(CDF / COAS)'s Desk

[hnn]

Obviously it remains to be seen, but this will be one of the biggest advantages of this role existing - assuming it is properly utilised. I wonder though if there are drawbacks that the person who fills the role will always be an Army man. How could that limit the capabilities and tactics of the airforce and the Navy?

I think Army only CDF is a narrow approach for long term but is much needed in short term.
Also, before diving right into the pros/cons of Army only CDF, I'd like to mention some information about US Armed Forces, who arguably, has been the most adept at integrated commands since 20th Century.

Here are some details:
USEUCOM Commanders
USA: 13, USMC: 1, USN: 1, USAF: 5

USCENTCOM Commanders
USA: 9, USMC: 5, USN: 2, USAF: 0

USINDOPACOM Commanders
USA: 0, USMC: 0, USN: 27, USAF: 0

COMISAF/RS Commanders
USA: 7, USMC: 3, USN: 0, USAF: 0

INDOPACOM Interesting Notes:

1. Strictly a command held by USN over the years, yet:
2. The Korean War, 1950-53, was initially the purview of INDOPACOM. However, for the war operations a new independent command was structured i.e. FECOM under Gen Douglas McArthur (USA) who was the strategic commander and operational commanders under him were also from USA (this was a naval invasion)
3. The Vietnam War, 1955-75, was the purview of INDOPACOM, the strategic commander was CINCPAC Admiral Sharp. However, for the war operations, again a separate command was structured i.e. MACV whose all 4 commanders were from USA but operated under CINCPAC instead of independent to him (like in Korea War).
4. The Cambodian Civil War, 1970, the strategic commander was CINCPAC and the operational command was under MACV (all USA Gen) - same as Vietnam War.

EUCOM Interesting Notes:

1. The only operational command held by USAF
2. Gen Norstad (1956-1963) - Op Blue Bat (strategic commander, operational commanders was USN Vice Admiral Brown)
3. Gen Ralston (2000-2003) - Op Enduring Freedom (only logistical support, military op was conducted under the operational command of Gen Franks (USA) (CENTCOM)
4. Gen Breedlove (2013-2016)
5. Gen Wolters (2019-2022) - succeeded by USA Gen for the Russia-Ukraine conflict
6. Gen Grynkewich (2025-present)

The points to note here are:

• The operational commands for arguably the world's most integrated military has been predominantly held by Army/Marines even to present day.
• The only command where USA is not represented is INDOPACOM, yet for all major military operations an ad hoc operational command under USA was structured
• Even under USAF command, for military operation, the operational command was given to USA
• Interestingly, the only major military operation where USA was not in operational command was the Op Blue Bat because it was strictly air-amphibian support op for Lebanese military

Now the question is why US keeps on giving the operational commands to USA even in the modern day Air Bridge operations (OEF)
As far as I have studied the military doctrines around the world, the two major themes/variables underpinning the strategic/operational/tactical tiers of planning rely on:

1. Recoverable/Irrecoverable losses (Territory vs Military Asset)
2. Resistance to Attrition (Personnel/Assets)

We can explore the above variables further, and find out how at present, CDF being an "operational command" favors an Army General in Pakistan's context (despite the modern warfare engagement) at least to a point where the level of integration is similar to that of US armed forces or any other e.g. Chinese Armed Forces and IDF.

As stated, the Army only CDF is narrow in long-term but that's a separate discussion.

 

[PakAl]

I completely agree with your request to keep things civil. As to your point about doubts about the equity between the services on account of the army's apolitical claims, that is your prerogative but that does not make your critique factual.

CDF is an essential need for a modern military. The same design could have been applied to CJCSC and it may have worked. However, the key is the change being affected which is what matters and that is to have combatant commands under a single, unified leadership.

For those suggesting that PAF, PN would suffer, you have to look at how CDF staff shapes the "Jointness". In Pakistan, this would mean officers at the Brig/Air Cdre/Cdre and higher ranks being brought into the joint staff together to look at the needs of services operating synergistically. The requirements/constraints of the PAF/PN would be discussed in this joint setting and appropriate plans put in place to cater to these issues. "Jointness" is being tried out through rudimentary measures even for early in career officers under training with PMA running its first "Joint Course" to start assimilating officers from across the services to work together.

Currently, a higher level of "jointness" in the works only done for SPD for "plans" and not operations, and also for limited procurement within the office of CJCSC. With CDF, members of the combatant commands will be pulled together. Real operational plans/strategy/tactics will be discussed at a much more granular level than the CJCSC office was ever able to.

Don't let your political baggage and dislike for a person cloud your understanding of the efficacy of the office of CDF. This is much more than a name change and it will bode well for Pakistan's security inshallah.

Brilliant post. This should end all the propaganda on CDF.

 

[Xestan]

I think Army only CDF is a narrow approach for long term but is much needed in short term.
Also, before diving right into the pros/cons of Army only CDF, I'd like to mention some information about US Armed Forces, who arguably, has been the most adept at integrated commands since 20th Century.

Here are some details:
USEUCOM Commanders
USA: 13, USMC: 1, USN: 1, USAF: 5

USCENTCOM Commanders
USA: 9, USMC: 5, USN: 2, USAF: 0

USINDOPACOM Commanders
USA: 0, USMC: 0, USN: 27, USAF: 0

COMISAF/RS Commanders
USA: 7, USMC: 3, USN: 0, USAF: 0

INDOPACOM Interesting Notes:

1. Strictly a command held by USN over the years, yet:
2. The Korean War, 1950-53, was initially the purview of INDOPACOM. However, for the war operations a new independent command was structured i.e. FECOM under Gen Douglas McArthur (USA) who was the strategic commander and operational commanders under him were also from USA (this was a naval invasion)
3. The Vietnam War, 1955-75, was the purview of INDOPACOM, the strategic commander was CINCPAC Admiral Sharp. However, for the war operations, again a separate command was structured i.e. MACV whose all 4 commanders were from USA but operated under CINCPAC instead of independent to him (like in Korea War).
4. The Cambodian Civil War, 1970, the strategic commander was CINCPAC and the operational command was under MACV (all USA Gen) - same as Vietnam War.

EUCOM Interesting Notes:

1. The only operational command held by USAF
2. Gen Norstad (1956-1963) - Op Blue Bat (strategic commander, operational commanders was USN Vice Admiral Brown)
3. Gen Ralston (2000-2003) - Op Enduring Freedom (only logistical support, military op was conducted under the operational command of Gen Franks (USA) (CENTCOM)
4. Gen Breedlove (2013-2016)
5. Gen Wolters (2019-2022) - succeeded by USA Gen for the Russia-Ukraine conflict
6. Gen Grynkewich (2025-present)

The points to note here are:

• The operational commands for arguably the world's most integrated military has been predominantly held by Army/Marines even to present day.
• The only command where USA is not represented is INDOPACOM, yet for all major military operations an ad hoc operational command under USA was structured
• Even under USAF command, for military operation, the operational command was given to USA
• Interestingly, the only major military operation where USA was not in operational command was the Op Blue Bat because it was strictly air-amphibian support op for Lebanese military

Now the question is why US keeps on giving the operational commands to USA even in the modern day Air Bridge operations (OEF)
As far as I have studied the military doctrines around the world, the two major themes/variables underpinning the strategic/operational/tactical tiers of planning rely on:

1. Recoverable/Irrecoverable losses (Territory vs Military Asset)
2. Resistance to Attrition (Personnel/Assets)

We can explore the above variables further, and find out how at present, CDF being an "operational command" favors an Army General in Pakistan's context (despite the modern warfare engagement) at least to a point where the level of integration is similar to that of US armed forces or any other e.g. Chinese Armed Forces and IDF.

As stated, the Army only CDF is narrow in long-term but that's a separate discussion.

Thank you for this wider view. I wish people on PDF gave more time to posts like these instead of derailing every thread with political mess.

About what you said, earlier, I was skeptical about Army always in command of CDF, but I have come to believe it's at least a start and we should be looking at it with some optimism.

As CDF said in his address, other services will keep their internal independence, and their chiefs would still be appointed by the PM.

Apart from this, this new CDF post basically brought changes on paper what was already taking place since a few decades now. The Army Chief was technically the chief advisor for the Prime Minister and he was the one who had more influence over the military decisions than any other services chief.

 

[hnn]

No arm/service will be "less relevant" in a future war. Clearly these analysts have not looked at warfare in the past 5 years (let alone the last 20 years).

Look at the war in Ukraine. Brutal slog on the ground with both Russia and Ukraine fighting it out to hold ground. No amount of air/naval activity takes anything away from the role their ground forces have to play.

Interestingly since Russia-Ukraine conflict is the hot topic on modern warfare these days, here's some interesting details on their operational commands:

Ukrainian Commanders:
Overall Strategic/Operational Commander:

• C-in-C General Oleksandr Syrskyi (Ukrainian Ground Forces)
• Pakistan functional equivalent position = CDF

Strategic/Operational Coordinator:

• CGS Lieutenant General Andrii Hnatov (Ukrainian Marine Corps)
• Reports to C-in-C
• Pakistan functional equivalent position = former CJCSC

Other Operational Commanders:

• Lieutenant General Anatolii Kryvonozhko (Operational Commander of Ukrainian Air Force) / Reports to C-in-C and only commands air operations under the joint command of C-in-C /Pakistan functional equivalent position = CAS
• Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi (Operational Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces) / Reports to C-in-C and only commands ground operations / Pakistan functional equivalent position = COAS

Russian Commanders:
Overall Strategic/Operational Commander:

• CGS & Commander of the Joint Grouping of Forces General of the Army Valery Gerasimov (Russian Ground Forces)
• Pakistan functional equivalent position = CDF

Deputy Operational Commander:

• Deputy Commander of the Joint Grouping of Forces General Sergey Surovikin (Russian Ground Forces)
• Prior to the war he was serving as Commander of the Aerospace Forces (Russia literally had an army general as the highest commander of their air force )
• He was initially made the Commander of the Joint Grouping of Forces for the conflict with Ukraine in late 2022 owing to his vast experience in Russian Ground Forces. Later, in January 2023, he was demoted from the position and made Deputy Commander of the Special Military Operations.
• His successors Gen Alexei and Oleg, are also army generals.
• The current Commander of Aerospace Forces for Russia is Colonel General Viktor Afzalov. Their Commander of Air Force (CAS equivalent) is under the command of this joint command, which itself is under the command of CGS.

So, even in Russia-Ukraine conflict, the highest strategic and operational commands are with Army/Ground Forces

Question is again, why? When all we hear is drones, missiles, and airforce.

 

[Blain2]

Interestingly since Russia-Ukraine conflict is the hot topic on modern warfare these days, here's some interesting details on their operational commands:

Ukrainian Commanders:
Overall Strategic/Operational Commander:

• C-in-C General Oleksandr Syrskyi (Ukrainian Ground Forces)
• Pakistan functional equivalent position = CDF

Strategic/Operational Coordinator:

• CGS Lieutenant General Andrii Hnatov (Ukrainian Marine Corps)
• Reports to C-in-C
• Pakistan functional equivalent position = former CJCSC

Other Operational Commanders:

• Lieutenant General Anatolii Kryvonozhko (Operational Commander of Ukrainian Air Force) / Reports to C-in-C and only commands air operations under the joint command of C-in-C /Pakistan functional equivalent position = CAS
• Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi (Operational Commander of Ukrainian Ground Forces) / Reports to C-in-C and only commands ground operations / Pakistan functional equivalent position = COAS

Russian Commanders:
Overall Strategic/Operational Commander:

• CGS & Commander of the Joint Grouping of Forces General of the Army Valery Gerasimov (Russian Ground Forces)
• Pakistan functional equivalent position = CDF

Deputy Operational Commander:

• Deputy Commander of the Joint Grouping of Forces General Sergey Surovikin (Russian Ground Forces)
• Prior to the war he was serving as Commander of the Aerospace Forces (Russia literally had an army general as the highest commander of their air force )
• He was initially made the Commander of the Joint Grouping of Forces for the conflict with Ukraine in late 2022 owing to his vast experience in Russian Ground Forces. Later, in January 2023, he was demoted from the position and made Deputy Commander of the Special Military Operations.
• His successors Gen Alexei and Oleg, are also army generals.
• The current Commander of Aerospace Forces for Russia is Colonel General Viktor Afzalov. Their Commander of Air Force (CAS equivalent) is under the command of this joint command, which itself is under the command of CGS.

So, even in Russia-Ukraine conflict, the highest strategic and operational commands are with Army/Ground Forces

Question is again, why? When all we hear is drones, missiles, and airforce.

For the simple reason, the entire conflict is over land, territory which is the purview of "boots on the ground", i.e., the Army.

A lot of critique here is simply on the basis of "political" bias against the Army and its leadership. It is not based on the merit of the situation.

Pakistan is not fighting expeditionary wars where it would execute its strategy through air and naval operations. Our entire posture is for defending the territorial integrity of Pakistan and that means holding ground and relying on sister services to check the pressure from the other side and blunt it.

This does not relegate the PAF/PN to a secondary role, it would allow them to maintain their own operational independence but in pursuit of joint, national defense missions and goals.

Use of "drones, missiles, air assets" is all to complement the defense of the homeland. They are not going to be used in a vacuum, or in expeditionary strikes, but to deliver on the strategy that deters the adversary from wanting to take land/territory so they can exploit us in negotiations.

 

[hnn]

A lot of critique here is simply on the basis of "political" bias against the Army and its leadership. It is not based on the merit of the situation.

True. However, the concern behind the critique might not be completely irrelevant (though I agree is being done very superficially in Pakistan) - let's explore

Pakistan is not fighting expeditionary wars where it would execute its strategy through air and naval operations.

I already mentioned FECOM and Gen Douglas McArthur in my previous post. For the Korean War he was given the Strategic and Operational Command instead of CINCPAC of INDOPACOM.

This was a naval invasion of South Korean Peninsula. The Inchon Landing (Op Chromite) to this day is taught at military schools around the world for it's audacious tactic of using the geographically most challenging route (in Pakistan military terms: the least likely direction of attack) - that a Naval Officer would 9.9/10 times not adopt, in fact, the USN and USMC commanders under Gen McArthur were heavily opposed to his plan. Op Chromite ended up changing the whole tide (pun intended) of the war, and eventual US victory but there were caveats later (mentioned in the end of the post)

In other Naval Invasions under INDOPACOM, the operational command was again given to Army Generals e.g. Vietnam War. The operational command was given to Gen Franks (CENTCOM) even though Gen Ralston (USAF) was commanding EUCOM (whose purview Afghanistan War eventually was as SACEUR NATO) and even though Op Enduring Freedom was an Aeriel Invasion (and world's first Air Bridge).

So, an argument could be made from history, that even for "expeditionary wars" Army General is still a valid choice. This is not to assert the position but just to point out that there are still other variables that underpin military warfare.

Use of "drones, missiles, air assets" is all to complement the defense of the homeland. They are not going to be used in a vacuum, or in expeditionary strikes, but to deliver on the strategy that deters the adversary from wanting to take land/territory so they can exploit us in negotiations.

This is a good starting point to make a case for Army General for CDF, as seen in case of Russia and Ukraine. We can still explore a lot in this direction.

The concern and caveat: General Douglas McArthur (also FM of Philippines Army) was later dismissed by President Harry Truman simply for insubordination and his expansionist ambition with Korean War (you get what I'm pointing at here).

PS: I left out the Pakistan context because I'm too sleepy to get into that rn haha - will get into that as the discussion continues tomorrow.

 

[VCheng]

For the simple reason, the entire conflict is over land, territory which is the purview of "boots on the ground", i.e., the Army.

Not only that, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and subsequent prolonged war is not a good example here because Ukraine is not being provided the air power resources, that would turn the tide very quickly, for other geopolitical reasons, and thus simply would not apply to any potential conflict involving Pakistan in the future.

 

[johukum]

Ek aur jarnail sahab 'ankhiyo se goli marey'

To view this content we will need your consent to set third party cookies.
For more detailed information, see our cookies page.

Accept third party cookies

 

[Blain2]

ab dekhte hain ke new CDS sahb Kashmir kab azad kerwatay hain......aur kab KP aur Balochistan mei peace latay hain....Economy sahi kerli ??


how long will the wait be, guys? kya khyaal hain

What you have destroyed with your hands over 70+ years won't get resolved by one person. If that was a possibility, Imran Khan would have already succeeded.

Kya khiyal hai? ;-)

 

[Blain2]

Ek aur jarnail sahab 'ankhiyo se goli marey'

To view this content we will need your consent to set third party cookies.
For more detailed information, see our cookies page.

Accept third party cookies

Only extremely biased, petty minds pick on such things. He is being jovial, what is the issue with that?

 

[Blain2]

ab dekhte hain ke new CDS sahb Kashmir kab azad kerwatay hain......aur kab KP aur Balochistan mei peace latay hain....Economy sahi kerli ??


how long will the wait be, guys? kya khyaal hain

Meray bhai, kiya FM ne thaika liya hai Kashmir azaad karanay ka? Jab Gen Musharraf ne koshish ki tau uss ko gali di aapnay and aapkay doston ne (and to this day I see you all self-flaggellating over Kargil on these threads). Aik aur chief dobara yeh ghalti nahi karay ga ab. Jitni galian apnay misguided logon ne Musharraf ko din Kargil operation per jo Kashmir ko azaad kara ne k liyay execute kiya, uss k bad kon yeh dobara karay ga?

 

[Watandar]

Meray bhai, kiya FM ne thaika liya hai Kashmir azaad karanay ka? Jab Gen Musharraf ne koshish ki tau uss ko gali di aapnay and aapkay doston ne (and to this day I see you all self-flaggellating over Kargil on these threads).

Perhaps Imran Khan ko bolain k Kashmir ko azad karain.

Jee haan, Pak Fauj nai theka liya hai Kashmir azaad karney ka aur Islam ka qilla bannnay ka. Why else have they been allowed to swallow the bulk of the budget last 70 plus years in Islamic Republic of Pakistan ?

With regards to Kargil, it was as shortsighted, flawed and dumb of a plan as Op Gibraltar in 1965 and Mr Musharraf and his 2 other goof generals are rightfully condemned for their recklessness and stupidity.

Tera CDF kiya gul khilaiy ga , dekhten hain.

 

[Blain2]

Jee haan, Pak Fauj nai theka liya hai Kashmir azaad karney ka aur Islam ka qilla bannnay ka. Why else have they been allowed to swallow the bulk of the budget last 70 plus years in Islamic Republic of Pakistan ?

With regards to Kargil, it was as shortsighted, flawed and dumb of a plan as Op Gibraltar in 1965 and Mr Musharraf and his 2 other goof generals are rightfully condemned for their recklessness and stupidity.

Tera CDF kiya gul khilaiy ga , dekhten hain.

"Tera"? Shava on the amazing manners!

The rest of the hyperbole is not worth commenting on.

 

[hnn]

Not only that, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and subsequent prolonged war is not a good example here because Ukraine is not being provided the air power resources, that would turn the tide very quickly, for other geopolitical reasons, and thus simply would not apply to any potential conflict involving Pakistan in the future.

Even if Ukraine is provided with a Tier A Air Force - their Air Force is still under the unified strategic/operational command of their C-in-C who is a Ground Forces General (I mentioned the command structure of Ukraine and Russia in my earlier post)

 

[Khansaheeb]

To view this content we will need your consent to set third party cookies.
For more detailed information, see our cookies page.

Accept third party cookies

Yes, because the Indians gave the US a boot.