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Unfortunately they wont be able to since the mechanism is built upon "taking over" rather than actually promoting industry and healthy demand/competition. That comes from both the nature of the leadership but also cultural aspects of being Pakistani.

happy to do an elaboration on exactly how and provide examples of project where this behavior presents itself - and to be fair is the outright result of unregulated capitalism as can be seen in the US as well. Compared to that Pakistan has little regulation and even those are irrelevant to anyone linked to the establishment.

Kaun sala mujh colonel ko roke ga?
Or we straight up ignore genuinely good opportunities because they're not shiny enough.

For example, in the late 1980s, a group of retired PAF officers and civilians got together to form a small IT services firm. At the time, they were taking on subcontracting work for SAP AG in Pakistan and the Gulf.

No help from Gov't. Just a bunch of people bootstrapping the whole operation to get contracts and execute over and over again. Ultimately, Accenture acquired them, but the shame is that no one in Pakistan mobilized the funding or investment to make them grow and be a Pakistani IT powerhouse.
 
Or we straight up ignore genuinely good opportunities because they're not shiny enough.

For example, in the late 1980s, a group of retired PAF officers and civilians got together to form a small IT services firm. At the time, they were taking on subcontracting work for SAP AG in Pakistan and the Gulf.

No help from Gov't. Just a bunch of people bootstrapping the whole operation to get contracts and execute over and over again. Ultimately, Accenture acquired them, but the shame is that no one in Pakistan mobilized the funding or investment to make them grow and be a Pakistani IT powerhouse.
Which is where "its the bigger fish" comes into play. The "braderi" in the establishment also has circles - first preference is force to force.. so any business(or even civil posts) goes first to Army.. and they will cut out PAF or PN.

Then within Army it would be "from my unit"..
Then even there are "my buddies".

No different than any other tribal loyalty structure.
 
Which is where "its the bigger fish" comes into play. The "braderi" in the establishment also has circles - first preference is force to force.. so any business(or even civil posts) goes first to Army.. and they will cut out PAF or PN.

Then within Army it would be "from my unit"..
Then even there are "my buddies".

No different than any other tribal loyalty structure.
yahan tu awey ka awaa bigraa howa ha
 
Which is where "its the bigger fish" comes into play. The "braderi" in the establishment also has circles - first preference is force to force.. so any business(or even civil posts) goes first to Army.. and they will cut out PAF or PN.

Then within Army it would be "from my unit"..
Then even there are "my buddies".

No different than any other tribal loyalty structure.
Here's the irony though. When Accenture acquired them, they folded that team into their EMEA operations and, in turn, began hiring more Pakistanis (and others, incl. Indians, to be fair) to drive the EMEA ops through the 2000s and 2010s.
 
Which is where "its the bigger fish" comes into play. The "braderi" in the establishment also has circles - first preference is force to force.. so any business(or even civil posts) goes first to Army.. and they will cut out PAF or PN.

Then within Army it would be "from my unit"..
Then even there are "my buddies".

No different than any other tribal loyalty structure.
I can understand the frustration, but this is a discussion that Pakistan needs to have sooner rather than later.

If the military is already deeply involved in the commercial sector, then it should focus on areas where it possesses genuine comparative advantages rather than remaining concentrated in rent-seeking sectors. For example, Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) has decades of experience in manufacturing and maintaining heavy military vehicles. Yet despite this accumulated expertise, it never seriously expanded into civilian heavy machinery, industrial equipment, construction vehicles, or related downstream industries where its technical capabilities could have been leveraged.

There are international precedents for such a model. Many of China's major industrial firms trace their origins to state-owned enterprises, military-industrial organizations, or individuals with strong links to the Chinese state. Over time, these entities expanded beyond their original mandates, entered competitive markets, and became globally significant manufacturers. The key difference was that they gradually adopted professional management practices and commercial discipline.

Pakistan needs a similarly professional approach. The Fauji Group itself eventually recognized this reality and brought in civilian professionals to manage several underperforming businesses. There is no reason organizations such as HIT, NASTP, or other military-owned enterprises cannot follow the same path.

This does not necessarily mean removing retired military officers from these organizations altogether. They can continue to occupy governance, oversight, liaison, and strategic roles where their institutional knowledge and networks add value. However, operational management, product development, marketing, finance, and business expansion should be entrusted to professionals with relevant industry experience.

The objective should not be to reduce the military's economic footprint overnight, but rather to make existing military-owned enterprises more productive, innovative, and globally competitive. A professionally managed organization that grows, exports, and creates jobs contributes far more to the national economy than one that merely protects existing rents.

Ironically, successful commercialization would also benefit the military itself. Larger and more profitable enterprises would create more high-quality positions for retiring officers while simultaneously strengthening Pakistan's industrial and technological base. In that sense, professionalization is not a threat to military interests; it is a way of aligning those interests with the country's broader economic development.
 
I can understand the frustration, but this is a discussion that Pakistan needs to have sooner rather than later.

If the military is already deeply involved in the commercial sector, then it should focus on areas where it possesses genuine comparative advantages rather than remaining concentrated in rent-seeking sectors. For example, Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) has decades of experience in manufacturing and maintaining heavy military vehicles. Yet despite this accumulated expertise, it never seriously expanded into civilian heavy machinery, industrial equipment, construction vehicles, or related downstream industries where its technical capabilities could have been leveraged.

There are international precedents for such a model. Many of China's major industrial firms trace their origins to state-owned enterprises, military-industrial organizations, or individuals with strong links to the Chinese state. Over time, these entities expanded beyond their original mandates, entered competitive markets, and became globally significant manufacturers. The key difference was that they gradually adopted professional management practices and commercial discipline.

Pakistan needs a similarly professional approach. The Fauji Group itself eventually recognized this reality and brought in civilian professionals to manage several underperforming businesses. There is no reason organizations such as HIT, NASTP, or other military-owned enterprises cannot follow the same path.

This does not necessarily mean removing retired military officers from these organizations altogether. They can continue to occupy governance, oversight, liaison, and strategic roles where their institutional knowledge and networks add value. However, operational management, product development, marketing, finance, and business expansion should be entrusted to professionals with relevant industry experience.

The objective should not be to reduce the military's economic footprint overnight, but rather to make existing military-owned enterprises more productive, innovative, and globally competitive. A professionally managed organization that grows, exports, and creates jobs contributes far more to the national economy than one that merely protects existing rents.

Ironically, successful commercialization would also benefit the military itself. Larger and more profitable enterprises would create more high-quality positions for retiring officers while simultaneously strengthening Pakistan's industrial and technological base. In that sense, professionalization is not a threat to military interests; it is a way of aligning those interests with the country's broader economic development.
HIT did venture into civil use products e,g shahzor bulldozer and some industrial plants , however it got no success in it.
 
HIT did venture into civil use products e,g shahzor bulldozer and some industrial plants , however it got no success in it.
That's precisely why I keep stressing the need for professional management and industry expertise. We have seen similar initiatives before. For example, Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) launched the PAC-PAD tablet in partnership with a Chinese company. However, the project failed to gain meaningful traction. As smartphones rapidly evolved and became more affordable, the tablet market lost much of its appeal, and the initiative gradually faded away.

The same caution applies to sectors such as bulldozers, forklifts, and heavy machinery. These are niche markets that require careful business planning, economies of scale, and a clear export strategy. Entering such industries without access to external markets can quickly become a financial dead end.

A more viable approach would be to partner with established global players. During President Zardari's recent visit to China, SANY Group expressed interest in exploring Pakistan as a manufacturing base. This could present an opportunity for HIT. SANY brings decades of experience in the highly competitive global heavy-equipment industry, while HIT possesses substantial engineering, manufacturing, and project-management capabilities. A partnership between the two would combine industrial expertise with local production capacity in a way that could be commercially sustainable.

The broader challenge is that military organizations and commercial enterprises operate according to very different logics. A military officer, regardless of competence, is typically trained to optimize for operational effectiveness rather than market dynamics, consumer demand, technological disruption, or long-term business strategy. As a result, anticipating future market shifts can be difficult without experienced industry professionals in leadership positions.

By contrast, Pakistan's leading private-sector conglomerates have generally demonstrated greater adaptability. Lucky Group, for instance, expanded from its traditional businesses into mobile phone assembly and is now exploring semiconductor-related opportunities. Whether every venture succeeds or not, the willingness to identify emerging industries and reposition accordingly is a hallmark of professional corporate management.

Ultimately, it all comes back to the same point: professionalization matters. Industrial policy, technology development, and manufacturing expansion cannot rely solely on engineering competence or institutional prestige. They require experienced managers, market specialists, financial planners, and industry veterans who understand how to build businesses that can compete and survive in the global marketplace.
 

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