“The passive defensive always leads to defeat; by applying one’s own strength to the enemy’s weakness, only the offensive can secure a decisive victory.” Adaptation of principles from Carl von Clausewitz.
Pakistan’s war fighting posture vis à vis India has historically revolved around deterrence. The country’s military strategy, force structure, and weapons induction policies have primarily focused on defending national territory against a numerically and economically larger adversary. Since its inception, Pakistan has sought to prevent conflict by deterring India from initiating war. Initially, this deterrence was purely conventional; following the nuclear tests of 1998, it became increasingly nuclear-centric.
While deterrence has succeeded in preventing full-scale war since 1971, it has also revealed serious limitations. The failure of deterrence in 1971 resulted in a catastrophic strategic outcome for Pakistan. Even during the 1965 war, the momentum shifted only when Pakistani forces repelled the initial Indian offensives and carried the conflict into Indian territory. More recent conflicts, particularly the protracted Russia Ukraine war, further demonstrate that wars are rarely won through static defense alone. Without the ability to shift the battlefield into enemy territory, defensive postures tend to devolve into attritional struggles that favor the side with greater depth and resources.
In this context, the long-standing assumption that territorial defense alone can ensure strategic success requires reassessment. A doctrine focused primarily on denial, coupled with limited offensive capability, risks ceding initiative to the adversary. In conventional warfare, denying the enemy access to one’s territory is most effectively achieved by compelling them to defend their own. Engaging the adversary within their territory, imposing territorial losses, and threatening critical operational depth can alter enemy calculations, hasten war termination, and strengthen bargaining positions at the political level.
Accordingly, Pakistan must reconsider not only its strategic outlook but also the force structure that supports it. An integrated offensive doctrine would require the ability to conduct sustained, large-scale maneuver operations beyond Pakistan’s borders in the event deterrence fails. This necessitates expanding and reorganizing existing capabilities rather than relying solely on nuclear escalation to offset conventional asymmetries. The Pakistan Army, in particular, requires more than a single offensive strike capability. Multiple well-equipped and well-integrated strike formations would enhance operational flexibility and reduce overdependence on a narrow set of options.
Force development must also extend beyond the Army. Pakistan’s Paramilitary Forces, such as Punjab Rangers, Sindh Rangers, and Frontier Corps units in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, remain underutilized in conventional war planning. With appropriate restructuring, improved training, and modern equipment, selected elements of these forces could be reorganized into maneuver-oriented formations capable of supporting offensive operations and holding captured territory. This would not only expand Pakistan’s operational depth but also free regular army formations for high-intensity combat roles.
Similarly, the role of Pakistan Marines requires significant reevaluation. Currently oriented toward coastal defense and limited territorial protection, the Marines possess the potential to serve as an amphibious strike force capable of opening new fronts and stretching enemy defenses. An expanded marine capability equipped with armored vehicles, helicopters, and integrated fire support would enhance Pakistan’s ability to conduct joint land and sea operations and exploit vulnerabilities along India’s western coastline, with the primary target being the Indian state of Gujarat. Such capabilities would complicate Indian defensive planning and contribute to escalation control by broadening the battlespace.
An offensive doctrine also demands closer integration of air power, naval assets, air defense, and electronic warfare with ground maneuver forces. Rather than focusing exclusively on territorial denial, the Pakistan Air Force and Pakistan Navy would need to prioritize degrading enemy defensive systems, logistics, and command and control nodes in support of land offensives. This joint approach would allow Pakistani forces to retain initiative, disrupt Indian mobilization, and prevent effective counteroffensives.
Critics may argue that economic constraints and escalation risks make such a doctrinal shift impractical. These concerns are valid and must be acknowledged. However, the absence of credible conventional offensive options may itself increase reliance on nuclear signaling, thereby lowering thresholds and increasing instability. A carefully calibrated offensive doctrine, under firm political control, could provide Pakistan with more options below the nuclear threshold while strengthening deterrence through demonstrated capability rather than mere intent.
Ultimately, this argument does not advocate war but states that war is inevitable, and yes, deterrence is important. Still, this argument says that deterrence alone is insufficient in shaping war outcomes once conflict begins. Preparing to fight decisively by carrying the battle into enemy territory, seizing the initiative, and imposing costs may be the most effective way to ensure that wars, if they occur, are short, controlled, and politically favorable. Incremental steps toward force expansion, doctrinal reform, and joint integration can lay the foundation for this shift, even within existing budgetary constraints.
About the author:
Zarvan Ali is an M.Phil scholar of International Relations at the University of Management and Technology, Lahore. His research interests include defense and security studies, military doctrine, conventional and nuclear deterrence, and geopolitics.
