Iran - Israel/US War: Israel-US declare war on Iran, Iran responds

[Shags202]

Junk news no?

I seriously can’t listen to the guy everything he says is junk

 

[Khorasan Black Flags]

Give me one reason why the Pezeshkian government should be upset about the rising dollar exchange rate or want to do anything about it:

Does it mean paying lower salaries? Yes

Does it put more pressure on the military and the people to surrender in the war, so that through an agreement it can portray itself as the savior? Yes

Could a rebellion replace the government and oppose the leader? Yes

 

[Jalz]

Give me one reason why the Pezeshkian government should be upset about the rising dollar exchange rate or want to do anything about it:

Does it mean paying lower salaries? Yes

Does it put more pressure on the military and the people to surrender in the war, so that through an agreement it can portray itself as the savior? Yes

Could a rebellion replace the government and oppose the leader? Yes

Their won't be an uprising. People are too crushed by poverty to care about anything other than surviving. Either concede the nuclear program or escalate to break the blockade. No war no peace situation is retarded.

This being said there are fiscal reforms the government could perform to ease inflation. For example spending $10 billion on non-critical organizations/institutions like IRIB or religious organizations or spending $6 billion on gasoline imports or leaving the Tehran stock exchange untaxed could go a long way in ending the $30 billion budget deficit the country is facing right now.

 

[Lulldapull]

I seriously can’t listen to the guy everything he says is junk

There is an Iranian channel called Iran International. Its run outta Israel and Sawdi Judea.

There's another channel called Monoto TV run outta LA.

Both are very nationalist but very anti IRGC.

I mean I'm not Irani turani......I'm pakistani pendu.....so don't get involved in internal Irani socio-political drama.

Not my cup of tea.

Just keep your distance man........best policy.

 

[Oracle]

First time after war first phase of war .. Iran is desperate for deal however usa don't want it.

During this time usa wanted deal and Iran was taking hard line... Now usa is preparing for war and this time tactical nuke coming...

USA and Israel are to blame however Iran also didn't wanted peace.

 

[Immortals]

 

[muhammed45]

On China-Iran relationship

Contrary to the media hype, the meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping concluded without the Chinese president making any commitment to increase pressure on Iran.

Grant Rumley, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, tells Al-Monitor: "China is currently playing a key role in keeping the Iranian regime afloat." On the diplomatic front, China and Russia last week vetoed a U.S.-proposed resolution at the UN Security Council that sought to extend—by one year—the mandate of the experts monitoring compliance with UN sanctions against Iran. Eleven Security Council members voted in favor of the resolution, while Pakistan and Somalia abstained. This veto ended the monitoring panel's mandate, although international sanctions remain in effect. Just a week before the meeting between Xi and Trump, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing, where Wang described the two nations as "comprehensive strategic partners."

On the economic front, according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China purchases over 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports, often at steep discounts. Although these purchases have declined during the war, they have not ceased: data from the firm Kpler indicates that China’s imports averaged 534,000 barrels per day in August, compared to approximately 1.4 million barrels per day in 2025. According to the Commission's report, the total value of Iranian oil exports to China in 2025 amounted to roughly $31.2 billion.

China also appears to be keeping its air links with Iran open, despite the imposition and implementation of new U.S. sanctions against Iran’s aviation sector on Wednesday. On Wednesday, a Mahan Air flight from Tehran landed in Guangzhou. The previous day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun had described the new U.S. measures as illegal. The continuation of these flights maintains a channel for trade and tourism between Iran and one of its most important economic partners at a time when the country's other international connections—including those with the UAE, Iraq, Oman, Azerbaijan, and other nations—are being severed.

Rumley believes: "Historically, Beijing rarely exercises its leverage in the region unless the matter is directly tied to China's interests. Any commitment Trump secures from Xi during this meeting will—in practice and on the ground—amount to, at best, a half-measure." China also possesses ways to maintain its support while ostensibly limiting direct government involvement [in measures backing Iran]. China’s independent, private refineries—known as "teapots"—process the bulk of Iranian oil exports to China. Rumley notes: "The nature of China’s support for Iran affords Xi the maneuverability of 'plausible deniability.' Xi can claim that the Chinese government has halted shipments to Iran, while Chinese companies and intermediary third-party entities continue to facilitate the ongoing export of dual-use goods to the country."

Furthermore, Beijing continues to serve as a primary source of dual-use technologies for Iran’s military programs. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that Chinese entities shipped approximately 1,300 consignments of dual-use components—including electronics suitable for use in drones and missile guidance systems—to Iran’s Ministry of Defense during the first half of 2026. This relationship offers China a low-cost means of supporting a partner capable of complicating U.S. military operations in the region, without the need to extend a formal defense commitment to Tehran.

Thus, China remains a key factor in Iran’s ability to withstand U.S. pressure, and the recent meeting between Trump and Xi showed no public signs of a shift in this dynamic. Moreover, even if Trump secured a commitment from Xi behind closed doors, Chinese support for Iran flows through a complex mix of state policies, private companies, and intermediary networks, making the monitoring and enforcement of any such agreement difficult.

 

[muhammed45]

On China-Iran relationship

Contrary to the media hype, the meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping concluded without the Chinese president making any commitment to increase pressure on Iran.

Grant Rumley, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, tells Al-Monitor: "China is currently playing a key role in keeping the Iranian regime afloat." On the diplomatic front, China and Russia last week vetoed a U.S.-proposed resolution at the UN Security Council that sought to extend—by one year—the mandate of the experts monitoring compliance with UN sanctions against Iran. Eleven Security Council members voted in favor of the resolution, while Pakistan and Somalia abstained. This veto ended the monitoring panel's mandate, although international sanctions remain in effect. Just a week before the meeting between Xi and Trump, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing, where Wang described the two nations as "comprehensive strategic partners."

On the economic front, according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China purchases over 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports, often at steep discounts. Although these purchases have declined during the war, they have not ceased: data from the firm Kpler indicates that China’s imports averaged 534,000 barrels per day in August, compared to approximately 1.4 million barrels per day in 2025. According to the Commission's report, the total value of Iranian oil exports to China in 2025 amounted to roughly $31.2 billion.

China also appears to be keeping its air links with Iran open, despite the imposition and implementation of new U.S. sanctions against Iran’s aviation sector on Wednesday. On Wednesday, a Mahan Air flight from Tehran landed in Guangzhou. The previous day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun had described the new U.S. measures as illegal. The continuation of these flights maintains a channel for trade and tourism between Iran and one of its most important economic partners at a time when the country's other international connections—including those with the UAE, Iraq, Oman, Azerbaijan, and other nations—are being severed.

Rumley believes: "Historically, Beijing rarely exercises its leverage in the region unless the matter is directly tied to China's interests. Any commitment Trump secures from Xi during this meeting will—in practice and on the ground—amount to, at best, a half-measure." China also possesses ways to maintain its support while ostensibly limiting direct government involvement [in measures backing Iran]. China’s independent, private refineries—known as "teapots"—process the bulk of Iranian oil exports to China. Rumley notes: "The nature of China’s support for Iran affords Xi the maneuverability of 'plausible deniability.' Xi can claim that the Chinese government has halted shipments to Iran, while Chinese companies and intermediary third-party entities continue to facilitate the ongoing export of dual-use goods to the country."

Furthermore, Beijing continues to serve as a primary source of dual-use technologies for Iran’s military programs. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that Chinese entities shipped approximately 1,300 consignments of dual-use components—including electronics suitable for use in drones and missile guidance systems—to Iran’s Ministry of Defense during the first half of 2026. This relationship offers China a low-cost means of supporting a partner capable of complicating U.S. military operations in the region, without the need to extend a formal defense commitment to Tehran.

Thus, China remains a key factor in Iran’s ability to withstand U.S. pressure, and the recent meeting between Trump and Xi showed no public signs of a shift in this dynamic. Moreover, even if Trump secured a commitment from Xi behind closed doors, Chinese support for Iran flows through a complex mix of state policies, private companies, and intermediary networks, making the monitoring and enforcement of any such agreement difficult.

Despite fanfare, Xi shows Trump no sign of breaking with Iran Link

China presses Iran, US to reopen Hormuz as disruptions threaten oil supply Link

Trump warns Xi over Chinese support for Iran, receives assurances, US envoy says Link

Why the Hormuz oil shock never became an energy catastrophe Link

Turkish carriers halt Iran flights as US sanctions bite: Who could follow? Link

How China’s ‘teapot’ refineries are cushioning it from Iran war oil crisis Link

What War in Iran Means for China’s “Teapot” Oil Refineries Link

 

[Oracle]

Why is Iran hitting civilian ships

Hitting oil tanker after oil tanker of other counties...

Iran goal is hitting other countries so they pressurise USA to acknowledge to irans demand.

Even if Iran win or lose. No one will trust Iran but China Russia only

 

[Michael]

On China-Iran relationship

Contrary to the media hype, the meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping concluded without the Chinese president making any commitment to increase pressure on Iran.

Grant Rumley, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, tells Al-Monitor: "China is currently playing a key role in keeping the Iranian regime afloat." On the diplomatic front, China and Russia last week vetoed a U.S.-proposed resolution at the UN Security Council that sought to extend—by one year—the mandate of the experts monitoring compliance with UN sanctions against Iran. Eleven Security Council members voted in favor of the resolution, while Pakistan and Somalia abstained. This veto ended the monitoring panel's mandate, although international sanctions remain in effect. Just a week before the meeting between Xi and Trump, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Beijing, where Wang described the two nations as "comprehensive strategic partners."

On the economic front, according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China purchases over 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports, often at steep discounts. Although these purchases have declined during the war, they have not ceased: data from the firm Kpler indicates that China’s imports averaged 534,000 barrels per day in August, compared to approximately 1.4 million barrels per day in 2025. According to the Commission's report, the total value of Iranian oil exports to China in 2025 amounted to roughly $31.2 billion.

China also appears to be keeping its air links with Iran open, despite the imposition and implementation of new U.S. sanctions against Iran’s aviation sector on Wednesday. On Wednesday, a Mahan Air flight from Tehran landed in Guangzhou. The previous day, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun had described the new U.S. measures as illegal. The continuation of these flights maintains a channel for trade and tourism between Iran and one of its most important economic partners at a time when the country's other international connections—including those with the UAE, Iraq, Oman, Azerbaijan, and other nations—are being severed.

Rumley believes: "Historically, Beijing rarely exercises its leverage in the region unless the matter is directly tied to China's interests. Any commitment Trump secures from Xi during this meeting will—in practice and on the ground—amount to, at best, a half-measure." China also possesses ways to maintain its support while ostensibly limiting direct government involvement [in measures backing Iran]. China’s independent, private refineries—known as "teapots"—process the bulk of Iranian oil exports to China. Rumley notes: "The nature of China’s support for Iran affords Xi the maneuverability of 'plausible deniability.' Xi can claim that the Chinese government has halted shipments to Iran, while Chinese companies and intermediary third-party entities continue to facilitate the ongoing export of dual-use goods to the country."

Furthermore, Beijing continues to serve as a primary source of dual-use technologies for Iran’s military programs. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that Chinese entities shipped approximately 1,300 consignments of dual-use components—including electronics suitable for use in drones and missile guidance systems—to Iran’s Ministry of Defense during the first half of 2026. This relationship offers China a low-cost means of supporting a partner capable of complicating U.S. military operations in the region, without the need to extend a formal defense commitment to Tehran.

Thus, China remains a key factor in Iran’s ability to withstand U.S. pressure, and the recent meeting between Trump and Xi showed no public signs of a shift in this dynamic. Moreover, even if Trump secured a commitment from Xi behind closed doors, Chinese support for Iran flows through a complex mix of state policies, private companies, and intermediary networks, making the monitoring and enforcement of any such agreement difficult.

Point 3 of the document "China and the United States Reach Eight Deliverables and Understandings"—released by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding President Xi Jinping's visit to the United States—addresses the issue of Iran.

Original text:

3. The two heads of state agree that Iran should honor its commitment to not developing nuclear weapons, and no country or institution can be allowed to impose tolls on international waterways. ------ Link to the full text!

This section touches upon two points:

1. The issue of Iran's nuclear weapons. The statement on this matter is entirely consistent with the Chinese government's long-standing position and reflects no change whatsoever.

2. The issue of tolls in the Strait of Hormuz. Neither the Chinese nor the English version makes direct reference to the "Strait of Hormuz" (SOH); instead, the term "international waterways" is used. This phrasing represents a broader definition rather than specifically addressing the issue of tolls for the SOH. It encompasses the Trump administration's stated intention to levy tolls on the SOH, as well as broader allegations regarding U.S. plans to impose tolls on other "international waterways"—going beyond the specific context of Iran charging tolls for the SOH.

In essence, President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States had no impact on, nor did it bring about any change to, the relationship and development between China and Iran. It neither took a step forward nor a step back, but simply maintained the status quo.

 

[RzA]

What a pathetic group of rats leading my beloved country. Essentially, what's being said here is that despite the existential threats and even escalatory motives by the US after mid terms, the regime will only retaliate 'accordingly' based on the enemy's level of engagement. If that's the case, why don't we then target the American warships maintaining the blockade?

Basically the regime will treat this war as a skirmish until further notice. We are so screwed.

 

[Zhuge Liang]

why don't we then target the American warships maintaining the blockade?

Is that even possible with Iran's capabilities? It's not that US naval command is stupid and doesn't know their ships are going to be targeted.