Ya, there is close cooperation between USA and Singapore and Singapore buy lot of US defense equipment, but it is British and Australia that really willing to defend them during 1960's against Indonesia. I think this is why their trust on both British and Australia pretty high
Actually the 1949 Peace Deal between Indonesia and Dutch didnt cover current Indonesia. Not only Papua Island, but other Islands are the result of Indonesian invasion like in Maluku Island, and later East Timor is also invaded under Soeharto.
USA is more toward global power landscape, so they dont want to go against Indonesia during 1960's due to their rivalry with Communist Power (Soviet and China). Losing Indonesia is big lost to them. Geopolitically it is not in their interest. So that thing could happen as well during the rivalry between USA and China (+Russia) Today. This is why FPDA is still exist despite close relationship between US and Singapore.
But I dont think current British and Australia will act the same like in 1960's. Their willingness during that time is more likely because they still see both Singapore and Malaysia as theirs ( Malaysia and Singapore get their independence peacefully in 1957).
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FPDA—not fade away
21 Oct 2014
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Euan Graham
Dubbed the ‘quiet achiever’ by Carl Thayer, the FPDA’s low profile belies a brisk tempo of multinational air, naval, land and command-post exercises held regularly under its auspices among Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the UK. Boilerplate-text aside, Australia’s 2013 White Paper was surprisingly effusive on the Five Power arrangements, noting that membership ‘provides Australia with a strategically important presence in Southeast Asia that augments bilateral and other multilateral engagement’.
Indonesia’s still the most important external factor bearing upon the FPDA. Although not officially acknowledged, the FPDA was created in the shadow of Confrontation as the successor to the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement, to provide a non-binding level of deterrence to Malaysia and Singapore against the return of Indonesian demagoguery (the arrangement obliges parties simply to consult in case of external attack on the Peninsula).
As Canberra has embraced Indonesia’s post-Soeharto democratisation, and pursued a bilateral compact with Jakarta as its strategic priority in Southeast Asia, so the FPDA has lost some of its lustre for Australia. Singapore and Malaysia view their larger neighbour with continuing caution and are less sanguine about the prospects for defence engagement.
That explains the continuing strong support for the FPDA in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, even as their own improving relationship has rendered the arrangements less important as a conduit for managing cross-Causeway tensions.
Three years ago the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) celebrated its 40th birthday, an anniversary that sparked a flutter of international curiosity about this most eclectic of regional security frameworks. By way of animal analogy, ...
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