UkrAF fighter pilots have openly admitted in multiple interviews that that in air combat their MiG-29s and Su-27s are vastly inferior to the Russian Su-35s. So, they abandoned the option of engaging in air combat in the following weeks of war, instead leaving the resurgent ground-base air defence (GBAD) networks to cover the front lines and the near-rear areas.
In the opening days of war, however, the UkrAF’s GBAD system was significantly beaten by the Russian missile strikes and electronic countermeasures, functioning in a low-effective mode. That is why UkrAF fighters had to be employed more actively in the air defence role in the border regions, facing and trying to disrupt the Russian air raids. These initial air combats have resulted in a good many UkrAF claims for shot down enemy aircraft, but none of these have since been confirmed by visual proof of aircraft wreckage, captured aircrew or death notices of RuAF fighter jet pilots. In contrast, there is numerous proof of RuAF Su-25s, Su-30SMs and Su-34s taken down by the Ukrainian GBAD in the opening weeks of war, including crash sites, captured and dead aircrew, and death notices published in the Russian media, social networks and municipal authorities.
Capt Vadim Voroshilov is the MiG-29 pilot who had to eject from his seriously damaged fighter after a mid-air collision with drone remains during a Shahed-136 night intercept near the city of Vinitsa on October 12, 2022 Ukrainian Air Force
First-hand accounts provided so far by Ukrainian fighter pilots who engaged in air combat against the RuAF fighters in the opening days and weeks of war invariably note that their common tactics comprised closing at ultra-low level, in an effort to remain under the coverage of the ground-based radars used by the Russians, getting into launch distance of their missiles while also trying to enter into visual combat. Pilots have also tended to claim successful avoidance of multiple Russian BVR missiles launched at their aircraft, using high-g manoeuvring to break lock-on and hide in terrain while flying at ultra-low level.
It is interesting to note that the Russian propaganda articles and video reports with apparently successful fighter pilots flying Su-35Ss, all refer to BVR air combats with R-77-1 active-radar missiles (launched in most of the engagements at the maximum or close to their maximum range); no close air combat accounts have been published so far. Similar first-hand accounts have been provided by MiG-31BM pilots, who tended to engage UkrAF aircraft with the very-long range R-37M missiles, capable of reaching targets at up to 110nm (200km) in head-on encounters. This, however, could be valid for engaging high-altitude targets in ideal conditions, while against manoeuvring fighters at low level, which is more representative for this war, missile range is well below 55nm (100km).
Remains of an UkrAF Su-27 fighter near Orekhovo, mostly likely shot down by friendly fire on June 5, 2022 claiming the life of Lt Colonel Dmitry Fischer via Russian internet
Countering drones
The UkrAF’s fighter force, however, proved still useful in countering deep raids of cruise missiles and long-range one-way strike drones. In such missions, however, fighter pilots cannot rely on their radars with mediocre shoot-down/look-down capability against small-size/low-altitude targets and instead they are heavily dependent on the guidance cues provided by ground-controlled intercept (GCI) facilities.
To be effective, the GCI officers must have a good situation awareness on the routes of the low-level targets to be countered, which is facilitated by an extensive use of early-warning radar networks to detect and track cruise missiles and drones. The
UkAF uses a centralised Virazh-Planshet command-and-control system for displaying the recognised air picture (by processing raw radar information supplied by a wide network of radar posts) and its distribution to the GCI facilities and the GBAD command-and-control posts. The system has proved highly useful for target detection and tracking, with distribution for subsequent engagement in the pre-designated operating zones of the air defence fighters and GBAD systems.
There is yet another important lesson learned here, related to the importance of deploying and sustaining a robust, redundant and survivable radar network with significant low-altitude coverage. It is a critical factor for supporting effective fighter operations when tasked with territorial air defence missions against low-flying cruise missiles and drones.
A pair of UkrAF MiG-29s seen in a training flight, without any armament Ukrainian MoD
The Russian missile strikes in the opening week of invasion targeted most – if not all – of the known early-warning radar posts across Ukraine, destroying a number of radars on duty, thus depriving the UkrAF of the ability to establish a reliable radar picture in certain regions of the country. Later on, however, the operability of the radar networks across the country was restored in a prompt manner thanks to the availability of spare radars, while the repair facilities provided an additional number of sets which sustained damage in the initial strikes.
The Ukrainian defence industry has also managed to supply numerous newly manufactured and refurbished radars while additional sets were delivered by friendly nations. These supplies enabled them to sustain the operability and coverage of the radar networks and compensate for the continuous combat attrition due to the Russian missile and loitering munitions strikes.
The gradual GBAD strengthening in the regions with active front lines at the beginning of March 2022 has relieved the fighter force from the difficult and dangerous task of facing the RuAF manned aircraft involved in air superiority, SEAD and CAS missions. At the times, there were no further deep raids carried out by Russian manned jets inside Ukrainian territory. Deep strikes were instead delivered by land-launched short-range ballistic missiles and air-/sea-/land-launched cruise missiles, and the UkrAF fighters began to be scrambled for intercepting cruise missiles on regular basis.
The UkrAF’s tiny fighter force has relied heavily on a significant number of experienced pilots who returned from retirement just before or soon after the outbreak of war, committed to fly combat sorties or act as instructors for young and unexperienced fighter drivers Ukrainian MoD
From September 2022 onwards, the Russian military has deployed the Iranian-supplied one-way long-range attack drone, the Shahed-131/136, in massed use. UkrAF fighters were tasked to counter the deep raids of these slow-speed drones, intercepting the Shaheds in pre-designated engagement zones outside the GBAD coverage. There is still no confirmed information on the real-world effectiveness of the fighter jets when scrambled for hunting for low-flying cruise missiles and drones.
A view from the MiG-29’s cockpit during an air-to-air mission Ukrainian MoD
During the Shahed drone intercepts, undertaken mostly at night, a MiG-29 was lost on October 12, 2022, due to a mid-air collision with drone fragments near the city of Vinitsa. The pilot, Capt Vadim Voroshilov, managed to eject safely. He told the local press that it happened in his second combat sortie that night, with three drones claimed gunned down in the first and two more in the second one. The third drone in the second sortie, however, exploded in close proximity to Voroshilov’s aircraft, causing serious damage.
Another MiG-29 is known to have been lost on February 13, 2023, in a night combat mission, defending territorial air. Its pilot, Capt Dmitry Shkvarevsky, managed to eject successfully in his 70th combat sortie in the war.
An Ukrainian MiG-29 pilot, wishing to remain anonninoius by wearing a face mack, poses in front of a fully-armed fighter. A serious proportion of the Fulcrum pilots killed in action in the first year of war were young and relatively inexperienced, but the survivors have rapidly gained combat experience to fly effective territorial air defence and SEAD/DEAD missions Ukrainian MoD