Israeli missile defences (deployed) - assessment and strategies

[ToddE]

IRGCAF can launch wave after wave of BMs but the problem is EW Sensors of US in the region that creates interception pocket coordinates minutes before the missiles even reach their apogees. This Search and Track data is live time transferred to layers of Israeli AD. Israeli AD only has to shoot so half of their job or dare I say the most critical one is already done by US passive sensors in the region.

Something interesting I noticed in the 12 day war was the fact that much deadlier Skip glide vehicles like Fattah and KS easily got through. Could it be because US sensors are less efficient in Search n Track of Skip Glide vehicles that do not hit their Boost phase projected Apogees, instead adapt a non-Ballistic Trajectory? These missile are fast as hell, Fattah is Hypersonic and KS is borderline Hypersonic in terminal phase but Layered AD's complete failure against them might hint towards the fact that as soon as anything fired from Iran does not get tracked early, the layered AD fails to create interception pocket for them. Fattah1/2, KS-1/2, K-4, Sejjil-II are the real weapons of IRGCAF, rest are force multipliers.

 

[Persian Gulf]

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[KingQamaR]

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[Foinikas]

Overview of deployed Israeli air defences:

• Arrow-2/3: 3 batteries
• THAAD: unknown (0-1 batteries)
• Patriot (PAC-2): 3-4 batteries
• David's Sling: 2 batteries
• Iron Dome: 10 batteries

Arrow-2/3: 3 batteries

Presume 2 Arrow-2 batteries and 1 Arrow-3 battery

1 battery = 4-8 launchers
1 launcher = 6 Arrow-2/3

--> each battery has 24-48 Arrow-2 missiles
Arrow-2 = 2 x 8 x 6 = 86 Arrow-2 missiles
Arrow-3 = 1 x 8 x 6 = 48 Arrow-3 missiles
= up to 134 total Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 missile interceptors deployed across Israel at any one time

THAAD: 0-1 batteries (not confirmed)

1 battery = 6 launchers
1 launcher = 8 interceptors

Israel does not have any of its own THAAD systems but the US sent unknown number of launchers to Israel in 2019. Assume 1 battery = up to 48 THAAD missile interceptors deployed (by USA).

Patriot PAC-2 air defence system: 3-4 batteries

1 battery = 6 launchers
1 launcher = 4 PAC-2 (OR 16 PAC-3 missiles)

--> each battery has up to 24 PAC-2 interceptors

Israel has 3-4 Patriot PAC-2 batteries deployed = (3-4) x 6 x 4 = 72-96 PAC-2 missile interceptors deployed at any one time

David's Sling: 2 batteries

1 battery = unknown number of launchers (presume 4-6)
1 launcher = 6-12 Stunner missile interceptors

--> each battery has 24-72 Stunner interceptors

Israel is estimated to have 2 David's Sling batteries deployed = 2 x 24-72 = 48-148 missile interceptors deployed at any one time

Iron Dome: 10 batteries

1 battery = 3-4 launchers
1 launcher = 20 Tamir missile interceptors

--> each battery has 60-80 Tamir interceptors

= 20 x (3-4) x 10 = 600-800 Iron Dome interceptors deployed across all of Israel at any one time

Relevance for Iranian ballistic missiles?

Iron Dome and David's Sling are not designed to intercept MRBMs so are of limited relevance.

Relevant systems: Arrow-2/3, Patriot PAC-2 and THAAD. Conservative estimates (from Iran's perspective) therefore suggest a total number of 278 ABM interceptors (134 Arrow-2/3 + 48 THAAD + 96 Patriot PAC-2) deployed by Israel to counter Iranian MRBMs.

Assuming Israel fires 2 interceptors per 1 MRBM detected = can attempt to intercept c. 140 MRBMs at once. If we assume no THAAD and 3 PAC-2 batteries instead of 4, this becomes c. 100 MRBMs.

600-700 MRBMs from Iran would mean Israel has to fully reload all such systems 4-6 times over. At that point (in reality, likely well before this point), Israeli ABM capability would likely be seriously degraded with inventories depleted (even accounting for US transfer of additional supplies).

Alternatively or in parallel, swarms of Iranian UAVs (Shahed-136, Shahed-238, Arash) and Fattah-1/2 HGV missiles could attempt to target Israeli radars or launchers, further degrading Israeli ABM capability, creating a positive impact where Iranian MRBMs have greater success.

If anyone has better data or wants to correct some numbers above, or add more information about where these missile batteries are deployed, please add.

Discuss.

@Nuffle @Hack-Hook @RescueRanger @LegionnairE @GWXP @mulj

Should you add the Navy's AA missiles too?

 

[Persian Gulf]

Should you add the Navy's AA missiles too?

Israeli Navy doesn't have anti ballistic missile interceptors

but when I made this thread I did not include the US Navy. didn't think the US would be willing to park such a large number of destroyers on the coast and devote them to ABM missions and use 1/4 of their entire SM-3/6 inventory to defend Israel for 12 days (in addition to sending 2 THAAD batteries to Israel as well)

 

[Foinikas]

Israeli Navy doesn't have anti ballistic missile interceptors

but when I made this thread I did not include the US Navy. didn't think the US would be willing to park such a large number of destroyers on the coast and devote them to ABM missions and use 1/4 of their entire SM-3/6 inventory to defend Israel for 12 days (in addition to sending 2 THAAD batteries to Israel as well)

Ah sorry,you're only talking about AB capabilities