Title: PATHANKOT STRIKE
By: Sarmad Hassan Sharif
Date: September 06, 1965
Time: 1630 Hours
Target: Pathankot Air Base
On 6th September Peshawar base had a single squadron, equipped with F-86 Sabres, which was enhanced to 18 aircraft as war establishment. The Station Commander Peshawar received the flash signal soon after 1200 hours, delivered by hand by the Senior Signals Officer, Wing Commander M.S. Khan.
The orders were handed to OC 19, Squadron Leader Sajad Haider, (famously described by John Fricker in Battle for Pakistan as ‘universally referred to as Nosey Haider, for his magnificently patrician proboscis’) soon after. The squadron had flown 2 sorties with 6 aircraft and formation had landed after the Wagah mission, transiting through Sargodha, at around 1130 hours. 2 F-86s were said to be on CAP and four were on ADA stand-by duties.
The major change in target was a surprise as in the original plan of June 1965; the target given to No. 19 Squadron had been Am..bala. It is of special mention that the heavily defended complex at Ambala was at the extreme range of the F-86F Sabre aircraft. Peshawar had been given Ambala as their primary target on D-Day and H-Hour.
Originally eight aircraft were to fly from Peshawar to Lahore (abandoned as an active base in peacetime owing to its vulnerability, was to be reactivated for occasional use during war, as stated in History of PAF 1988), where they were to be joined by eight more aircraft originating from Mauripur led by Squadron Leader Waqar Azim.
The Mauripur Sabres were to form the second element behind the Peshawar Sabres. These aircraft were to move in there at six hours’ notice a couple of days or so before for the anticipated strikes. From there, they were to launch deep strike mission targeting Ambala and were to initially recover at Lahore in near darkness.
After refueling the Peshawar’s Sabres were to return back to Peshawar while the Mauripur Sabres were to head for Sargodha. Peshawar was to be given a new target the next day (possibly Srinagar, depending upon the attrition suffered during the attack on the highly defended Ambala airfield).
In a tête-à-tête, with retired Air Commodore Sajad Haider about few years ago, it transpired that No. 19 Squadron had practiced their assigned task with realistic simulation. This included simulating night landing on a 6000 foot Lahore runway, practiced at their Peshawar base. Upon achieving the exercise results the Director of Plans was sent by AHQ to endorse the squadron recovery capability. The outlines of the Ambala runway were drawn at the Jamrud firing range, where the Sabres from Peshawar used to carry out attacks at dusk and sometimes well after dusk in pitch darkness. Use of flares and napalm bombs to illuminate the target was also practiced and perfected with permission from ACAS (Operations). The concept was somewhat utopian but it showed the spirit of determination, motivation and seriousness by the squadron to be fully prepared to deliver, if the war came.
The change of target from Ambala to Pathankot had its own significance, as Pathankot has been creating a lot of problems for the PAF since 1 September 1965, and had to be sorted out. However, the target allocation came as a big surprise for No. 19 Squadron. Pathankot had not been assigned as a target in June or later. Consequently, they had little information about its layout, the dispersal areas and aircraft shelter complex or even the runways direction which was an absolute pre-requisite for an airfield attack.
This information was indispensable for the success of the attack, especially because the Sabres would be operating at the outer most fringes of their operational radius of action, 220 miles to the target and would have little fuel for loitering around to familiarize with the lay-out down below.
As mentioned Peshawar had one squadron with 18 F-86 aircraft at the start of war and luckily remained with 18 at the end of war. The change of target from Ambala to Pathankot came as a surprise for No. 19 Squadron and its pilots who had relentlessly trained to take down Ambala. In a detailed discussion with Air Commodore ® Sajad Haider some years ago, after some persuasion he recounted the details of this mission which is as follows:
“Soon we realized that this was a second change of target on 6th September, and would entail a re-appraisal of attack plan from the Ambala base, which the squadron had perfected as close to the possibility of achieving success in this complex assigned mission. Although to my reckoning Pathankot would be an easier target, but for its success we required maximum intelligence about the target base.
Another issue to be factored-in was the distance to the target (that was more than 220 miles), and the fuel management had to be considered, which might restrict the number of attacks. The complete change of target for the second time in one morning was a minor challenge for which 19 Squadron had been well trained.
You must remember that our pilots had been trained through planning to fly long range composite missions ending at Jamrud Range for a single attack on the Ambala simulated airfield painted below. They were trained to land with as little as 400 Ibs of fuel, so as never to panic when fuel state was low.
This paid great dividends in war as I exploited this good honing to maximum. Ironically, PAF historians 1988 have wrapped me on the knuckles and drubbed it as imprudent for such an initiative which I considered prerogative of the combat commander in a real combat environment. So be it.
The results of the 1965 war performance of Zambos of 19 Squadron remain incomparable in perpetuity. The joie de verve amongst our squadron was indescribable and uplifting. Most pilots despite having flown 2 sorties till midday were hankering to be on this mission.
