Well, China tend to see ourselves as the victim, India does the same. You get me? You think we are pushing you around, we might think the opposite. The best way forward is just maintain a neutral zone where neither gets in. That way neither loses face but judging from the Indian ego and lack of pragmatism, I doubt this will happen.
Regarding automation, I hope you won't get a rude awakening. It is happening very very fast in China. Multiple axis robotics had been available for the past 40 years, but the difference now is AI and perception recognition. The robot is not just doing things as programmed, they can sense better and adapt and learn. Due to mass industrialization, robots are getting cheaper due to Chinese economies of scale.
China is perhaps the last country to have overcome poverty through industrialization. This was largely due to the circumstances of China being embargoed by the collective West. To counter this, China focused on developing their industry for import substitution during Mao's period, even though the quality of their goods was questionable. This laid the foundation for broad advances in a wide range of industries, particularly in heavy industry. Deng's experiment with capitalism saw a lot of these state-owned companies closed and replaced by village-owned enterprises which found considerable success because it is strictly capitalist. the more you work the more money you get. Later some of the VOE were bought by management and became private companies. So basically China's growth is domestically driven. Not relying too much on foreign capital Though many of these private companies later form a joint venture with foreign entities. Also, it is a period of globalization where the West thinks they can manage China's rise by exploiting Cheap labor and lax environmental rule. While maintaining control of the high-value-added industry. They are wrong!
For India to pin their hope of Western capital and technology to help them industrialized will never materialize Because more than not they will kick the ladder on which India climb the industrial chain as this Korean economist famously said
eh.net
Ha-Joon Chang enlists economic history to mount a provocative critique of the “Washington Consensus” — the standard set of policy recommendations that aim to promote economic development in poor countries. According to the consensus, developing countries should adopt a set of “good policies” and “good institutions” to improve their economic performance.
The good policies include stable macroeconomic policies, a liberal trade and investment regime, and privatization and deregulation. The good institutions include democratic government, protection of property rights (including intellectual property), an independent central bank, and transparent corporate governance institutions and financial establishments.
These policies have been embraced by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and many mainstream economists, hence the term Washington Consensus.
Chang highlights the paradox that many of today’s high income countries did not pursue such policies when they were climbing the economic ladder of success in the nineteenth century. Rather, these countries implemented high tariffs and sectoral industrial policies, lagged in the introduction of democratic reforms, stole industrial technologies from one another, did not have independent central banks, and so forth.
Therefore, in Chang’s view, developed countries are hypocritical when they seek to deny developing countries access to these same policy tools and when they urge them to adopt democratic reforms and protect intellectual property.
In some sense, this book pits Adam Smith (free market orthodoxy) against Friedrich List (managed intervention heterodoxy) and comes down on List’s side. In Chang’s view, developed countries preach Adam Smith’s policies to developing countries today but pursued Friedrich List’s policies themselves in the past.
Developed countries are “kicking away the ladder” (in Friedrich List’s memorable phrase) that they used to become richer and instead are trying to foist upon developing countries a set of policies wholly unsuited for their economic condition and contrary to their economic interests. This book has already achieved high status as an iconoclastic critique of neo-liberal “market fundamentalism” as pronounced by establishment economics and international institutions.
Chang, who is Assistant Director of Development Studies at the University of Cambridge (UK), divides his slim book into four chapters. Each chapter focuses on the policies pursued a century ago by the leading rich countries of today (Britain, United States, Germany, Japan, and other European countries) and compares those policies to the ones that developing countries are urged to adopt the Washington Consensus. Chapter One introduces the book and asks “How Did the Rich Countries Really Become Rich?” Chapter Two looks at trade and industrial policies designed to allow developing countries to “catch up” with industrial countries. Chapter Three focuses on institutions and good governance. Chapter Four concludes with lessons from the past.
