Still way more accurate than you, who doesn't know what bill I am talking about:
fa.wikipedia.org
Funny you don't know the most important bill after the JCPOA.
I think you're confusing two separate developments.
In 2019, Iran began gradually reducing its JCPOA commitments in response to the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and the failure of the remaining parties to deliver sanctions relief. These steps were based on Articles 26 and 36 of the JCPOA, not on a parliamentary law passed in 2019.
The full name of the parliamentary law you're referring to is the
“Strategic Action Plan to Lift Sanctions and Protect the Rights of the Iranian Nation,” which was passed by the Iranian Parliament in December 2020.
This is the very same law that provided the legal framework for expanding uranium enrichment beyond 20%.
Although the law does not explicitly mention 60% enrichment, Article 1 requires the production of uranium enriched to at least 20% and addresses the provision of uranium enriched above 20%.
Iran began enriching uranium to 60% in April 2021, following the implementation of this legislation.
So let's get the facts straight: the 2019 measures and the 2020 parliamentary law are two different developments. However, the 60% enrichment issue is associated with the 2020 parliamentary law, not some separate 2019 law.
The key point is that the 60% enrichment program is linked to the implementation of the December 2020 parliamentary law, not to a separate parliamentary law passed in 2019. The 2019 measures were part of Iran's gradual reduction of its JCPOA commitments, whereas the 2020 legislation established a new legal framework for expanding nuclear activities.
You should work on your basic knowledges...
I cannot wait for 18 hours so I answer your respond here:
First of all, let's separate Iran's obligations under the JCPOA from its broader nuclear ambitions.
1. Regarding the IR-40 reactor:
The JCPOA did require Iran to redesign and rebuild the Arak heavy-water reactor. However, it specifically required a MODERNIZED reactor based on an internationally agreed design, not the reconstruction of the original IR-40 design.
In fact, the original reactor's calandria was removed and rendered inoperable in January 2016, as verified by the IAEA.
Furthermore, the Arak modernization project was not simply abandoned or never initiated. A Chinese-Iranian consultancy contract was signed in April 2017, and the conceptual redesign was subsequently completed, according to the US Congressional Research Service.
So saying that the original IR-40 reactor was never reconstructed is technically true, but presenting that as evidence that the modernization project was never initiated is misleading.
2. Regarding the 190,000 SWU claim:
This is where you're confusing Iran's long-term nuclear ambitions with its actual obligations under the JCPOA.
The figure of 190,000 SWU was a long-term enrichment capacity target publicly advocated by Iranian officials before the nuclear agreement. It was NOT a commitment under the JCPOA that Iran was supposed to implement after Trump's withdrawal.
In fact, the JCPOA explicitly restricted Iran to 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz for 10 years and capped uranium enrichment at 3.67% for 15 years.
Iran's gradual reduction of its JCPOA commitments began in May 2019, invoking Articles 26 and 36 of the agreement. It was not required to achieve 190,000 SWU as compensation for Trump's withdrawal.
You can criticize Iran for failing to complete the Arak modernization project or debate its nuclear policy, but please don't misrepresent what the JCPOA actually stipulated.
There is a fundamental difference between what Iran wanted to achieve, what it agreed to under the JCPOA, and what it subsequently did after the US withdrawal. Understanding that distinction is basic to understanding the nuclear agreement.
Kish O Mat!
