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Iranian F-14 Tomcats in the crosshairs​

1. Aviation Features
2. Iranian F-14 Tomcats in the crosshairs

By Babak Taghvaee
17th September 2025
Feature



The June conflict between Iran and Israel saw one of the most significant air campaigns in the Middle East since the 2006 Lebanon War. At the heart of this confrontation stood the Iranian Air Force’s aging fleet of F-14A Tomcats – once revered as the backbone of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force’s high-altitude air defense capability. Babak Taghvaee reports

3-6029 was used as a source of spare parts between 2000 and 2011, restored and overhauled between 2011 and 2014. After redelivery to 81st TFS, it remained airworthy until 2018 when its MTBO was reached again
Keyvan Tavakkoli
Based at the 8th Tactical Fighter Base (TFB.8) near Isfahan, officially designated Babaiee, these Grumman F-14A Tomcats were assigned to the 81st Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) and the 83rd Tactical Training Squadron (TTS).

In the lead-up to Israel’s Operation Rising Lion, a meticulously planned joint intelligence and strike operation supported by Mossad assets embedded inside Iran – including joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) – the operational readiness of the Tomcat fleet had reached a perilous low. Decades of sanctions, attritional wear, and limited access to critical spare parts had left the 81st and 83rd Squadrons with as few as five to seven airworthy F-14As by mid-June 2025. Israeli and US planners recognized the residual threat posed by these long-range interceptors. They prioritized them as high-value targets during the Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) phase of the wider operation.

This article examines the deteriorating condition of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force’s (IRIAF’s) F-14A fleet in the weeks preceding Rising Lion, the targeted drone strike that eliminated several aircraft at Babaiee Air Base, and the subsequent dispersal of surviving Tomcats to Bandar Abbas. It contextualizes the symbolic and tactical decline of Iran’s most iconic fighter aircraft within the broader air campaign, coinciding with US Air Force operations under Midnight Hammer, including B-2A Spirit stealth bomber raids against the regime’s hardened nuclear facilities.

Aborted transition​

In line with a long-standing modernization initiative, the IRIAF had entered into a discreet agreement to acquire a batch of at least 25 Sukhoi Su-35SE multi-role fighters, initially destined for the Egyptian Air Force. These aircraft, retained in storage by the Russian Federation after Cairo canceled the order, were intended to replace the aging fleet of F-14A Tomcats and partially supplant the service’s veteran F-4E Phantom IIs. Transition plans had progressed to the point that, by December 2024, the first cadre of IRIAF Tomcat pilots had completed type conversion training on the Su-35SE in the Russian Federation.

Under the original procurement plan, deliveries were scheduled to begin in January 2025, with the aircraft to be initially assigned to the 81st TFS. A second Su-35SE squadron was to follow once the initial deliveries and infrastructure adjustments had been finalized. However, the transfer was abruptly canceled in early 2025 under circumstances that remain unclear. While the financial details of the deal – including any down payments made by Iran – were never disclosed, it is known that the trained IRIAF pilots were subsequently reassigned to fly Yakovlev Yak-130 advanced jet trainers and now serve as instructor pilots within the Air Force.

This satellite image of the 8th TFB Babaiee taken on June 16, 2025, shows nine F-14As, including at least two decoys, parked in open space next to hardened aircraft shelters and on one of the taxiways. This indicates no evacuation of either airworthy or grounded aircraft from the base three days after the start of Operation Rising Lion
Satellite image by Satellogic and analysis by Babak Taghvaee

This satellite image of the 8th TFB Babaiee taken on June 23, 2025, shows burn marks resulting from the destruction of three F-14A Tomcats including at least one decoy, as well as evacuation of the remaining aircraft and decoys
Satellite image by Satellogic and analysis by Babak Taghvaee
Rumors circulated within the IRIAF that the Dictator Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, had personally intervened to halt the acquisition. Russian refusal to permit in-country maintenance training for Iranian ground crews was cited as a contributing factor. Iranian officials had envisioned establishing a depot-level maintenance capability for the Su-35SE fleet at Shahinshahr Airport, near Isfahan, where the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries Company (IAMI) would also produce select consumables and non-structural components.

As the Sukhoi acquisition program stalled, a high-level Algerian Air Force delegation visited Tehran in early 2025. Within weeks, decisions were made to transfer 14 of the stored Su-35SE airframes – originally earmarked for Iran – to Algeria, where deliveries commenced shortly after. The collapse of the procurement plan left the IRIAF’s 81st TFS with no choice but to continue operating a drastically diminished fleet of F-14A Tomcats.

At the time of Operation Rising Lion in June, the 81st TFS maintained a limited Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) capability with three serviceable Tomcats. Two of these aircraft were armed with a standard loadout of two AIM-9J infrared-guided short-range air-to-air missiles and two AIM-7E Sparrow semi-active radar-guided medium-range missiles, supplemented by full 20mm M61A1 Vulcan cannon rounds. The third QRA Tomcat was equipped solely with two Sidewinders, suggesting a non-functional AN/AWG-9 radar system.

Destruction of Iranian Tomcats​

On the morning of June 13, 2025, at approximately 0730hrs local time, one of the armed F-14As was scrambled over Isfahan in response to the initial wave of Israeli strikes during the first phase of Operation Rising Lion. This sortie was brief and uneventful; the aircraft returned without engagement. Within hours, the IASF executed a co-ordinated Suppression and Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign across central Iran, systematically dismantling the IRIADF’s radar and surface-to-air missile (SAM) coverage, including key installations in and around 8th TFB Babaiee.

One of the Hermes 900 armed MALE drones of the IASF, 975 that took part in Operation Swords of Iron in Gaza (2023) and Operation Northern Arrows in Lebanon (2024)
Israeli Air and Space Force
With IRIAF’s early warning and air defense infrastructure neutralized, further combat air patrols by the Tomcat fleet became unsustainable. Despite escalating threats, the base command opted not to evacuate grounded F-14A airframes – many of which had been parked in front of hardened aircraft shelters for years, serving either as decoys or static displays. These aircraft, some of which had been gutted for parts or were long unserviceable, remained exposed.

On June 15 the IASF used a Golden Horizon AI-launched ballistic missile (launched by an F-15I Ra’am) to destroy an IRIAF KC-707 tanker in Mashhad International Airport, the last aircraft of the air force capable of refueling the Tomcats in the air. Days later, on June 21, the IASF launched a precision airstrike against Babaiee Air Base, targeting several of the exposed Tomcats. The raid marked the symbolic but temporary end of the F-14A’s operational presence in Isfahan and underscored the terminal decline of a once-feared interceptor fleet.

On the evening of June 21, the IASF executed a further targeted strike against Babaiee, utilizing a Hermes 900 Kochav armed MALE (Medium Altitude Long Endurance) drone. The UAV employed precision-guided Mikholit air-to-surface missiles to destroy three parked F-14A Tomcats. Post-strike imagery and assessments indicated two of the aircraft were non-airworthy – either long-grounded airframes or decoys. However, the third, camouflaged under standard netting and parked on an exposed taxiway near the base’s storage area, was believed to be one of the last five to seven operational Tomcats remaining in service.

The following day, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) released EO/IR footage from the Hermes 900 strike, documenting the destruction of all three targets at Babaiee. A few days prior, the IDF had published drone footage showing the destruction of two other F-14As at 1st TFB Lashgari in Mehrabad International Airport, Tehran. Subsequent satellite imagery confirmed both of those airframes were decoys – deliberately positioned to create a false impression of readiness and deter enemy planning.

This F-14A (3-6006) is one of the last airworthy examples operated by the 81st TFS after its post-overhaul redelivery by IACI in 2024. It is pictured here during a test flight in Tehran, May 2024
Keyvan Tavakoli

 

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Wreckage of the IASF Hermes 900 armed MALE drone, 939, which was shot down near Khorramabad on June 23, 2025
Iranian Air Defense Force

One of the three Tomcats destroyed by the IASF on June 21, 2025, can be seen in this screen grab of a video recorded by the EO/IR sensor of a Hermes 900 armed drone. This F-14A had a camouflage net and was parked on taxiway meaning it was most likely operational
Israeli Air and Space Force

This F-14A ‘3-6041’ has been grounded since 2017 and converted into a source of spare parts once its MTBO was reached. It is pictured in Isfahan in February 2017 during the final months before retirement
Ali Naderi
The June 21 strike proved to be a catalyst for immediate action by IRIAF. Within hours, a decision was made to evacuate remaining Tomcats from open storage at 8th TFB. These included both derelict and decoy aircraft that had long served to deceive surveillance satellites and enemy intelligence assessments. They were rapidly moved into secure storage facilities or prepared for transfer to alternative airbases.

Since the runway infrastructure at 8th TFB remained undamaged throughout Operation Rising Lion, IRIAF was able to conduct a final evacuation flight on June 22. During this sortie, four to six F-14As were flown to 9th TFB Abdul Karimi in Bandar Abbas. Once relocated, they were secured inside hardened aircraft shelters and effectively withdrawn from combat operations.

Now stored at 9th TFB, these Tomcats, constitute the last operational examples of the Grumman F-14A anywhere in the world. Protected from immediate threat, they are no longer capable of credibly challenging the IASF’s fourth- and fifthgeneration aircraft. While nominally on standby, their combat relevance has faded due to outdated avionics, limited weapons stocks, and systemic maintenance deficiencies.

Operation Rising Lion officially concluded with a ceasefire on June 25. Yet the strategic impasse between Israel and Iran remains unresolved. As the Islamic regime refuses full capitulation to US conditions or peace with Israel, the prospect of renewed conflict remains high. In any future engagement, the remaining IRIAF Tomcats may be among the first symbolic losses, closing the final chapter of a legendary fighter interceptor.

Once the spearhead of Iran’s air defense, feared by adversaries flying MiG-23s and MiG-25s across the Persian Gulf and beyond, the F-14A’s twilight is marked not by dogfights or missile kills, but by attrition, obsolescence, and the quiet erosion of capability. Its legacy, however, endures – etched into the doctrine of aerial warfare and preserved in the memory of every air force that once viewed the Tomcat with both respect and caution.

F-14AM (3-6049) taxiing back to its shelter after a flight on February 5, 2014
Ali Naderi

This image from May 2012 shows 3-6045, later upgraded to F-14AM standard
Ali Naderi

One of the last known public appearances of an F-14A in Iran occurred during the Dezful Airshow in March 2023 when 3-6001 was deployed to the 4th TFB
Keyvan Tavakkoli

The hidden collapse​

While international sanctions and chronic underfunding significantly eroded the capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF), internal factors played an equally destructive role in undermining its operational effectiveness. Chief among these were institutional mismanagement, politicized command appointments, and the prioritization of ideological conformity over military competence. These structural flaws – exacerbated by a culture of propaganda and denial – proved catastrophic during Operation Rising Lion, culminating in the destruction of three F-14A Tomcats on June 21, and the broader failure of the IRIAF to defend Iranian airspace.

At the center of this decline was Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi, the IRIAF’s commander since 2021, who was elevated to the position not for his strategic acumen or operational experience, but for his proven loyalty to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the regime’s ideological apparatus. Under his leadership, priorities within the Air Force shifted away from readiness and modernization toward religious indoctrination and political conformity. An excessive focus was placed on enforcing Islamic dress codes among the families of personnel, promoting clerical influence on base life, and organizing religious ceremonies, often at the expense of essential flight training, maintenance operations, and mission planning.

 

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Two F-14As, ‘3-6003’ and ‘3-6058’, are seen here. 3-6003 was lost in an accident due to double engine failure during a functional check flight at 8th TFB on May 13, 2019; both pilot and RIO ejected safely
Babak Taghvaee

3-6016 served with the 81st TFS until between 2010 and 2014 and has not been airworthy since. It is pictured in Isfahan on February 10, 2011
Babak Taghvaee

Before the decline in airworthy Tomcats, the 81st TFS and 83rd TTS used to deploy six to nine aircraft for Iran’s Army Day parade in Tehran. This image shows some preparing for the April 17, 2012 parade
Babak Taghvaee
This erosion of professionalism was most apparent on the morning of June 13 when the IASF initiated the first wave of strikes under Operation Rising Lion. According to several internal reports, senior IRIAF officers – including Vahedi – responded not with tactical co-ordination or threat response planning, but by gathering in mosques to engage in collective prayer. Operational command posts remained largely inactive, while QRA procedures were either delayed or ignored entirely.

In the aftermath of the airstrikes, which caused widespread damage to IRIAF infrastructure – including the confirmed destruction of multiple aircraft such as the F-14As at Babaiee – IRIAF leadership sought to contain internal dissent through a co-ordinated disinformation campaign. The Ideological and Political Organization of the IRIAF, an extension of the regime’s internal security structure, was tasked with producing propaganda content designed to reassure and mislead both personnel and the broader public. These efforts included fabricated claims that IRIAF Tomcats had successfully shot down Israeli F-35I Adir stealth fighters, despite no radar or visual confirmation, and no missile expenditure logged. Propaganda officers used computer-generated footage created in the Digital Combat Simulator (DCS) platform to simulate fictitious air-to-air kills, passing them off as authentic combat footage.

At several bases, including 8th TFB, clerics embedded within the Political-Ideological branches of the IRIAF led efforts to disseminate these videos and reinforce the illusion of operational success. Personnel were shown animated briefings and edited clips meant to conceal the reality of the airstrikes. Meanwhile, satellite imagery released by international intelligence sources and defense analysts contradicted official claims, showing smoking wreckage at multiple bases, large impact craters, and the destruction of aircraft, including three Tomcats on open tarmac at Babaiee.

This environment of denial and ideological distortion further demoralized already disillusioned IRIAF personnel, many of whom were aware of the reality on the ground but silenced by fear of reprisal. The long-term result was a hollow force structure: one outwardly postured for combat readiness, yet paralyzed by politics, constrained by dogma, and incapable of defending Iran’s airspace in the moment of greatest need.



IRAN'S LAST TOMCATS

In the years preceding Operation Rising Lion, the IRIAF had initiated planning to reassign its last remaining Grumman F-14A Tomcats as Red Air or adversary platforms, particularly for dissimilar air combat training (DACT) in support of future Sukhoi Su-35SE pilots. This concept emerged in 2023, when the Air Force faced a shortage of suitable aircraft for domestic aggressor training following the anticipated induction of the Su-35SE multirole fighter jets, which were procured – though never delivered – from the Russian Federation.
Historically, the IRIAF’s 102nd TFS, based at 10th TFB Delhamed Brothers near Chabahar, had assumed the primary Red Air role using a fleet of 12 Mirage F1EQ and five Mirage F1BQ aircraft. However, only four of the F1EQs and two of the F1BQs were maintained in airworthy condition at any given time. Though superior in agility to the IRIAF’s F-5E/F fleet, the Mirage F1s were deemed inadequate for training pilots destined to operate the Su-35SE, due to limitations in radar, avionics, and performance envelope.
As such, the IRIAF designated the last six airworthy F-14A Tomcats of the 81st TFS, based at 8th TFB Babaiee, as the core of a new domestic aggressor force. This plan was made viable by the fact that these Tomcats – despite their age – offered superior transonic performance, long-range radar capabilities via the AN/AWG-9, and an extensive history of Beyond Visual Range (BVR) doctrine integration, albeit with severely outdated missile systems.
By December 2022, the 8th TFB possessed eight airworthy F-14As: 3-6001, 3-6039, 3-6050, 3-6053, 3-6059, 3-6066, 3-6069, and 3-6077. Aircraft 3-6066 was withdrawn from service in January 2023, having reached the end of its Mean Time Between Overhaul (MTBO), which reduced the effective fleet to seven. Of those, only four remained airworthy by late 2024: 3-6001, 3-6039, 3-6053, and 3-6059.
Two additional F-14As were returned to service after depot-level overhaul and programmed depot maintenance (PDM) by the Iran Aircraft Industries (IACI). Aircraft 3-6006 was redelivered to the 81st TFS in June 2024, while 3-6067 was still undergoing post-overhaul functional check flights (FCFs) at Mehrabad as of November 2024, with redelivery expected in early 2025. These aircraft brought the total number of operational or near-operational Tomcats to six.
Despite the small size of this remaining fleet, the IRIAF intended to employ these F-14As for DACT missions to simulate high-speed, radar-equipped threats for Su-35SE pilot training and proficiency. However, the adversary training program was abruptly canceled after Khamenei personally suspended the Su-35SE acquisition deal. The aircraft were never delivered and the aggressor training mission for the Tomcats was consequently shelved.
As of November 2024, the IRIAF maintained two F-14As in Fully Mission Capable (FMC) condition at 8th TFB, assigned to QRA duties. Both were armed with a pair of AIM-9J Sidewinder infrared-guided short-range air-to-air missiles (SRAAMs), a pair of AIM-7E-2 Sparrow semi-active radar-guided medium-range air-to-air missiles (SARH MRAAMs), and a full combat load of 675 rounds for their internal M61A1 Vulcan 20mm cannon. Though antiquated, these aircraft remained a preferred asset for intercepting low-flying threats such as one-way attack drones and cruise missiles.
The progressive retirement of the IRIAF’s Tomcat fleet between 2019 and 2024 saw many of its experienced aircrews reassigned. Front-seat pilots were absorbed into other platforms, including PC-7s as instructor pilots at the 82nd UPT Squadron, or into tactical transport squadrons flying the C-130E/H Hercules. Meanwhile, many radar intercept officers (RIOs) transitioned to roles as UAV operators or navigators aboard larger platforms, including Boeing 707-3J9C and Boeing 747-131F tankers, as well as C-130s. Interestingly, by late 2024, no former Tomcat pilot had volunteered for transition to the Su-35SE, suggesting a generational and doctrinal disconnect between the legacy and future combat aviation cadres within the IRIAF.
Despite their symbolic and historical significance, the last operational F-14As were increasingly constrained by obsolete systems, limited spares, and mounting airframe fatigue. Still, until the Israeli strikes of June 2025, they remained the most capable long-range interceptors in Iran’s inventory – albeit more useful in training roles than front-line air defense.

Source: Combat Aircraft Journal

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Israel's strikes on the Phantoms of Shahrokhi​

1. Aviation Features
2. Israel's strikes on the Phantoms of Shahrokhi

8th September 2025
Feature



Babak Taghvaee reports on Israel’s strike on Iran’s F-4E stronghold, the 3rd Tactical Fighter Base Nojeh

Some of the 31st TFS’s F-4E Phantom IIs seen here during their peak post-Iran–Iraq War readiness, with 18 aircraft reported airworthy simultaneously in spring 2004
Karim Abdoli
In a sweeping and meticulously co-ordinated air campaign, as a part of the Israel Air and Space Force (IASF) Operation Rising Lion, Iran’s offensive and defensive air capabilities were crippled in anticipation of a broader coalition air operation. Among the earliest and most strategically significant targets were the McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom II multi-role fighter jets stationed at 3rd Tactical Fighter Base (TFB.3) Nojeh (Shahrokhi), near the city of Hamadan in western Iran. The airbase was home to the 31st Tactical Fighter Squadron (31st TFS) of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF), a unit that operated 17 F-4Es, the largest single concentration of the type in Iran’s frontline air force structure. These ageing, Cold War-era aircraft remained a potent threat due to their long-range strike capabilities and geographical proximity to key ingress routes from the west.

By June 13 this year, when the opening wave of IASF airstrikes commenced, the IRIAF had a total of 41 F-4E Phantom IIs in its operational fleet, with approximately 30 aircraft in active flightworthy status. With its 17 F-4Es, the 31st TFS accounted for the lion’s share of Iran’s Phantom capability, making TFB.3 Nojeh a critical node in the country’s defensive posture. These aircraft were quickly identified by Israeli planners as priority targets in a broader Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) effort to eliminate threats to an imminent US-led deep-strike campaign – Operation Midnight Hammer – involving B-2A Spirit stealth bombers scheduled to penetrate Iranian airspace on June 22.

Shelter Areas No. 2 and 4 at 3rd Tactical Fighter Base Nojeh sustained the most damage during the first day of Operation Rising Lion on June 13, 2025. Bomb craters and burn marks indicate the destruction of at least seven F-4E and RF-4E Phantom IIs inside these HASs
All images by or via Babak Taghvaee unless stated
During the opening hours of the Israeli operation, precision strikes destroyed most of the 31st TFS’s F-4Es – either on the ground or inside hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) – effectively eliminating the unit as a combat force. This pre-emptive blow ensured a more straightforward path for US strategic assets. It highlighted the continued relevance of legacy platforms as both threats and targets in modern high-intensity conflict. This article explores the operational role of the F-4E Phantom II within the IRIAF’s 31st TFS in the months leading up to the attack, the tactical logic behind its targeting, and the sequence of events that led to the destruction of Iran’s largest Phantom squadron – a decisive moment in one of the most consequential air campaigns of the 21st century.

F-4Es of the 31st TFS​

By the late 2000s, ageing airframes and shrinking spare parts availability threatened the viability of the IRIAF’s Phantom fleet. In response, the Iranian Aircraft Industries (IACI) Corporation launched a three-phase upgrade and life extension program named Project Dowran in 2008. Managed by the IRIAF’s High Command and drawing upon past research by the Self-Sufficiency Jihad (SSJ), the program aimed to return up to 64 F-4Es to full mission capability, while also integrating modern avionics, new weapon systems, and structural refurbishments.

TFB.3’s 31st TTS/TFS was chosen as the lead squadron for Dowran, reflecting its role as Iran’s principal F-4E operator. The prototype aircraft for the modernisation was F-4E 3-6556, previously used to test R-73E AAM integration during Project Fallah. After extensive upgrades, including structural repairs and new communication systems, the aircraft re-entered service in August 2011. One of the most advanced Dowran aircraft, 3-6675, received a retractable in-flight refuelling probe and was equipped to carry Chinese-made cruise missiles, including the C-801K, C-802A, and C-704KD. In July 2015, it successfully test-fired a C-704KD, leading to an order for 100 domestically produced air-launched Nasr missiles. That retractable refuelling probe was later removed due to the pilots’ objection to receiving fuel from IRIAF Boeing KC-707 tankers.

While Dowran progressed slowly – modernising only two aircraft per year at peak – IACI was supplemented by the IRIAF’s internal maintenance depots, including those at TFB.1 (Mehrabad) and TFB.3 itself. Aircraft such as 3-6598, 3-6650, and 3-6669 were restored to FMC status for the 31st TFS between 2011 and 2014. Despite budget limitations, TFB.3 overhauled several Phantoms locally, including aircraft severely damaged by fire or battle wear.

By 2020, plans called for 12 31st TFS F-4Es to be upgraded to the full Dowran Phase II standard, extending their service lives into the 2030s – unless new aircraft such as the Su-35SE were procured. In 2024, it was decided to retire and replace the squadron’s F-4Es with 12 to 15 Su-35SEs, with deliveries scheduled to begin in January 2025. However, the plan was abruptly halted in March 2025 when the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic ordered the cancellation of the acquisition of the ex-Egyptian Air Force Su-35SEs from Russia. The budget allocated for their procurement was redirected to the missile development programs of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force (IRGCASF).

In September 2024, the unit demonstrated the enduring capability of its F-4E Phantom II fleet during the first nationwide IRIAF gunnery competition held in over a decade. The event took place at the 3rd TFB, the home of the 31st TFS, and included participation from five IRIAF bases. A total of 15 F-4Es – including five from 31st TFS – joined the contest, with selected pilots having previously qualified through squadron-level trials.

Two Block 63 F-4E Phantom IIs of the 31st TFS – 3-6669 and 3-6682 – are seen here. At least one of them was destroyed during the Israeli airstrikes on June 13, 2025
The competition began with training rounds fired during both day and night sorties, followed by live munitions strikes at the Asleh Gunnery Range, located 40km east of the base. Each F-4E conducted bombing runs with Mk. 82 and Mk. 83 bombs, 2.75in rockets, and 20mm Vulcan cannon fire. According to official IRIAF sources, the 31st TFS team outperformed all other units, scoring the highest across gunnery, rocketry, and bombing evaluations. Their results were a testament to the unit’s experience and tactical proficiency, despite the age and logistical limitations of their aircraft.

On September 12, 2024, the squadron’s aircrews received recognition for their achievements in a ceremony held at 3rd TFB. While their triumph marked a brief resurgence of pride and capability, it tragically foreshadowed the devastating loss of ten F-4Es and one RF-4E less than a year later. The gunnery competition underscored the operational relevance of the Phantom fleet at the time and highlighted the IRIAF’s efforts to revitalise basic combat skills among its ageing yet determined fighter force.

Destruction of the F-4Es​

In the early hours of Operation Rising Lion, while the IASF carried out precision strikes against the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defence Force (IRIADF) and the IRGC Aerospace Force’s radar and missile systems surrounding nuclear and ballistic missile facilities, a parallel wave of joint Mossad-IASF operations was underway. These covert strikes targeted high-ranking IRGC commanders, atomic scientists, and members of the Iranian Joint Chiefs of Staff in Tehran – individuals critical to the Iranian regime’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs.

F-4E 3-6684 (Block 63) of the 31st TFS pictured during an exercise at 2nd TFB in Tabriz in September 2011. Originally intended for the 92nd TFS in Bandar Abbas in 1979, this jet was reassigned to the 12th TFS in Tehran due to the Islamic Revolution, and later joined the 31st TFS during the Iran–Iraq War following heavy squadron losses

F-4E Phantom II 3-6662 (Block 63) of the 31st TFS seen landing at Tehran–Mehrabad Airport on April 12, 2013
Just after sunrise, as smoke rose above several destroyed Iranian facilities, the Iranian Joint Staff issued emergency scramble orders to launch quick reaction alert (QRA) fighters to intercept presumed Israeli aircraft and drones operating within Iranian airspace. Among the first to respond was an F-4E Phantom II of the 31st TFS, based at 3rd TFB. Armed with two AIM-7E Sparrow semi-active radar-guided medium-range air-to-air missiles, two AIM-9J Sidewinder infrared-guided short-range air-to-air missiles, and a full complement of 20mm cannon rounds, the Phantom launched with three external fuel tanks to maximise its range and loiter time.

The 31st TFS Phantom carried out a 90-minute combat air patrol that extended as far as the skies over Tabriz in northwest Iran before returning to base. Aircraft were scrambled from Mehrabad (1st TFB-MiG-29Bs),Tabriz (2nd TFB MiG-29B/F-5Es) and Dezful (4th TFB F-5Es). All this including the Phantom’s flight was perceived by Israeli intelligence as a meaningful attempt to mount an air defence posture. Though no interception took place, the presence of the Phantom and its armament was noted by Israeli surveillance assets as a potentially escalating threat.

Hours later, as part of the OCA phase of Operation Rising Lion, IASF commanders authorised a major airstrike against 3rd TFB Nojeh. The mission was entrusted to F-16I Sufas of the elite 107 Squadron, based at Hatzerim AB, which delivered GBU-39/B small diameter bombs equipped with steel penetrator warheads against the HAS. Satellite imagery later confirmed 17kg (38lb) penetrating warheads had been employed, given the heavy internal damage to aircraft within relatively intact structures.

A typical QRA (Quick Reaction Alert)

 

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loadout of a 31st TFS F-4E Phantom II is seen here on aircraft 3-6652, which was most likely destroyed on 13 June 2025. The aircraft is loaded with two AIM-7E Sparrow medium-range missiles, two AIM-9J Sidewinder short-range missiles, and three external fuel tanks.

This Block 55 F-4E of the 31st TFS underwent full restoration between 2010 and 2012 at the IRIAF’s F-4 overhaul centre at 1st TFB Mehrabad after suffering significant structural and exterior damage in an earlier incident

Three F-4Es of the 31st TFS, including 3-6611, pictured at 1st TFB Mehrabad in April 2012
Out of 22 shelters at TFB, 11 were directly hit. According to on-base sources, all 11 housed F-4E or RF-4E Phantom aircraft. Seven of the struck shelters contained airworthy aircraft, including at least one of the IRIAF’s three remaining RF-4E Photo Phantoms operated by the 31st Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (31st TRS). In addition to the operational losses, Israeli aircraft struck several abandoned HAS in the northern perimeter of the base, many of which contained dilapidated MiG-23s that had defected from Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. The 31R/13L runway and taxiways (six points) were also cratered, and the local air defence radars – already degraded from the morning’s strikes – were further neutralised.

F-4E 3-6611 (Block 56) of the 31st TFS was a combat veteran of Operation Morvarid (Pearl), during which its crew sank several Iraqi Navy Osa-class missile boats in November 1980 using AGM-65A Maverick missiles

The 107 ‘Knights of Orange Tail’ Squadron of the IASF equipped with 25 F-16I Sufa strike fighters was granted the task of destroying combat aircraft of the IRIAF in the 2nd and 3rd TFBs on June 13 using GBU- 39/B SDBs, as they can be seen loaded on them at Hatzerim AB in the morning of June 13, 2025
Israeli Air Force

The 31st TFS regularly took part in Iran’s Army Day flypasts on April 17 or 18 in southern Tehran. These were cancelled in 2024 and 2025 due to Israel’s war on terrorism and increased threat levels
A key supporting radar facility, the IRIADF’s Subashi Early Warning Radar Site(Westinghouse ADS-4 radar), located near TFB.3, was also destroyed. Several IRIADF personnel were killed in the strike, leaving the region around Hamedan completely blind to any further incursions by Israeli aircraft or drones. A total of five airworthy F-4Es and one RF-4E escaped the Israeli airstrikes. These were then evacuated from the 3rd TFB Nojeh using trailers and trucks. Despite that, the strategic cost to the IRIAF was staggering. The 31st TFS lost an estimated ten out of its 17 remaining F-4Es, while the 31st TRS lost at least one of its final three RF-4Es. With only 11 F-4Es now remaining at the 6th TFB in Bushehr and 13 more in the 9th TFB in Bandar Abbas and several other non-airworthy units in storage or cannibalised for spare parts, the destruction of the core of the Hamedanbased Phantom fleet was a significant blow to Iran’s already fragile tactical airpower. Though Iranian Aircraft Industries (IACI) and the IRIAF’s F-4 Overhaul complex in Tehran may attempt to restore two heavily cannibalised F-4Es of the 31st TFS (3-6619 and 3-6645) from storage at the 1st TFB Lashgari to compensate for the losses, these efforts will be insufficient to close the gap created by the June 13 strike. The IASF’s decision to eliminate the combat capability of the 31st TFS was just as much about degrading Iran’s air defence as it was a calculated reprisal for its Phantom’s presence in the skies during the early hours of the USAF’s Operation Midnight Hammer on June 22.



Legacy at Shahrokhi

Established in June 1965 as a critical forward airbase to counter Soviet-backed threats from Iraq, the 3rd TFB – known initially as Shahrokhi Air Base – quickly evolved into a cornerstone of Iran’s tactical airpower. First equipped with Northrop F-5A/B Freedom Fighters, TFB.3 transitioned into a Phantom base in 1971, following the delivery of 32 McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom IIs under the US Foreign Military Sales program Peace Roll II. Rising tensions with Iraq – particularly the 1969 Arvand-Rud (Shatt al-Arab) confrontation – accelerated Iran’s modernisation efforts, and TFB.3 was prioritised for Phantom conversion. The 301st, 302nd, and 303rd TFS were redesignated as the 31st to 33rd TFS, each equipped with 20 F-4Es by 1977, making the base Iran’s largest Phantom hub.

Before the 1979 revolution, TFB.3 maintained C-1 combat readiness and regularly participated in CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) exercises alongside USAF units, demonstrating interoperability and advanced readiness. However, the revolution had a drastic impact on the base. Following the Nojeh coup plot, 18 of the IRIAF’s best F-4E pilots and scores of support personnel were executed or imprisoned, severely degrading the base’s operational capability. Sortie rates collapsed and training ceased.

Despite this, TFB.3 played a vital role in repelling the Iraqi invasion of 1980. On September 22, 1980, just hours after the war began, four F-4Es from the base struck Iraq’s Kut Air Base. Over the eight-year conflict, TFB.3’s Phantoms were heavily engaged in primary operations such as Kaman-99, Shabah-II/III, and Mersad, cementing their legacy in Iran’s modern military history.

In the post-war years, TFB.3 remained a focal point of Iran’s regional air strategy, engaging in anti-insurgency operations against the Mojahedin-e-Khalq terrorist organisation in 1991 and Taliban deterrence flights from Mashhad in the late 1990s. A notable incident occurred in 2001, when two of its F-4Es intercepted Azerbaijani naval vessels in the Caspian Sea, demonstrating the IRIAF’s reliance on the Phantom even decades after its introduction.

The F-4E Phantom II’s combat record was extended well into the 21st century when Iran’s western border was threatened by the rapid expansion of ISIL (Daesh) across Iraq. In November 2014, the 31st Tactical Training/

Fighter Squadron (TTS/TFS) and 31st TFS at TFB.3 were tasked with providing close air support for Kurdish Peshmerga and Iranian IRGC Ground Forces involved in the Battle of Jalawla and Saadiya.

Operating under strict secrecy, four F-4Es (3-6556, 3-6598, 3-6662, and 3-6682) conducted up to two daily combat sorties from November 23 to 30, guided by embedded Iranian FACs within Kurdish units. Aircraft bore masked national markings to conceal Iranian involvement. Their strikes were instrumental in securing the Diyala corridor and pushing ISIL back from Iran’s frontier.

In 2015, the F-4Es of 31st TFS also played a support role by escorting Russian Air Force bombers transiting Iranian airspace bound for Syria. As Russian Tu-95MS and Tu-160 aircraft launched cruise missiles or bombed targets in Syria, IRIAF F-4Es provided escort duties alongside F-14A Tomcats, reinforcing Iran’s military cooperation with Moscow.

Later, in August 2016, the strategic relevance of TFB.3 was reinforced when eight Russian Su-34s temporarily deployed to the base. While these modern fighters conducted bombing missions in Syria, TFB.3’s F-4Es flew escort and QRA missions, underscoring the Phantom’s continued frontline utility in a complex regional battlespace.



Mossad’s 2023 sabotage strike

Well before the skies over western Iran roared again with Israeli drones and standoff munitions during Operation Rising Lion in 2025, the 3rd TFB had already become the focus of Israeli attention. On October 25, 2023, just weeks after the Hamas-led terrorist attacks on Israel and the launch of the IDF’s Operation Swords of Iron, the Israeli Intelligence Service (Mossad) carried out a sabotage operation targeting the 31st TFS.

In the early hours, two air force technicians affiliated with the 31st Maintenance Squadron surreptitiously entered HAS 1 adjacent to the central maintenance hangar. The saboteurs doused four parked F-4E Phantom IIs with petrol and ignited them. The fire consumed one aircraft entirely – 3-6634 – and severely damaged another. Two additional airframes sustained fire-related damage to their undercarriages and tyres. It took base personnel nearly 30 minutes to mobilise fire suppression efforts, owing to the lack of a night shift at the base’s fire station.

The loss of aircraft 3-6634 was both a material blow and a symbolic one. A combat veteran of the Iran–Iraq War, the aircraft had participated in Operation Morvarid in 1980, where Iranian F-4s decimated Iraqi Navy missile boats in a series of devastating airstrikes. More recently, the aircraft had served in Iran’s limited anti-ISIS operations in Iraq, conducting strike sorties in Diyala Province in 2014 and 2015. Refurbished under Project Dowran between 2008 and 2012, the aircraft had been restored with updated systems and remained one of the more capable Phantoms in the IRIAF inventory.

The sabotage shocked commanders at TFB.3 and triggered a wave of arrests and interrogations. Among the first suspects was Colonel Hashem Moradi, head of the base’s counterintelligence unit, whose radical ideological behaviour had already raised tensions among flight crews. Although Moradi was briefly detained, the investigation ultimately led to three arrests: two aircraft technicians, one of whom was a devout political commissar aligned with the regime’s ideological arm, and a counterintelligence officer responsible for the base’s CCTV network. Surveillance footage from an overlooked camera in an adjacent building had recorded the saboteurs en route to the shelters, providing the critical evidence needed to identify them. Their motivation, according to sources, was financial, and possibly facilitated by Mossad assets exploiting ideological fissures within the base.

The impact on operational readiness was immediate. With one aircraft destroyed and three grounded for repairs, nearly one-third of the active F-4Es assigned to the 31st TFS were knocked out of action. The strike highlighted the deep vulnerabilities of Iran’s underfunded conventional air arm, especially when compared to the heavily prioritized and protected ballistic missile and drone forces of the IRGC Aerospace Force. In targeting TFB.3, Mossad signalled not just a capability to infiltrate supposedly secure installations but also an understanding of where it could inflict maximum psychological and operational damage with minimal force.

In retrospect, the October 2023 sabotage operation was not just a standalone act of espionage but a rehearsal in miniature, demonstrating both the fragility of Iran’s ageing air bases and the precision of Israel’s intelligence apparatus. When Operation Rising Lion was launched the following year, many of the same vulnerabilities would again be exploited, but with far more destructive consequences.

Source : AFM

 

[Immortals]

“Two additional airframes sustained fire-related damage to their undercarriages and tyres. It took base personnel nearly 30 minutes to mobilise fire suppression efforts, owing to the lack of a night shift at the base’s fire station.“

Simply embarrassing

Although Moradi was briefly detained, the investigation ultimately led to three arrests: two aircraft technicians, one of whom was a devout political commissar aligned with the regime’s ideological arm, and a counterintelligence officer responsible for the base’s CCTV network.

Even more embarrassing that they not only flipped a IRI supporter, but they flipped a counterintelligence officer to spy for them as well. Again when you pay soldiers nothing (not even enough to live off of) it’s easy to tempt them with hundreds of thousands of dollars in crypto or even foreign currency.

But this thinking that IRGC are somehow more loyal than Artesh, has no basis in reality. They are likely just as comprised or in some cases more since Israel/US purposely target IRGC infiltration as high on their list.

 

[Ali_Baba]

@Fatman17 - From a copyright perspective, is it appropriate to post entire articles ?

I think we should be careful ?

 

[Fatman17]

@Fatman17 - From a copyright perspective, is it appropriate to post entire articles ?

I think we should be careful ?

Not to worry

 

[Shafagh]

“Two additional airframes sustained fire-related damage to their undercarriages and tyres. It took base personnel nearly 30 minutes to mobilise fire suppression efforts, owing to the lack of a night shift at the base’s fire station.“

Simply embarrassing

Although Moradi was briefly detained, the investigation ultimately led to three arrests: two aircraft technicians, one of whom was a devout political commissar aligned with the regime’s ideological arm, and a counterintelligence officer responsible for the base’s CCTV network.

Even more embarrassing that they not only flipped a IRI supporter, but they flipped a counterintelligence officer to spy for them as well. Again when you pay soldiers nothing (not even enough to live off of) it’s easy to tempt them with hundreds of thousands of dollars in crypto or even foreign currency.

But this thinking that IRGC are somehow more loyal than Artesh, has no basis in reality. They are likely just as comprised or in some cases more since Israel/US purposely target IRGC infiltration as high on their list.

That's what you get for letting retard mullahs run a country. They make a mess, mismanage the economy, let corruption run rampant, killed the air force, planted seeds of treason, and on top of all this, want to smack around young people for hijab and dumbass social restrictions because "gHaRBzaDeGi" . It took them 40 some years until they gave up. Traitors.

And to know that there are people in this forum still supporting this shitstain government.

So sad to see what the nation is becoming. This is a warning to any country, never ever put religion into government. Never again.

It's time for new management.

 

[ShapurII]

I have long suggested to rename this thread to "Museum of the Imperial Iranian Air Force", because it is exactly that now.

 

[Flotilla]

Without Air force and degraded IADs the Government are more exposed than ever. It is something so evident that I am sure they will do something to reinforce IRIAF.

 

[Shafagh]

Without Air force and degraded IADs the Government are more exposed than ever. It is something so evident that I am sure they will do something to reinforce IRIAF.

I hope so. At least some new Migs or Su 27s. Please... anything.

 

[Comandante]

The summary was very good, I read it through several times. When it came to the weapons of the F14 aircraft, I noticed that neither the Fakur 90 nor the AIM 54 were mentioned. It is interesting because it would have made sense in that situation. It is also interesting that according to the article there is no suitable aircraft to carry it, which seems quite incredible since there were pictures of the F14 flying the Fakur 90 on the forum. At that time, there was talk of the longer-range Fakur 90 missile, also with a picture. I wonder what the truth is?

 

[ToddE]

As expected, Khamenei killed the SU-35S deal. F-14A's are gone and so does F-4E/D. Local F-5 derivatives are no longer being pursued. IRI of today is almost ditto of post first PG war Baathist Iraq.

I am amazed how much deep rooted hatred Khamenei and other shithead mullahs at the helm of IRI carried in their hearts against Iran and Iranians ? more importantly what caused this hatred ? They destroyed Iran by ruining its society, economy, defense, deterrence all deliberately with their own hands. There must be a reason for this hatred in their heads that they are systematically sacrificing an ancient empire. Or they are simply foreign deployed agents of historical enemies of Iran. There is just no other explanation to it otherwise. There exists no such example in history where a group of deluded, illiterate, corrupt and illogical religious zealots sit at the throne of a rich ancient nation and just destroy it from within.

Economy crippled with self induced sanctions
Society collapsed with draconian Islamic laws, brain drain
Strategic Deterrence gone with no nuke, ICBM policy
Conventional Deterrence gone with deliberate murder of IRIAF
No foreign soft or hard power left anymore, borders are no longer secure.

 

[ToddE]

The summary was very good, I read it through several times. When it came to the weapons of the F14 aircraft, I noticed that neither the Fakur 90 nor the AIM 54 were mentioned. It is interesting because it would have made sense in that situation. It is also interesting that according to the article there is no suitable aircraft to carry it, which seems quite incredible since there were pictures of the F14 flying the Fakur 90 on the forum. At that time, there was talk of the longer-range Fakur 90 missile, also with a picture. I wonder what the truth is?

Timeline of F-14A fleet erosion

44 airframes were selected for deep MLU in early 2000s
During Obama era diplomacy, critical spare parts reached Iran
42 AIrframes became FMCs
26 alone were deployed on QRA duties in 2010s
F-14AM upgrade program started to reach F-14D or even beyond status
F-14AM program due to IRIAF budget cuts became depot level upgrades
2 F-14 AM were built, program abandoned
Local WVR (Azaraksh), LR-BVR (Fakour-90) were built
100 x Fakours-90 and 35 refurbished AIM-54A were supplied
WVR HOBS Azaraksh instead went to IRIAD and became a SHORAD
Maghsoud LRBVR with 220 KM proposed range abandoned
MTBOs of FMC airframes reached but IRIAF had no $
FMC numbers went down to ~1 dozen barely
IRIAF finally grew a pair to openly say to Mullahs, they need replacement
Bagheri signed SU-35S deal after failure of J-10A/B + JH-7 deal with China
Pilots trained on SU-35S in Russia, ~10-12 YAK-130 arrived in Iran
Khamenei killed SU-35S deal OR Russia again fooled Iran.