Oil, Gas and Refinery Sectors - updates

Fuel supply fears ease as oil tankers arrive at Port Qasim​


Port Qasim spokesperson says vessel from Fujairah has arrived, three more ships expected in coming days

Web Desk
March 10, 2026


photo file


Fears of a petrol shortage in Pakistan began to subside on Tuesday as oil shipments began arriving at Port Qasim after fuel prices surged amid the ongoing US-Iran conflict in the Middle East.

According to Port Qasim Authority (PQA) spokesperson Asad Altaf Hussain Warsi, the vessel Torm Damini has already discharged about 37,000 metric tonnes of gas oil at Port Qasim over roughly 40 hours and is scheduled to sail tonight.

ā€œThe tanker Nave Atropos, carrying around 50,000 metric tonnes of Mogas (motor gasoline) from Singapore, arrived at Port Qasim on March 9 and is scheduled to berth on March 11. The vessel is expected to complete discharge operations within about 30 hours before sailing on March 12,ā€ he said.
 
Another vessel, Spruce II, carrying approximately 55,000 metric tonnes of Mogas from Sohar, Oman, was expected to arrive at the port today.

ā€œThe ship will berth after Nave Atropos and is expected to sail on March 13 following the completion of discharge operations,ā€ he added.

He said a third tanker, Sea Clipper, carrying around 34,000 metric tonnes of Mogas from Fujairah, was scheduled to arrive on March 11. The vessel will berth after Spruce II and is expected to complete discharge operations within about 30 hours before sailing on March 14.
 
A vessel arriving from Fujairah had already reached the port, while three additional ships carrying petroleum products were expected in the coming days.

He added that one of the incoming vessels was arriving from Oman, while details of the remaining two ships would be shared once confirmed.

Warsi said the PQA was ensuring smooth handling and scheduling of all vessels to maintain uninterrupted port operations and steady fuel supplies.
 
The situation in the Middle East worsened after the United States and Israel attacked Iran, resulting in the killing of its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In retaliation, Iran launched attacks on Gulf states and closed the Strait of Hormuz, triggering a sharp rise in global crude oil prices.

To cope with the situation, the government last Friday increased petrol and diesel prices by Rs55 per litre. The sharp hike has intensified the cost-of-living pressures, with residents reporting higher transport fares and rising prices of daily-use items.
 
Ų­Ś©ŁˆŁ…ŲŖ نے سرکاری آفیسرز کے Ł¾Ł¹Ų±ŁˆŁ„ Ų³ŪŁˆŁ„ŲŖ کو 50 فیصد کم کر دیا ہے ، Ł¾ŁˆŚ†Ś¾Ł†Ų§ تھا کہ unlimited کا 50 فیصد کتنا ہوتا ہے
 
Three ships carrying petrol have arrived in Pakistan while one has already discharged its diesel cargo to replenish the fuel stocks in the country amid global shortages, it emerged on Tuesday.

The berthing for three ships that are yet to discharge their cargoes is scheduled for the coming days this week.

Read more: https://www.dawn.com/news/1980592
 

Ogra notifies massive increase in RLNG price for March

Khaleeq Kiani
March 12, 2026

ISLAMABAD: Less than a week after the government hiked the prices of petroleum products by a whopping Rs55, the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (Ogra) on Thursday notified a massive 19-22 per cent increase in the price of regasified liquified natural gas (RLNG) for sales at the distribution stage by the two Sui gas companies for the month of March.

The increase was mainly because of increase in terminal charges amid lower import molecules and minor increase in import price, the dataset from the authority showed.

The rare increase (19-22pc) in RLNG price for March has come following a minor 0.5pc increase in February and two consecutive monthly reductions in December (6pc) and January (5pc). The prices had cumulatively increased by 4.4pc in October and November.

The Karachi-based Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (SSGCL) serves consumers in Sindh and Balochistan and its system losses at the distribution stage stand at 12.55pc, compared to 10.6pc a couple of months earlier.
 
The basket RLNG price was based on a total of only two cargoes in March against eight cargoes each in February 2026 and March 2025 due to a force majeure declared by Qatar after its gas facilities came under attack and close of the Strait of Hormuz.

Both cargoes were imported under two LNG contracts between PSO and Qatar Gas at an average of about $7.68 per mmBtu (DES price), compared to $7.45 per mmBtu last month, but still significantly lower than $8.9 per mmBtu in March last year.

The DES price was at $7.52 per mmBtu in January, $7.87 per mmBtu in December and $8.15 per mmBtu in November. Of the two, one cargo was procured at $8.72 and another at $6.65 per mmBtu.
 
Pakistan has quietly executed one of the most significant shifts in its energy strategy over the past five years. We should name it for what it is: a success.

Not a partial success. Not a success-in-progress. But a structural achievement that has fundamentally altered the country’s exposure to the two greatest threats to energy security: (1) Strait of Hormuz blockade, and (2) economic coercion via expensive fuel contracts.





The fact that this transformation has gone largely unnoticed in policy circles is itself revealing. Pakistan’s energy system was architected for crisis five years ago. Today, it is architected for resilience. And the mechanism is worth understanding—not because it’s complex, but because it’s instructive.

The Crisis: One-Third of Supply at Risk

In FY 2020-21, Pakistan’s power system rested on a precarious foundation. Consider the arithmetic:



Total imported fuels: 49.5 TWh (one-third of supply). This was not a stable energy base. A thirty-day blockade of the Strait of Hormuz—through which 90% of global seaborne oil and our LNG cargoes flow, would have cost the system 2.87 TWh, enough to trigger cascading load-shedding of greater than eight hours daily and demand destruction.

ā€œThe system was not designed for this risk; it merely accepted it as the cost of energy growth.ā€

The Shift: Five-Year Transformation

By FY 2024-25, the arithmetic has fundamentally changed:




How It Happened: Three Pillars

The transition was not accidental. It resulted from three moving parts that operated in sequence, each enabling the next.

Pillar 1: Nuclear Baseload (Policy-Driven)

K-2 reactor, commissioned May 2021, added 1,145 MW of capacity. Nuclear generation more than doubled: from 10.9 TWh (FY 2020-21) to 22.5 TWh (FY 2023-24, +106%). This was not marginal. A 1,100 MW baseload plant running at 95% capacity factor produces 9 TWh annually—enough to displace 9 TWh of expensive RLNG.

The mechanism is straightforward: RLNG plants can be throttled back without grid instability when nuclear baseload provides the foundation. K-2 was designed precisely for this. The policy worked.
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Pillar 2: Coal Stabilization (Structural Recovery)

This is where the mechanism becomes visible. Pakistan has proven coal reserves of 175 billion tonnes in Thar, Sindh. Yet coal-based generation hovered around 37 TWh for a decade. The issue was not resource availability but dispatch economics.

RLNG was being forced to run (due to take-or-pay contracts with Qatar) even when coal was cheaper:
https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch...624a-31f1-48db-938a-55601e4535a0_1084x352.png
Pakistan was paying a Rs 12/kWh premium to run expensive imported fuel rather than cheaper coal sitting in the ground.
As RLNG volumes contracted (from 35 to 18 TWh), coal regained its position in merit order. By FY 2024-25, coal generation stabilized at 35.8 TWh. This is not growth—it is durability. The structure shifted; coal became the swing fuel.

Pillar 3: Behind-the-Meter Solar (Market-Driven)

And here is where the story becomes fascinating. Between 2022 and 2024, Pakistan imported 24-31 GW of solar modules. Only 4 GW went to utility-scale IPPs. The remaining 20-27 GW went onto factory roofs, agricultural fields, and residential terraces.

By mid-2025, Pakistan had accumulated 14-20 GW of BTM solar capacity, generating an estimated 20 TWh annually—generation that never passes through a DISCO meter, never appears in national statistics, yet is entirely indigenous.

The economic mechanism was simple: DISCO tariffs climbed to 30+ Rs/kWh. Payback periods for rooftop solar fell to 3-4 years. Rational actors—factories, farms, middle-class households—responded by investing in solar and exiting the grid. The decentralized revolution was bottom-up, not policy-driven.
https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch...9d69-40ad-45f7-85d5-aec313b0eb5a_1084x278.png

The Hidden Crisis: Economic Lock-In Broken

Behind the geopolitical story lies a deeper economic one. Pakistan signed two long-term contracts with Qatar backed by take-or-pay sovereign guarantees:



Under take-or-pay clauses, Pakistan was obligated to pay for contracted volumes regardless of actual demand. This created a financial trap: even if demand fell (due to economic recession, solar adoption, or cheaper coal), Pakistan was obligated to pay.

The Cost of Forced Running

Annual excess cost (FY 2022-23):
Rs 9,408 billion (~$32M USD) in forced RLNG premium vs. optimal coal/gas dispatch.

5-year cumulative economic waste: Rs 37–47 trillion ($125–160B USD). This was a hidden tax on consumers passed through tariffs.

Pakistan was also actively suppressing its own domestic gas:



Petroleum Minister Ali Pervaiz Malik stated it explicitly: ā€œDomestic gas producers are unable to sell gas to the power sector because regasified LNG plants are forced to run to absorb contractual supplies.ā€ This is perverse: Pakistan was starving its own domestic gas sector while being forced to buy expensive imported LNG.

By reducing RLNG from 35 to 18 TWh, Pakistan freed up pipeline capacity for domestic gas and allowed coal to reclaim merit order. The economic stranglehold was released.

The Geopolitical Victory

Now, consider the blockade scenario. If the Strait of Hormuz were blocked for 30 days today, Pakistan would lose 1.46 TWh of RLNG generation. The policy response would be straightforward
https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch...8cd6-55a1-464d-9a63-fb080e57d6fc_1084x372.png
This is manageable. Five years ago, the same blockade would have cost 2.87 TWh, a crisis-scale event requiring emergency external intervention. The difference is not marginal; it is the difference between a manageable shock and a systemic crisis.

More interesting still: a Strait blockade today would actually unlock economic potential. The power sector could absorb an additional 4-5 TWh of domestic gas without infrastructure expansion. Imported coal imports (currently minimal at 0.5 TWh) could be halted entirely, shifting to full domestic coal capacity. The system would not break; it would reconfigure toward indigenous resources.

This is the architecture of energy security. It is not built on goodwill or geopolitical alignment; it is built on the structure of the energy system itself.

The Total Picture: 147 TWh Indigenous

When you add grid generation (127.4 TWh) to BTM solar (20 TWh), Pakistan now generates 147.4 TWh of total indigenous power. Only 25 TWh is imported.





Energy independence: 85% (up from 66%). All actual electricity consumption is met by domestic sources: hydropower, nuclear, local coal, wind, solar (utility + BTM), and renewables. Imported fuel dependency has been nearly eliminated except for marginal RLNG/RFO for peak shaving.

The Six Insights You Need

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What Comes Next

Pakistan has (almost) solved the energy security problem. The remaining agenda is operational efficiency, tariff restructuring, and economic reform:

Renegotiate Contracts

At 18 TWh RLNG (vs 35 TWh baseline), Pakistan is now a marginal buyer, not a strategic asset. Leverage exists for 2026 renegotiation.

Formalize BTM Solar

Bring 20 TWh into official accounting. Enable net metering for BTM, and make buyback price market competitive, rather than rigid, and fixed. Dynamic pricing and time-of-use tariffs required to prevent hidden cross-subsidies.

Two-Part Tariff

Move from a variable-pricing based tariff to a tariff that transparently recovers fixed cost, and sells energy at the margin. This changes the way energy economics work in the country

Five years ago, Pakistan’s energy system was architected for crisis. Expensive imported fuels dominated. Blockade risk was existential. Economic lock-in strangled the economy. Demand was being destroyed by tariff spirals.

Today, it is architected for resilience. Indigenous sources dominate. Blockade risk is halved. Economic trap is broken. Demand can be managed through efficiency, not crisis suppression.

The fact that this success has gone largely unnoticed says something about how policy circles think about energy. We celebrate projects. We debate tariffs. We argue over subsidies. But structural transformation, the kind that rewires the entire system, often happens quietly, in the margins, through the accumulated decisions of millions of actors (nuclear plants, coal miners, solar installers, farmers) responding to incentives.

That is what Pakistan has achieved.
 
Also mention people's own efforts.
Nearly 20 Giga watts of Solar panels installed by people with their own money .
With an average daily consumption of 15 Gw in winters ans 30 GW in summers . The solar panels could be independent local power supply of Pakistan, directly benefiting people.
But the government allowed installation of IPP with highest possible power tariffs and guaranteed payment. No such guarantees for people who plugged their solar panels into the grid .

The problem with Pakistani power production is corruption not actual capacity
 
What has circular debt got to do with it ? That's a different issue...

Not really. The entire power sector remains a hostage to the circular debt, regardless of "feel good" statistics that are promoted from time to time.
 

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