Iran - Israel/US War: Israel-US declare war on Iran, Iran responds
- Thread starter Khorasan Black Flags
- Start date
Abdul q
Registered Member
Surprisingly despite more concrete in Lahore than ever before, Lahore is much cooler this time than it has been in last decade during summer
The oil prices are not coming down to even pre-war in Pakistan rest assured.
Ravenman
Registered Member
Yes i saw a report that it has effected Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is now mid june but still raining in Turkey, thats not how it always was.
Years ago i read somewhere that UAE was stealing rain and clowds from their neighbours. They have a weather control radar build by the US that directs rain to Israel and the UAE.
the vicious kind
Registered Member
There is no such thing as "Stealing clouds". You might have heard about cloud seeding: aircraft release salt into existing suitable clouds to slightly improve the chance of rain. It cannot create clouds from nothing, cannot pull clouds from Pakistan/Iran/Turkey, and cannot steer rain across borders.
One of the true tests of this deal is whether America will keep pressuring other countries not to get close to IRan, or do much business with Iran. Iran Pakistan pipeline is one example. Iraq investments another. We have to see. Is it a real deal in the future? Or is it just: we tried, we f*cked up, we'll see if we can try again in the future to keep you weak and try to attack again.
Master Chief
Trusted Member
Iran has made concessions. USA has made concessions.
Can anyone tell me exactly what Israel has conceded in this deal?
My understanding is that Israel gets its latest "buffer zone" in another nation's land.
As for the outcomes here, I have USA and Israel down for a score draw, with Israel getting an away win.
Musings
Administrator
Unless the USA use an iron fist and control Netanyahu - i can see the deal being derailed. He is aware if there is a sign of peace he maybe thrown into the dock and hopefully get locked up. I know i am dreaming here
the vicious kind
Registered Member
Post Iran–U.S. War Review
The Iran–U.S.–Israel war has produced several important strategic lessons.
1. The failure of the decapitation strategy
Despite heavy strikes on senior leadership, the Iranian regime and the IRGC survived. Commanders were replaced quickly, command-and-control was restored, and the system did not collapse. This showed the institutional depth of the IRGC and forced the U.S.–Israeli campaign to shift from leadership targeting to broader infrastructure pressure
2. Iran’s shift in missile strategy
Unlike TP-1, TP-2, and TP-3, Iran appears to have adjusted its missile strategy. Instead of expending large numbers of missiles against heavily defended targets inside Israel, IRGC prioritized the U.S. early-detection and support layer.
Whether this shift came from new leadership or from institutional learning inside the IRGC, it showed a higher level of strategic adaptation than previous rounds.
3. Hormuz and energy coercion replaced the nuclear option
Iran did not need to rely on a nuclear option to create strategic deterrence. By threatening or disrupting the Strait of Hormuz, and by placing GCC oil facilities, terminals, and export infrastructure under pressure, Iran was able to hold the global economy at risk. The war became a global economic crisis. This was the single most decisive factor in the failure of the U.S.–Israeli campaign to achieve its objectives.
4. Failure to mobilize internal opposition
The U.S. and Israel were also unable to mobilize Iranian opposition groups or separatist movements, including Kurdish and Baloch factions. This was notably different from earlier periods, when anti-regime and separatist groups were more visibly active against IRGC interests inside Iran. This again points to a major miscalculation: external pressure did not automatically translate into internal collapse.
5. GCC appetite for war collapsed early
Apart from the UAE, most GCC states appeared to lose their appetite for escalation very early in the conflict. There were also kinetic attempts, information operations aimed at widening the conflict by drawing Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states deeper into the confrontation. However, this effort failed.
Pakistan’s role was particularly important. The quadrilateral mechanism involving Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Egypt helped create a diplomatic channel focused on de-escalation rather than expansion. Israel’s last hope was to convert the war into a wider regional confrontation. That objective also failed.
6. The U.S. Navy’s Hormuz problem
Perhaps the most shocking lesson was the U.S. Navy’s inability to quickly and decisively restore secure passage through the Strait of Hormuz. For decades, U.S. naval power has been built around the assumption that Washington can guarantee maritime access through critical chokepoints.
Hormuz challenged that assumption.
If the United States struggled to reopen and secure the Strait of Hormuz against Iran, how would it manage a similar crisis in the Strait of Malacca against China? This war therefore exposed a broader vulnerability in U.S. maritime strategy
The Iran–U.S.–Israel war has produced several important strategic lessons.
1. The failure of the decapitation strategy
Despite heavy strikes on senior leadership, the Iranian regime and the IRGC survived. Commanders were replaced quickly, command-and-control was restored, and the system did not collapse. This showed the institutional depth of the IRGC and forced the U.S.–Israeli campaign to shift from leadership targeting to broader infrastructure pressure
2. Iran’s shift in missile strategy
Unlike TP-1, TP-2, and TP-3, Iran appears to have adjusted its missile strategy. Instead of expending large numbers of missiles against heavily defended targets inside Israel, IRGC prioritized the U.S. early-detection and support layer.
Whether this shift came from new leadership or from institutional learning inside the IRGC, it showed a higher level of strategic adaptation than previous rounds.
3. Hormuz and energy coercion replaced the nuclear option
Iran did not need to rely on a nuclear option to create strategic deterrence. By threatening or disrupting the Strait of Hormuz, and by placing GCC oil facilities, terminals, and export infrastructure under pressure, Iran was able to hold the global economy at risk. The war became a global economic crisis. This was the single most decisive factor in the failure of the U.S.–Israeli campaign to achieve its objectives.
4. Failure to mobilize internal opposition
The U.S. and Israel were also unable to mobilize Iranian opposition groups or separatist movements, including Kurdish and Baloch factions. This was notably different from earlier periods, when anti-regime and separatist groups were more visibly active against IRGC interests inside Iran. This again points to a major miscalculation: external pressure did not automatically translate into internal collapse.
5. GCC appetite for war collapsed early
Apart from the UAE, most GCC states appeared to lose their appetite for escalation very early in the conflict. There were also kinetic attempts, information operations aimed at widening the conflict by drawing Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states deeper into the confrontation. However, this effort failed.
Pakistan’s role was particularly important. The quadrilateral mechanism involving Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Egypt helped create a diplomatic channel focused on de-escalation rather than expansion. Israel’s last hope was to convert the war into a wider regional confrontation. That objective also failed.
6. The U.S. Navy’s Hormuz problem
Perhaps the most shocking lesson was the U.S. Navy’s inability to quickly and decisively restore secure passage through the Strait of Hormuz. For decades, U.S. naval power has been built around the assumption that Washington can guarantee maritime access through critical chokepoints.
Hormuz challenged that assumption.
If the United States struggled to reopen and secure the Strait of Hormuz against Iran, how would it manage a similar crisis in the Strait of Malacca against China? This war therefore exposed a broader vulnerability in U.S. maritime strategy
the vicious kind
Registered Member
Future of the Post-U.S. Middle East
The United States will gradually reduce its direct military burden in the Middle East as it shifts focus toward East Asia and the China challenge. The “Pivot to Asia” is central to long-term U.S. survivability. As Washington steps back, the Middle East will not become peaceful; it will become more multipolar.
I see four main blocs emerging.
1. Israel–UAE–Jordan–Bahrain–Kuwait–Cyprus, backed by the U.S. and EU
This bloc will try to expand its regional influence through intelligence cooperation, trade corridors, air defence integration, and covert pressure on Iran. Its main goal will be to bypass vulnerable chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz by creating alternative energy and logistics routes.
Yemen will likely become a major focus. Removing or weakening Houthi influence over the Bab al-Mandab Strait would be central to securing Red Sea trade and protecting Israel–Gulf connectivity.
2. Saudi Arabia–Pakistan
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will move toward a closer defence partnership built around deterrence, training, air defence, intelligence sharing, and protection of critical infrastructure. Saudi Arabia brings financial, energy, and diplomatic weight; Pakistan brings military depth, manpower, strategic experience, and regional credibility.
This bloc will not seek open war. Its strategy will be controlled deterrence: protect Saudi territory, prevent regional escalation, secure energy routes, and act as a balancing force between Iran, Israel, Turkey, and the Gulf.
3. Turkey–Qatar–Syria
Turkey and Qatar will expand their influence in post-war Syria through reconstruction, trade, military training, energy deals, and political patronage. Syria will become Turkey’s strategic depth and Qatar’s entry point into the Levant.
This bloc will present itself as the Sunni political alternative to both Iranian influence and Israeli-Gulf dominance. Its power will come from reconstruction money, logistics routes, security cooperation, and influence over new Syrian institutions.
4. Iran–Lebanon–Iraq–Yemen
Iran will not abandon its proxy network; it will redesign it. After the war, Tehran will likely focus on rebuilding Hezbollah, strengthening Iraqi militias, expanding Houthi capabilities, and recruiting a new generation of fighters across the region.
The strategy will shift from large symbolic confrontation to dispersed pressure: drones, missiles, cyber attacks, maritime disruption, political penetration, and low-cost attrition. Iran’s goal will be to make any future campaign against it too expensive for Israel, the U.S., or the Gulf.
The United States will gradually reduce its direct military burden in the Middle East as it shifts focus toward East Asia and the China challenge. The “Pivot to Asia” is central to long-term U.S. survivability. As Washington steps back, the Middle East will not become peaceful; it will become more multipolar.
I see four main blocs emerging.
1. Israel–UAE–Jordan–Bahrain–Kuwait–Cyprus, backed by the U.S. and EU
This bloc will try to expand its regional influence through intelligence cooperation, trade corridors, air defence integration, and covert pressure on Iran. Its main goal will be to bypass vulnerable chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz by creating alternative energy and logistics routes.
Yemen will likely become a major focus. Removing or weakening Houthi influence over the Bab al-Mandab Strait would be central to securing Red Sea trade and protecting Israel–Gulf connectivity.
2. Saudi Arabia–Pakistan
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will move toward a closer defence partnership built around deterrence, training, air defence, intelligence sharing, and protection of critical infrastructure. Saudi Arabia brings financial, energy, and diplomatic weight; Pakistan brings military depth, manpower, strategic experience, and regional credibility.
This bloc will not seek open war. Its strategy will be controlled deterrence: protect Saudi territory, prevent regional escalation, secure energy routes, and act as a balancing force between Iran, Israel, Turkey, and the Gulf.
3. Turkey–Qatar–Syria
Turkey and Qatar will expand their influence in post-war Syria through reconstruction, trade, military training, energy deals, and political patronage. Syria will become Turkey’s strategic depth and Qatar’s entry point into the Levant.
This bloc will present itself as the Sunni political alternative to both Iranian influence and Israeli-Gulf dominance. Its power will come from reconstruction money, logistics routes, security cooperation, and influence over new Syrian institutions.
4. Iran–Lebanon–Iraq–Yemen
Iran will not abandon its proxy network; it will redesign it. After the war, Tehran will likely focus on rebuilding Hezbollah, strengthening Iraqi militias, expanding Houthi capabilities, and recruiting a new generation of fighters across the region.
The strategy will shift from large symbolic confrontation to dispersed pressure: drones, missiles, cyber attacks, maritime disruption, political penetration, and low-cost attrition. Iran’s goal will be to make any future campaign against it too expensive for Israel, the U.S., or the Gulf.
Israel has 'conceded' without actually saying, that the greater israel project is dead, that america won't be around forever, that they will have to leave lebanon, the west bank and leave gaza alone, or 400 million people's governments in the region will force it to happen in 10-15 years time. it has no future unless it rapidly repents. That's reading geopolitics.
Michael
VIP Member
Will the war continue? Or will it take a different turn?
This is not a decision for Iran or the United States. Nor is it determined by the wishes of their decision-makers, regardless of their true intentions.
The Russia-Ukraine war has dragged on for years. Whether it's Ukraine or Russia, Zelensky or Putin... the two sides actually didn't want to fight anymore a long time ago. But the war continues.
Even if Netanyahu is willing to cease hostilities, many practical issues will still push him toward war.
Starting a war is very easy. But stopping a war is very difficult.
Users who are viewing this thread
Pakistan Defence Latest
Country Watch Latest
-
-
-
-
TF-X / KAAN / Hürjet Turkish Fighter & Trainer Aircrafts News & Discussions (5 Viewers)- Latest: MMM-E
-