Feroze
Trusted Member
- Thread starter
- #211
Believe what you want. We will keep pushing for plebiscite since India agreed to it and UNSC resolution push for plebiscite.
Same goes for Indian military until it withdraws from Kashmir region, we will not withdraw either.
We must withdraw equally.
UNSC Resolution 80 (1950) subsequently called on both India and Pakistan to prepare and execute a program of demilitarization, based on General McNaughton’s principles or mutually agreed modifications. Its objective remained eventual determination of Kashmir’s future through a free and impartial plebiscite.
This could be convincingly demonstrated as well.
So the fault is with India.
Resolution 47 explicitly contemplated a “free and impartial plebiscite” to determine whether Jammu and Kashmir would accede to India or Pakistan.
It is more complicated than “Pakistan refused to withdraw” nonsense which Indians keep harping about when "India needs to withdraw its forces from Kashmir" according to the UNSC 80 resolution.
Pakistan and India did both accept the principle of a UN-supervised plebiscite. The disagreement became how to accomplish the prerequisite demilitarization.
Pakistan argued for a military balance between forces remaining on the two sides. The UN's own documentation records these conflicting interpretations.
The plebiscite ultimately failed because India and Pakistan never reached and implemented the required demilitarization arrangements.
India and Pakistan accepted the UNCIP framework, although disagreements subsequently arose over its implementation.
5 January 1949 — UNCIP plebiscite resolution. India and Pakistan accept principles for a free and impartial plebiscite under a UN-appointed Plebiscite Administrator, conditional upon implementation of the preceding ceasefire/truce arrangements.
1 January 1949 — Ceasefire takes effect.
24 January 1949 — UN military observers arrive. This develops into UNMOGIP, which still exists.
July 1949 — Karachi Agreement. India and Pakistan formally establish the Ceasefire Line under UN supervision.
1950 — Sir Owen Dixon mediation. UN Representative Owen Dixon tries unsuccessfully to obtain agreement on demilitarization and explores alternative arrangements.
1951–52 — Frank Graham negotiations. Another UN representative, Frank Graham, conducts extensive negotiations. India and Pakistan agree on much of his framework but continue disagreeing about how many forces could remain and what kinds of forces they could be.
23 December 1952 — UNSC Resolution 98. The Security Council proposes negotiations around approximately 3,000–6,000 forces on the Pakistan side and 12,000–18,000 on the Indian side after demilitarization.
So Pakistan does not need to completely remove all their military forces from Kashmir territory as the Indians keep barking about.
Same goes for Indian military until it withdraws from Kashmir region, we will not withdraw either.
We must withdraw equally.
UNSC Resolution 80 (1950) subsequently called on both India and Pakistan to prepare and execute a program of demilitarization, based on General McNaughton’s principles or mutually agreed modifications. Its objective remained eventual determination of Kashmir’s future through a free and impartial plebiscite.
This could be convincingly demonstrated as well.
So the fault is with India.
Resolution 47 explicitly contemplated a “free and impartial plebiscite” to determine whether Jammu and Kashmir would accede to India or Pakistan.
It is more complicated than “Pakistan refused to withdraw” nonsense which Indians keep harping about when "India needs to withdraw its forces from Kashmir" according to the UNSC 80 resolution.
Pakistan and India did both accept the principle of a UN-supervised plebiscite. The disagreement became how to accomplish the prerequisite demilitarization.
Pakistan argued for a military balance between forces remaining on the two sides. The UN's own documentation records these conflicting interpretations.
The plebiscite ultimately failed because India and Pakistan never reached and implemented the required demilitarization arrangements.
India and Pakistan accepted the UNCIP framework, although disagreements subsequently arose over its implementation.
5 January 1949 — UNCIP plebiscite resolution. India and Pakistan accept principles for a free and impartial plebiscite under a UN-appointed Plebiscite Administrator, conditional upon implementation of the preceding ceasefire/truce arrangements.
1 January 1949 — Ceasefire takes effect.
24 January 1949 — UN military observers arrive. This develops into UNMOGIP, which still exists.
July 1949 — Karachi Agreement. India and Pakistan formally establish the Ceasefire Line under UN supervision.
1950–53: Why the Plebiscite does not work
14 March 1950 — UNSC Resolution 80. The UN moves toward a new demilitarization approach involving the forces of both India and Pakistan. India abstains on the resolution.1950 — Sir Owen Dixon mediation. UN Representative Owen Dixon tries unsuccessfully to obtain agreement on demilitarization and explores alternative arrangements.
1951–52 — Frank Graham negotiations. Another UN representative, Frank Graham, conducts extensive negotiations. India and Pakistan agree on much of his framework but continue disagreeing about how many forces could remain and what kinds of forces they could be.
23 December 1952 — UNSC Resolution 98. The Security Council proposes negotiations around approximately 3,000–6,000 forces on the Pakistan side and 12,000–18,000 on the Indian side after demilitarization.
So Pakistan does not need to completely remove all their military forces from Kashmir territory as the Indians keep barking about.
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