Pakistan Air Force | News & Discussions

[Fatman17]

highly acclaimed J-10C Vigorous Dragon patch

Another PAF J-10C patch signifying two roles

The JF-17C Block 3s were armed with the PL-10 and PL-15s, which was not publicly acknowledged until just before India attacked Pakistan. They never shot down an Indian Air Force jet during Pakistan’s Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos, probably because the jet’s KLJ-7A radar does not match the range of the J-10C’s KLJ-10
PAF
Rafale kills

The author, understandably, wanted to know how the PAF could identify the downed aircraft, as many of the Indian public will not believe it. As a retired officer explained: “In this BVR war, it’s very difficult to show the wreckage of the jet you have shot down, because they fell in Indian territory. Although there were many images appearing on social media, our foe will never admit it, so what we do is judge the ‘kill’ with different parameters as most air forces do.

“Our Identification (ID) Matrix is a structured process that ensures accuracy, accountability, and verification in air combat operations. It begins with the detection of an aircraft radar, followed by its positive identification within the Comprehensive Complete Air Picture (CCAP) at the command centre, where every Indian aircraft is clearly tagged and tracked. “Once detection is confirmed, the next step involves assessing the lock parameters of the missile system, which can only engage a target within specific speed, range and angular limits. After securing a lock on the target, the missile is launched, and its progress is monitored through radar tracking. If the target’s radar signature disappears from the CCAP screen, it is registered as a ‘probable kill’.

A close-up of an Indian Air Force Rafale kill on the side of a J-10C in mid-July
PAF

No 29 Squadron is the PAF’s Aggressor squadron, that commenced flying operations on January 23, 2019, just before Op Swift Retort took place on February 27, 2019. It is an integral part of the ACE facility, playing Red Air during exercises like Saffron Bandit and Indus Viper. The J-10C pilots have also trained as Aggressors and will undoubtedly be a big attraction for foreign air forces attending Indus Viper next year
“However, the process does not end there, upon returning to base, the pilot undergoes a thorough debrief in which the mission video recording is reviewed to validate that the missile engagement met all required parameters – direction, speed, lock range and envelope. This Multilayered ID Matrix not only guarantees the precision of engagements but also ensures transparency and post-mission verification, making it a cornerstone of the PAF’s credibility in confirming air-to-air victories. Once these steps had been processed, the PAF tried to confirm the ‘kills’ by OSINT/ HUMINT.”

None of the above could be done without the seamless integration of radar inputs from multiple field radars and sector headquarters to create the CCAP at Command HQ. This process by the PAF ensures that data from geographically dispersed radars is fused into one unified, real-time operational display. Instead of each radar working in isolation, their coverage areas are digitally overlapped and synchronised, eliminating gaps and blind spots. The PAF achieves 360° surveillance of national airspace, enabling commanders to track, identify, and prioritise aerial threats with precision. It enhances situational awareness by filtering and corelating radar feeds, thereby reducing the duplication or misinterpretation of targets. As the senior officer told the author: “[Radar] Knitting symbolises the transition from localised radar control to network-centric defence system, empowering the PAF to maintain air superiority through unified awareness, co-ordinated response, and robust command and control.”

The PAF provided the Rafale tail numbers, BS001, BS021, BS022 and BS027 to allow Dassault an opportunity to clarify if the aircraft was still current. Much of the Indian population and news channels still refuse to believe the Rafales were shot down, but while the IAF refutes these allegations, they have yet to provide post-May 7 images of the four jets with the serial numbers and close ups of their manufacturers’ serial number.

Dassault has remained tight-lipped, although it did quite unusually put out a press release denying that its CEO Eric Trappier had said “no Rafales were shot down” after this was circulating on social media.

Sources told the author: “We have video recordings of the downed aircraft and battle damage assessment imagery which we intend to release at the time of our own choosing and when we deem it appropriate which will cause further embarrassment to the IAF.”

Indian acknowledgement

The Indian Chief of Defence Staff, General Anil Chauhan, admitted to Bloomberg Television on May 31, that IAF jets had been shot down that night. He denied Pakistan’s tally of six but declined to specify the exact number. “What is important is not the jet being [shot] down, but why they were downed,” Chauhan said. “Numbers are not important.”

Op Swift Retort

During Operation Swift Retort, an IAF MiG-21UPG Bison (serial no CU-2328) was shot down by a PAF F-16A piloted by Wg Cdr Nouman Ali Khan over Balakot on February 27, 2019.

The IAF Chief of the Air Staff at the time, ACM Birender Singh Dhanoa, claimed the MiG-21 pilot, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman who was captured by Pakistan, had shot down a PAF F-16C with one of its R-77 Adder or R-73 Archer missiles, before it crashed.

This was simply untrue, as I had the opportunity to visit the MiG-21 wreckage sometime later, and the four missiles were all damaged but still intact. The US government also denied a F-16 had been lost.

The PAF also claimed a Su-30MKI Flanker was shot down that night, and while they did not have any verifiable wreckage, the AIM-120C missile that was fired by F-16B pilot, Wg Cdr Hassan Siddiqui, according to the PAF met all the parameters of a kill. The jet was later seen at an Anatolian Eagle exercise at Konya, Turkey sporting an Indian kill.

An IAF SPYDER (Surface-to-air Python and Derby) surface-to-air missile battery shot down a IAF Mi-17 helicopter in a friendly fire incident the same day, an incident that the IAF initially put down to ‘a crash during to routine ops’. Seven months later, the IAF backtracked and confirmed it was indeed shot down by a SPYDER based at Srinagar Air Force Station ten minutes after it left the base. In 2023 the Chief Operations Officer (COO) of Srinagar AFS at that time, was dismissed from the IAF.
He admitted tactical mistakes were made during the conflict, although he observed that the Indian military did carry out long-range precision strikes on targeted installations. Chauhan finished: “The good part is that we are able to understand the tactical mistakes, remedy them, and implement them again.” His admission was overshadowed by a bolder statement from a political heavyweight in India, Subramanian Swamy, who acknowledged the loss of at least five Indian aircraft during the clash. On August 9, Indian Air Force commander Marshal Amar Preet Singh, who has been in office since September 2024, prompted ripples of disbelief while addressing an Air Force Association gathering in Bangalore by saying: “We shot down five PAF fighters and an AEW&C Erieye with our S-400 SAMs at a range of 300 kilometres.”

The Saab 2000 Erieye was the unsung hero of Op Bunyan-un-Marsoos, supporting the situational requirements of the fighter packages
Coming three months after the battle had concluded, it not only contradicted the earlier admission by his superior, General Chauhan, but also lacked any supporting evidence.

It appeared to be a desperate attempt to placate Prime Minister Modi, whose government has been under mounting pressure to mask the scale of the IAF’s losses. The stark contradiction between India’s top military leaders underscores the turbulence within its defence establishment.

Training to fight Rafale

The IAF had bought 36 Dassault Rafales in 2016, along with MBDA Meteor BVRAAMs, MBDA Scalp EG/Storm Shadow cruise missiles and Safran AASM Hammer glide bombs. The author sensed during subsequent visits to the PAF, that it was a concern for the leadership. Undeterred, they set about training to fight the Rafale and the European BVRAAM. In 2020, the PAF ordered both the long-range PL-15 and short-range PL-10 missiles which could be a game changer against the Meteor.

The PAF’s new tactics development school went into overdrive, employing the PAC/ Chengdu JF-17 and Lockheed Martin F-16s against Rafales in simulations. Every possible avenue was exploited to understand the weaknesses of the French jet.

Asked if the air forces of Qatar or Egypt had helped with this? ACM Sidhu said: “No. Because neither side fly the Rafale in the same tactical manner as India does.”

This Operation Swift Retort memorial at Mushaf, heralds the work of the based aggressors which claimed the shoot down of a Su-30MKIFlankerand highly publicised MiG-21 Bison
In the 1990s, before the PAF took delivery of the AIM-120 AMRAAM, it concentrated on within visual range (WVR) tactics, and according to the RAF and USAF pilots the author had talked to after exercises with them, they were very good at it. But it was different now.

 

[Fatman17]

Multi domain warfare

When ACM Sidhu became PAF Chief of the Air Staff on March 19, 2021, he ushered in some very big changes, realising the importance of different challenges of Air Power, and wanted to confront them through indigenous efforts. On the operational side, he invested time and resources into new domains like cyber, electronic warfare and space, as well as ground-based air defences and unmanned aerial vehicles. He would then integrate them with the operational fighters in what he refers to as ‘multi domain warfare’.

In June 2021, just three months after taking office, ACM Sidhu ordered 20, now much-prized Chengdu J-10Cs from China. They would be armed with the very long-range PL-15 and shorter-range PL-10 air-to-air missiles. The first six J-10Cs arrived on March 4, 2022. A multi-domain operations centre (MDOC) and a National ISR Air Ops Centre (NIIAOC) were two of many new departments the Commander created, where along with his staff and personnel, he could watch all these new assets interlinked while controlling the PAF’s every move.

At the same time, the Airpower Combat Employment (ACE) facility at PAF Base Mushaf, created in 2016, was upgraded considerably into one of the best tactical training ranges in the world. In 2023 it was relabelled the Aerospace Power Centre of Excellence (ACE). ACE is where PAF pilots and GCIs can test their capabilities and skills against each other and with international allies during Indus Shield exercises. Two have taken place to date, in 2023 and 2024. During the latter, 24 nations, including observers, participated with Royal Saudi Air Force Tornados, Turkish Air Force F-16C/Ds and Egypt F-16Cs present. A senior officer told me: “We embraced fifth-dimensional warfare, with a highly effective cyber force that we built with support from the National Aerospace Science Technology Park [NASTP]. The aim is to support PAF ops, both kinetic and non-kinetic effects. We practice everything at ACE.”

NASTP is an interesting development, a bold leap into the future that wasn’t even an idea when the author last visited in 2020, where academia, industry and the government are linked together through an impressive ecosystem. It isn’t just a technology park for innovation; it has been created to pursue the Air Chief’s vision of a launchpad for strategic autonomy.

A close-up of the 29 Squadron memorial, giving all the names of the pilots on the unit during Op Swift Retort. The OC, Wg Cdr Nouman Ali Khan, shot down the IAF MiG-21 Bison with an AIM-120 AMRAAM ‘Slammer’ while flying a 11 Squadron jet
The level of intelligence being gleaned from India through different domains, as the author observed at the NIIAOC, is quite unbelievable. The author was allowed exclusive access to the facility, where even the most senior officers are often not allowed to visit.

Every Indian base could be monitored, every aircraft from the moment of lift-off in Western Command was tracked. There are Pakistani eyes everywhere. During my time with the PAF it was obvious there was nothing the PAF didn’t know about the IAF.

From the start of the contingency op and as the tension with India escalated, the PAF Commander made the command centre his home, snatching sleep whenever possible on a mattress in a side room. He said he felt it was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity and he didn’t want to miss anything. Alongside him in the command centre were the heads of all the new integrated domains, EW, Cyber and Space; there were air defence controllers, along with the head of the main kinetic force – the fighters in the air. He consulted with them, before making decisions in what the PAF calls ‘centralised control and decentralised execution’.

Several officers who worked with the CAS, told the author how the ‘boss’, as they refer to him, took the lead on everything, even telling the J-10C pilots when and where to fire.

The 29 Squadron Aggressors’ patch
Indian strikes then a response

According to the IAF, retaliatory strikes took place at 11 different military air bases, on May 10. The bases included PAF Base Nur Khan near Rawalpindi, which was, according to the PAF, struck by Spice 2000 PGMs released by Mirage 2000s. It missed the HQ-9 missile battery at the facility.

Rafiqui was also struck, as was a hangar at PAF Base Murid, the home to four squadrons of UAVs, and the runway at Rahim Yar airfield that the IAF says plays a strategic role in Pakistan’s air defences, but is a civil airport used by the UAE Royal family for hunting trips.

PAF Base Bholari was subjected to an attack on one of its hangars, that claimed the lives of five PAF personnel and damaged a Saab 2000 Erieye that the PAF says has been repaired. The runway at PAF Base Mushaf was struck but was made operational again within a few hours.

A 16 Squadron JF-17C Thunder Block 3 taxies back to the unit’s shelter area at Kamra-Minhas. The Black Panthers played a major part in the air defence of Pakistan on May 6/7
PAF
“They were sitting ducks -they didn’t stand a chance when our J-10Cs unleashed those PL-15s.”

In retaliation to the IAF offensive and loss of civilian lives, the PAF sent indigenous killer drones assembled by the NASTP into India flying over the bases at Adampur, Agra, Bhantral, Bhatwala, Bhuj, Gujrat, Srinagar and even the capital, Delhi, where they flew orbits overhead, packed with 20kg explosives. The drones with PAF’s homegrown front and back-end technologies were not met with any resistance because the IAF’s air defences had been blocked, and as a result the IAF was practically grounded.

Over the next few hours on May 10 the PAF hit 34 targets on different bases, half were by fighters, the rest were struck by the killer drones. While the PAF was initially aggressive, everything became measured, and more could have been taken out, according to a PAF senior officer, who told me they even had a lock on a A-50 AWACS lining up at Agra, but the attack was stopped, according to the PAF, so the IAF could save face.

For seven days, after the strikes ended, only one aircraft flew from Western Command and that was a Rafale that dropped a Scalp EG/ Storm Shadow cruise missile, working with an A-50 AWACS.

SEAD

One of the biggest threats to the PAF, alongside the Rafale, is the mobile S-400 air defence system. They needed them to be destroyed, because they are extremely dangerous. So much so, the PAF was monitoring their every move in Western Command – at Adampur, Bhuj and Bikaner. The S-400 is a long-range Russian mobile surface-to-air missile (SAM) system - the SA-21 Growler - designed to destroy a wide range of aerial threats, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft and drones. It is considered one of the most advanced SAMs in the world, capable of engaging multiple targets simultaneously. Most NATO fighter forces train to counter the S-400 and will be very interested in how the PAF fared. The system has a range of up to 400km (250 miles), engage targets up to 100,000ft (30km) and track up to 300 targets, engaging 36 of them simultaneously. It is deadly.

The PAF was not keen to share the S-400’s MAR (the distance from which the SAM can hit its target). Needless to say, the JF-17s needed to get close to the range of the S-400 to fire its two long-range supersonic Chinese-made CM-400AKG missiles.

In the early morning of May 10, a JF-17C Thunder Block 3 of 14 Sqn ‘Tail Choppers’ departed Rafiqui on a deadly Destruction of Enemy Air Defence (DEAD) mission, to destroy the S-400 system deployed to Adampur. As the JF-17 headed towards the target, the S-400’s radars were being saturated by a substantial amount of jamming and other electronic warfare methods. At the same time, the JF-17 was spitting out decoys coupled with evasive manoeuvres.

As it got inside the S-400’s firing range, the pilot was ordered to fire his CM400AKGs. He flew well inside the Rafale’s Meteor’s MAR but thankfully for the pilot, there was no resistance. According to the PAF, the CM-400AKGs scored a direct hit on the ‘Cheese Board’ low altitude tracker and ‘Big Bird’ early warning and broad surveillance radars, and as a result put the S-400 missile launchers out of action. Three days later, the Indian PM, Narendra Modi, visited Adampur AFS, where he posed for a photo in front of a S-400 missile system to show that it was still operational. But as the PAF Commander said: “They didn’t show him with the radar systems – without them it is useless.” The CM-400AKG is China’s long-range air-launched air-to-ground weapon, powered by a solid-fuel rocket that can reach supersonic speeds of Mach 5. It is passive, so doesn’t need to be guided onto the target by radar. The range of the S-400 missiles (up to 400km) is the same as the JF-17’s CM-400AKG. As the senior officer told me: “To get inside the range of an S-400 radar and come back alive is quite an achievement because you are giving the missile a chance to shoot you down. You must employ your game plan and the maximum range you can go. We employ scenarios through ACE and Combat Commanders School (CCS), flying them regularly again and again as we do on the squadrons.” So, what happened was no different than what the PAF had trained for. Similarly, the PAF gave a crippling blow to the IAF by destroying the IACCS at Barnala.

Cobras

No 15 ‘Cobras’ Squadron and its J-10Cs played a massive part in defeating India’s ambitions on May 7. It is testimony to the way they train, that the pilots who went into battle only had between 100 and 120 hours on the Chinese jet. During the three years in service, they had spent much of their time devoted to air-to-air combat training in the likes of 2v2, 4v4, 8x8, 10v8 scenarios.

The current office commanding (OC), who for security reasons did not want to be identified, said: “In a relatively short span of three to four years, the PAF has inducted a new generation aircraft. While the Chinese have operated the J-10 for two decades, they haven’t employed it the way we have and that’s because of the PAF’s training. The best pilots were recruited from the F-16 Viper and JF-17 Thunder forces and transferred to the J-10.

The IAF received their Rafales years before the PAF received its J-10s (the first five were delivered in July 2020) and they had more (36) too.

Incredibly, the six pilots who went to Chengdu in China to train on the J-10C, flew just two to three hours before ferrying six jets back to Kamra-Minhas in March 2022.

The PAF needed them quickly because of the rising Rafale threat, and within nine months they were operational. Much of that time was spent mastering the tactical sensors, working in all the different spectrums, including air-to-air refuelling. It took the PAF just eight months to get the jets to Pakistan after the contract was signed. Compare that to the Rafale in India, and the five to six years it took from contract signature to being operational.

The J-10C’s KLJ-10 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar improves detection and targeting in environments that pose a longer range over the F-16C Block 52’s older mechanically scanned AN/APG-68 radar system, allowing the J-10C to engage targets from a much greater distance. PAF J-10Cs reached fully operational capability by early 2023 and were involved in a national level exercise the same year. The threats that PAF can simulate in J-10Cs are unlike anywhere else in the world. The PAF’s ‘Radar Knitting’ and ‘ID Matrix’ processes were extremely good during the air battle, while the rules of engagement were very clear, something that the IAF lacked in the conflict.

The 15 Sqn OC continued: “The CAS has brought ACE on a lot since 2016, back then it was more Air Power, than Aerospace and was more rudimentary for the pilots and fighter controllers. Now it includes air battle management and GBADs [ground-based air defences] and there is an operational interface with the Joint Strike Simulation Centre at ACE.” The author visited the ACE’s Joint Services command and Staff College (JSSC) where students develop game plans, with air defence assets like GBADs alongside radars, electro-optical sensors and passive sensors enabling recognised air pictures. They then run it, to see how it works before they flew the mission. In the first international Indus Shield exercise at ACE in 2023, 14 countries attended and on the second in 2024 there were 24. A former Turkish Air Force F-35 pilot, now an F-16 Sqn Commander, told the OC 15 Sqn: “Indus Shield is similar to the USAF’s Red Flag and in some domains better. vThe PAF is now working in a multi domain warfare and while very aggressive, they are disciplined.”

Pakistan and India have already fought each other in two wars, since Pakistan gained independence in 1947. There have also been two major skirmishes between the PAF and IAF – Kargil in 1999 and Swift Retort in 2019, but this latest confrontation, that saw the biggest BVR air war ever witnessed anywhere in the world, is a sign that nothing will change anytime soon. With tension running high between the two nations, things could even get worse…


The author, Alan Warnes
About the author

I have visited the Pakistan Air Force over 20 times, since first going to Pakistan in May 2001. I had not visited since 2020, due to family reasons and because the PAF was going through huge modernisation. This year, facilitated by the support of veterans and senior officers, I re-established my association with the PAF and had the privilege of visiting various facilities in July.

From being primarily fighter-centric when I last visited, the PAF has now emerged as a full-spectrum, multi-domain force operating seamlessly across space, cyber, artificial intelligence, drone warfare and integrated kinetic air power. As a result, the PAF I have observed now stands as a contemporary, forward-looking air force that is ready to meet the challenges of modern warfare head-on.

Two JF-17C Thunder Block 3 of 8 Squadron ‘Haiders’ attended the Royal International Air Tattoo in July, and surrounded the specially marked jet with all the weapons in its inventory. This included the PL-15 and PL-10, as well as the large CM-400AKG seen here on the right
Ben Stanley Hall
“We targeted the Rafales, because the IAF had always said they would make ‘the difference’.”

A JF-17C Block 3 Thunder of 16 Squadron spits out flares

​

 

[Tariq Habib Afridi]

Understanding the Rafale kills​

1. Aviation Features
2. Understanding the Rafale kills

16th September 2025
Feature



**World Exclusive**World Exclusive**World Exclusive**

Alan Warnes gained rare and exclusive access to the Pakistan Air Force in mid-July, to understand how it managed to shoot down six Indian Air Force fighters on the night of May 6/7

With vapour streaming from its wing tips, this camouflaged Chengdu J-10C looks every inch the deadly fighter it was on May 6/7
All images Alan Warnes unless stated

PAF Commander, ACM Zaher Ahmed Baber Sidhu has revolutionised the PAF over the past four years.
PAF
“We ambushed them,” a high-ranking PAF officer told me in mid-July. “We trapped them in our kill chain and created chaos.”

That’s how the PAF claims it shot down six Indian Air Force (IAF) fighters in the early hours of May 7, when the biggest beyond visual range (BVR) air battle was contested on Pakistan’s border with India.

The IAF had launched Operation Sindoor (Sindoor being an orange/red powder worn by Hindu women). The PAF retaliated with a counter-operation, Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos, (an Arabic phrase meaning a solid structure, derived from the Quran.)

More than 114 fighters were involved - 72 IAF and 42 from the PAF - most believed to be fitted with BVR missiles developed by the French, Israelis, Russians and Chinese. The senior officer said: “Fifty-two minutes after the air war had started, the fight was over, we won and they headed home.

“We could have shot down more Rafales than we did, but we held back. An escalation could have led to all-out war between two nuclear nations. During Op Bunyan-un-Marsoos we targeted the Rafales and the S-400s [Russian air defence system] and it worked out well!”

Very interesting point here.. especially the above bold one? it seems from the above that even on 10 may we may have shot some more rafale? especially the 4th one?

 

[Fatman17]

The S-400 quandary​

1. Aviation Features
2. The S-400 quandary

15th September 2025
Feature



Mike Mihajlovic considers the claims by both Pakistan and India related to the Indian Air Force’s S-400 ground-based air defence systems

The S-400 Triumf (NATO name SA-21 Growler) formerly the S-300PMU-3, is a mobile long-range surface to air missile system. It’s one of the most capable in the world and feared by most air forces that have to confront it
Images via author, unless stated
India began inducting the S-400 Triumf system in late 2021, marking a significant enhancement of its long-range AD capabilities. Within a year, several regiments were deployed along the western front, with the first unit widely reported to be positioned in Punjab to monitor and secure airspace along the western border. By 2022–2023, additional units were operational, extending coverage to other strategically important sectors. The deployment was a clear signal of India’s intent to strengthen its aerial deterrence posture, particularly against high-performance aircraft and long-range strike assets in neighbouring states.

The JF-17 officially entered service with the Pakistan Air Force in 2010. Initial production runs were completed in China, but as the program matured, manufacturing increasingly shifted to the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) at Kamra, enabling domestic upgrades and greater autonomy over the fleet’s configuration. Among the most notable additions to the JF-17’s arsenal was the CM-400AKG, a Chinese-made high-speed air-to-surface missile. Open-source evidence indicates that Pakistan likely acquired the CM-400AKG in the early 2010s, with integration and trials on the JF-17 beginning around 2012–2013. Since then, the CM-400AKG has been a central component of Pakistan’s long-range strike capability. Its inclusion in the JF-17’s armament portfolio expanded the PAF’s ability to threaten heavily defended targets, both maritime and land-based, from standoff distances.

S-400

India’s acquisition of the S-400 system represents a profound enhancement to its AD architecture, one that blends advanced radar capabilities, frequency agility, and networked resilience. At the heart of the system lies a suite of radar sensors: the 91N6E Big Bird for early warning and broad surveillance (over 300-600km), the 92N6E Grave Stone fire-control radar for engagement, the 96L6E Cheese Board low-altitude tracker, and optionally stealth-target detectors such as Nebo-M. These radars collectively create a layered detection envelope, enabling India to detect and begin tracking Pakistani aircraft from long ranges, irrespective of flight altitude or intent to evade.

The S-400 exists in two principal forms: the domestic configuration used by the Russian Aerospace Forces and the export configuration, which is designated by the addition of the suffix ‘E’ to component nomenclature, as in 91N6E for the acquisition radar or 92N6E for the engagement radar. While the export system retains the overall architecture, general capabilities, and versatility of the original design, it incorporates a series of deliberate modifications intended to protect sensitive Russian technology, maintain a strategic advantage over foreign operators, and comply with both national and international arms control regimes.

The four mobile systems that make up the complete S-400 system. From left to right, the 55K6E Command post vehicle, 92N6E target acquisition radar, 91N6E surveillance radar and 5P85SE2/sP85TE2 missile launchers. The 91N6E Big Bang radar is usually parked about 1km from the command and control vehicle, while the 92N6E target acquisition radars can be found between 30-100km away
One of the most significant distinctions lies in radar performance. The domestic 91N6 acquisition radar has been credited, in ideal conditions, with the ability to detect large high-altitude targets at ranges approaching 600km. The export variant, the 91N6E, is slightly reduced in maximum detection range, often cited at approximately 570km, with a marginally lower effectiveness against targets with small radar cross-sections. The reduction in capability arises not only from moderated transmitter power output but also from the deliberate simplification of signal processing algorithms. A similar pattern is seen in the engagement radar. The Russian 92N6 radar can track over a hundred targets simultaneously and engage approximately forty of them at once, employing highly advanced target discrimination routines. The 92N6E generally retains most of this capacity, but in export form, its simultaneous tracking and engagement channels are slightly fewer, and certain adaptive discrimination functions are less sophisticated, limiting its peak efficiency in extremely dense or deceptive air combat environments.

This mock-up of the big CM-400AKG was seen at the Royal International Air Tattoo in July, the weapon’s first public viewing
Chris Lofting
The Russian domestic radars utilise a fully classified suite of counter-jamming features, including high-speed frequency hopping, wideband waveform agility, adaptive beamforming, and dynamic noise rejection algorithms. These allow the system to maintain target tracks even under concentrated hostile electronic attack. In the export versions, these features are retained in a functional but less complex form. Frequency agility remains a prominent characteristic, but the hopping patterns are simplified, and some of the adaptive ECCM (electronic counter-countermeasures) logic is reduced to make the system more predictable for authorised operators while safeguarding Russia’s most advanced techniques from potential reverse engineering.

The CM-400AKG information board displayed next to a mock-up at Zhuhai Airshow in 2019
Alan Warnes
The differences extend beyond the radar subsystems to the missile inventory. The Russian S-400 employs a family of missiles including the 40N6, with a reported range of up to 400km; the 48N6DM, with a range of 250km; and the 9M96E/E2, which are shorter-range but highly agile interceptors. While export clients may receive the 40N6E missile with a nominally similar maximum range, its seeker sensitivity, ECCM robustness, and in some cases actual operational range are thought to be marginally reduced compared to the domestic missile.

A remarkable facet of the S-400’s design is its use of frequency-hopping and beam-steering technologies. These features allow the radar to rapidly switch frequencies in a pseudo-random manner and direct energy precisely toward targets – techniques that severely degrade the effectiveness of enemy jamming attempts. In practice, such agility forces an adversary’s jammer to spread its power across multiple frequencies or attempt to predict the hopping sequence, often unsuccessfully, thus substantially weakening any jamming effort.

India’s deployment of the S-400 goes beyond standalone operation; it is deeply interwoven into the nation’s broader defense sensor network. Systems such as the indigenous Akash AD and Rajendra radar are integrated via the IACCS command-and-control system, helping to correlate radar data from various layers and maintain tracking even amidst jamming or signal interference. The Rajendra, a passive phased-array radar, can track multiple targets and issue missile guidance commands, even under intense electronic warfare conditions.

A JF-17C Block 3 Thunder launched the CM-400AKG missile at the IAF’s deadly S-400 air defence system. Two members of 14 Squadron ‘Tail Choppers’ were awarded the third highest military honour, Sitara-i-Jurat (Star of Courage) for their part in the mission
Alan Warnes

 

[Fatman17]

This combination empowers the S-400 not only to detect, track, and lock onto Pakistani aircraft, whether traditional fighter jets, surveillance platforms, or low-flying drones, but also to maintain that capability when adversaries attempt to blind it electronically.

Indeed, analysts note that during past operations, including instances like the recent Operation Sindoor, the S-400 demonstrated a robust ability to maintain target locks under jamming pressure.

It is also important to note that the S-400’s anti-electronic warfare (EW) capabilities extend beyond pure hardware and software design. Russian doctrine emphasizes mobility and concealment for its high-value air defense assets. The S-400 launchers, radars, and command posts are mounted on mobile platforms that can be rapidly redeployed. Frequent movement, combined with decoys and emission control techniques, makes it harder for adversaries to concentrate jamming efforts against a fixed position.

The result is a layered defense against EW: multi-band radar redundancy, signal processing that filters interference, networked sensors providing independent target data, guidance systems that are less dependent on continuous external input, and operational tactics that minimize vulnerability windows. While no system is entirely immune to the effects of advanced jamming – particularly from well-resourced adversaries – the S-400’s combination of technical features and operational doctrine makes it considerably more resistant to EW suppression than many of its peers.

The takeaway is that the S-400’s resistance to electronic warfare is not due to a single ‘magic’ technology but to an entire philosophy of redundancy, adaptability, and integration. In a future battlefield where electronic attacks will be as common as missile salvos, the S-400’s designers have built a system intended not merely to survive under electronic assault, but to continue fighting effectively even when the electromagnetic spectrum is heavily contested.

The PAF claims it destroyed an IAF mobile 91N6E (NATO name Big Bird) acquisition radar with a CM-400AKG missile that was launched from a 14 Sqn JF-17C Thunder on May 10
Moreover, its missiles are capable of engaging high-speed threats and executing high-precision interception. The 9M96E2, for example, can maneuver up to 20g and achieve Mach speeds that make low-flying targets vulnerable, even those just five meters above ground level. The system’s missiles can also intercept ballistic and cruise missiles and are claimed to possess anti-stealth capabilities when used in concert with suitable radar nodes.

Pakistani CM-400AKG

In its standard configuration, the CM-400AKG can reach speeds between Mach 4.5 and Mach 5.5 during the terminal phase of its flight, which significantly reduces the window for interception and complicates defensive response. Its operational range is generally reported to be up to approximately 250km, though the actual reach can vary depending on factors such as launch altitude, aircraft speed, and specific mission profile. The PAF claims 400km. The missile utilises an inertial navigation system supplemented by satellite navigation inputs for mid-course guidance, and it can engage precision targets in the terminal phase using either radar or infrared seekers. The warhead configuration typically includes a 150kg high-explosive fragmentation variant, or a heavier penetration model intended for use against fortified or hardened targets.

The CM-400AKG’s flight trajectory tends to combine a high-altitude cruise with a steep terminal dive, a manoeuvre designed to reduce the effectiveness of point-defence interceptors and complicate radar tracking. These flight characteristics, combined with its substantial warhead, give the missile a broad engagement envelope and allow it to threaten a diverse range of targets, including static infrastructure, command posts, and mobile air-defense systems. Its high speed and maneuverability, coupled with flexible guidance and destructive payloads, make it a formidable ordnance capable of penetrating sophisticated defensive networks and imposing significant operational risks on adversary air-defense platforms.

Confrontation

According to India’s air chief (see page 56), the sharpest use of the S-400 came during clashes in May 2025’s Operation Sindoor. He stated that Indian air defences shot down six Pakistani jets - five fighters and one large aircraft - adding that “most” of the kills were by S-400 and that the large aircraft (described as a surveillance-type) was engaged at roughly 300km range. He offered no evidence.

Pakistan immediately rejected this account, calling the Indian narrative “fabricated”. A very different headline was that Pakistan destroyed an Indian S-400 battery at Adampur in Punjab (see page 56). Pakistani media and social channels framed this as a precision strike, sometimes pairing the claim with footage of a JF-17 carrying CM-400AKG missiles. India formally dismissed these stories as fake via the government’s Press Information Bureau fact-check, and Indian outlets highlighted a subsequent prime-ministerial photo-op in front of an S-400 at the same base as a rebuttal.

The core problem is evidence: Pakistan has not released corroborated damage imagery of a destroyed battery, and India has not provided independent audit trails for all of its own claims either. In short, the destruction claim remains unverified propaganda to New Delhi, and a victory claim to Islamabad.

A 96L6E (NATO name: Cheese Board) a 3D early-warning and acquisition radar was also successfully targeted by a PAF JF-17C according to the PAF. It scans a specified area and automatically generates a target flight path for priority targets
S-400 vs CM-400AKG

A confrontation between these two systems would revolve around the CM-400AKG’s claimed ability to penetrate or evade the S-400’s defensive envelope. One possible scenario involves Pakistan launching the missile at or near its maximum effective range. By exploiting the missile’s speed, high flight path, and steep terminal dive, Pakistani planners might have aimed to compress the S-400’s reaction time and reduce interception probability. In such an attack, the CM-400AKG could be guided towards key components of the S-400 battery, such as its command post or its radar units, potentially limiting the system’s effectiveness even without destroying its missile launchers. For more see page 56. Such an operation would closely resemble a SEAD mission, although the CM-400AKG is not inherently an anti-radiation missile. In theory, if the missile were equipped with a passive seeker or supplied with precise targeting data, it could be directed towards the radar emissions of an S-400 battery, potentially threatening its most critical sensing components. The notion of “hoping to extend the range” does not necessarily imply exceeding the missile’s technical limitations. Rather, it reflects a tactical decision to operate the CM-400AKG near the upper boundary of its performance envelope, thereby maximising standoff distance to keep the launching JF-17 relatively safe while attempting to strike high-value targets deep within Indian airspace.

However, the CM-400AKG faces inherent limitations related to fuel capacity and flight endurance. Extending its range requires that the JF-17 reach higher launch altitudes to optimise trajectory and maximise the missile’s glide and cruise phases. This approach, however, increases detectability, as Indian S-400 radars would likely acquire the launch platform as it climbs, providing early warning to the air-defence crews. Once the missile is launched, its trajectory is similarly observable, granting the S-400 operators precious extra seconds to initiate countermeasures, prepare interceptors, or activate electronic counter-countermeasures. In essence, while the CM-400AKG offers high-speed, stand-off strike potential, the interplay between launch altitude, missile range, radar detection, and defensive reaction times imposes a complex operational calculus that both sides must consider in planning such high-stakes engagements.

Regardless of the veracity of these claims, the event illustrates the strategic interplay between advanced strike systems and cutting-edge air defence networks in South Asia. Pakistan’s adoption of the CM-400AKG provides it with a high-speed, stand-off strike capability that complicates India’s threat calculations. Conversely, India’s deployment of the S-400 creates a defensive barrier that forces Pakistan to consider long-range, high-risk tactics if it wishes to threaten critical assets. The 2025 episode, whether successful or not, underscores that modern conflicts in the region are fought as much through contested narratives and psychological deterrence as through physical destruction. Each side seeks to demonstrate both capability and resolve, while carefully managing escalation risks in an environment where technology, strategy, and information warfare are closely intertwined.

One thing is certain: without hard evidence, such as on-site photographs, authenticated radar recordings, and thorough parametric analysis, what truly occurred between these two systems remains, for the time being, a matter of speculation and personal interpretation. Both sides have relied heavily on their own preferred narratives, often presenting them as established facts. In this sense, the situation resembles the evolution of the Ghost of Kyiv story, which began as a mixture of rumour and propaganda before gradually taking on new shapes and layers, moulded as much by perception and politics as by verifiable reality. In the absence of incontrovertible proof, such accounts tend to live in a space where strategic messaging, national pride, and the public’s appetite for dramatic stories all converge, making them resistant to definitive resolution.

 

[Xestan]

A good read but almost everything has been public knowledge already. I really wished PAF had chosen AC (R) Kasier Tufail to publish its side of the story, since he writes with more technical clarity and with less bias wordings. Alan Warnes has just parroted everything that PAF wanted everyone to believe. Not saying that PAF's performance was any less impressive, but some of the claims regarding electric grid degradation and other cyber 'achievements' have no substantial evidence from any neutral observer.

Having said that, we have evidence of 4 confirmed losses on Indian side, with very clear evidence.

1 Rafale in Bahtinda,
1 Mig-29 in Ramban, IOK
1 Mirage-2000 in Pampore, IOK
1 SU-30MKI in Akhnoor

There's a confirmation from some Indian sources that one Rafale was damaged and managed to land back to its base.

It's possible that 2 other Rafales crashed in some forested areas of IOK but we have yet to see any leaked videos of that.

All in all, PAF came out on top, there's room for a lot of improvement when it comes to air defence of our FABs, drone warfare, and better and proper BDA. And it seems like steps are already been taken.

 

[mythbuster]

A good read but almost everything has been public knowledge already. I really wished PAF had chosen AC (R) Kasier Tufail to publish its side of the story, since he writes with more technical clarity and with less bias wordings. Alan Warnes has just parroted everything that PAF wanted everyone to believe. Not saying that PAF's performance was any less impressive, but some of the claims regarding electric grid degradation and other cyber 'achievements' have no substantial evidence from any neutral observer.

Having said that, we have evidence of 4 confirmed losses on Indian side, with very clear evidence.

1 Rafale in Bahtinda,
1 Mig-29 in Ramban, IOK
1 Mirage-2000 in Pampore, IOK
1 SU-30MKI in Akhnoor

There's a confirmation from some Indian sources that one Rafale was damaged and managed to land back to its base.

It's possible that 2 other Rafales crashed in some forested areas of IOK but we have yet to see any leaked videos of that.

All in all, PAF came out on top, there's room for a lot of improvement when it comes to air defence of our FABs, drone warfare, and better and proper BDA. And it seems like steps are already been taken.

Who are supposed to be neutral observers ?

 

[Xestan]

There's a reason many private satellite imagery firms didn't want to release images from 11th May of Adampur AB. Indians claim that the incoming CM-400s were shot down, but they have still not showed any pictures of the destroyed missiles. S-400 was not moved from Adampur, because Modi went to take selfies with it the next day. So, something did happen there. Maybe with time, we'd see some clarity.

 

[Xestan]

Who are supposed to be neutral observers ?

I forgot to add, OSINT. There's little evidence of grid degradation or widespread cyber attacks. This cannot be hidden and Pakistani and international OSINT accounts would have reported this.

You turn off electricity of an area, people will talk about it online. This cannot be hidden.

 

[mythbuster]

I forgot to add, OSINT. There's little evidence of grid degradation or widespread cyber attacks. This cannot be hidden and Pakistani and international OSINT accounts would have reported this.

You turn off electricity of an area, people will talk about it online. This cannot be hidden.

People were talking about electric grid problems in India.

 

[Asfandyar Bhittani]

One thing is certain: without hard evidence, such as on-site photographs, authenticated radar recordings, and thorough parametric analysis, what truly occurred between these two systems remains, for the time being, a matter of speculation and personal interpretation. Both sides have relied heavily on their own preferred narratives, often presenting them as established facts

Pakistani jets and S400 being destroyed are "F-16 and Su-30 being shot down in 2019" all over again basically.

 

[Waterboy]

7 is the number President Trump quoted. So if we go by that, PAF claims are accurate.

The bases included PAF Base Nur Khan near Rawalpindi, which was, according to the PAF, struck by Spice 2000 PGMs released by Mirage 2000s

This is interesting. I thought Nur Khan's base attack was with a scalp.

The J-35 and ASOJ (Airborne Stand Off Jammer) are both listed. While ASOJ has been contracted with Turkey, the J-35 is still being studied

This is cool stuff. I don't think J 35 is coming anytime soon. Most likely around 2029 or 2030.

The Dassault 20ECMs of 24 ‘Blinders’ Squadron which had performed so well in Op Swift Retort in February 2019 (see panel) were not used in Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos because of their lack in wattage power.

Again, interesting. We need to upgrade these.

 

[Waterboy]

according to a PAF senior officer, who told me they even had a lock on a A-50 AWACS lining up at Agra, but the attack was stopped, according to the PAF, so the IAF could save face.

Should have gone for the kill. The adversary targeted everything they could.

 

[Mighty_Dragon_Strike]

The way I see it, neither the S-400 nor the Rafale managed to become a hero on their side. That’s enough — if it had been otherwise, we would have heard a lot about it from day one.

so something is clearly wrong!

S400 is meant to blow jets out of the sky!

 

[RajaBaja]

May 2025 is the past. We are now looking at the future. Let's build a threat picture of what we'll be facing around 2028 and beyond.

NOTE: India has done "pai lagon pitta g" to Xi/China. So now the entire Indian military has one focus: Pakistan. I believe this focus is based on Israeli input to India that they should temporarily become friends of China or act like it, so they can remove the bigger enemy from a two front war problem.

S-400 is being acquired in 4-5 additional batteries with some S-500 upgrades. Later S-500 will come in also. India is also now testing its own LR-SAMs for 200 KM range variant, while 150 KM variant is now being produced.

This LR SAM's missiles are also built with Russian assistance and based on S-400 technology. So a 3 layered large air defense ring is being built so even if they lose 1,2,3,4 batteries, the batteries deep inside India can still cover the entire border with Pakistan and into Pakistani airspace.

Now air power: 250 SU-30 (upgraded) + 150+ Rafales (in a few years) + 60 SU-57 + 400 various other jets including Mirage 2k, Tejas, Tornados, Mig-29's). This near 800 jets, fully available for a conflict with Pakistan.

So if you take a look at the above, some critical areas show up for Pakistan to immediately work on:

- Deploy a mass produced local built air defense missile like NASAMS. FAAZ was a promising project. Not sure where it is at in the development stage. But like India, we must create a 2 or 3 year SAM tier approach.

- Advanced jets to evade Indian air defense systems covering nearly 200-250 KM Pakistani airspace where they can actually target us.
This option means acquiring a single engine 5th gen stealth option to be built between China and Pakistan as a custom variant in manned and unmanned versions of some Chinese system from the recent parade. This will now form the backbone of Pakistan due to above threat picture. 4th gen and 4.5th gen are going to be outdated soon due to such extensive and deep strike capability India is building through SAM tiers.

- We should keep all JF-17's upgraded to block III version and get some more J-10C's. But the focus should be to build a single engine stealth jet under PFX in numbers to counter India.