Political Implications of Creating 12 Provinces
The PPP is likely to resist any restructuring of Sindh through every available political and legal channel. If that resistance disrupts governance or law and order, however, it could ultimately weaken the party’s position.
Under this scenario, Sindh would be divided into two provinces. The province containing Karachi could be led by a non-PPP chief minister, while the PPP would retain control of the other Sindh province. Although the PPP was founded as a democratic movement, its opposition to provincial restructuring could create the perception that the party is prioritizing political control over democratic decentralization.
The PPP could partially offset its loss in Sindh by gaining influence in a new South Punjab province centered around Multan. A separate Bahawalpur State province could initially be governed by a regional coalition or a party other than the PPP and PML-N. Northern Punjab and another newly created Punjab province would likely remain favorable to the PML-N.
If Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were divided into three provinces, one could align with Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman’s party, one with the PML-N, and one could remain under PTI. Similarly, three provinces emerging from Balochistan could potentially be divided among PTI, PPP, and PML-N.
Under this hypothetical 12-province structure:
- PML-N could govern four to five provinces
- PPP could govern three to four provinces
- PTI could govern one to two provinces
- The remaining provinces could be contested by regional parties and new coalitions
A new province incorporating Karachi and southern Sindh could potentially be governed by an MQM–Jamaat-e-Islami coalition, PTI, or another emerging regional alliance. The PML-N could also seek to maintain influence in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, subject to their separate electoral and constitutional arrangements.
The central challenge for the PPP would be the loss of political authority over Karachi and the provincial revenue, administrative influence, and patronage associated with governing Pakistan’s largest commercial center. This concern should be framed as a question of control over resources and institutions rather than as an established allegation of corruption unless supported by credible evidence.
For the PPP to accept such a restructuring, a larger political settlement might therefore be required. Potential elements could include:
- A constitutionally defined revenue-sharing formula
- Strong representation in federal institutions
- Guarantees concerning water, infrastructure, employment, and resource distribution
- Continued influence over the remaining Sindh province
- A major federal leadership role for the PPP
- A broader power-sharing agreement involving the presidency, premiership, Senate leadership, or key federal ministries
The most consequential question would be whether Bilawal Bhutto Zardari is offered a credible path to becoming prime minister as part of a national political settlement. Such an arrangement could give the PPP a reason to accept reduced provincial control in exchange for greater federal authority.
Overall, this model attempts to distribute political influence so that each major party gains something. However, its feasibility would depend on constitutional approval, provincial consent, transparent boundary-setting, equitable resource distribution, and public support. Without those safeguards, provincial restructuring could intensify ethnic, political, and administrative tensions rather than produce a stable balance of power.