Pakistan-Af: Operation Khyber Storm

[Watandar]

kill their every leader (including gangster and thugs) and install ones which support our objectives or at least are not against our objectives.

That's what Project Taliban was ??

 

[Jango]

as it should be only Pakistanis with CNICs should be allowed in Islamabad . have u seen the videos of afghanis in Islamabad waving their flags and asking for missions

So all Pathans are now Afghans?

And even if not, you should be disgusted in yourself.

 

[aurelianpilled]

One thing which I fear is that how easy it is for the enemy to bait us due to our shitty past policies and kartooten. India would surely try to turn the tables on Pakistan by literally teaming up with the IEA and opening costly two-fronts (East/West), it would literally be an uno reverse card played on us similar to the two-front war worry which India has always yapped about regarding Pakistan and China.

And it wouldn't be the first time we have fallen into a bait like this, if this air bombing escalates though, since we have been doing such things for decades. Clear-cut example? 1971, India exhausted us after we launched Operation Searchlight, poked/provoked us heavily from August to November to go for the bait and we literally went after the f*cking bait by launching Operation Chengiz Khan (air offensive, land offensive of Op Chegiz Khan was never even launched due to the incompetent military leadership delays).

 

[Hakikat ve Hikmet]

Hezbollah exists, Hamas exists, and again, Pakistan can’t use the same approach as Israel of bombing without concern for civilian casualties. The Israelis have also essentially walled off their territory (easier to do with their geography and size), which is not feasible for Pakistan.

This is not a conventional war, its COIN, and while attacks such as these help, its not going to end the TTP or Baloch insurgencies without sustained, non-kinetic measures.

Again, since people seem to have trouble understanding what we mean when we caution about the future - not arguing against the strikes, merely pointing out that kinetic strikes alone aren’t enough in the long term.

Keeping the Ram Rajya of Bharat's primary offensive forces - the Last Afgans, TTP, BLA etc. - to a manageable level is right now the primary objective IMO. Let $ bills for Bharat grow exponentially as she needs to keep on replenishing the written off assets...

 

[RescueRanger]

So drop it another 200-250 km west to kabul and than we wont have that problem

Kya logic hain apka sir.

 

[ARMalik]

Did you even read and properly comprehend the post you are replying to?

No one is against the return of undocumented migrants/refugees. But people born here and stuck in legal limbo are being shafted off as well.

If your strategy is to racially profile people in Islamabad and pick up anyone who looks like pathan, then you need to revisit an ethics class.

Islamabad was literally made into a free racism against Pathans zone for months by the police and interior ministry, it was shameful.

Pakistan does not have birthright citizenship law - never had one. So please stop making Laws on the go. Born here or not, the State needs to make a decison to deport them ot not.
Thank you.

 

[hasssanali8998]

So all Pathans are now Afghans?

no i clearly stated only Pakistanis should be allowed that includes our Pashtun

 

[Watandar]

Pakistan does not have birthright citizenship law - never had one. So please stop making Laws on the go. Born here or not, the State needs to make a decison to deport them ot not.
Thank you.

Pakistan has unrestricted birthright citizenship. Anyone born in Pakistan is automatically a citizen. Look up Pakistan Citizenship Act 1951. Thank you.

 

[Jango]

Pakistan does not have birthright citizenship law - never had one. So please stop making Laws on the go. Born here or not, the State needs to make a decison to deport them ot not.
Thank you.

THE PAKISTAN CITIZENSHIP ACT, 1951, Section IV, read it up.

There is an IHC case as well from a few years back.

So please stop making statements on the go. Thank you

 

[Saifullah]

Eventually you have to address the political issues causing these. Military operations are exact reason TTP was born. Yes state has to strike back but before 2006 there was no TTP. The way military entered in 2003 and three years of operation gave birth to TTP. Now the solution is not simple. It has to be multi layered strategy.

Before 2006 or 2003 those same guys were still fighting. They were busy fighting in Afghanistan or among themselves. Those areas were always turbulent.
The solution is multi layered. But how do you execute that solution when the area is still in a state of war?

Step 1 of that multi layered solution now is war. Step 2 is good governance and administration in liberated areas. Step 3 is following through with strategies to hold liberated areas with development, jobs, and education. Step 4 is peace.
You can’t get to step 4 without step 1.

Why has none of the military operations Pakistan did have any lasting results? Because none of them made it past step 1. You did military operations but followed it up with installing horrible administrators and let feudals keep power. The “development” was mostly paying bribes and filling pockets. The education was none existent and where it existed there was no jobs for the educated. If that wasn’t enough, the state gave space to anti Pakistan groups to spread their disease among the youth and brainwash them. The universities built for educating became breeding grounds for different anti state ideologies. All this ignored for years leading up to the mess we face now.

Pakistan is back at step 1 now. War is always brutal and dirty. Because of the nature of threats Pakistan faces, just a simple conventional war or operations won’t be enough. Now Pakistan is facing insurgencies in its country and an Afghanistan that can concentrate 100% of its resources against Pakistan, supported by India. Divide and conquer is now needed to break this axis of evil so Pakistan can do operations like Zarb e Azb and achieve Zarb e Azb results.

 

[hasssanali8998]

THE PAKISTAN CITIZENSHIP ACT, 1951, Section IV, read it up.

There is an IHC case as well from a few years back.

So please stop making statements on the go. Thank you

yes we know it has already been discussed here in detail and it needs to go away

 

[M. Sarmad]

@Agnostic Muslim

You, sire, are offering poetry to the tone-deaf.... a noble folly, perhaps...

 

[Jango]

yes we know it has already been discussed here in detail and it needs to go away

You'd fit right in with the some right wing racist organization. Maybe start one if not already!

 

[Mighty_Dragon_Strike]

That's what Project Taliban was ??

I dont understand your question, it is not straightforward

on the basis of half cooked question, i can say:
every country has a cult or a gang, which it supports overtly or covertly
Problem may lie within you, when you start you think, every thing should be black and white!

 

[Owaiz]

Okay lets look at some ground realities that people are ignoring here:

Since mid-2024–2025 Afghanistan remains a major source of illicit opiates and other contraband; trans-border smuggling routes through Pakistan (Khyber, Balochistan/Makran, and Sindh coast) continue to be exploited by criminal networks and sometimes taxed/leveraged by local armed actors.

[Source: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR_2025/WDR25_B1_Key_findings.pdf?]

Cross-border militant violence has increased in 2025 with high-profile ambushes and clashes in frontier areas, highlighting an upsurge in capability and activity by groups such as TTP and other insurgents operating along/from Afghan border areas. Islamabad has publicly blamed sanctuaries across the border; Kabul faces international pressure to act.

[Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-...ved-attack-that-killed-11-soldiers-2025-10-10]

The drug economy remains a major enabler — rising opium/heroin prices and high profits create powerful incentives for smuggling and corruption that indirectly sustain militant logistics. UNODC and other agencies note sharply elevated prices and continued flows.

[Source: https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_Drug_Insights_V4.pdf]

Current Picture - factual anchors:

Recent violence: Pakistani forces reported operations after an ambush that killed soldiers in early October 2025; security operations and cross-border rhetoric have intensified. [Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-...ed-attack-that-killed-11-soldiers-2025-10-10/]

Narcotics context: UNODC’s 2025 reporting documents continued dominance of Afghan opiates in regional trafficking, with higher prices increasing smuggling incentives; Pakistan remains a major transit route. [Source: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR_2025/WDR25_B1_Key_findings.pdf]

Insurgent landscape: TTP has re-emerged as a major national security threat inside Pakistan, while ISIS-K and various local networks remain active in the border region—multiplicity of actors complicates attribution of attacks and links to smuggling networks. [Source: https://acleddata.com/report/battle-borderlands-tehreek-i-taliban-pakistan-challenges-states-control]

Key drivers:
Economic incentives from illicit economies — record/high opium and heroin prices create financial rewards for smugglers and intermediaries; proceeds can be taxed/used by armed groups. [Source: https://unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2025/unisnar1495.htm]

Security vacuums and sanctuary dynamics — porous border areas, uneven control, and local alliances enable militant groups to regroup and operate across the frontier. Recent spikes in attacks indicate these sanctuaries are being exploited.[Source:https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-...ved-attack-that-killed-11-soldiers-2025-10-10]

Organizational overlap — criminal smuggling networks, patronage networks, and some militant groups have transactional relationships (safe passage, finance, logistics). This blurs lines between pure “criminal” and “terrorist” flows. [Source:https://www.state.gov/wp-content/up...otics-Control-Strategy-Volume-1-Accessible.pd]

Regional geopolitics — shifting diplomatic relations (e.g., greater external engagement with Kabul) and interstate tensions affect cooperation on border control and counterterrorism.[Source: https://apnews.com/article/india-afghanistan-taliban-muttaqi-899bac27dee2422e88a54372bdd9efaa]

Timeline and Evidence:
View attachment 152866
View attachment 152867
View attachment 152868

Heat Mapping:
View attachment 152870
Historic Trend analysis:

View attachment 152864
Analysis:
Although terrorist attacks were recorded in all four provinces and the federal capital
in 2024, over 95% of them were concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and
Balochistan.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa recorded the highest number of terrorist incidents in the country in 2024, with 295 attacks that also included five sectarian-related attacks. These attacks claimed 509 lives and left 517 others injured.

Compared to the previous year, the number of terrorist incidents in the province increased by 69%, while fatalities rose by 21%. This indicates that militants not only escalated the frequency of their attacks but also carried out more intense and high-impact attacks during the year under review.

Most of the terrorist activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was concentrated in six southern
districts—North and South Waziristan, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, and Dera Ismail
Khan—which collectively accounted for 171 attacks, or 58% of the total incidents in
the province.

Other significant hotspots included Bajaur, with 34 attacks largely attributed to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K), and the provincial capital, along with the neighbouring Khyber district, which together witnessed 36 attacks.

Overall, terrorist activity was reported in 22 districts across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in
2024. Security and law enforcement personnel, particularly from the army and police,
were the primary targets, accounting for over 68% of the total reported attacks in the
province.

Cross referencing the above attacks with most likely smuggling routes based on data provided by UNODC:
View attachment 152865

The above schematic is very important to provide a quick snapshot of the main transit and interdictions routes from cross-border smuggling routes - it is also the main route for movement of terrorists into Pakistan.

Borders are managed by "two nations" - Afghanistan as a state has the responsibility to manage her side of the border, a task her "government" has failed at multiple times as the officials inside Kabul do not recognise the Durand line nor the Pakistan/Afghanistan border.

Based on demands by Islamabad they are two main models to be examined here in examining any conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan:

• Scenario A: Strong Afghan action against TTP
• Scenario B: Afghanistan maintains the status quo

What would Scenario A look like: Afghan authorities move from public denials/limited measures to sustained, visible counter-TTP operations — arrests of senior TTP figures, disruption of logistics and training grounds, plus joint security steps or intelligence-sharing with Pakistan.
Likelihood based on Analysis from Brookings: Low-Moderate (Source: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-talibans-three-years-in-power-and-what-lies-ahead)


What would Scenario B look like: continued Afghan denials, limited or symbolic actions, constrained enforcement in border areas, and TTP continues to operate with some sanctuary/access to Afghan territory.
Likelihood based on historic monitoring and reporting: Moderate-High - Reasoning: current reporting and repeated cycles of accusation/limited cooperation point to this being the baseline trajectory. (Source Cited: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024...ns-ties-with-the-afghan-taliban-turned-frigid)

Second-order effects & risks:
Escalation: Pakistan may increase unilateral military actions (air or cross-border strikes), raising the risk of a sustained cross-border confrontation. (Source: https://warontherocks.com/2025/03/decoding-pakistans-2024-airstrikes-in-afghanistan)

Regional consequences: Increased instability may draw in China (protecting projects/ nationals), or see international pressure on Afghanistan; refugee flows or cross-border displacement could rise. (Source: https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R45122)

TTP consolidation: Continued safe haven enables TTP to recruit, plan larger attacks, and potentially coordinate with other militant groups, raising the long-term threat level. (Source: https://acleddata.com/report/battle-borderlands-tehreek-i-taliban-pakistan-challenges-states-control)

Escalation Trigger timeline:
0–3 months: Status quo continues; occasional big attacks in Pakistan draw loud diplomatic protests. Islamabad signals readiness for action; Kabul issues denials. (Baseline seen repeatedly through 2024–2025 reporting).
3–9 months: If external pressure + incentives rise (or a political decision in Kabul), limited cooperation or targeted Afghan actions may appear (Scenario A partial realization). Otherwise, continued tit-for-tat (Scenario B).
9–18 months: Path diverges: successful Afghan sustained action could reduce attacks and open security channels; failure or persistence of status quo increases risk of sustained Pakistani unilateral measures and regional friction.
^ We are here!

Key triggers for widening escalation:
1. A major inside-Pakistan attack with high civilian or foreign national casualties — raises pressure for drastic action.
2. A sudden policy pivot within the Taliban leadership
^ We are here!

TLDR: The status quo within Afghanistan is unsustainable for Pakistan from a security perspective.

I don't disagree with that, but to go from a situation where the Afghan Taliban was considered the good Taliban and Faiz Hamid visited Kabul as a Fateh to Pakistan having to carry out airstrikes on Kabul (if confirmed) is a failure of statecraft, not some stroke of strategic genius. One should learn from mistakes, not celebrate then as success.