Bangladesh Army

I believe that there is much to learn from the battlefields of Ukraine, Gaza and now Lebanon however painful they may be to watch. These lessons can be useful for a small country like Bangladesh faced with multiple threats across its borders by both state and non-state actors.

Interesting discussion in the link below:


In light of the recent developments and future challenges, the below points are the key points that any modern army should cover:
To view this content we will need your consent to set third party cookies.
For more detailed information, see our cookies page.


In my understanding, drones, AI, precision guided munitions, electronic/cyber warfare, intelligence and counter-intelligence with an emphasis on being agile can make the army a force to reckon with. These solutions are not necessarily extremely expensive. But quality must be given more emphasis over quantity.

BD army is relatively small. I believe it'll be easier for them to adopt new tech and methodologies relative to our much larger and powerful adversaries.

The approach should be minimal cost and maximum impact.
 
Last edited:
I believe that there is much to learn from the battlefields of Ukraine, Gaza and now Lebanon however painful they may be to watch. These lessons can be useful for a small country like Bangladesh faced with multiple threats across its borders by both state and non-state actors.

Interesting discussion in the link below:


In light of the recent developments and future challenges, the below points are the key points that any modern army should cover:
To view this content we will need your consent to set third party cookies.
For more detailed information, see our cookies page.


In my understanding, drones, AI, precision guided munitions, electronic/cyber warfare, intelligence and counter-intelligence with an emphasis on being agile can make the army a force to reckon with. These solutions are not necessarily extremely expensive. But quality must be given more emphasis over quantity.

BD army is relatively small. I believe it'll be easier for them to adopt new tech and methodologies relative to our much larger and powerful adversaries.

The approach should be minimal cost and maximum impact.


These aren't the real issues bro. These lessons are discussed frequently. And cost also not necessarily the issue here always.

Our main problem lies with lack of adequate doctrine and outdated organizational set up.

Without having a joint doctrine that would enable all three services to fight as one big integrated force conceptually and organizationally, as well as adequate doctrines for each services perfectly aligned with the joint doctrine, we will continue to lag behind.

In the end of the day, it is your doctrine that enable your unique organizational set up and drive procurement strategy.

@Joe Shearer
 
Last edited:
These aren't the real issues bro. These lessons are discussed frequently. And cost also not necessarily the issue here always.

Cost is always a factor.

Our main problem lies with lack of adequate doctrine and outdated organizational set up.

And from where will they be able to formulate a doctrine and organization set up in the post 9/11-era? The answer should lie in the environment. The current doctrine (if any) and organizational structure was based on a period before 9/11. Those were very different times when threat levels were next to non-existent. And we know how the army fared in the post-9/11 period with fifty-seven of our brightest officers murdered followed by politization of the military and related institutions with zero emphasis on meritocracy. How do we expect them to be moving forward with this?
 
BD army is relatively small. I believe it'll be easier for them
Whether an army is large or small, its leadership must know what changes are needed and how to bring them about, and must have the authority and political backing to implement them. Some of the points mentioned in Maj. Gen. Mandip Singh's list are big challenges for Bangladesh; simply wishing that they be done is not enough.
 
These aren't the real issues bro. These lessons are discussed frequently. And cost also not necessarily the issue here always.

Our main problem lies with lack of adequate doctrine and outdated organizational set up.

Without having a joint doctrine that would enable all three services to fight as one big integrated force conceptually and organizationally, as well as adequate doctrines for each services perfectly aligned with the joint doctrine, we will continue to lag behind.

In the end of the day, it is your doctrine that enable your unique organizational set up and drive procurement strategy.

@Joe Shearer
Doctrine must precede, not follow, practice. In this case, if doctrine itself is arthritic, nothing will be gained by changing practice.
 
Factor and issue is a bit different.
Isn't it time for Bangladesh members to initiate a discussion on how to implement change, taking Gen. Mandip Singh's list as a guideline? It might be a very interesting exercise, and if anyone from the military is listening in, it might be very useful as well.
 
Bangladesh Defence forces has walked backward in this regard, i fear.
You might like to look up the Indian Army Land Warfare Doctrine of 1918, and adapting it, as a purely private and hypothetical exercise in military practide.
 
So that means that defeat is inevitable.
In that case, why maintain an army at all? Dress them up in red coats and bearskin headgear and keep them changing guard at Gonobhovon with a band in attendance.

Indeed.

I went to one of their fancy cantonments that was off limits to the public two years ago under the clearance from a relative of mine. It was too fancy. Luxurious. That's when I thought 'oh boy, we are screwed'.
 
their fancy cantonments
You mean the Bangladesh Army?
Sadly, I suspect that mindset is inherited.
The Indian Army has cantonments, but they are quite open, except, of course, you can't loaf around the residences, some old-fashioned, dating back to the Raj, some new apartment blocks, and I've even seen two-storey pre-fab ones in the Ballygunge Maidan in Calcutta.
There is a lot of pressure from this awful government on the military, and they have managed to persuade their puppet chiefs, who are too scared to say 'No' beyond a certain point, to give up 69 cantonments in the north. Secunderabad, where I live, is still intact, but who knows?
 
Cost is always a factor.



And from where will they be able to formulate a doctrine and organization set up in the post 9/11-era? The answer should lie in the environment. The current doctrine (if any) and organizational structure was based on a period before 9/11. Those were very different times when threat levels were next to non-existent. And we know how the army fared in the post-9/11 period with fifty-seven of our brightest officers murdered followed by politization of the military and related institutions with zero emphasis on meritocracy. How do we expect them to be moving forward with this?
a lot of the sword of honor graduates end up not going past the brig. Gen. rank... heck a lot of recent sword of honor graduates from the past 20 years were abducted and or kicked out from the military for not complying with criminal activities....

Next election is BNP for sure but if they screw up then awami league will return and then there probably wouldn't be a bangladesh army anymore.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Country Watch Latest

Latest Posts

Back
Top