The Syrian leadership is moving within a very limited margin due to heavy regional and international interventions. Its military decision, especially in the south of Syria and the province of As -Suwayda, is no longer completely free. Rather, it is sometimes dependent on approvals or green light from major powers and even Israel, as it was evident in recent media statements, as it was confirmed that the Syrian army is moving according to conditions imposed by external parties, especially Israel. The equation on the ground is not a "weakness", but rather complex accounts that affect national sovereignty. In light of the explicit Israeli threat of any move that explains the threat of the Druze or a change in the balance of the south, the Syrian leadership was forced to negotiate the ceasefire under the auspices of regional and international powers, and not only according to its desire or military agenda.
The sanctions are still imposed and the Syrian square is economically and military, which complicates any strategic decision for leadership. Even if the leadership wants to "hit the endosperm and not procrastinate in agreement", every major movement may expose the country to a new wave of sanctions or direct external military escalation, we have already witnessed intense Israeli raids on the Syrian sites in the south in conjunction with every field escalation.
Leadership accounts were not negligence or fear of its past, as much as it was to avoid slipping the country into a widespread regional war or losing any political gains that it achieved in the ongoing negotiations under international sponsorship. In the recent speech of the Syrian president, he called for unifying the ranks and rejecting sectarianism, and stressed that the endosperm is not a field for secession projects or sectarian qualifiers.
An entire Syrian party is held responsible for what happened in which it ignored the field and political facts: the Israeli intervention and the pressing American position, and the Arab decision was dispersed, all of these elements that paralyzed the margin of the real move of the Syrian national decision, so that the choice was not between "victory or negligence" but rather between "the great loss or reducing losses and breathtaking politically."
Conclusion: It is easy for any party from outside the field to demand the leadership of the initiative and not to fear the sanctions, but whoever is at the location of the decision is estimated by the size of the exact interventions and balances, in light of the intertwined regional and international reality that makes Syria sometimes fighting with one hand and the other hand tied with the penalties, threats and conflicting interests of the surrounding countries.