FYI for all - before everyone goes all into long range SMASH - this should be required reading.
Chinese AsBM
But since that expectation is unrealistic - The most pertinent parts for any extended range AsBM - land or sea launch is somewhat irrelevant - is
"China operates a wide spectrum of satellites, which can provide data useful for targeting within its maritime region.” Moreover,Dorsett stated, “China’s non–space-based ISR could provide the necessary information to support DF-21D employment. This includes aircraft, UAVs,fishing boats and over-the-horizon radar for ocean surveillance and targeting."
Please consider China's fleet of these system versus Pakistan's.
Then
"Demonstrated Chinese ASBM capability to strike a moving maritime target would not only suggest the potency of a new, unique weapons system, but also serve as a leading indicator of emerging C4ISR-supported counter-intervention capabilities. "
You cannot truly be effective in AsBM without C4ISR - the initial success of PAF in May had this as the key lynchpin - NOT THE PL-15.
"
Satellite-based ISR will improve the ability of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles to strike moving maritime targets. For instance, a DF-21D ASBM might be launched on a ballistic trajectory aimed roughly at the position of aCSG based in part on satellite data. Satellites might also be used to track and target the CSG, e.g. by supplying position updates. 170 If engaged in air operations, the CSG would have a large electromagnetic signature. Initial detection systems include China’s existing land-based sky wave and surface wave OTH radars, which could detect aircraft Doppler.171 Such near-space vehicles as airships/aerostats are credited by Chinese analysts as offering large early warning surveillance areas, good concealment and survivability, good dwell time and persistent coverage; and low launch and operating costs; they might eventually play a similar role. Inputs from these systems, in turn,could be used to task imaging satellites to search small areas to confirm identification of the CSG"
"Imaging satellites, which must be based in low-earth orbit, remain in constant motion, and thus take snapshots of pre-designated areas at periodic and predictable revisit times. Shifting orbits could temporarily improve coverage slightly, but would consume precious fuel. Hence, a basic sense of coverage may be gained by examining satellites’ orbits, inclinations, and periods. By2009, China had approximately 22 imaging satellites with sufficient resolution to play a role in detecting and tracking a CSG"
What similar near continuous coverage can Pakistan claim for its EEZ or the Indian Ocean? India could with more investment make it because both money and ability to launch own ecosystem of satellites gives them an existing base, but Pakistan has no money nor the existing base.
What Pakistan has in options is hoping to get UAV's out HOURS IN ADVANCE to expected AOR of IN and hope they go undetected and robust against jamming - which can then be used for mid course correction or final targeting data.
LASTLY - before we all propose short paragraphs on "what ifs" and "YEH KYUN NAHIN KARTE!!!"
So folks talking to long range SmASH - Please try to answer the following in your post - as a sincere request. Or at least think of them.
P.s Happy to be corrected
@JamD @Ak01 @Quwa @Michael @Deino
Overall kill chain
- How should Pakistani naval planners conceptualize the full ASBM kill chain against Indian carrier or major surface groups, beyond the basic steps of detection, tracking, defense penetration, hitting a moving target, and causing mission killing damage
- What specific operational phases (such as peacetime shaping, crisis surveillance, targeting, strike authorization, and post strike assessment) should Pakistan define in its ASBM doctrine for the Indian Ocean theatre
- How can Pakistan ensure that the kill chain remains resilient if individual nodes such as space assets, over the horizon radar, maritime patrol aircraft, data links, or command centers are degraded or destroyed
Targeting and seeker architecture
- What seeker and onboard sensor architecture would be most realistic for a Pakistani ASBM like SMASH or its successor to reliably engage high value Indian naval targets at range
- What mix of sensors such as coastal or shipborne radars, airborne ISR (including Sea Sultan and UAVs), commercial or friendly satellites, electronic and communications intelligence, and potentially over the horizon radar could Pakistan integrate to generate and maintain targeting quality tracks for ASBM employment
- In the likely absence of a dense, dedicated Pakistani space based ISR constellation, what alternative cueing concepts such as airborne ISR, surface pickets, UAV swarms, or passive RF sensing could keep the target’s potential movement during the missile’s flight within the seeker’s acquisition basket
- To what extent could Pakistani planners consider non traditional or civilian maritime assets such as fishing fleets, commercial shipping, coastal observers, AIS data, and other open sources as contributors to the wider maritime picture used to cue ASBMs, and what are the operational and escalation risks
- For a Pakistani ASBM seeker:
- Would active radar, passive RF, imaging infrared, or a multi mode combination be most appropriate given India’s likely electronic warfare and decoy capabilities
- How should the seeker be designed to perform target discrimination within a task group, for example identifying a carrier or major combatant versus escorts or merchant vessels
- How challenging would robust discrimination be in the cluttered, high traffic Arabian Sea and broader Indian Ocean environment
- Does accurate discrimination and engagement fundamentally rely on the large radar or infrared signature of a carrier sized target, or should Pakistan design its system and doctrine from the outset to also prosecute smaller but critical targets such as destroyers, large auxiliaries, and key logistics ships
Countermeasures and vulnerabilities
- What do Pakistani strategists assess as the main technical and operational failure modes that could render a SMASH type ASBM ineffective or unusable in a conflict with India, for example ISR disruption, jamming, decoys, interceptors, or cyber attacks on command and control
- How should Pakistan evaluate and plan around Indian current and future counter space capabilities, including anti satellite testing and electronic attack on satellite links, that might threaten any reliance on foreign or domestic space based assets for ASBM targeting and navigation
- If GPS, BeiDou, or other global navigation systems are degraded by India through jamming, spoofing, or regional denial measures, what backup or complementary navigation methods such as improved inertial navigation, terrain or sea state correlation techniques, celestial updates, or datalink corrections should a Pakistani ASBM incorporate
- How effective might Indian ship and land based missile defense systems, for example Barak 8, Indian BMD layers, and cooperative engagement with airborne sensors, be against a Pakistani ASBM, and what saturation, timing, or trajectory tactics could Pakistan adopt to stress those defenses
- What electronic warfare, cyber, and deception capabilities should Pakistan assume India will bring to bear against the ASBM kill chain, and how can Pakistani doctrine and technical design mitigate those threats
Evasion, maneuvering, and penetration aids
- What level of maneuverability, including pull up profiles, irregular or quasi ballistic trajectories, or depressed and lofted paths, is realistic and desirable for a Pakistani ASBM to complicate Indian early warning and engagement solutions
- How should Pakistan prioritize and sequence the development of penetration aids such as decoys, chaff, inflatable or radar reflective submunitions, infrared flares, or signature shaping reentry vehicles for a SMASH class missile
- What trade offs in range, payload, and guidance complexity is Pakistan willing to accept to gain higher terminal maneuvering performance and better survivability against Indian ballistic missile defense and ship based interceptors
- How can Pakistan test and validate irregular or maneuvering trajectories, as well as penetration aid performance, within its own instrumented ranges and telemetry constraints without revealing too much about capabilities and profiles to external observers
- What doctrine should Pakistan adopt for salvo size, launch timing, and mixed profile attacks, combining ballistic and cruise missiles and different trajectories and altitudes, to maximize the chance of ASBM penetration through India’s layered air and missile defenses
Integration into Pakistani strategy
- How does a SMASH type ASBM fit into Pakistan’s broader conventional deterrence and anti access or area denial posture against India, especially in the North Arabian Sea and approaches to key ports such as Karachi and Gwadar
- What command and control arrangements, including the balance between centralized and delegated authority and between pre planned and dynamic target assignment, best reconcile escalation control with the need for rapid engagement of fleeting Indian naval targets
- How should Pakistan coordinate ASBM employment with other assets such as submarines, anti ship cruise missiles, airpower, and coastal defenses to create layered, overlapping threats that complicate Indian naval operations and defenses
