ShapurII
Trusted Member
Do you remember the fate of Saddam?
The Russians themselves have been looking for a way to convince the Europeans to accept them for centuries lol It's a historical issue that has existed from the time of Peter the Great.
Iran - Israel/US War: Israel-US declare war on Iran, Iran responds
- Thread starter Khorasan Black Flags
- Start date
The Russians themselves have been looking for a way to convince the Europeans to accept them for centuries lol It's a historical issue that has existed from the time of Peter the Great.
Mero
Registered Member
When Europe was needed during the cold war, the US allowed a long leash on those nations. They could not be nuclear powers, India was later allowed more freedom, though they could be junior partners with vast political freedom.
That is why Kissinger and pals undermined Germany with globalism to send success of Catholic nations such as Western Germany to send their success to China.
Watch the videos I proved in the previous page, Kissinger and cia pals also undermined Catholic rivals in the US from replacing Anglo-American dominance. Catholics had real power in the 1950s and the cia was spooked the Anglo-American Zionist Empire was to be replaced by the Continental Catholics. And if they let Catholics succeed, Catholics would have replaced Anglos. We out numbered them.
Kissinger: “Poor old Germany. Too big for Europe, too small for the world”
A quote by Henry Kissinger
Poor old Germany. Too big for Europe, too small for the world
www.goodreads.com
The US/Trump/cia overtly/covertly supported Russia going into Ukraine threatening Europe to bring chaos to Europe along with war. So that Russian natural gas is replaced by American LNG and the Europeans run like scared children to daddy Washington. Hegemony for the hegemon USA. Putin bringing war to Europe and to NATO helps Trump as Trump plays leader of the Europeans that desperately need the US or else could lose cities to Russian nukes. Trump supported Ukraine War and discussed wars with friend Putin for these and more reasons.
Chinese success was over Catholic labor and nation's success with globalism. Catholics were the internal rivals to the Anglos then, and China was the place to send their golden geese. Trump in the 2010s was supposed to destroy China and loot it as the fattened animal to slaughter. The was the reason for the COVID, that failed and China continued.
Mero
Registered Member
I was warning the Iranians on the old PDF that you were being played like a fiddle supporting these wars, that these wars benefited the usual suspects. Now Trump, Israel and Putin are the winners. Iranian revenge seeking to have Putin take revenge on NATO Europe to drive the Europeans further into the arms of Trump. Play one side to do one thing, to win more hegemony.
Persian Gulf
INT'L MOD
Bagheri and Hajizadeh delayed TP3 because they realised Iran had severe weaknesses in air defences
Persian Gulf
INT'L MOD
Qatar's response to Israel bombing Doha and US failing to protect it was to seek more guarantees from the US
they clearly want to outsources their security to the US, if we only attack US bases in Qatar then Qatar won't respond directly
Persian Gulf
INT'L MOD
Persian Gulf
INT'L MOD
kastor ville
Registered Member
Persian Gulf
INT'L MOD
mangekyo
Trusted Member
Why? Not all nations has ambitions to be an independent world power. They saw the hand they were dealt and played their cards well. What did we achieve with all our resources?
ShapurII
Trusted Member
It's because of a Jewish holiday apparently.
TruthSeeker
Trusted Member
Iran Update, October 1, 2025
The Iranian regime appears to be trying to mitigate internal economic pressure by taking steps to remove itself from the FATF blacklist.
understandingwar.org
The Iranian regime appears to be trying to mitigate internal economic pressure by taking steps to remove itself from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist, which currently hampers Iran’s access to the international financial system. FATF is the global body that sets international standards to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.[2] The FATF blacklisted Iran in February 2020 for failing to implement anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing policies. An FATF blacklist designation requires all FATF member states to sanction and restrict international financial interactions with Iran.[3] The Iranian Expediency Discernment Council approved Iran’s accession to the Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) convention on October 1, which is the final convention required for Iran to exit the FATF blacklist.[4] The Expediency Discernment Council approved Iran’s accession to the other required convention, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, in May 2025.[5] The CFT is a set of international policies and measures that prevent terrorist groups from accessing and using financial resources.[6] The Expediency Council is an administrative assembly appointed by the Supreme Leader to resolve differences between the Iranian Parliament and the Guardian Council.[7] Sadegh Amoli Larijani, who is Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani’s brother, heads the Expediency Discernment Council. Amoli Larijani has historically opposed Iran joining the FATF, but Ali Larijani and other pragmatic figures, such as former President Hassan Rouhani, have supported taking actions to remove Iran from the FATF blacklist.[8] Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian previously stated in September 2024 that his government has “no choice but to resolve FATF” and emphasized that addressing the FATF designation is essential to improving Iran’s economy.[9] It is very unlikely that Iran will halt financial support for the Axis of Resistance, which makes its removal from the blacklist doubtful even if it has adopted international treaties on transnational crime and terrorist financing. Iranian officials have repeatedly framed support of the Axis of Resistance as a core national security policy.
The Expediency Discernment Council may have also advanced CFT accession to calm Iran’s domestic markets, which have faced sharp currency depreciation following the reimposition of UN Security Council snapback sanctions on September 27.[10] The European Union (EU) also reimposed sanctions on Iran on September 29 that it had lifted under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).[11] Several Iranian officials framed the reimposition of snapback sanctions as “psychological warfare” against Iran and downplayed the sanctions’ economic impact.[12] These remarks come after four unspecified Iranian officials and two unspecified “insiders” told Reuters on September 27 that the reimposition of sanctions will deepen Iran’s economic isolation and fuel public anger.[13] The Iranian rial lost 14.5 percent of its value after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered snapback sanctions on August 28, falling from 1,013,000 rials to a US dollar to its lowest value at 1,160,000 rials on October 1.[14]
The Iranian Guardian Council ratified a law on October 1 to harshen punishments for espionage and cooperation with Israel and other “hostile countries.”[34] The Iranian parliament approved the bill on June 29.[35] The Guardian Council ratified another law on October 1 to regulate non-military drones. The Iranian parliament likely passed these bills in an attempt to address counterintelligence concerns and protect against drone attacks after the Israel-Iran War.[36] Israel smuggled small drones into Iran and then launched them from secret locations to target Iranian ballistic missile infrastructure in the opening hours of the Israel-Iran War.[37] The Iranian regime has arrested hundreds of purported ”Israeli spies” since the beginning of the Israel-Iran War to address the regime’s fear of real and perceived Israeli penetration in Iran.[38]
A high-ranking Iranian delegation may have briefly visited Minsk, Belarus, on September 30. An Iranian media outlet shared Flight Radar screenshots that show a plane registered to the Iranian regime departed Minsk on October 1, flying toward Iran.[39] Unverified social media posts claimed that Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani may have been aboard the plane as part of an Iranian delegation to Minsk.[40] The SNSC is a body responsible for deciding Iran’s national security and defense policies within the stated intent of the supreme leader.[41] Iranian regime-affiliated media did not confirm the diplomatic visit.[42] Larijani’s travel could be related to earlier agreements between the two countries. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed 12 memoranda of understanding on bilateral trade and military technology cooperation with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on August 20.[43] Iran seeks Belarusian help to restore Iranian air defense systems and electronic warfare equipment that Israel damaged during the Israel-Iran War, according to an August 2025 Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service assessment.[44]
The United States sanctioned 22 entities and 22 individuals on October 1 for supporting Iran’s defense industry and nuclear and missile programs. The US sanctions come after the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27. The US Treasury Department sanctioned 21 entities and 17 individuals involved in the acquisition of goods and technology for Iran’s Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Ministry and for supporting Iran’s missile and military aircraft production.[45] The State Department sanctioned five other individuals and one other entity.[46] The US Treasury Department sanctioned the following entities, among others:
- Beh Joule Pars Commercial Engineering Company: This company coordinates the procurement of accelerometers, gyroscopes, and microelectromechanical system components for entities that are subordinate to the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), including the Shahid Hemmat Space Group. AIO oversees Iran’s ballistic missile program.[47]
- Tamin Sanat Amen Company: This company is subordinate to Beh Joule Pars and operates in Iran’s oil, gas, petrochemical, and steel manufacturing sectors.
- Abzar-e Daghigh-e Taha Company: This company procures gyroscopes and provides services to the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), which is subordinate to AIO.
- Pasargad Helicopter Company (PHC): This company has attempted to procure American helicopters and spare parts for the Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Company (PANHA).[48] The United States sanctioned PANHA in 2018 for providing maintenance, overhaul, and manufacturing support for military helicopters used by the Iranian armed forces.[49]
MNZGamerX
Registered Member
Why Washington Will Rue the Costs of Israeli Aggression
Galip Dalay and Sanam Vakil
October 1, 2025
The countries of the Middle East increasingly see Israel as their new shared threat. Israel’s war in Gaza, its expansionist military policies, and its revisionist posture are reshaping the region in ways that few anticipated. Its September strike on Hamas’s political leaders in Qatar—the seventh country hit by Israel since the October 7, 2023, attacks, in addition to the Palestinian territories—has shaken Gulf states and cast doubt on the credibility of the U.S. security umbrella. In the last two years, Israeli leaders have hailed their evisceration of Hezbollah’s leadership in Lebanon, their repeated strikes on targets in Yemen, and their battering of Iran. But rather than consolidate Israeli power or improve relations with Arab states that have long been wary of Iran and its proxies, these actions are backfiring. States that once regarded Israel as a potential partner, including the Gulf monarchies, now perceive it as a dangerous and unpredictable actor.
This week, U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced a new 20-point “peace plan,” celebrating the framework as a major breakthrough and a way to return stability to the region. But its prospects are dim as long as Israel continues to behave aggressively and ignores the legitimate demands and concerns of Palestinians. Although a raft of leaders in the region have welcomed the announcement, the plan seems unlikely to reverse the damage of two years of war. Before the October 2023 attacks, Israel, with strong American backing, had hoped to remake the region to its advantage, casting itself as a partner for Arab governments while sidelining rivals, notably Iran. Now, Israel has only isolated itself, made Arab states reluctant to stomach the reputational and political costs of working with it, and turned former partners into wary adversaries.
Many countries in the region are responding to Israeli aggression by diversifying their security partnerships, investing in their own autonomy, and moving away from normalization with Israel. A welter of projects that sought to bind Israel closer to Arab countries—principally with the help of the United States, but also with Indian and European support—will likely fall by the wayside. That is bad news not just for Israel but also for the United States. Unstinting American support for Israel is undermining Washington’s standing in the region. Where once the threat of Iran could encourage states in the region to hew close to the U.S. line, the specter of a bristling Israel now pushes them away from the United States.
The United States must wake up to the shifts underway in the Middle East. On its own, the recently proposed framework will not repair the ruptured relations between Israel and the broader region. If Washington refuses to rein in Israel and does not search for a just political answer to the Palestinian question, it risks weakening ties with key regional partners and losing influence over the emerging regional order. Failing to address the issue of Palestine and allowing Israel to behave aggressively with impunity will also fuel a new wave of radicalism that will threaten U.S. interests, regional stability, and global security.
That all changed after the October 7, 2023, attacks. Israel’s campaigns have forced Cairo to take a different position. In September, Sisi labeled Israel an “enemy,” a significant rhetorical departure from decades of careful language from Egyptian statesmen. He also took the symbolic step of downgrading security cooperation with Israel. Egypt and its erstwhile rival Turkey undertook a joint naval drill in the eastern Mediterranean, aiming to deepen their defense cooperation.
Before the current war, certain Gulf states tentatively aligned with Israel because they regarded Iran as the paramount threat to their security. Iran’s disruptions in the region, including its cultivation of armed groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen and its nuclear ambitions, made cooperation between Gulf monarchies and Israel a convenient choice. The rise of political Islam and the 2011 Arab uprisings strengthened this alignment, as Gulf rulers and Israel alike feared that these movements could topple regimes, reshape the region, and constrain Israel’s regional role. The Abraham Accords, the normalization deals negotiated between Israel and a handful of Arab states in 2020 with help from the United States—emerged from this context, with the central imperative of containing Iran and insulating regimes from any prospective domestic and regional transformation.
Today, however, the logic of normalization is unraveling. Israel’s new forward defense doctrine, which has it breaching the sovereignty of other states at will, is making almost all the states in the region feel insecure. The devastating war in Gaza, the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank (often justified with religious rhetoric), Israel’s uncompromising approach in Lebanon, and its repeated strikes in Syria and encroachment into Syrian territory, have turned the maintenance of formal ties with Israel into a political and strategic liability for Arab governments. Indeed, Israeli actions have provoked such outrage across the Arab world that any form of visible alignment with Israel has become a direct threat to the legitimacy and security of regimes. According to an analysis of recent surveys by the research group Arab Barometer, public backing for normalization with Israel remains extremely low across the region, with no country exceeding 13 percent support and Morocco dropping from 31 percent in 2022 to just 13 percent in 2023 after the October 7 attacks.
Saudi Arabia, once under intense American pressure to normalize relations with Israel, now hesitates not only because of domestic risks but also because of doubts over Israel’s reliability as a strategic partner, given the range of aggressive Israeli actions in recent years. The United Arab Emirates, once Israel’s closest ally in the Gulf, has paid reputational costs among the publics of Arab and Muslim countries for defending the Abraham Accords even as Israeli leaders openly discuss the depopulation of Gaza and the potential annexation of the West Bank. After Israel’s strike on Hamas negotiators in Doha, Qatar has positioned itself as the principal Arab critic of Israeli policy in Gaza. Kuwait and Oman remain aloof and wary of being drawn into any association with Israel that could undermine the domestic legitimacy of their governments, antagonize their publics, or complicate their careful regional balancing strategies. Israel, once imagined by some Gulf and U.S. policymakers as a potential pillar of Gulf security, is now seen as a liability and a destabilizing threat.
Turkey’s reversal is equally striking. For years, Ankara condemned Israel for its treatment of the Palestinians but did not consider it a direct security rival. Israel, for its part, did not overtly seek to antagonize Turkey in geopolitical and security matters. During a 2020 standoff between Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean, Israel took a far less confrontational stance toward Turkey than did Egypt and a slew of European countries. During the 2023 war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, both Israel and Turkey supported Azerbaijan and provided its military with equipment. Israeli President Isaac Herzog paid an official visit to Ankara in 2022, and only weeks before October 7, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, exploring potential energy cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean.
The war in Gaza has pushed the two countries further apart. Turkey has suspended trade with and closed its airspace to Israel as punishment for the campaign in Gaza. Israeli actions in Syria have also deeply alarmed Turkey: its longest land border is with Syria, and millions of refugees have crossed into Turkey since the eruption of the Syrian civil war over a decade ago. Ankara wants a stable neighbor and a centralized Damascus. Israel, by contrast, has been supporting minority groups in southern Syria, as well as advancing into Syrian territory, undermining the country’s new government and promoting division and instability. As Syria becomes a key zone of geopolitical contestation, Turkey now perceives Israel as a major threat.
This widening network of partnerships leaves shrinking space for Israel. Regional initiatives such as the Abraham Accords; the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, a U.S.-backed trade and connectivity project linking India, the Middle East, and Europe; the Negev Summit, a regional security forum that brought Israel together with Arab and Western partners; and I2U2, grouping India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States for technological and economic cooperation, were designed to build a new order rooted in Arab-Israeli cooperation under American supervision. The goal was to bind Arab states to Israel, exclude Turkey, and contain Iran. American and Israeli officials assumed that normalization and greater acceptance of Israel in the region were inevitable. That vision is collapsing. Israeli policy has made the very subject toxic, turning normalization into a domestic and strategic risk for Arab leaders and their governments.
The Israeli attack in Doha underscored these dynamics. Qatar is a mediator between Israel and Hamas, as well as a close American ally hosting the largest U.S. base in the region. The attack undermined not only Qatar but also American prestige and credibility: from that episode, Gulf rulers have taken the lesson that Israel is unpredictable and aggressive—and American security guarantees are unreliable. As a result, they will seek diversified relations with other powers and expanded investment in homegrown defense industries.
These developments will create new alignments that could reshape the region. Turkey and Saudi Arabia, two of the most significant regional powers, will likely cooperate more closely. Although they were previously rivals in many regional hot spots, including in Libya, the two now share concerns about regional instability and Israel’s disruptive role. They could work together to try to stabilize Syria and coordinate joint efforts in multilateral forums to push for ending the war in Gaza and restraining Israeli aggression. Indeed, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has called for the establishment of a joint security platform with regional states, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Both Erdogan and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia must manage domestic political costs from the Gazan war. Erdogan faced mounting public anger over continued trade with Israel, which Ankara has since suspended, and pressure from Islamist and conservative constituencies to take a harder line; Mohammed faces criticism within his kingdom and in the wider Arab world for having even considered normalization with Israel. Both must also contend with the prospect of further conflict between Israel and Iran.
To be sure, Iran has not disappeared as a concern, and its regional network of proxies is weakened but not eliminated. Saudi Arabia and Turkey will have to tread carefully. For Saudi Arabia, that means continuing the cautious détente with Iran that was launched with Chinese mediation in 2023, reducing escalation risks in Yemen and the Gulf. For Turkey, it means balancing cooperation and competition in Iraq, Syria, and the South Caucasus. Both Saudi Arabia and Turkey are seeking to ensure that they can counter Iran without making it feel cornered, since a cornered Iran could double down on asymmetric tactics and create new crises.
With its considerable heft, the United States will no doubt remain an important actor in the region for the foreseeable future. But to preserve its credibility and influence, it must recalibrate its approach by directly addressing the concerns of Egypt, the Gulf states, and Turkey and working toward cooperative security frameworks that prioritize de-escalation, conflict prevention, and economic integration. That would be a sharp departure from its recent track record of encouraging the militarization of the region and bloc politics. Washington must further anchor U.S. policy in support of a just resolution of the Palestinian question. Ending Israel’s crushing campaign in Gaza, preventing the depopulation of the territory, stopping the manmade famine there, and halting the annexation of the West Bank should be the starting points. The United States cannot skirt the plight of the Palestinians and ignore Israeli revisionism if it wants to foster a functional and credible regional order.
Galip Dalay and Sanam Vakil
October 1, 2025
The countries of the Middle East increasingly see Israel as their new shared threat. Israel’s war in Gaza, its expansionist military policies, and its revisionist posture are reshaping the region in ways that few anticipated. Its September strike on Hamas’s political leaders in Qatar—the seventh country hit by Israel since the October 7, 2023, attacks, in addition to the Palestinian territories—has shaken Gulf states and cast doubt on the credibility of the U.S. security umbrella. In the last two years, Israeli leaders have hailed their evisceration of Hezbollah’s leadership in Lebanon, their repeated strikes on targets in Yemen, and their battering of Iran. But rather than consolidate Israeli power or improve relations with Arab states that have long been wary of Iran and its proxies, these actions are backfiring. States that once regarded Israel as a potential partner, including the Gulf monarchies, now perceive it as a dangerous and unpredictable actor.
This week, U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced a new 20-point “peace plan,” celebrating the framework as a major breakthrough and a way to return stability to the region. But its prospects are dim as long as Israel continues to behave aggressively and ignores the legitimate demands and concerns of Palestinians. Although a raft of leaders in the region have welcomed the announcement, the plan seems unlikely to reverse the damage of two years of war. Before the October 2023 attacks, Israel, with strong American backing, had hoped to remake the region to its advantage, casting itself as a partner for Arab governments while sidelining rivals, notably Iran. Now, Israel has only isolated itself, made Arab states reluctant to stomach the reputational and political costs of working with it, and turned former partners into wary adversaries.
Many countries in the region are responding to Israeli aggression by diversifying their security partnerships, investing in their own autonomy, and moving away from normalization with Israel. A welter of projects that sought to bind Israel closer to Arab countries—principally with the help of the United States, but also with Indian and European support—will likely fall by the wayside. That is bad news not just for Israel but also for the United States. Unstinting American support for Israel is undermining Washington’s standing in the region. Where once the threat of Iran could encourage states in the region to hew close to the U.S. line, the specter of a bristling Israel now pushes them away from the United States.
The United States must wake up to the shifts underway in the Middle East. On its own, the recently proposed framework will not repair the ruptured relations between Israel and the broader region. If Washington refuses to rein in Israel and does not search for a just political answer to the Palestinian question, it risks weakening ties with key regional partners and losing influence over the emerging regional order. Failing to address the issue of Palestine and allowing Israel to behave aggressively with impunity will also fuel a new wave of radicalism that will threaten U.S. interests, regional stability, and global security.
HOW TO LOSE FRIENDS
For more than two decades, Israel had been able to make common cause with a number of Arab countries. Egypt was the first Arab state to normalize relations with Israel as a result of the 1978 Camp David accords. The peace between the two countries has held for nearly four decades, even though significant connections and exchanges at a deeper societal level have failed to materialize. Until recently, Egypt viewed Turkey as its primary rival in the eastern Mediterranean. Relations between the two countries took a nosedive in 2013 after the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected Islamist president. Turkey strongly supported him and opposed the coup that brought Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to power. As a result, Egypt under Sisi cut bilateral deals with Israel and worked with Israel inside the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, a regional organization that coordinates energy development to encourage the joint exploration of offshore gas reserves. Those moves also had the implicit goal of countering Turkish claims in the Mediterranean. Beyond energy cooperation, Egypt has also deepened its security coordination with Israel in the Sinai desert, allowing Israeli strikes against militant groups there and helping manage the Gaza border.That all changed after the October 7, 2023, attacks. Israel’s campaigns have forced Cairo to take a different position. In September, Sisi labeled Israel an “enemy,” a significant rhetorical departure from decades of careful language from Egyptian statesmen. He also took the symbolic step of downgrading security cooperation with Israel. Egypt and its erstwhile rival Turkey undertook a joint naval drill in the eastern Mediterranean, aiming to deepen their defense cooperation.
Before the current war, certain Gulf states tentatively aligned with Israel because they regarded Iran as the paramount threat to their security. Iran’s disruptions in the region, including its cultivation of armed groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen and its nuclear ambitions, made cooperation between Gulf monarchies and Israel a convenient choice. The rise of political Islam and the 2011 Arab uprisings strengthened this alignment, as Gulf rulers and Israel alike feared that these movements could topple regimes, reshape the region, and constrain Israel’s regional role. The Abraham Accords, the normalization deals negotiated between Israel and a handful of Arab states in 2020 with help from the United States—emerged from this context, with the central imperative of containing Iran and insulating regimes from any prospective domestic and regional transformation.
Today, however, the logic of normalization is unraveling. Israel’s new forward defense doctrine, which has it breaching the sovereignty of other states at will, is making almost all the states in the region feel insecure. The devastating war in Gaza, the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank (often justified with religious rhetoric), Israel’s uncompromising approach in Lebanon, and its repeated strikes in Syria and encroachment into Syrian territory, have turned the maintenance of formal ties with Israel into a political and strategic liability for Arab governments. Indeed, Israeli actions have provoked such outrage across the Arab world that any form of visible alignment with Israel has become a direct threat to the legitimacy and security of regimes. According to an analysis of recent surveys by the research group Arab Barometer, public backing for normalization with Israel remains extremely low across the region, with no country exceeding 13 percent support and Morocco dropping from 31 percent in 2022 to just 13 percent in 2023 after the October 7 attacks.
Saudi Arabia, once under intense American pressure to normalize relations with Israel, now hesitates not only because of domestic risks but also because of doubts over Israel’s reliability as a strategic partner, given the range of aggressive Israeli actions in recent years. The United Arab Emirates, once Israel’s closest ally in the Gulf, has paid reputational costs among the publics of Arab and Muslim countries for defending the Abraham Accords even as Israeli leaders openly discuss the depopulation of Gaza and the potential annexation of the West Bank. After Israel’s strike on Hamas negotiators in Doha, Qatar has positioned itself as the principal Arab critic of Israeli policy in Gaza. Kuwait and Oman remain aloof and wary of being drawn into any association with Israel that could undermine the domestic legitimacy of their governments, antagonize their publics, or complicate their careful regional balancing strategies. Israel, once imagined by some Gulf and U.S. policymakers as a potential pillar of Gulf security, is now seen as a liability and a destabilizing threat.
Turkey’s reversal is equally striking. For years, Ankara condemned Israel for its treatment of the Palestinians but did not consider it a direct security rival. Israel, for its part, did not overtly seek to antagonize Turkey in geopolitical and security matters. During a 2020 standoff between Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean, Israel took a far less confrontational stance toward Turkey than did Egypt and a slew of European countries. During the 2023 war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, both Israel and Turkey supported Azerbaijan and provided its military with equipment. Israeli President Isaac Herzog paid an official visit to Ankara in 2022, and only weeks before October 7, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, exploring potential energy cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean.
The war in Gaza has pushed the two countries further apart. Turkey has suspended trade with and closed its airspace to Israel as punishment for the campaign in Gaza. Israeli actions in Syria have also deeply alarmed Turkey: its longest land border is with Syria, and millions of refugees have crossed into Turkey since the eruption of the Syrian civil war over a decade ago. Ankara wants a stable neighbor and a centralized Damascus. Israel, by contrast, has been supporting minority groups in southern Syria, as well as advancing into Syrian territory, undermining the country’s new government and promoting division and instability. As Syria becomes a key zone of geopolitical contestation, Turkey now perceives Israel as a major threat.
LOOKING ELSEWHERE
Israel’s revisionism and aggression are also accelerating militarization and a diversification in defense strategies across the region. States are drawing lessons from these two years of conflict, including the poor performance of Russian weaponry in the conflict between Iran and Israel and the political and security constraints that come with reliance on American weapons systems. Governments are hedging by investing in domestic capabilities and diversifying their suppliers. Saudi Arabia has expanded cooperation with China on missiles and drones, sought to further localize defense production, and recently signed a defense cooperation pact with Pakistan signaling its desire for alternative security partnerships and intent to build ties with a fellow Muslim power outside the U.S.-led security architecture. The United Arab Emirates has purchased French fighter jets and partnered with South Korea on missile defense and nuclear energy, strengthening its technological capacities while reducing its dependence on the United States. Qatar and Kuwait have respectively acquired Eurofighter Typhoons from the United Kingdom and Italy, embedding themselves further in European security networks. Gulf countries are all buying cost-effective Turkish drones. For its part, Turkey unveiled its Steel Dome integrated air defense system in August, comparable to Israel’s Iron Dome system of antimissile defense—suggesting a doctrinal shift in which Turkish planners now feel obliged to measure their capacities against Israel’s.This widening network of partnerships leaves shrinking space for Israel. Regional initiatives such as the Abraham Accords; the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, a U.S.-backed trade and connectivity project linking India, the Middle East, and Europe; the Negev Summit, a regional security forum that brought Israel together with Arab and Western partners; and I2U2, grouping India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States for technological and economic cooperation, were designed to build a new order rooted in Arab-Israeli cooperation under American supervision. The goal was to bind Arab states to Israel, exclude Turkey, and contain Iran. American and Israeli officials assumed that normalization and greater acceptance of Israel in the region were inevitable. That vision is collapsing. Israeli policy has made the very subject toxic, turning normalization into a domestic and strategic risk for Arab leaders and their governments.
The Israeli attack in Doha underscored these dynamics. Qatar is a mediator between Israel and Hamas, as well as a close American ally hosting the largest U.S. base in the region. The attack undermined not only Qatar but also American prestige and credibility: from that episode, Gulf rulers have taken the lesson that Israel is unpredictable and aggressive—and American security guarantees are unreliable. As a result, they will seek diversified relations with other powers and expanded investment in homegrown defense industries.
These developments will create new alignments that could reshape the region. Turkey and Saudi Arabia, two of the most significant regional powers, will likely cooperate more closely. Although they were previously rivals in many regional hot spots, including in Libya, the two now share concerns about regional instability and Israel’s disruptive role. They could work together to try to stabilize Syria and coordinate joint efforts in multilateral forums to push for ending the war in Gaza and restraining Israeli aggression. Indeed, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has called for the establishment of a joint security platform with regional states, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Both Erdogan and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia must manage domestic political costs from the Gazan war. Erdogan faced mounting public anger over continued trade with Israel, which Ankara has since suspended, and pressure from Islamist and conservative constituencies to take a harder line; Mohammed faces criticism within his kingdom and in the wider Arab world for having even considered normalization with Israel. Both must also contend with the prospect of further conflict between Israel and Iran.
To be sure, Iran has not disappeared as a concern, and its regional network of proxies is weakened but not eliminated. Saudi Arabia and Turkey will have to tread carefully. For Saudi Arabia, that means continuing the cautious détente with Iran that was launched with Chinese mediation in 2023, reducing escalation risks in Yemen and the Gulf. For Turkey, it means balancing cooperation and competition in Iraq, Syria, and the South Caucasus. Both Saudi Arabia and Turkey are seeking to ensure that they can counter Iran without making it feel cornered, since a cornered Iran could double down on asymmetric tactics and create new crises.
A CREDIBLE ORDER
For the United States, these dynamics demand a reevaluation of strategy. U.S. policymakers are missing the profound alarm caused by Israel’s actions, and they must reckon with the ensuing imperative in the region to diversify security partnerships. Continued unconditional support for Israel undermines American influence and reinforces perceptions that Washington sees the region solely through the prism of Israeli interests. Regional elites are already hedging by cultivating China, Europe, Russia, and other powers. This trend will only accelerate as long as the United States blithely backs Israel and ignores the attending collateral damage to its own relations with other regional countries. Without a course correction, the United States will be left behind in a region defined less by the challenge posed by Iran than by the revisionist and disruptive role of Israel. If it fails to adjust, Washington will end up being complicit in the demolition of the very strategic architecture it has sought for years to build in the Middle East.With its considerable heft, the United States will no doubt remain an important actor in the region for the foreseeable future. But to preserve its credibility and influence, it must recalibrate its approach by directly addressing the concerns of Egypt, the Gulf states, and Turkey and working toward cooperative security frameworks that prioritize de-escalation, conflict prevention, and economic integration. That would be a sharp departure from its recent track record of encouraging the militarization of the region and bloc politics. Washington must further anchor U.S. policy in support of a just resolution of the Palestinian question. Ending Israel’s crushing campaign in Gaza, preventing the depopulation of the territory, stopping the manmade famine there, and halting the annexation of the West Bank should be the starting points. The United States cannot skirt the plight of the Palestinians and ignore Israeli revisionism if it wants to foster a functional and credible regional order.
