Just like all these people.......
Iranian Nuclear Doctrine
- Thread starter jauk
- Start date
Khorasan Black Flags
Trusted Member
Persian Gulf
INT'L MOD
StormBreaker
Trusted Member
Hack-Hook
INT'L MOD
Another fear mongering baseless claims
Its Is years that they make such claims about Iran whenever anybody sneeze
Persian Gulf
INT'L MOD
please don't spread fake news from low quality sources
ShapurII
Trusted Member
I don't know why I do not get notified when you mention me.
Yes, Fereydoon Abbasi is one of the patriots in the Iranian nuclear program. I wish he would have a bolder role in decision making.
I'm glad that you finally accept that laser isotope separation is a viable option for a covert nuclear program. We can produce an array of lasers in Iran, including copper-vapor and carbon-dioxide lasers.
Now you understand why I insist that Iran's nuclear program is a waste of energy. It has failed as a commercial/civilian program and cannot sustain even 2% of our needs in the next 5 years. And it has failed to provide us as a means for weaponization as well. That's why it's better to keep our enriched uranium in Iran and accept a temporary halt, if it convinces the US to lift both primary and secondary sanctions.
Persian Gulf
INT'L MOD
New IAEA report leaked
As of May 17, 2025: Iran has 408.6kg of 60% HEU (+133.8kg since February 2025, when it was 274.8kg)
Iran has enough 60% HEU for 10+ nuclear warheads if enriched to 90% (conservatively assuming 25kg / warhead, it rises to 15 warheads if we assume a more efficient 15kg / warhead design)
Not including the 20% HEU stockpile
Enrichment continues at decent pace (c. 45kg / month), which is c. 1 nuclear warhead per month
As of May 17, 2025: Iran has 408.6kg of 60% HEU (+133.8kg since February 2025, when it was 274.8kg)
Iran has enough 60% HEU for 10+ nuclear warheads if enriched to 90% (conservatively assuming 25kg / warhead, it rises to 15 warheads if we assume a more efficient 15kg / warhead design)
Not including the 20% HEU stockpile
Enrichment continues at decent pace (c. 45kg / month), which is c. 1 nuclear warhead per month
ShapurII
Trusted Member
Does the report include how much 20% HALEU is remaining?
+133.8kg means that we have lost about 400kg of 20% uranium.
Persian Gulf
INT'L MOD
Persian Gulf
INT'L MOD
Undeclared activities in the latest IAEA report:
Lavisan-Shian site:
Natural Uranium was drilled, processed and used in the production of explosively-driven neutron sources (EDNS, also referred to as ‘neutron initiators’) at Lavisan-Shian on at least two occasions in 2003. These EDNS use small quantities of natural or depleted uranium and are designed to initiate a nuclear device by producingneutrons in response to an imploding shockwave."
IAEA assesses "the EDNS produced at Lavisan...were small-scale & designed for testing, and were integrated into scaled implosion systems and explosively tested" twice in 2003.
In addition, the Agency’s evaluation also indicates that equipment was developed and tested atLavisan-Shian that included neutron detectors and housings; an identical housing for neutron detectors was deployed in an explosive test at Marivan on 15 April 2003. The Agency thinks the that around 10 kg of natural uranium metal, undeclared by Iran, was used by the Applied Physics Institute at Lavisan in 2002-3.
the Agency believes Iran under-reported the amount of uranium previously worked on at Lavisan when it dissolved some of that material in 2022. I won't get into detail of it but it is important. Because it means that there is a certain amount of fissile material floating around out there that the Agency hasn't been able to account for. That COULD potentially lead to diverted fissile material which could be used by Iran:
The quantity of the nuclear material unaccounted for indicates that more uranium metal than theapproximately 10 kg previously assessed by the Agency to be available to the Applied Physics Institute, which was operating Lavisan-Shian was available to Iran. The current whereabouts of this nuclear material remains unknown to the Agency. Therefore, the Agency is not in a position to determine whether it has been consumed, mixed with other declared material, or is still outside of safeguards.
Marivan site:
The evaluation of all safeguards-relevant information available to the Agency indicates that in2003 Iran conducted a number of explosive tests at this location. In four of these tests Iran utilised full-scale hemispherical implosion systems diagnosed using at least one high-speed camera. Iran also prepared to use neutron detection equipment for future tests at this location, and on 15 April 2003 conducted a preparatory test of blast shielding for this neutron detection equipment.
Iran then delayed access for IAEA to Marivan before finally letting them in to take samples. After that, "the Agency observed...that bunkers at the explosives test area of Marivan had been removed." Agency asked why. Iran replied with a "not technically credible" explanation.
Based on further evaluation of all safeguards-relevant information, the Agency assesses that in2003 Iran planned to conduct future EDNS manufacturing at Marivan, which would have involved the use of small quantities of natural or depleted uranium.
Agency says assessment "in fact, continues to be that, in 2003, Iran conducted a number of explosive tests at this location. These tests utilised full-scale implosion systems, and were diagnosed with at least one high-speed camera. Iran also planned to use neutron detectors at future tests at this location, and conducted tests of shielding for this equipment in preparation for those future tests.
Varamin site:
Agency concluded that Iran did R&D activities related to nuclear fuel cycle at Varamin, which it says was "an undeclared pilot-scale facility for theprocessing and milling of uranium ore and conversion into uranium oxide and possibly, at laboratory scale, into UF4 and UF6.
IAEA says "follow-on, production-scale facility" planned though it doesn't know if it was built. Since Iran not answered questions, IAEA again concludes it can't say whether nuke material at Varamin consumed, mixed with declared nuke material or "still outside of safeguards".
Turquz Abad site:
IAEA says that indicates that "nuclear material and/or heavily contaminated equipment was stored at this location, arising from Varamin, JHL, possibly Lavisan-Shian and other locations." While some of the containers stored at Turquzabad were dismantled at the location, others may have been removed from the location intact in 2018 and moved to an unknown location." Where those containers now are "remains unknown."
Lavisan-Shian site:
Natural Uranium was drilled, processed and used in the production of explosively-driven neutron sources (EDNS, also referred to as ‘neutron initiators’) at Lavisan-Shian on at least two occasions in 2003. These EDNS use small quantities of natural or depleted uranium and are designed to initiate a nuclear device by producingneutrons in response to an imploding shockwave."
IAEA assesses "the EDNS produced at Lavisan...were small-scale & designed for testing, and were integrated into scaled implosion systems and explosively tested" twice in 2003.
In addition, the Agency’s evaluation also indicates that equipment was developed and tested atLavisan-Shian that included neutron detectors and housings; an identical housing for neutron detectors was deployed in an explosive test at Marivan on 15 April 2003. The Agency thinks the that around 10 kg of natural uranium metal, undeclared by Iran, was used by the Applied Physics Institute at Lavisan in 2002-3.
the Agency believes Iran under-reported the amount of uranium previously worked on at Lavisan when it dissolved some of that material in 2022. I won't get into detail of it but it is important. Because it means that there is a certain amount of fissile material floating around out there that the Agency hasn't been able to account for. That COULD potentially lead to diverted fissile material which could be used by Iran:
The quantity of the nuclear material unaccounted for indicates that more uranium metal than theapproximately 10 kg previously assessed by the Agency to be available to the Applied Physics Institute, which was operating Lavisan-Shian was available to Iran. The current whereabouts of this nuclear material remains unknown to the Agency. Therefore, the Agency is not in a position to determine whether it has been consumed, mixed with other declared material, or is still outside of safeguards.
Marivan site:
The evaluation of all safeguards-relevant information available to the Agency indicates that in2003 Iran conducted a number of explosive tests at this location. In four of these tests Iran utilised full-scale hemispherical implosion systems diagnosed using at least one high-speed camera. Iran also prepared to use neutron detection equipment for future tests at this location, and on 15 April 2003 conducted a preparatory test of blast shielding for this neutron detection equipment.
Iran then delayed access for IAEA to Marivan before finally letting them in to take samples. After that, "the Agency observed...that bunkers at the explosives test area of Marivan had been removed." Agency asked why. Iran replied with a "not technically credible" explanation.
Based on further evaluation of all safeguards-relevant information, the Agency assesses that in2003 Iran planned to conduct future EDNS manufacturing at Marivan, which would have involved the use of small quantities of natural or depleted uranium.
Agency says assessment "in fact, continues to be that, in 2003, Iran conducted a number of explosive tests at this location. These tests utilised full-scale implosion systems, and were diagnosed with at least one high-speed camera. Iran also planned to use neutron detectors at future tests at this location, and conducted tests of shielding for this equipment in preparation for those future tests.
Varamin site:
Agency concluded that Iran did R&D activities related to nuclear fuel cycle at Varamin, which it says was "an undeclared pilot-scale facility for theprocessing and milling of uranium ore and conversion into uranium oxide and possibly, at laboratory scale, into UF4 and UF6.
IAEA says "follow-on, production-scale facility" planned though it doesn't know if it was built. Since Iran not answered questions, IAEA again concludes it can't say whether nuke material at Varamin consumed, mixed with declared nuke material or "still outside of safeguards".
Turquz Abad site:
IAEA says that indicates that "nuclear material and/or heavily contaminated equipment was stored at this location, arising from Varamin, JHL, possibly Lavisan-Shian and other locations." While some of the containers stored at Turquzabad were dismantled at the location, others may have been removed from the location intact in 2018 and moved to an unknown location." Where those containers now are "remains unknown."
Persian Gulf
INT'L MOD
The Europeans are pressuring the IAEA to declare Iran in material breach of its NPT safeguards obligations by refusing to answer IAEA questions about activities at those four sites. This can lead to a reference to the UNSC. Although this can be vetoed by China and Russia this time, it is likely this is an attempt to justify invoking "snapback" of all UNSC sanctions against Iran that were lifted in 2015.
Persian Gulf
INT'L MOD
the risk of war with Israel has never been higher than this year. the next 6 months will possibly be the most important period of IRI's history.
Garcia Sea
Registered Member
The situation is clearly heading towards the worst-case scenario.
According to Reuters, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany are preparing to submit a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors, which will convene on June 9th, to certify Iran's non-compliance with the JCPOA and refer the matter to the UN Security Council.
Furthermore, France has already stated in April that if Iran does not yield, it will trigger the snapback mechanism by August.
The Trump administration is unilaterally demanding that Iran completely abandon uranium enrichment without any sanctions relief, which is essentially a demand for surrender.
If Iran accepts this, it will lose all its negotiating leverage, leading to a naval blockade, expanded inspections across the entire country, and the dismantling of the government through large-scale assassination operations.
Surrender or death – this is the ultimatum presented to Iran by the West and Israel.
Of course, there are other options; if the Iranian government could demonstrate a willingness to engage in all-out war, like North Korea's Kim Jong-un, Trump might hesitate and consider some negotiations.
However, this is impossible for the reformist government and indecisive religious leadership, making this third option highly unlikely.
At present, the Iranian government is more likely to choose surrender, followed by a scenario where time runs out, the snapback mechanism is triggered, and full-scale bombing by Israel and the United States commences.
According to Reuters, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany are preparing to submit a resolution to the IAEA Board of Governors, which will convene on June 9th, to certify Iran's non-compliance with the JCPOA and refer the matter to the UN Security Council.
Furthermore, France has already stated in April that if Iran does not yield, it will trigger the snapback mechanism by August.
The Trump administration is unilaterally demanding that Iran completely abandon uranium enrichment without any sanctions relief, which is essentially a demand for surrender.
If Iran accepts this, it will lose all its negotiating leverage, leading to a naval blockade, expanded inspections across the entire country, and the dismantling of the government through large-scale assassination operations.
Surrender or death – this is the ultimatum presented to Iran by the West and Israel.
Of course, there are other options; if the Iranian government could demonstrate a willingness to engage in all-out war, like North Korea's Kim Jong-un, Trump might hesitate and consider some negotiations.
However, this is impossible for the reformist government and indecisive religious leadership, making this third option highly unlikely.
At present, the Iranian government is more likely to choose surrender, followed by a scenario where time runs out, the snapback mechanism is triggered, and full-scale bombing by Israel and the United States commences.
StrategicBear
Registered Member
Why are you so pessimistic?
There are many hardliners in the IRGC that will never allow surrender, and you underestimate the pride of Persians.
Persia never lost its heart and soul even now they are Shiite Muslims, and that is : they will not allow another "Alexander" or "Arab invasion" to topple its regime without a bloody fight that engulfs the entire region into flames...
Anything must be done to resist the supremacist white men in power in USA now.
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