Instead of pussyfooting around this Baloch issue, there is a much greater need to take proactive, decisive and forceful action. The author dilates upon the options and, for a change which is not the norm for the Balochistan watchers, does not mince words about where the problem emanates and why bending to the will of the Baloch sardars is no longer viable and equally, negotiations will not lead to pacification.
Insurgency in Baloch areas of Balochistan — way forward
A localised insurgency risks spreading without decisive state action
Inam Ul Haque February 12, 2026
The analysis scene in Pakistan over situation in Balochistan, especially the former Kalat State, is in overdrive. Most analysts lament the policy adopted by Pakistan over decades in dealing with Baloch 'grievances' and 'sense of deprivation', blaming this or that civil or military government. Some are crying hoarse that the issue has 'political solution' only, with kinetic response in the past and now being a blunder. When grilled, this segment does not have cogent solutions and suggests empowering the same tried and tested political faces-cum-militant sponsors-cum-Sardars, who are part of the problem, have remained so for years, and are squarely responsible for it. Sardar Akhtar Mengal and his father Sardar Attaullah Mengal are cases in point.
So, let us restate the problem candidly, without hiding in the sands of time, geography and ethnicity. One, the obtaining situation is an 'insurgency' limited mainly to the erstwhile Kalat State of Balochistan, with militant forays reaching out and now infecting central Balochistan and Quetta. Pashtun Belt and former Lasbella State are relatively peaceful with Kharan and Makran partially affected. Kalat, Jhalawan and Sarawan are in militant focus and hotbed of their operations.
Two, in current formulation, Sardars have become irrelevant and the insurgency is in the hands of manipulated and misled Baloch youth, educated in mainstream universities in Pakistan, or radicalised in the state-funded and rather newly-established universities in Panjgur, Khuzdar and Turbat. Their teachers subscribing to the far-right have actively aided and abetted in the process.
Three, Sardars were and are part of the problem and strengthening them again would be reinforcing failure, as this remedy has not worked since 1947.
Four, insurgency is aimed at seceding Balochistan from Pakistan, claiming the promised riches from Sea Corridor and untapped minerals will create a Baloch Singapore.
Five, foreign intelligence has heavily invested in the insurgency, providing leadership advice, training, logistics and financial support. Technical support from India and Israel, financial backing from India, logistic and basing (haven)-support from Afghanistan and Iran are known unknowns. Although June 2025 war with Israel has forced a reality check on Iran. Meddlesome powers like the EU, the UAE and the UK's erstwhile keenness have, overtime, left murky footprints in Baloch sands.
Six, dialogue as touted, under the given circumstances is a non-starter, considering the secession demands and the 'perceptual' waning of the writ of the State in the militancy-hit areas.
Seven, like in all such cases, Pakistan must be ready for a protracted and bloody counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign, as the cancer seems to have spread, needing desperate treatment. COIN needs to be fully resourced with across-the-board political support and ownership, military and civilian surge in manpower, materiel, financial support and in-sync employment of non-kinetic means, with due diligence. Pakistan cannot afford its previous policy of taking one step forward and two steps backward, expecting the problem to self-correct or disappear.
Balochistan is not a monolith as my writings emphasise and should not be treated as such. Having understood the nuances of demography, size and scale of popular support, this is a 'localised problem' with the potential to infect other areas, if not controlled with the urgency of purpose. State must never allow people to become fence sitters. Successful COIN will unleash 'latent' public support for Pakistan in the militancy-hit areas. The strands of suggested response under COIN environment are as follows.
First, military surge. Southern Command needs urgent allocation of resources. Nuclear umbrella and its declared and effective deployment should be enough to mitigate 'other' risks, in order to resource SC, if push comes to shove. Waziristan and Tirah provide an attested and tried blueprint to deal with terrorised populations, and insurgents in their midst. Technology and stand-off weapons should deal with them in their mountain hide-outs. Establishing smaller TFZ (Terrorist-Free Zones) and expanding them sideways would sanitise large swaths of infected areas relatively quickly. Cleared areas be held in strength to avoid relapse, instill confidence in the local population and facilitate vigorous civil surge immediately. Small-sized cantonments be established as resources permit, and never again vacated to defer to this or that Sardar. State footprint and writ should be seen, felt and never be transient.
A broad strip of 'No Man's Land' be created around the infected districts to interdict cis/trans-border movement of foreign intelligence operatives, militants and supplies. Ubiquitous surveillance through technical means, and airborne payloads to deliver killing blows, would quickly and effectively deal with any threat movements. Dividing the AOR (area of responsibility) suitably into task forces, newly raised HQs, etc would make command articulation better, responsive and effective.
Second, intelligence surge. Ownership issues, if any, be resolved. Intelligence should be forward leaning as far as possible. Intel cooperation with Iran, technical intelligence and contact-intelligence through deployed troops are vital and would be valuable. With the tide turning, pro-Pakistan elements would come forward to collaborate and cooperate with the State. My information suggests no legislator in Balochistan Assembly condemned the recent two dozen attacks on security forces across Quetta and other areas, undoubtedly due to fear. Only vigorous and very synchronised COIN will overcome public fear and intimidation by terrorists in the not so large militancy-hit belt.
Third, administrative surge. After wresting control of contested areas, the state machinery should be effectively deployed, with Civil Administration suitably beefed up. K-P formats could come in handy. Preferably, civil servants from outside the province be employed. Subsequent development work should be undertaken with speed and efficiency and without reliance, under any circumstances, on Sardars, to ensure benefits — this time around — reaching common man. And funds are not misappropriated in the tribal labyrinths to fatten Sardars' already fat coffers. Each activity/project be benchmarked and monitored for corruption, timely completion and utility.
Fourth, narrative surge. Media, in particular SM, be harnessed without controlling it, to disseminate state narrative and its fact-based propagation, to debunk the romanticism of militants' story. Most of the gullible Baloch youth may not even know facts, like in 1970s, when surrendered militants during post-operation Bara Khanas (joint meals) were surprised to find out that Pakistan Army was Muslim. They were misled by Sardars to believe that they were waging jihad against infidel occupation forces.
Imperatively, urgent engagement, coordination at 'all' levels to continue!
A localised insurgency risks spreading without decisive state action
tribune.com.pk
