muhammed45
Elite Member
Read this translated article. (Off topic but worth of mentioning)
Few analysts would consider Iran’s partnership with India in Chabahar a successful experience of cooperation. Nearly a decade after the signing of the trilateral port agreement, the Indian operator’s investment in the port has been limited to the transfer of six cranes, and the port’s current prosperity is largely due to Iran’s handling of cargo. Almost all analysts agree that, apart from technical and legal considerations, India has paid far less strategic attention to Chabahar due to two external factors: (1) US sanctions and (2) the collapse of the Afghan republic; however, there is disagreement about why India continues to be involved in the project and has concluded a new contract.
Despite India’s emphasis on balanced relations with various parties in West Asia and the importance of Chabahar in providing the country with access to Central Asia (as part of its wider neighborhood), many believe that India has undermined the strategic project to prevent China from entering the region and has no intention of seriously pursuing its development. India’s recent positions on regional issues are in fact a reflection of its role and role-playing in the desired American order in the Asia-Pacific environment, the latest manifestation of which can be seen in India’s avoidance of condemning Israel’s actions since October 7, including the attack on Iran.
In fact, India’s growing closeness to Israel, along with tensions with Pakistan, has reinforced the concern that India’s presence in Makran could become a platform for inciting ethnic hatred in Balochistan (against Pakistan and Iran), and this concern has led to the issue of India’s disenfranchisement from the Chabahar project being raised in various circles.
Is disenfranchisement desirable?
The sanctions exemption for Chabahar Port has not been extended, and in light of the tariff disputes, it seems that India has joined the US maximum pressure campaign on sanctions, even more so than during the previous Trump presidency. Accordingly, the probability of direct investment ($120 million) and the promised credit line ($250 million) being realized is low, and without the development of Chabahar Port, the country’s other development goals in Makran will also be at risk. In addition, the continuation of the current situation for a period of ten years will definitely lead to the elimination of this port from the corridor competition.
Therefore, if there is a specific, transparent, and pragmatic positive plan for the development of Chabahar Port in the form of foreign participation or through domestic resources, the continuation of the current ambiguous cooperation with India will not be justified. Paying attention to the three aforementioned caveats is of particular importance, because in recent years, others have also viewed investment in Iran with suspicion, and there are many restrictions on the direction of domestic resources.
Given the cessation of oil exchanges between Iran and India, Chabahar Port is now the largest element linking the two countries to each other, and excluding India from this port must necessarily be pursued as part of the country’s macro foreign policy approach. This means that excluding India from Chabahar Port should be done along with a serious review of Iran’s relations with China and Pakistan. In this regard, the connection of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan in the South Caucasus also requires special attention.
Is dispossession possible?
In the issue of excluding India from the Chabahar project, one of the most important considerations is the ten-year contract signed between IPGL and the Ports Organization last year, parts of which were declared confidential in order to protect against US sanctions. It is not clear to us what exactly the two parties have included in the contract for unilateral termination and which institution will be responsible for arbitration in the event of a dispute.
If the arbitration is entrusted to a foreign institution, it remains to be seen how justifiable Iran's reasons for terminating the contract are and what financial and non-financial consequences it will have for Iran; because, in any case, the experience of the cersent should not be repeated in the country.
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A couple of keypoints in the article
1) Iran is gradually removing India from Chabahar project
2) Oil deals with India has reached zero point. Actually there is non
3) India is not considered as an economic partner anymore
All this leads to removal of India from Iranian port, especially, after allowing Chinese and Pakistani officials in inauguration of Chabahar port in Iran. Indians were badly triggered.
These dumbass idiots thought that with a few hundred million dollar, they were going to possess complete dominance in Iranian port.
