India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

[Panzerkiel]

This may be a personal blind spot, but to an Indian observer or analyst, the actions of Pakistan's 12th Div. (under Akhtar Hussain Malik; 7th Div. under Yahya Khan) are no more than a prologue, a small collection of scenes setting the tone of the play; furthermore, the folklore surrounding this action is also a fixed narrative.

THE NUMBERS INVOLVED: This section, the southern part of the State of J&K, just to the north of its boundary with the Indian State of the Punjab, had always been guarded by a brigade; the Pakistan Army assembled a full division opposite it, with 3 full Brigades under its command, attacked without warning, and created terrible pressure on the Indian defences. Well, yes, more or less; but when we examine the situation in detail, we find a surprising situation rather different from what this bald statement of facts tends to show us.

First, 191 Brigade was an oversized brigade. A typical Indian Army brigade has 3 battalions, and perhaps a field artillery regiment (105 mm guns). 191 Brigade had no less than 5 battalions, and a full battalion each of the J&K Militia and the Punjab Armed Police, these being

1. 3rd Mahar (+ 2 coys. of 3 J&K Militia);
2. 6th Sikh LI (+ 2 coys. of 3 J&K Militia);
3. 15th Kumaon;
4. 9th Punjab;
5. 5th Gorkha Rifles;
6. 14th Field Artillery Regt. (+ 1 troop from 39 Medium Artillery Regt.);
7. C Squadron 20th Lancers (deploying AMX 13 light tanks)

In addition, the battalion of Punjab Armed Police on border duties.

Normally, three brigades would be (3 x 3 =) 9 battalions in an Infantry division, and it should, on the face of it, have been 9 battalions under Pakistan Army's 12th Div., and it should have been opposed by a mere 3 battalions under the Indian brigade. In reality, there were (as listed above) no less than 5 battalions under 191 Brigade, and a full battalion of J&K Militia, so, 5 + 1, and we always omit to mention that two more brigades, 41st Mountain Brigade to serve in the front echelon and 28th Infantry Brigade in divisional reserve, had been assembled in the region, to serve under the newly raised 10th Infantry Division.

On top of that, the Pakistanis had 3 Brigades, but these were not 3-battalion brigades; 10th Brigade and 104th Brigade had only 2 battalions each, and the Azad Kashmir Brigade, 4th AK Brigade, had 3 battalions. So, a total of 7 battalions to oppose 191 Brigade's 6 and the strength of 41st Mtn Brigade and 28th Inf. Brigade; not the overwhelming odds as we tend to visualise when thinking of a forlorn brigade facing all the might of a division.

However, the Pakistanis were reasonably strong in artillery, with a full artillery brigade opposed to the regiment + a troop of the Indians; their armoured strength opposed 2 full armoured regiments, 11th Cavalry and 13th Lancers, to the solitary squadron of the Indian 20th Lancers.

It was by no means an overwhelming numerical superiority of the Pakistanis.

OTHER FACTORS: In fairness, the confusion on the Indian side needs to be understood.

• The brigade commander of 191 Brigade, Brig. Master, had been killed in action in mid-August, when a strong contingent of the Gibraltar Force overwhelmed the border defences of the 191 Brigade (the PAP battalion) with support from their artillery; death of the Brigadier and his GSO3 happened during the attempted counter-attack due to shelling by the Pakistan artillery.
• In addition, the induction of 10th Division into the field created its own confusion. It was inducted from Bangalore, so had no idea of local conditions or of the commanders' minds and personalities of the 191 Bde. and its constituent battalions, and certainly no idea about the newly-attached brigades, 41st Mtn Bde or 28th Inf. Bde.
• Finally, there was an intense pressure on the Indian side caused by the irregular warfare that had broken out due to Gibraltar, along with the heavy artillery firing that had caused casualties already, as noted above.

That leads us to summarise the lessons that might have been learnt by the Indian Army, below.

1. Pakistan will tend to use, wherever possible, irregulars in the first wave; as has been seen in 47-48, again in 65, again in 99, and as it is continuing today;
2. PA artillery and regulars will support these irregulars to the fullest extent, without any declaration of war. In this present instance, it is sufficient to cite the heavy artillery support that their 12th Div. received, first, during the irregular phase, during Operation Gibraltar, and second, during the regular set-piece attack by 12th Div., Operation Grand Slam.
   1. Indian artillery needs strengthening, both with towed weapons from Akhnoor southwards, and SP weapons between Rajauri to Leh;
3. India has tended to perform badly during changes of command or changes of duty, for instance, during Kaul's attempted take-over of 4th Corps in 62, and during 10th Div. take-over of 191 Bde., 41 Mtn. Bde., and 28th Inf. Bde. For that matter, Pulwama happened during the replacement of one unit on the LOC by its successor.
4. The Indian Army is always caught by surprise by the opposition. We need both to raise the quality of our field intelligence, and the reaction time that we take to react. The PA seems to react by an order of magnitude faster.
5. A personal opinion: asking a Mtn. Div. to serve in the plains is just not logical.

There are several other rather painful conclusions that emerge not only from this conflict but also from the recent border crises on the border with China, but it is appropriate to raise this at a later point. Let us wait for that point.

We come next to action by XI Corps.

 

[Panzerkiel]

This may be a personal blind spot, but to an Indian observer or analyst, the actions of Pakistan's 12th Div. (under Akhtar Hussain Malik; 7th Div. under Yahya Khan) are no more than a prologue, a small collection of scenes setting the tone of the play

If things would have gone according to GOC 12 Division desires, 12 Division would have veered towards Jammu, with 7 Division going towards Naushara.......Kashmir would have been more or less cut off from mainland India, road Jammu-Samba-Kathua interdicted.....

For that matter, Pulwama happened during the replacement of one unit on the LOC by its successor.

The Indian Army is always caught by surprise by the opposition. We need both to raise the quality of our field intelligence, and the reaction time that we take to react. The PA seems to react by an order of magnitude faster.

A personal opinion: asking a Mtn. Div. to serve in the plains is just not logical.
Click to expand...

Lets not forget the change in IAF command last Feb as well, around PAF riposte.

IA army being caught be surprise, despite having superior ISR capabilities, has a multitude lessons of its own....how come Pakistan Army manages to achieve surprise (Gibralter, Grandslam, Khem Karan, Kishengarh, Chamb (71), Fazilka (71, PA 105 Brigade), Brass Tacks, Trident, Kargil, Parakaram, Swift Retort....to name a few)

Ofcourse, as already highlighted, a Mountain Division is neither trained nor equipped for operating in non-mountainous terrain.

 

[Panzerkiel]

If things would have gone according to GOC 12 Division desires, 12 Division would have veered towards Jammu, with 7 Division going towards Naushara.......Kashmir would have been more or less cut off from mainland India, road Jammu-Samba-Kathua interdicted.....

To be honest, I never understood the dichotomy. My understand was/is that the same units were to be managed by 7th Div only due to Yahya taking over. What was the difference between the two?

Lets not forget the change in IAF command last Feb as well, around PAF riposte.

IA army being caught be surprise, despite having superior ISR capabilities, has a multitude lessons of its own....how come Pakistan Army manages to achieve surprise (Gibralter, Grandslam, Khem Karan, Kishengarh, Chamb (71), Fazilka (71, PA 105 Brigade), Brass Tacks, Trident, Kargil, Parakaram, Swift Retort....to name a few)

1. I didn't mention it for reasons of economy. It was, in fact, fairly high on my mind, along with the curiosity of the PAF having gone through a very major handing-over just weeks before, from Asghar Khan to Nur Khan, with no ill-effects whatever.
2. What you have mentioned is a very strange thing, that the IA seems to be caught flat-footed on every single occasion.

Ofcourse, as already highlighted, a Mountain Division is neither trained nor equipped for operating in non-mountainous terrain.

It would not be proper of me to dwell on that, but I believe that a segregation into different theatres is essential. But that is so much above my pay-scale that there is no point in going into that.

 

[Panzerkiel]

Point regarding IA artillery....we should remember that in Kargil conflict, in order to attain the artillery superiority, IA had to induct artillery even from Western and South Western Commands' Strike Formations....desperate times do call for desperate measures, but imagine if something would have happened in Indian Punjab or Rajasthan at the same moment.....it would have been a replay of Grandslam.

 

[Panzerkiel]

Point regarding IA artillery....we should remember that in Kargil conflict, in order to attain the artillery superiority, IA had to induct artillery even from Western and South Western Commands' Strike Formations....desperate times do call for desperate measures, but imagine if something would have happened in Indian Punjab or Rajasthan at the same moment.....it would have been a replay of Grandslam.

Absolutely.

On artillery, I hope and pray that the plethora of options available to the IA will be exploited to the fullest (except that the difference in calibres is difficult to understand) and that there are full complements in every location. We in India need Artillery Divisions like mother's milk, considering the deterrent effect they would have on regular formations, and we are really shy of larger formations of more than brigade size.

It is strange, yes.....but it has happened. Personally, i believe that Indian belief in its own superiority always goes counter productive to its performance.

Well yes, it is true. Going as per numbers, there was hardly an instance when Pakistan attacked with an absolute majority.

Two additional brigades were earmarked. Operation Roll Top was the one against Naushara.

At the end of the day, my conclusion is that, like the Chinese in 62, the Pakistanis had the upper hand in 65 in Chhamb due to

1. A clear plan;
2. Close coordination between different ground forces units assigned to the same objectives;
3. Purposefulness; they moved towards their goals, while we meandered around aimlessly.

If IA Generals cant think ahead, even nukes wont be of any use.

Shubh shubh bolo ji, shubh shubh bolo.....

Sure, why not.

In 1965, the Indian Army did not have a Northern Command. We had the Eastern Command, back at Calcutta after the 62 debacle, Central Command, at Lucknow, the older HQ of Eastern Command, Southern Command, with HQ at Pune, and the very important Western Command, that had a mandate from Leh to Sri Ganganagar in Rajasthan, just at the beginning of the Thar Desert.

To manage all this, the Army Commander had two Corps: XV Corps in Srinagar (XIV Corps didn't exist then) and XI Corps in Udhampur. We have seen how XV Corps was assaulted at all points by the contingents under Operation Gibraltar, and beat them back, not without taking casualties up to the level of Brigadier, and also captured the Haji Pir Pass, without, sadly, getting a grip on the heights bordering the Uri-Poonch Road. We have also seen how the short, sharp pressure led to a considerable diversion of troops to XV Corps, and left 191st Brigade alone to handle any pressure on the Jammu road*.

[* Thanks to inputs by @Panzerkiel, about the total effect of the Gibraltar contingents, about the inability to use the Uri-Poonch Road due to the heights overshadowing it being dominated by the Pakistan Army, and about the loss of Command reserves to the boiling situation in the Vale.]

According to conventional narrative, a lone, isolated 191st Brigade was suddenly attacked in full strength by an entire Pakistani Division; on further investigation, it turns out that the Brigade had been under attack for two weeks prior to the direct attack by the Pakistan regular Army, and had suffered the loss of the Brigade Commander to very heavy artillery barrages. It further turns out that 191st Brigade was quite beefy.

So why did General Harbaksh Singh, one of our best soldiers at the time, react so strongly to the thrust by 12th Div. against Chhamb? The following reasons applied:

1. 191st Brigade was showing signs of wear and tear; three of its five battalions went into the hills to the north of the salient, two more were holding on by the skin of their teeth;
2. Of the other brigades, 41st was handled roughly and retreated to the rear, passing through the 10th Div. reserves, 28th Brigade, and going past the Div. HQ towards the highway;
3. Harbaksh had spent all his resources and his cupboard was bare. If the ongoing thrust by 12th Div. was to be fulfilled, there would be - difficulties.

So the General needed desperate measures. He took desperate measures.

In the first instance, he launched XI Corps at Lahore. Whether there was a real plan to capture Lahore or not is not known today any longer. What is known is that the initial target was the east bank of the Pakistani defensive feature, the Ichhogil Canal. Quite clearly, even this limited objective would jolt the Pakistan Army, and force them to adjust their military perspectives, or so seems to have been the thinking.

In the second instance, he sought to cut communications between Sialkot and Lahore. For this, he deployed I Armoured Corps. This Corps, newly raised, was in addition to his original XV Corps (in Srinagar) and XI Corps. It was commanded by Lt. Gen. P. O. Dunn, whom we have seen earlier commanding the defending division when the skirmishes at Chhad Bet had broken out.

We shall see in summary form, purely from the Indian Army point of view, what happened along each of these axes of attack, for XI Corps, by 4th Mountain Div., 7th Infantry Div. and 15th Infantry Div., and for I Corps, by 1st Armoured Div., 6th Mountain Div., 14th Infantry Div. and 26th Infantry Div., and the conclusions from these actions.
(to be cont.)

 

[Panzerkiel]

At the end of the day, my conclusion is that, like the Chinese in 62, the Pakistanis had the upper hand in 65 in Chhamb due to

1. A clear plan;
2. Close coordination between different ground forces units assigned to the same objectives;
3. Purposefulness; they moved towards their goals, while we meandered around aimlessly.

Shubh shubh bolo ji, shubh shubh bolo.....




In 1965, the Indian Army did not have a Northern Command. We had the Eastern Command, back at Calcutta after the 62 debacle, Central Command, at Lucknow, the older HQ of Eastern Command, Southern Command, with HQ at Pune, and the very important Western Command, that had a mandate from Leh to Sri Ganganagar in Rajasthan, just at the beginning of the Thar Desert.

To manage all this, the Army Commander had two Corps: XV Corps in Srinagar (XIV Corps didn't exist then) and XI Corps in Udhampur. We have seen how XV Corps was assaulted at all points by the contingents under Operation Gibraltar, and beat them back, not without taking casualties up to the level of Brigadier, and also captured the Haji Pir Pass, without, sadly, getting a grip on the heights bordering the Uri-Poonch Road. We have also seen how the short, sharp pressure led to a considerable diversion of troops to XV Corps, and left 191st Brigade alone to handle any pressure on the Jammu road*.

[* Thanks to inputs by @PanzerKiel, about the total effect of the Gibraltar contingents, about the inability to use the Uri-Poonch Road due to the heights overshadowing it being dominated by the Pakistan Army, and about the loss of Command reserves to the boiling situation in the Vale.]

According to conventional narrative, a lone, isolated 191st Brigade was suddenly attacked in full strength by an entire Pakistani Division; on further investigation, it turns out that the Brigade had been under attack for two weeks prior to the direct attack by the Pakistan regular Army, and had suffered the loss of the Brigade Commander to very heavy artillery barrages. It further turns out that 191st Brigade was quite beefy.

So why did General Harbaksh Singh, one of our best soldiers at the time, react so strongly to the thrust by 12th Div. against Chhamb? The following reasons applied:

1. 191st Brigade was showing signs of wear and tear; three of its five battalions went into the hills to the north of the salient, two more were holding on by the skin of their teeth;
2. Of the other brigades, 41st was handled roughly and retreated to the rear, passing through the 10th Div. reserves, 28th Brigade, and going past the Div. HQ towards the highway;
3. Harbaksh had spent all his resources and his cupboard was bare. If the ongoing thrust by 12th Div. was to be fulfilled, there would be - difficulties.

So the General needed desperate measures. He took desperate measures.

In the first instance, he launched XI Corps at Lahore. Whether there was a real plan to capture Lahore or not is not known today any longer. What is known is that the initial target was the east bank of the Pakistani defensive feature, the Ichhogil Canal. Quite clearly, even this limited objective would jolt the Pakistan Army, and force them to adjust their military perspectives, or so seems to have been the thinking.

In the second instance, he sought to cut communications between Sialkot and Lahore. For this, he deployed I Armoured Corps. This Corps, newly raised, was in addition to his original XV Corps (in Srinagar) and XI Corps. It was commanded by Lt. Gen. P. O. Dunn, whom we have seen earlier commanding the defending division when the skirmishes at Chhad Bet had broken out.

We shall see in summary form, purely from the Indian Army point of view, what happened along each of these axes of attack, for XI Corps, by 4th Mountain Div., 7th Infantry Div. and 15th Infantry Div., and for I Corps, by 1st Armoured Div., 6th Mountain Div., 14th Infantry Div. and 26th Infantry Div., and the conclusions from these actions.
(to be cont.)

We'll discuss XI Corps operations later of course, but since you have made a mention, so some points...

Indian XI Corps did not enjoy the advantage of PA in Lahore sector.......that is, PA defences were based on BRB / Ichogil canal while XI did not have any formidable geographical or a water obstacle to base its defences. Capturing of area upto the canal till Kasur (4 Mtn Division) would have greatly improved the defensibility of XI Corps area and would have provided added security to Indian Punjab and its main cities. As per my understanding after reading Indian books, Lahore was a be-prepared mission which Indian Army was supposed to go for in case the opportunity presented itself and PA may be unable to defend it (3 Jat took the advantage). However, capture of all land till BRB was certainly one of the main aims of 7, 15 and 4 Mountain Divisions.

For the Indian offensive in Sialkot Sector, there was an Indian plan even in late 50s / early 60s where by Indian offensive was supposed to reach Marala Ravi Link Canal in the first phase, and then reach GT Road in order to cut it. Sialkot and Shakergarh would have been isolated and Marala Headworks would have been captured as well.

Indian 1 Corps has its own litany of.....well dont know that to call it......to start with, a newly raised Corps which had not even started to function as a Corps, no coordination, the Corps Commander was junior to his armored division commander Rajinder Sparrow.....list goes on....

 

[Panzerkiel]

We'll discuss XI Corps operations later of course, but since you have made a mention, so some points...

PLEASE interject whenever you wish to; it is most useful in setting the mise en scene.

Indian XI Corps did not enjoy the advantage of PA in Lahore sector.......that is, PA defences were based on BRB / Ichogil canal while XI did not have any formidable geographical or a water obstacle to base its defences. Capturing of area upto the canal till Kasur (4 Mtn Division) would have greatly improved the defensibility of XI Corps area and would have provided added security to Indian Punjab and its main cities.

Perfect.

That elements of 15th Infantry Div. penetrated as far as Batapore, with no base for its defences, and under air attack from a vigilant PAF, is creditable in itself. But the best was yet to be. Whatever 3 Jat won was given back with a generous hand by Brigadier Rikh, who succumbed to his Div. Commander's panic.

As per my understanding after reading Indian books, Lahore was a be-prepared mission which Indian Army was supposed to go for in case the opportunity presented itself and PA may be unable to defend it (3 Jat took the advantage). However, capture of all land till BRB was certainly one of the main aims of 7, 15 and 4 Mountain Divisions.

Yes, Sir, indeed; that was clear. The canard about Chaudhuri planning his evening refreshment in the Lahore Gymkhana Club is one I traced back to a Calcutta rag called the Amrita Bazar Patrika, that has sunk without trace now. There was no basis for that story; as you have succinctly put it, Lahore was a target of opportunity for XI Corps, and its primary objective was reaching the East Bank of the Ichhogil Canal.

At Kasur, 4th Mountain Div. met a strong counter-attack and recoiled, and it was a coup d'oeil by Indian commanders to make a stand around Asal Uttar. The Independent Armoured Brigade under Brigadier Theograj and his regimental commander Col. Caleb played a key role in the ensuing battle. However, at the end of the day, it was a gallant recovery by 4th Mountain Div., and XI Corps was nowhere near the Canal in this sector.

For the Indian offensive in Sialkot Sector, there was an Indian plan even in late 50s / early 60s where by Indian offensive was supposed to reach Marala Ravi Link Canal in the first phase, and then reach GT Road in order to cut it. Sialkot and Shakergarh would have been isolated and Marala Headworks would have been captured as well.

Your remarks following have a poignancy of their own for Indian readers.

Indian 1 Corps has its own litany of.....well dont know that to call it......to start with, a newly raised Corps which had not even started to function as a Corps, no coordination, the Corps Commander was junior to his armored division commander Rajinder Sparrow.....list goes on....

Whenever I think of Rajinder Sparrow, I think of the sad fate of an able field commander who rises to a position where he is sadly no longer performing at his best. This was the dashing young chevalier of Zoji La, now the hesitant, risk-averse Divisional Commander of a Division that had the fate of the conflict in its hands.

Life is cruel.

As you must have noticed, both Corps had their full share of failure of command, in the case of XI Corps, an aggressive failure, in the case of I Corps, a sad failure of vision and a visible need to avoid failure.

Lt. Gen. Dunn was on the verge of retirement. I sometimes wonder.....

@Panzerkiel

You must be aware that members have been following the thread in order to read your commentary, not in order to follow the narrative, that is well-known by all who are interested in military history.

 

[Panzerkiel]

A bit about history.....

Main reasons of IA decline TILL 1962 were mainly three
Pacifist political leaders
Leftist orientation
A belief that IA was a relic and last bastion of of British imperialism

First indian offensive plan against West Pakistan was formulated in 1951, with main attack against Lahore and secondary effort against Sailkot, limit of exploitation being MRLC.
The main objectives were to defend Kashmir and Punjab at all costs while limited offensive actions along rest of the border to gain space and keep main line of communication between Indian and Kashmir open.

Indian Wargame ABLAZE was a landmark which was again followed by intense planning and corrections

Prior to 1965

Concept of operation of Indian Western Command was...
That initiative is with Pakistan
Western Command should be able to first, blunt and stabilize PA offensive thrusts
WC should then be able to secure area east of BRBL, with Lahore as well IF POSSIBLE.

The new plan was
In phase 1, to capture area upto BRBL, eliminate Jassar enclave, and the bridge as well to negate any PA thrust towards Dera Baba Nanak.
In phase 2, to capture area till MRLC as already highlighted.

The SUDDEN advent of IA 1 Corps opened up new possibilities, options and problems as well, with regards to operational concepts and employment options.

There was a very heated debate between COAS and GOC of IA 1 Armored Division regarding the launch area of IA 1 Corps. Options available were either through Jassar, across Ravi towards North East, the other being from East of Jammu / area Samba towardss South West (which actually happened).

Positive points in favor of Jassar option (supported by COAS)
Move and concentration of a large force in the form of 1 Corps would be easily detected in Jammu Samba area as the road runs very near to the border.
Jassar option will allow IA 1 Corps to radiate threat in multiple directions (Narowal, Sialkot and Lahore), this option would auto protect the log bases of IA WC as well.
Samba thrust would be perforce a UNIDIRECTIONAL THRUST with very limited options afterwards.
Samba thrust would suffer from space constraints in Pak territory
Bad road network to support Samba thrust in Pak area

GOC 1 Armored was too much scared of a Jassar option as it involved crossing Ravi and he didnot want to engage in a bridghead operation, even though COAS tried to make him understand that in this case, the important Ravi crossing are in Indian territory, not Pakistan. He was all for Samba option as there was no river crossing involved in that case.

Even GOC WC supported COAS for Jassar option due to fol reasons....
Ravi xings in Indian territory, already secured
Engineer recce of these xings already done, operation deemed feasible by IA engineers
Surprise element would be on Indian side as they would be operating AGAINST the grain / relief of the land.

Opinion of GOC 1 Armored Division carried more weight since he was accepted as an authority on large scale armor operations based on his WW2 experience.
This all resulted into a bad compromise, whereby IA WC was tasked to launched offensive from Samba while protecting the road Pathankot-Samba and Dera Baba Nanak as well (28 Brigade op).

The above is a little background of what then transpired in the form of Operation Riddle and Nepal.

Just to add...

In-house friction within IA can be judged from the fact that previously, IA 1 Armored Division was Corps reserve of XI Corps in Punjab....once 1 Corps was raised, XI Corps VERY RELUCTANTLY, had to give it up for 1 Corps Ops, which is the main reason as to why XI Corps then had to limit the depth of its attack objectives (home bank of BRB).

 

[Panzerkiel]

I will be back at around 3'o'clock, after cooking lunch, eating it, and clearing up.

A bit about history.....

Main reasons of IA decline TILL 1962 were mainly three
Pacifist political leaders
Leftist orientation
A belief that IA was a relic and last bastion of of British imperialism

Much though it pains me to do so, in the interests of transparency and intellectual integrity, it is necessary to mention that there were pulls and pushes within the Indian military leadership as well, what you have referred to as in-house friction.

{EDIT} In addition, you have mentioned three points above. Some of these came to life in terms of a horror movie. Most of what I have mentioned below was entirely due to the then Defence Minister, Krishna Menon; there is now documentary proof of this negative influence.{END EDIT}

1. During General Thimayya's tenure, he was communicating regularly with the British High Commissioner in New Delhi, who, in turn, faithfully communicated every snippet of information to HMG.
2. This would not by itself have been important, but the UK still wanted to play a role in South Asia; in 1965, Harold Wilson was very active in getting India and Pakistan to the negotiating table.
3. Thimayya was accused in writing of 13 charges against him (based on gossip and on conjecture) while he was the COAS, by Lt. Gen. Thapar, the next most senior officer, who reported to him, and who told him in the letter that the PM was aware that this letter was being written and that the PM would be happy to hear Thimayya's side of the story.
4. Thapar wrote a similar letter to Thorat, but with only 5 charges rather than 13; in identical terms, Thorat was informed that the PM knew and would be happy to hear from him!
5. Thimayya himself wanted Thorat to succeed him; Thorat had a brilliant career in the Army, and was streets ahead of Thapar, although Thapar was the senior of the two.
   1. Thimayya took it on himself to ask the President to appoint Thorat the next chief;
   2. The President (Rajendra Prasad) agreed and actually issued orders appointing Thorat;
   3. Krishna Menon and Nehru immediately said that this could not be, what the Raksha Mantri (Defence Minister) and the Pradhan Mantri (Prime Minister) wanted had to be implemented.
   4. Finally the PM and RM prevailed.
6. Thimayya had gone to the RM with stories about one of his direct reports, alleging improprieties of an unknown nature, only to reverse himself a few days later saying that there had been a misunderstanding and that the entire matter had arisen due to that officer's wife's unpopularity.
7. Among other such incidents, besides the Gohar Ayub accusation, Manekshaw was accused of being excessively pro-British, as he had portraits of Clive and Hastings in his cabin at Wellington.
8. We all know about Kaul, and about Monty Palit, and how they had cowed down Bogey Sen. In Bogey Sen we had yet another very good officer in the field completely decaying away at senior level. Rajinder Singh Sparrow was not alone.

First indian offensive plan against West Pakistan was formulated in 1951, with main attack against Lahore and secondary effort against Sailkot, limit of exploitation being MRLC.
The main objectives were to defend Kashmir and Punjab at all costs while limited offensive actions along rest of the border to gain space and keep main line of communication between Indian and Kashmir open.

Indian Wargame ABLAZE was a landmark which was again followed by intense planning and corrections

Prior to 1965

Concept of operation of Indian Western Command was...
That initiative is with Pakistan
Western Command should be able to first, blunt and stabilize PA offensive thrusts
WC should then be able to secure area east of BRBL, with Lahore as well IF POSSIBLE.

The new plan was
In phase 1, to capture area upto BRBL, eliminate Jassar enclave, and the bridge as well to negate any PA thrust towards Dera Baba Nanak.
In phase 2, to capture area till MRLC as already highlighted.

The SUDDEN advent of IA 1 Corps opened up new possibilities, options and problems as well, with regards to operational concepts and employment options.

There was a very heated debate between COAS and GOC of IA 1 Armored Division regarding the launch area of IA 1 Corps. Options available were either through Jassar, across Ravi towards North East, the other being from East of Jammu / area Samba towardss South West (which actually happened).

Positive points in favor of Jassar option (supported by COAS)
Move and concentration of a large force in the form of 1 Corps would be easily detected in Jammu Samba area as the road runs very near to the border.
Jassar option will allow IA 1 Corps to radiate threat in multiple directions (Narowal, Sialkot and Lahore), this option would auto protect the log bases of IA WC as well.
Samba thrust would be perforce a UNIDIRECTIONAL THRUST with very limited options afterwards.
Samba thrust would suffer from space constraints in Pak territory
Bad road network to support Samba thrust in Pak area

GOC 1 Armored was too much scared of a Jassar option as it involved crossing Ravi and he didnot want to engage in a bridghead operation, even though COAS tried to make him understand that in this case, the important Ravi crossing are in Indian territory, not Pakistan. He was all for Samba option as there was no river crossing involved in that case.

Even GOC WC supported COAS for Jassar option due to fol reasons....
Ravi xings in Indian territory, already secured
Engineer recce of these xings already done, operation deemed feasible by IA engineers
Surprise element would be on Indian side as they would be operating AGAINST the grain / relief of the land.

Opinion of GOC 1 Armored Division carried more weight since he was accepted as an authority on large scale armor operations based on his WW2 experience.
This all resulted into a bad compromise, whereby IA WC was tasked to launched offensive from Samba while protecting the road Pathankot-Samba and Dera Baba Nanak as well (28 Brigade op).

The above is a little background of what then transpired in the form of Operation Riddle and Nepal.

Just to add...

In-house friction within IA can be judged from the fact that previously, IA 1 Armored Division was Corps reserve of XI Corps in Punjab....once 1 Corps was raised, XI Corps VERY RELUCTANTLY, had to give it up for 1 Corps Ops, which is the main reason as to why XI Corps then had to limit the depth of its attack objectives (home bank of BRB).

It is very sad to reflect on Sparrow's role in his command of 1st Armoured Div.

More in two hours.

Much of this has been summarised earlier. Please feel free to skip it and move on.

What followed the beginning of Grand Slam is complex. Contrary to impressions that we have gathered so far, there was in fact a plan, Operation Riddle, prepared by the Indian Army in response to the Indian PM's request after the events of the Rann of Kutch. This had the three broad objectives as follows:

1. To destroy the ability of the Pakistan Army to wage war;
2. To occupy territory that could be used for negotiation later on;
3. To defend against Pakistan's attempts to grab Kashmir by force.

These are borrowed from Shuja Nawaz's presentation at the Hudson Institute, where he quotes from the book based on the war diaries of Y. B. Chavan. However, that presentation has its issues:

• For a pacifist Prime Minister such as Shastri to consider grabbing land in the Rann of Kutch is simply ludicrous; in fact, the intention was that of Pakistan.
• For I Corps to be given this task well in advance of the conflict, when it had not been formed or deployed, is far-fetched. In the event, Mr. Nawaz mentions XI Corps as carrying out this plan, that had two parts to it:
  1. An attack towards Lahore: this was led by XI Corps;
  2. An attack towards Sialkot, to cut lines of communications between Sialkot and Lahore, and isolate forces in northern Pakistan from forces grouped around Lahore and located further south.

The problem was, as @Panzerkiel has pointed out already, General Chaudhuri and General Harbaksh Singh had very different views on the conduct of the war. There was a higher level version of this, in that the Defence Minister Chavan did not have confidence in his COAS; in meetings, Chavan felt, Chaudhuri would not answer questions fully, (read: honestly), and that in general, he was always keeping things close to his chest.

There was also a general impression about Chaudhuri in the minister's mind, that Chaudhuri was too careful and was a plodding kind of general. This is vindicated in part by his abrupt decision to pull Indian troops back behind Amritsar, leaving that city defenceless and open to capture by Pakistani forces, when the Pakistan Army got a breakthrough in Khem Karan.

Why did Pakistan have the impression that she could hold her own in a defensive war against India?

For one thing, the force levels: there was a belief that India would need a 4:1 numerical advantage to attack Pakistan and penetrate her defences. The norm is 3:1; therefore the Martial Races premium in the minds of the Pakistani High Command may be calculated at (0.33 - 0.25 =) 0.08, or 1 in 12. In 1964, Pakistan had 8 Divisions, from some accounts; a ninth, the 6th Armoured Division, was set up in 1965 itself, and was sent into action. The general idea was to absorb an enemy attack successfully, and then counter-attack. Pakistani General Mahmud Ahmed has been quoted as reporting that the Pakistan Army HQ had estimated that India had 19 Divisions, but 7 were committed to the Chinese front, while 2 were committed to East Pakistan. Of the remainder, 4 Infantry Divisions and 1 Armoured Division, as well as an Armoured Brigade were in the Vale of Kashmir; this was an obvious morale booster for the planners in Pakistan, who felt that they should be able to take care of the 5 Divisions left over with no difficulty.

On the other hand, the ISI had apparently in August 1965 informed all concerned in the Pakistan Army, the Pakistan Navy and the Pakistan Air Force that the Indian Government had allowed the Indian COAS to cross the border into Pakistan whenever and wherever necessary. It is difficult to sympathise with Pakistani shock at Operation Riddle being launched at Lahore and Sialkot. The report also claimed that Indian troops were within striking distance of the International Border between India and Pakistan, but this makes strange reading. One only needs to see the distances that some units had to travel, the inability of others to got to battle because of their exhaustion, and the consequences of diversion of Mountain Divisions into plains field battles.

In the event, GHQ Pakistan believed that the main Indian effort would be in Kashmir, with some action against East Pakistan, but nothing against West Pakistan. This was incorporated into one of their Operations Directives.


It deals with the operations of two Indian Army Corps (I am writing this entirely from the point of view of the Indian Army), XI Corps and I Corps, and with the detailed operations of 15th Infantry Division, 7th Infantry Division and 4th Mountain Division. Within those broad categories, there was the specific operation of 54th Brigade and 38th Brigade under 15th Infantry Division, and their constituent battalions and armoured regiments and integral artillery.

The Pakistani assessment of the war was that the Army punched above its weight, and held its own against a much larger adversary, and that the Air Force, too, played a major role in the initial stages of the war, while the Indian Air Force was nowhere to be seen at the outset, while the two navies played a very tangential role. However, the Pakistan Navy did make a very bold move, shelling Dwarka. This enfuriated the Indian CONS, who demanded a meeting with the Defence Minister, failed to get a release to attack, asked to see the Prime Minister, failed again, and went and met the President (reported in Chavan's war diaries). He was stalled at all three levels, told that the Navy would be brought in, but later, and had to be content with that.

We have to reckon with two different points of view of how the Indian Army fared. One of them is obviously the Indian side, the other, equally obviously, the Pakistani side. So let us look at them.

Two sources have been cited to encapsulate the Indian point of view, the book War Despatched by General Harbaksh Singh, and a recent article by Manoj Joshi in The Wire. So "XI Corps performance was a sickening repetition of command failures leading to the sacrifice of a series of cheap victories." And "...I Corps, with the exception of a few minor successes, the operational performance was virtually a catalogue of lost victories. In two key battles, Dograi near Lahore and Phillora, early in the war, Indian forces broke through, but were pulled back by commanders who were worried that they had been sucked into a trap."

Akhtar Malik on the other hand says, "...we lost the initiative the very first day, and never recovered it." Another view, from Shuja Nawaz, was that the campaign was marked by "tactical brilliance and gallantry at the lower levels of command, nullified by a lack of vision and courage among the higher leadership of the Pakistan Army."

Mahmud Ahmed's book was originally titled "Illusions of Victory", and was changed by the Pakistan Army to "History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965", had a similar assessment. Apparently 28 study groups were set up to dissect the lessons of the war at the Staff College, Quetta; it is not known how many were set up in India.

This was NOT the official (=Government) point of view; Ayub Khan's government proclaimed the war a magnificent victory for Pakistan.

In effect, Pakistan had failed to liberate Kashmir, and had failed to rouse a popular uprising. India, with a numerically superior force, failed to dominate the Pakistan Army, and failed to make the Pakistan Army sue for peace.

@Cuirassier
@mumm-ra

For your consideration.

"The 1965 war was a war between two Second World War armies, trained to fight for someone else, and both sides demonstrated not a balance of power, but a balance of incompetence."

 

[Panzerkiel]

Let us classify posts from #152 to 178 as commentary, and return to a straight narrative of Grand Slam, until the point when General Yahya Khan was put in as Divisional Commander, with his own Divisional HQ of 7th Div., vice General Malik the author of Grand Slam.

We have already seen that around mid-August, 191 Brigade had lost its CO, and had been pretty roughly handled. The disposition of its components was all along the Cease Fire Line, in the plains, 3 Mahar and 3 GR north of the CFL, 6 Sikh LI to their south, hinged on Burejal, 15 Kumaon in echelon, on the Mandiala heights (this is reported in Google Maps as Mandiwala), so forming a curve facing the CFL, 9 Punjab further north in the hills, the J&K Militia distributed among the Mahars and the Sikh LI. The artillery was close to the 15 Kumaon in Mandiwala.

Better military minds than mine will no doubt have an explanation for this layout, but on the face of it, it seems reasonable. The front is covered, in linear fashion, but that was the precise weakness that had been noticed. 3 Mahar, 6 Sikh LI and 3 GR held the line, 9 Punjab held the hills immediately beyond 3 Mahar, and 15 Kumaon was in the middle of the curve formed by the front line, that is, by 3 Mahar, 3 GR and 6 Sikh LI, along with the divisional artillery and the brigade HQ.

41 Mtn. Brigade, on release to 10th Div., was to take up position between the border and Jammu, south of Mandiala, and the Corps reserve, 28th Bde., was to be further back, with the divisional headquarters, based on Akhnoor.

All very well, but within 4 days, 1st September to 4th September, all was over.

On the 1st, after an artillery bombardment starting at 03:30 and going on till 06:30, the Indian positions on the west to east alignment was attacked by 203 mm guns of the Pakistani artillery. At this time, no artillery of this bore was even available in the Indian Army; only the Field Artillery Regiment of 105 mm guns located on the Mandiwala heights and the troop of 155 mm Medium Artillery could oppose this terrifying assault.

Following this, three thrusts were launched, one, in the north, at the Mahars and Gorkhas, at Dewa, by the 4 Azad Kashmir Brigade supported by the 13 Lancers; they pushed the Mahars and the Gorkhas into the foothills behind and the positions between them and the easternmost Indian defences at Mandiwala lay clear.

At right angles to this, there two armoured attacks supported by infantry. One thrust was delivered east of Burejal by a squadron and was resisted by the AMX 13s of 20 Lancers; Major Amin describes these light tanks, not MBTs, as matchboxes in front of 11 Cavalry and 13 Lancers Pattons. Another thrust was by the 11 Cavalry and an infantry battalion attacking eastward at Moel, that is, at 15 Kumaon and the grouped recoil-less rifles of the brigade. There was no artillery support for the Indians against this attack, because the contingent located at Mandiwala was neutralised by counter-battery fire.

By the evening, the northern thrust had broken through the defences of the Mahars and the Gorkhas, and the way towards Mandiwala lay clear. This also compromised the position of the Sikhs, already under pressure from the 11 Cavalry. There was then a gap between the elements of the Mahars and the Gorkhas who had retreated into the foot-hills, and the 6 Sikh LI, still facing south but under great pressure from their right flank and to their front. 9 Punjab was too far back to give any support to these defensive positions. 15 Kumaon remained at Mandiwala, along with the artillery and the brigade HQ.

After a break, when the Pakistanis moved their engineers forward to support a tank crossing of the Jammu Tawi river, the attack commenced again. All troops were withdrawn to the east bank of the Tawi, and the defences were taken up by the newly-inducted 41 Mtn. Brigade. We have the situation then that the mountain brigade,without any anti-tank artillery as is normally carried by plains infantry divisions, was left facing the Pattons of the 11 Cavalry and the 13 Lancers. Besides making the remainder of the troops on the Mandiwala heights vulnerable, as well as the artillery and the brigade HQ, the way to Jammu was blocked only by the 28 Brigade positioned at Akhnoor, along with the 10 Div HQ.

In Greek drama, when the plot line reached unmanageable complications, the author usually launched a Deus Ex Machina. It was time for Field Marshal Ayub Khan to launch his own Deus Ex Machina.

On the morning of the 2nd September, this was the situation:

• 3 Mahars and the Gorkhas were sheltered in the foothills; they had had to give way against the assault by 4th Azad Kashmir Brigade and 13 Lancers, and the path forward to Mandiwala was open.
• 9 Punjab were behind them in the foothills.
• 6 Sikh LI had been badly mauled by the combined attacks at Moel and at Burejal on the CFL itself, and the orders had gone out for 191 Brigade elements to fall back on the east bank of the Jammu Tawi. The west bank was no longer tenable, and the 11 Cavalry, with support from engineering, had already crossed over; even the east bank was no longer tenable.
• 191 Brigade itself was asked to fall back to Akhnoor.
• The J&K Militia attached to the Mahars and to the Sikh LI were caught up in the general melee, and were forced along with their attached organisations.
• 15 Kumaon, with its outgunned 105 mm Artillery Regiment, were left perched on the Mandiwala heights, staring down the barrel of a gun; both 13 Lancers, moving east from the CFL with the Azad Kashmir Brigade and 11 Cavalry, moving north to overwhelm the 6 Sikh LI, were closing in on the position.

At this point, the 41 Mtn. Brigade was deployed, with the usual mountain brigade equipment not including anti-tank weapons, facing the combined might of the two Patton-equipped cavalry regiments.

10 Div HQ was perched uneasily in between 41 Mtn. Brigade and 28 Brigade, based on Akhnoor.

Disaster was imminent.

Nothing happened on the 2nd.

Unknown to the Indians, the Pakistani GHQ has decided to replace Maj. Gen. Akhtar Husain Malik, author of the entire operation, with Maj. Gen. Yahya Khan, who arrived to take over the 7th Div. HQ, while General Malik departed. Yahya Khan decided he needed to take stock, and ordered a consolidation on the 2nd. That was all the time that Harbaksh Singh needed to get his own plans in order.

But that is later, on the 6th. To continue with events in the ongoing battle at Chhamb, the Pakistani 10 Brigade crossed the Tawi. A detachment to the south captured a position well to the south, the left flank, of the Indian 41 Mtn. Brigade, rendering it vulnerable to a flank attack. That was not to be needed.

On the 4th, the Pakistanis assaulted 41 Mtn. Brigade. During the day, they broke that brigade's defences, and forced its elements to fall back through 28 Brigade's lines to the HQ of 191 Brigade.

On the 5th, nothing much happened. Now that the road to Jammu, or, at least, to Akhnoor lay open, it was natural that the Pakistani side, that had completely convinced itself that it was performing a sandbox exercise, and that the sandbox was the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, completely ignored other options and possibilities, and airily dismissed the clear warnings of the 5'2" Indian Prime Minister about the right to strike anywhere, any time in response to a Pakistani attack.

On the 6th, there was a half-hearted attack on the 28 Brigade's position at Akhnoor, during the late afternoon and the night; the energy and enthusiasm was not there, because the news of the Indian XI Corps attack on Lahore had got through.

And there ended the brilliantly-conceived brilliantly-led Operation Grand Slam, that could have reached Jammu by the 6th, taking away the day of consolidation caused by Yahya's abrupt arrival on the battlefield in mid-battle.

 

[Panzerkiel]

At this point, before plunging into the narrative relating to the actions of the Indian XI Corps, and then I Corps, one asks oneself: what was Operation Grand Slam, after all? Was it, is it, just a footnote in history?

It is so tempting to dismiss it with the thought that it was a child of the Pakistani military establishment, or at least, that part of it secretly engaged in planning the sequence of events that was to achieve a bigger victory than in the Rann of Kutch. On the other hand, it had an historical and public policy value.

This is the war that Pakistan should have fought, but didn't.

General Malik actually was outnumbered. Far from a conventional 3:1 superiority in numbers, he had fewer infantry battalions. But those who have learnt to use Lanchester equations would have a different story to tell. They would have pointed to the overwhelming superiority in armour, the overwhelming superiority in artillery, and would have said, with this force composition, cutting through a bloated infantry only formation would be as easy as a hot knife through butter. So two armoured regiments with the best contemporary armour, opposed to the light tanks of the Indian 20 Cavalry, a Corps artillery strength against one single solitary field artillery regiment and a troop of big guns: Malik knew precisely what to do, and how to do it. And he was precisely right in his execution.

Thus he put pressure alternately on different points of the Indian front, first, a softening up with ambushes and hit-and-run raids, then, a softening up by massive artillery bombardment, third, probing attacks where the objectives were well-guarded by Indian Army troops, and then the last, fourth phase, the combined arms attack in full strength.

These tactics succeeded in the west, where the Azad Kashmir Brigade softened up the Mahars and the Gorkhas; it succeeded in the south, where the armoured regiment the 11 Cavalry softened up the 6 Sikh LI, and then broke through. It was at the last step, to bear down on 28 Brigade at Akhnoor, and to sweep them aside, that they faltered.

 

[Panzerkiel]

Am also one of those few who believe that Lanchester equation can be quiet misleading at times....it just deals with numbers instead of other important factors......an inherent limitation....

Just a short analysis of Op Grandslam....

for IA, battle of Akhnur was basically an example of a proper withdrawal operation......
PA failed to cash in the opportunities available from 1 to 4 Sep
PA also expected some threat from IAF which delayed their crossing of Tawi

On 1 Sep, Indian government gave permission to COAS to cross international border...
If PA would have continued to bash on, Akhnur should have been captured by 6 Sep...which may have paved the way for conditions of a strategic envelopment of IA in Punjab (the other pincer being PA 1 Armored and 11 Divisions from Khem Karan)

Op Grandslam also had to potential to link up with Gibralter forces which were comfortably holding in Budil area.


Coming to Operations Riddle and Nepal....

XI Corps attack plan was named RIDDLE.....
involved attack towards Lahore along three axis (15, 7 and 4 Mountain Divisions), they were to capture area uptill BRBLC, with a be-prepared mission to go across it in case of unexpected success...moreover, Jassar enclave was to be eliminated and its bridge capture to negate a Pakistani offensive option towards DBN.

1 Corps attack plan was named Nepal..
for which a bridgehead was planned in Bhagowal-Phillaurah area to provide a firm base for 1 Armored Division to break out towards MRLC and Daska....

Problems faced by IA...
first, owing to vast distances (international border to peacetime locations), WC was forced to stagger all these attacks...therefore all these formations had to attack right from their line of march without any rest or necessary coordination...
WC also did not have upto date maps of their area of operations....

Moreover, there was also indicators of indian reluctance to cross the international border....some reasons being...
PA's edge in armor (quantity and quality)
Superior PA artillery
F-104 (even though it was available in a limited quantity to have any major impact on the tactical battle)

GOC XV Corps, since he was hard pressed due to Gibralter and Grandslam, pressed COAS to open the international border so that PA pressure against him can be reduced. Therefore IA D Day was advanced to 6 Sep in order to relieve pressure against Akhnur..

IA formations started moving towards their launch location on ni 2/3 Sep, this move went entirely unnoticed despite the large distances involved.

A word about effects of Rann of Kutch agreement.....
it was a brilliant diplomatic coup for Pakistan, whereby it diffused tension and ensured withdrawal of Indian troops......but PA troops remained near the border since their peacetime locations were already near it. Despite the forward placement of PA troops, they still were surprised once IA offensive opened up across the international border.

 

[Panzerkiel]

Just started reading this thread. I hope the quality is maintained. Congrats to @Joe Shearer & @PanzerKiel

From 1947/8 perspective - this is what I read and you two can shed some light. Sheikh Abdulla was the tallest leader in the State and after accession to India he demanded and got the Maharaja to abdicate and be replaced by his son

Also he recommended that India stop its offensive to recapture the erstwhile Princely State where it did because the Sheikh's influence did not extend to non Kashmiri speaking regions and it would be difficult to convince the people of the wisdom of accession to India.

@Joe Shearer @PanzerKiel

PanzerKiel's commentary is stunning. How he remembers the exact order of battle, and who was doing what when, is something that flat out boggles my imagination.

Your comment about Sheikh Abdullah is something that I have read about before, but someone somewhere has to document it for verifiability. Just as, to give you an example, Jairam Ramesh' book on Krishna Menon, A Chequered Brilliance, throws extremely valuable light on the extent of damage that he did to the Indian military. I wish someone would confirm this, as it makes perfect sense.

Sheikh Sahib would not have wanted to get entangled in West Jammu/Azad Kashmir politics; they had just recently rebelled against his leadership and his policies and revived the erstwhile Muslim Conference, that he had re-named to the National Conference. Neither would he have wanted to get to have to deal with Gilgit, knowing as little as he or any other Jammu and Kashmir politician knew about this remote location under British direct rule.

I was thinking about this thread and your remarks, and wanted to share with you some insights (into 65) that I got, either directly from PanzerKiel, or through his provocative remarks that made me dig harder in spots that I thought I had understood very well already.

• I learnt that we tend to underestimate the effects of Gibraltar a lot. We are normally dismissive about it - the Pakistani special forces got no support from the locals, they were hunted down and killed, as a bonus, we rolled on to capture Haji Pir Pass - but that is clearly a mistake. PanzerKiel (and Cuirassier) adduced facts and figures to show that XV Corps was in fact bruised pretty severely by the operations of these special forces groups, perhaps one reason why Mitha's book is one of PanzerKiel's three favourites. We lost a CO of one of the Kumaon battalions, and the commander of 191 Brigade in the supporting artillery fire given to the intruders; that gives us a measure of the headaches they gave Katoch.
• Gibraltar also may have contributed to softening up 191 Brigade, ahead of Grand Slam. Already having lost a CO, and then subjected to massive bombardment with guns that were far more powerful than ours, all five battalions of 191 Brigade were under stress. Only two battalions may have been badly battered - 3 Mahars and 6 Sikh LI, but 15 Kumaon was not very happy at the attention it was paid, and 3 GR seems to have suffered too. 9 Punjab may have got away with glancing injuries, but according to the good Major's account, 12 Div was supposed to hook left, while 7 Div - Yahya's command, replacing 12 Div - was to have battered its way through the Indian position at Akhnoor - the remnants of 15 Kumaon, 191 Brigade HQ, a fairly badly mauled 4 Mountain Div., sent to battle very strong armour with no weapons with which to battle them, and, supporting them, 28 Div.
• I was surprised to find that numerically, the Indian 191 Brigade was possibly almost as strong as the Pakistani 10 Brigade, 104 Brigade and 4 Azad Kashmir Brigade put together, 5+1 battalions to their 7. However, in armour and in artillery, the PA had overwhelming superiority; 2 armoured regiments running Pattons, against a detachment of 2 squadrons of AMX 13 'matchboxes', and 203 mm artillery against a Field Artillery Regiment and a troop of 155 mm Medium Artillery.
• It was impressive to see how Malik marshalled his forces. Two taps and a third, and then a massive tank charge, and the fighting of the 1st of September, the 3rd, the 4th and the 6th resulted in 3 battalions and their linked J&K Militia battalion jammed against the foothills, unable to move, unable to link up with the main forces, and simply waiting for the Azad Kashmir Brigade to lower the boom. Other formations had been swept out of their positions on the CFL and near Mandiwala and onto Akhnoor.
• PanzerKiel argues, however, that this was a fighting retreat, and delayed the onslaught on Akhnoor by sufficient time to allow the Army commander, Harbaksh Singh, to launch attacks by XI Corps and I Corps and bring the PA off balance. As always, his observation must be considered seriously.

 

[Panzerkiel]

Luckily, in the form of Gen Akhtar and Gen Eftikhar, PA had the best commanders available in Chamb sector in both the wars.....

Just like 3 Jat getting Dograi twice, PA advances again towards Akhnur in 1971 are no mean feat.

Just for info, our 17 division was grouped together with 23 division for Gen Eftikhar offensive.... Imagine what these two divisions could have done in Akhnur sector in 1971.... However situation elsewhere forced the employment of 17 division somewhere else.

191 brigade was later to move through 28 and 41 brigades towards Akhnur for its defense.

 

[Panzerkiel]

On our (Indian) western front, I believe Eftekhar Janjua's attack in the Chhamb sector was the best command performance in South Asia these 70+ years. It is mesmerising how he took a firm grip on an assault that was faltering, changed axis in mid-battle and broke through.

M. J. Akbar wrote somewhere that (the Lord God) favoured India (he did not say the Lord God). Only that can explain Akhtar Malik's removal in 65, or Eftekhar Janjua's helicopter crash in 71.