The SC
INT'L MOD
Since World War II, the Middle East has remained a laboratory of strength and unrest, and development caused by successive wars has been disrupted. This part of the world has a complex relationship with wars. Despite this, the idea of changing maps, despite its recent repetition and waving it around in major crises, has remained intractable to invaders, experimentation projects, domination by force, or building arms and investing in militias.
Today, the region is facing a decisive moment and two projects that are opposite in appearance but similar in essence. Israel, since 1948 and more deeply after the 1967 war, has linked its security and model to control, systematic occupation, and imposing facts on the ground, relying on military force and superior technology. Then this coercive force was transformed from a defense tool into a means of managing the occupation, perpetuating geographical reality with the logic of force, and replacing the logic of deterrence that does not stop with attempts at settlement.
On the other hand, since the 1979 revolution, Iran has built its project in a different way. Do not rely on direct expansion, but rather on investing in agents. After its long war with Iraq, and then the fall of Baghdad in 2003, it realized that chaos was less costly and more effective than direct occupation, so it extended its influence through sub-state entities and militias in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria before the fall of the Assad regime and Yemen, thinking that infiltrating the surrounding countries would weaken it, when in fact it was an exhaustion of Iran itself, reflected internally and appearing in harsh protests that more than once almost touched the regime.
The explicit hostility between Iran and Israel does not prevent this comparison at the strategic level. The surplus of power in Tel Aviv, and the surplus of agents in Tehran, both seek to transform unstable countries into arenas for negotiation and pressure, and the result is the same: countries that are less stable, more fragile, and closer to explosion.
On the other hand, there is a third way that today reaps the fruits of its different approach through investment at home, and the Saudi model stands out here, which expanded the concept of power to include stability, development, and investment in citizens, considering that they are the most important weapons that are the foundation of solid power. Therefore, Riyadh sought, in addition to its defensive superiority, to build a sustainable power based on a diversified economy, a welfare state and efficiency, supported by a vibrant society that has solid immunity that has baffled opponents in confronting targeting and disinformation campaigns.
The Saudi model did not ignore security and firmness; Riyadh has invested in developing its defense capabilities, localizing industries, and protecting energy, cities, and vital facilities, and has sent a clear message more than once that it does not tolerate its security. But at the same time, she chose not to be dragged into wars she did not choose. Throughout Saudi history, provocation did not influence its policy. Rather, it demonstrated the thin line between responsible deterrence and military impulsiveness, which reflects the longevity and traditions of the ruling house.
The fact is that the development weapon has succeeded repeatedly in modern history. Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore tried it, and all of them created their experience through stability, education, industry, and openness to the world. On the other hand, history is full of countries whose national projects were eroded by an ideological discourse that failed to produce state logic.
There are reformist voices in Iran today who realize the danger of investing in escalation. Muhammad Ali Abtahi, Khatami’s deputy and a well-known reformist, wrote a striking article about the necessity of extending a hand to the Gulf states for the growth of the region and the interest of its people, stressing that turning the Gulf into an arena of pressure harms Iran more than it harms its neighbors, who will remain in the end when the war ends.
Saudi Arabia is betting on an equation that has proven successful: development protected by force, and national interests sponsored by superior diplomacy, supported by a solid economy, societal unity, and diverse alliances. Therefore, this Saudi mixture has become a unique story of stability, confirming that stability in the Saudi concept, and among moderate countries, is a force multiplier factor. It not only protects the interior, but also turns development into a regional model that confirms day after day that survival is for the most stable.
Today, the region is facing a decisive moment and two projects that are opposite in appearance but similar in essence. Israel, since 1948 and more deeply after the 1967 war, has linked its security and model to control, systematic occupation, and imposing facts on the ground, relying on military force and superior technology. Then this coercive force was transformed from a defense tool into a means of managing the occupation, perpetuating geographical reality with the logic of force, and replacing the logic of deterrence that does not stop with attempts at settlement.
On the other hand, since the 1979 revolution, Iran has built its project in a different way. Do not rely on direct expansion, but rather on investing in agents. After its long war with Iraq, and then the fall of Baghdad in 2003, it realized that chaos was less costly and more effective than direct occupation, so it extended its influence through sub-state entities and militias in Lebanon, Iraq and Syria before the fall of the Assad regime and Yemen, thinking that infiltrating the surrounding countries would weaken it, when in fact it was an exhaustion of Iran itself, reflected internally and appearing in harsh protests that more than once almost touched the regime.
The explicit hostility between Iran and Israel does not prevent this comparison at the strategic level. The surplus of power in Tel Aviv, and the surplus of agents in Tehran, both seek to transform unstable countries into arenas for negotiation and pressure, and the result is the same: countries that are less stable, more fragile, and closer to explosion.
On the other hand, there is a third way that today reaps the fruits of its different approach through investment at home, and the Saudi model stands out here, which expanded the concept of power to include stability, development, and investment in citizens, considering that they are the most important weapons that are the foundation of solid power. Therefore, Riyadh sought, in addition to its defensive superiority, to build a sustainable power based on a diversified economy, a welfare state and efficiency, supported by a vibrant society that has solid immunity that has baffled opponents in confronting targeting and disinformation campaigns.
The Saudi model did not ignore security and firmness; Riyadh has invested in developing its defense capabilities, localizing industries, and protecting energy, cities, and vital facilities, and has sent a clear message more than once that it does not tolerate its security. But at the same time, she chose not to be dragged into wars she did not choose. Throughout Saudi history, provocation did not influence its policy. Rather, it demonstrated the thin line between responsible deterrence and military impulsiveness, which reflects the longevity and traditions of the ruling house.
The fact is that the development weapon has succeeded repeatedly in modern history. Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore tried it, and all of them created their experience through stability, education, industry, and openness to the world. On the other hand, history is full of countries whose national projects were eroded by an ideological discourse that failed to produce state logic.
There are reformist voices in Iran today who realize the danger of investing in escalation. Muhammad Ali Abtahi, Khatami’s deputy and a well-known reformist, wrote a striking article about the necessity of extending a hand to the Gulf states for the growth of the region and the interest of its people, stressing that turning the Gulf into an arena of pressure harms Iran more than it harms its neighbors, who will remain in the end when the war ends.
Saudi Arabia is betting on an equation that has proven successful: development protected by force, and national interests sponsored by superior diplomacy, supported by a solid economy, societal unity, and diverse alliances. Therefore, this Saudi mixture has become a unique story of stability, confirming that stability in the Saudi concept, and among moderate countries, is a force multiplier factor. It not only protects the interior, but also turns development into a regional model that confirms day after day that survival is for the most stable.
Source:
Youssef Al-Dini Saudi researcher and intellectual consultant, He has worked in journalism since 1999
Youssef Al-Dini Saudi researcher and intellectual consultant, He has worked in journalism since 1999
