Pakistani Defense Minister Asif has declared publicly that Pakistan will not participate in any arrangement that involves disarming Hamas.
By
Ahmed Khan
November 26, 2025
Pakistan is exploring the possibility of deploying
troops to Gaza as part of a U.N.-mandated International Stabilization Force (ISF) that constitutes a central element of the Donald Trump administration’s
post-ceasefire framework for the territory.
The
force under consideration has been authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, which was adopted on November 17. The resolution endorses the initial phase of U.S. President Donald Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan. This includes consolidating the ceasefire concluded between Hamas and Israel, securing humanitarian corridors, and preparing the ground for reconstruction while deferring more contentious political issues to subsequent negotiations.
While Pakistan supported the U.S.-sponsored resolution at the UNSC, its representative at the United Nations, Asim Iftikhar Ahmed, has said that the country is not
entirely satisfied with the outcome. He warned that “some critical suggestions” from Pakistan were not included in the final text. “We earnestly hope that further details in coming weeks will provide the much-needed clarity,” he said.
The matter seems to have moved beyond speculation in Pakistan. Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif recently
stated that a final decision would be taken in the near future following exhaustive consultations with all stakeholders. “This thing has to be finalized [and] it is in process. The government will take a decision after passing through the process,” he said.
Similarly, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar told parliament that Pakistan’s leadership
would soon decide whether to contribute troops, adding that Indonesia has already offered to send 20,000 soldiers. Dar also stated that the U.N. and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) have both failed to reach a peace deal in Gaza, subtly suggesting that the stabilization force could play an important role.
“With the U.S., we can see an end to the war,” he noted.
These measured responses from Pakistani officials reflect neither outright commitment nor rejection, but rather a deliberate positioning that keeps Islamabad firmly within the emerging diplomatic consensus on the issue.
On the issue of deploying soldiers in Gaza, Islamabad has maintained broad alignment with the eight-nation group of Muslim countries – comprising Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkiye, Indonesia, and Bahrain – that played a key role in facilitating the ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel.
The
joint statement of the Muslim group on October 5 welcomed Hamas’ constructive engagement and called for the unification of Gaza and the West Bank, full Israeli withdrawal, Gaza’s reconstruction, and a “just peace based on the two-state solution.”
Pakistani officials have repeatedly emphasized that troop contribution will proceed only in full alignment with the Muslim group’s decision. Pakistan’s defense minister said last month that if
Muslim countries decided to participate in the peace force and Pakistan too took part, then it would be a “moment of pride for the country to play a role in protecting Palestinians.”
Asif added, “This is an opportunity that Pakistan should avail if it is available to us.”
Such alignment, however, faces significant challenges.
The mandate of the proposed military force remains ambiguous on a number of critical points. There is no clarity whether its primary role will be limited to humanitarian protection and aid facilitation, or whether it will extend to active security functions. Moreover, it remains unclear if operational coordination with Israeli forces will be required. Most importantly, will the force be tasked with measures that could be interpreted as disarming Palestinian resistance factions?
Asif has already declared publicly that Pakistan will not participate in any arrangement that involves
disarming Hamas. This position clearly reflects both principled solidarity and acute awareness of domestic sensitivities.
These sensitivities are rooted in bitter historical memory. The Pakistani public and large segments of the political spectrum remain profoundly distrustful of initiatives perceived to serve U.S. or Israeli objectives. Islamist parties in Pakistan and elements within the opposition have already signaled readiness to mobilize if the mission is seen as compromising Palestinian rights.
Nevertheless, strategic considerations, particularly Pakistan’s longstanding relations with key regional powers and its role in regional stability initiatives, continue to guide the country’s decision-makers toward a cautious, consensus-driven approach. The idea of participation in a high-profile, Muslim-coordinated mission would enhance Pakistan’s standing as a responsible middle power. Moreover, participation can also strengthen the country’s defense and financial ties with key Gulf partners at a moment of acute economic vulnerability, and offer the defense forces an opportunity to enhance their international image and efficacy that was seemingly lost after the U.S. forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Per
reports, Army Chief General Asim Munir’s recent visits to Amman and Cairo in October were devoted precisely to forging a common Muslim position on the issue.
Thus far, Pakistan has navigated these competing pressures with considerable dexterity. The country has endorsed both the controversial Gaza ceasefire and the stabilization force. Both of these moves have been
welcomed in Washington. At the same time, Pakistan has continued to condemn Israeli actions in unequivocal terms and insisted on Palestinian statehood as the only acceptable solution to the Gaza crisis.
Similarly, domestically, the narrative has been carefully managed by the government and the powerful military. Pakistan’s policymakers have maintained that any Pakistani role would be solely to protect Palestinian civilians and facilitate aid, and not to undermine their struggle.
However, that restraint may not endure the moment Pakistani boots touch Gazan soil.
The idea of soldiers ordered to interdict armed Palestinians, getting caught in crossfire during renewed hostilities, or being photographed in proximity to Israeli positions would instantly transform the mission into a domestic political crisis. The country’s leadership is likely aware that a single misjudged incident could resurrect accusations of serving foreign agendas and unleash unrest on a scale not seen since the anti-blasphemy protests of recent years.
Considering these concerns, Pakistan’s response has therefore been to insist on collective Muslim leverage rather than committing anything unilaterally.
Diplomatic efforts are now focused on securing revisions to the mandate of any potential international force. This push might include provisions such as no involuntary disarmament of Hamas, exclusively humanitarian functions, and explicit guarantees against Israeli military action in ISF areas.
In essence, Pakistan’s leadership appears drawn to the historic opportunity of helping to secure Gaza under an Islamic banner. At the same time, it might recognize that the political, operational, and reputational risks of such an engagement are formidable.
From the Pakistani perspective, words of principled support have so far sufficed to balance international expectations with domestic imperatives.
Actual deployment, however, would demand clarity and consensus that the current framework simply does not provide. As long as those conditions remain unmet, Pakistan will continue to strike a carefully calibrated pose that supports the idea of deployment to stabilize Gaza but will not move unless its concerns are addressed.
