Aryan_B
Elite Member
their continent will be destabalised as Trump and co start cheating in elections. Mark my words trump intends to cheat in mid terms
Iran - Israel/US War: Israel-US declare war on Iran, Iran responds
- Thread starter Khorasan Black Flags
- Start date
tsunset
The Legend
Watandar
Elite Member
Whoever runs Ghalibaf's Twitter account has got a great social media game.
Immortals
Elite Member
Pretty sure it’s run by an Iranian-American out of California. I remember reading an article on it early months of the war. Def someone bright who understands the world of finance and mathematics.
Kyussis
SpeedLimited
They did and they aired footage captured from the Rq-170 on Iranian Televission.
030292
Registered Member
Ghalibaf is a Phd himself, no? One can assume he has the elementary knowledge of us/world economy.
kobra
Registered Member
Why Are Oil Prices Still Low? And How Did the Reformists in Iran Allow the United States to Smuggle Oil Through the Strait of Hormuz?
Many of you are wondering about the reason why oil prices are still much lower than the levels analysts expected after the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait of Hormuz, before the war, was exporting nearly 20 to 21 million barrels of oil and its derivatives daily, equivalent to about one-fifth of the world's consumption of petroleum liquids, including around 15 million barrels of crude oil and condensates alone. And when Iran tightened the closure in earnest, flows dropped to an average of about 4.9 million barrels per day during the second quarter of 2026, with Brent crude rising at one point to $118 per barrel.
If the quantities exiting the Gulf had remained at that level, oil prices today wouldn't be where they are.
What changed after that is that Gulf countries started finding ways to get millions of barrels out of the region even with the Strait of Hormuz still far from its pre-war normal state.
Take the UAE as an example. The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, ADNOC, began relying extensively on ship-to-ship oil transfer operations outside the Gulf. Instead of a massive tanker entering Abu Dhabi, loading two million barrels, then crossing Hormuz and continuing its journey to China, another tanker now carries the oil from inside the Gulf and crosses the strait with it only, then reaches the waters opposite Fujairah or the Gulf of Oman. There, a massive tanker awaits; the two ships pull up alongside each other, and the cargo is transferred at sea. The massive tanker takes the oil to China or India, while the first ship returns inside the Gulf to load another shipment.
So instead of all the world's tankers entering the Gulf, there are now ships constantly moving between Gulf ports and the Gulf of Oman, transferring oil to tankers waiting outside the region.
These operations were transferring about 1.4 million barrels per day in August. In September, the figure rose to nearly 2.5 million barrels per day.
That's about 75 million barrels per month exiting this way alone.
Saudi Arabia has also now returned to exporting massive quantities of its oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia had been relying on the East-West Pipeline to transport oil from the eastern part of the country to Yanbu on the Red Sea to bypass Hormuz, but after the pipeline came under attack and export capacity from Yanbu was damaged, Aramco returned to Gulf ports. In September, Saudi exports via Hormuz reached about 2.9 million barrels per day, and in just one week, 22 tankers carrying around 42 million barrels of Saudi oil departed.
42 million barrels in just one week.
And take Iraq as well. A few days ago, the tanker Pinios departed loaded with about two million barrels of Basrah crude. It didn't complete its journey to China. It reached the waters off Fujairah, and there, its cargo was transferred to another massive tanker named New Constant, which then took the oil and completed the trip to Asia.
So we're not talking about a single incident or a ship that happened to get through by chance. There's now a full network operating between the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Emirati oil, Saudi oil, Iraqi oil, and other shipments from the region are exiting daily, with parts of them then being consolidated outside Hormuz and transferred to larger tankers.
And that's when you understand why oil prices stayed much lower than they could have reached.
When Iran tightened the closure, flows dropped from over 20 million barrels per day to less than 5 million. And now, when it allows 2.5 million barrels per day to exit via ship-to-ship transfers, and allows Saudi Arabia alone to export about 2.9 million barrels per day, then you add the Emirati and Iraqi oil and the rest of the shipments, you're putting back into the market millions of barrels that were supposed to disappear from it.
And those millions are what make the difference.
If 15 or 20 million barrels per day had truly vanished from the market, we wouldn't be talking about oil at $100 or $110. We'd be talking about a global energy shock, higher fuel prices, higher inflation, and immense pressure on the United States, Europe, and Asia.
Via Cosmotrade.
kobra
Registered Member
The Revolutionary Guard and the hardliners want to use the Strait of Hormuz to the very end, and their logic is crystal clear.
If Iran has the capability to block a massive portion of Gulf oil from reaching the world, then use that capability to its fullest. Close Hormuz, pull 15 or 20 million barrels a day out of the market, drive oil prices to levels the global economy can't sustain, and let the resulting surge in fuel prices, inflation, and market chaos pressure the United States—instead of Iran bearing the full cost of the war alone.
At that point, Trump would face two choices. Either plunge into a full-scale war to try to force Hormuz open, or offer Iran a far better deal than he was prepared to give before the war.
As for the reformers, led by Masoud Pezeshkian's government, they don't want to reach that stage. They want to use Hormuz to pressure Washington, yes, but they don't want to choke off all Gulf exports. They want high oil prices, they want pressure on Trump, and at the same time, they want negotiations to continue on sanctions, frozen Iranian funds, Iranian oil sales, and the American blockade.
In other words, they want to play the card, but not to the bitter end—so as not to force Trump into making a choice.
And the reason isn't just fear that Trump might choose war. There's also an internal political struggle in Iran.
Imagine the Revolutionary Guard fully closes the Strait of Hormuz: 15 or 20 million barrels a day vanish from the market, oil prices skyrocket to levels the global economy can't handle, fuel prices soar inside the United States, and political and economic pressure mounts on Trump—until he's finally forced to make major concessions to Iran.
What would the Revolutionary Guard say to the reformers afterward?
They'd tell them: You've negotiated with the United States for years, while we closed Hormuz for just a few months and got by force what you couldn't achieve through all your talks.
And that's the problem.
Any major deal Iran secures after a full Hormuz closure wouldn't be credited politically to the reformers—it would become the strongest ammunition the Revolutionary Guard uses against them. Force compelled the concessions, not negotiation.
That's why Pezeshkian's government doesn't want to burn the Hormuz card to the very end. It allows a portion of the oil to pass through understandings and deals with Gulf states, tightens scrutiny on other ships, and keeps shipping traffic itself as part of the bargaining with Washington. Every tanker that gets through means oil reaching the market, and every million barrels that reach the market means less pressure on prices and more room for the United States to weather the ongoing crisis.
And that's why oil prices are at these levels so far.
The problem isn't that Iran tried to close Hormuz and failed. When it tightened the closure, flows did drop—from over 20 million barrels a day to under 5 million. The problem is that Iran didn't sustain that level of strictness with Hormuz, and millions of barrels started flowing out of the Gulf via Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, and ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman.
There's a vast difference between 15 or 20 million barrels disappearing from the market daily and allowing several million to slip out.
That's why we haven't seen the real explosion in oil prices yet.
Not because the Strait of Hormuz has lost its importance, and not because the United States forced it open by might—but because Iran's strongest economic card is being played at about half strength.
The Revolutionary Guard wants to use it to the hilt and raise the cost of war to a level that forces the United States to back down. As for the reformers, they want to keep the Strait of Hormuz as a pressure and negotiation tool, because using it to the end might deliver a victory for Iran—but at the same time, it would be a political win for the Revolutionary Guard's theory over their own.
Via Cosmotrade
Shags202
Registered Member
He’s right they did show a lot of footage I think this was one of those things america dropped the ball big they didn’t think Iran could access it or bring it down or even track it let’s just assume Iran is more capable in the field of reverse engineering than most doesn’t mean they can copy everything but they can gain a lot of knowledge those cruise missile and missiles that didn’t explode guarantee in the future we will see something similar
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