many will be forced to seek private sector employment, possibly at lower emoluments.
The critics cannot have it both ways. You cannot demand higher pensions for retirees, which is what the OROP (one-rank-one-pension) scheme was all about, and still demand that armed forces recruitment must continue as before.
It is fair to call for a review of the Agnipath scheme, and recommend some viable tweaks, but going back to the old scheme makes no economic or even strategic sense.
Reason: even the armed forces need to shift the focus away from mass recruitments to a mix of specialists and a smaller contingent of regular foot-soldiers. This is because future wars will be hybrid in nature, and they will use more technology and equipment, including those powered by artificial intelligence and robots.
The overall numbers in the army need down-sizing, even while the quality of recruits is upgraded to work more with technology and sophisticated equipment, even robots.
This cannot happen if the old recruitment process continues, which can constrict the resources available for buying hardware and software, and for recruiting more specialists in areas like cyber warfare, use of drones, and war robots.
Just in case navy commanders Karambir and Arun Kumar are unaware, this has to happen not only in the armed forces, but other arms of government too. The government simply cannot afford to recruit so many lower level office staff like peons and despatch personnel as in the past.
The private sector is already using more technology and fewer people. One example: consider how many middle positions in bank branches are being eliminated as customers use UPI and other digital modes of banking and payments. Even software services companies are recruiting fewer freshers, and focusing on upskilling existing staff, and inducting more experts laterally.
If these shifts in the private sector and the software services industry are not impacting their business effectiveness, ex-armed forces chiefs must ask themselves why the armed forces cannot maintain or improve their combat readiness even under the new economic realities?
To say that warfare readiness cannot be subjected to normal standards of economic viability is silly. In fact, this is one reason why many armed forces in the world, including the US, use mercenaries and private contractors to aid the war effort, when required. We don’t need to go so far, but we have to think bang for the buck.
The point is not that Agnipath is a good scheme, but maybe the thing to do is to tweak it, and make it more sensible. Maybe, as retired Maj Gen GD Bakshi has suggested, Agniveers should have an extended term of seven years, and the absorption rate increased to 50 per cent instead of the current 25 per cent.
These are possible compromise solutions. If former leaders in the armed forces think Agnipath is bad for combat effectiveness, they must come up with economically viable alternatives.
If OROP is eating into defence budgets, why did they not flag this issue before it was implemented? Why were some former defence staff, including some ex-generals, sitting in dharna on Delhi’s Jantar Mantar demanding an even more generous OROP?
Former generals, air marshals and navy commanders cannot speak with forked tongues. They cannot have their cake and eat it too. They must come up with viable solutions without reducing combat effectiveness.
Just as future wars cannot be fought using tactics that worked in previous wars, the armed forces cannot be run like they were in the past. In any case, the armed forces are not an employment generation scheme.
Agnipath Scheme Can Be Improved, But Critics Who Don't Have Better Ideas Should Shut Up
It is fair to call for a review of the Agnipath scheme, and recommend some viable tweaks, but going back to the old scheme makes no economic or even strategic sense.
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Once India develops a Military Industrial Complex as significant as the US's, it can consider becoming a global police force by establishing military bases worldwide. This would necessitate an army of over one million personnel. However, for now, India should concentrate on countries within its sphere of influence and its giant neighbor, China.
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