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Foreign fighters presently in Afghanistan/Pakistan pose a considerable risk to regional security:
It is important to differentiate between a home grown terrorist and foreign fighters. An insurgent is a person who is fighting against a state or a government and frequently resorts to violence which in majority of cases is directed towards Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) or state institutions without any or semi-religious base to achieve the political objectives. Whereas, a terrorist is person who may have a political motive but should contain shades of ideological or religious penchant and uses public centric violence as a means to achieve the aim.
A militant is an individual who often fights for a political or ideological cause and can resort to violence anytime anywhere. This clearly indicates that a militant has a level of training in weapon usage and handling and knows how to fire ammunition with appreciable consistency.
The words like ‘radical’ and ‘extremist’ can now be explained on the basis of definitions of the three terms. A radical or an extremist is a person who is in a dynamic state since such an individual is constantly accepting and negating certain ideas or beliefs psychologically and metastasizing concepts during an evolutionary phase through different means of experiences and impressions.
Once we have explained these terms it may now become quite easy to enunciate the terminology of ‘foreign fighter’. The term ‘foreign fighter’ can therefore be applied to a person who travels abroad through different means to participate in a conflict for multiple reasons. These may be financial, ideological, religious or sectarian to name the few. Moreover, a foreign fighter may also pass through a dynamic phase of extremism and radicalization to arrive at a stage where he or she is mentally ready to participate in a journey of active battlefield experience.
The diagram indicates political-ideological-religious leaning along x-axis whereas different violence trends are depicted along y-axis. Thus, we have the whole spectrum of Ideological – Religious - Political, Non-Ideological – Secular - Apolitical, Violence-against-State-Institutions and Public- Centric-Violence spectrum along the axes. These definitions have been graphically represented in the format below.
The domain of the foreign fighters therefore rests on all four quadrants. Hence, we have different shades of foreign fighters including one who may not have active experience of battlefield but is surely susceptible to radical views.
Such category of foreign fighters is most often used as the battleground fodder or is utilized for technical expertise if they have a skill or a set of skills at their disposal.
Before we discuss the numbers of these foreign fighters, it is important that we classify different streams of fighters traveling from Pakistan and participating in an active war theatre to foreign lands. We have therefore categorized it into three groups namely (i) Shiite Fighters (ii) Sunni fighters other than those affiliated with ISIS (iii) Sunni fighters attached with ISIS.
Shiite Fighters
The sectarian turf in Pakistan was intensified in the fall of 1979 as Iran braced for the Islamic Revolution brought about by Ayatollah Khomeini.
The incident was synchronized with invasion of USSR in Afghanistan thus sending ripples of nervousness in the power corridors of Pakistan. The country was literally sandwiched between the Shiite Islam on the one hand and rise of communist ideology on the other.
As the Saudi Arabia and USA stepped into the Afghan cauldron, the sectarian landscape in Pakistan underwent a drastic change. The statistics indicate that number of sectarian incidents peaked during the period stretching from 1984 till the end of the last century. A sharp peak can also be observed in post 2001 phase as USA attacked Afghanistan to take out Taliban regime in the back drop of 9/11 attacks on American soil.
The intensification of sectarian warfare was also coupled with rise of many sectarian organizations in the country. This has probably enhanced Shiite funding and assistance in Pakistan since they largely view it as a corollary of Shia-Sunni animosity in Af-Pak region.
As a large number of foreign fighters started pouring in to join Afghan jihad, the Shiite faction saw it as a legitimate cause of concern and they began working on mobilization and raising of informal cadres of diehard militants to fight for their co-sects.
These fighters were deployed for multipurpose including protection of Shiite sites, securing places of worships, acting as razakars or volunteers for safety of shia processions and religious ceremonies, fighting for shia ideology in conflict zones especially in Iraq and Syria.
The initial reported incidents in early 2011-12 highlighted two distinct groups who were believed to include fighters recruited from shia majority areas in Pakistan to protect the shrines of Hazrat Zainab and other revered personalities buried in Iraq and Syria.
These groups were called Zainabyoun and Fatimeyoun. In July 2013, a rocket attack near the shrine of Hazrat Zainab killed many pilgrims including Pakistanis along with the security guards deputed at the place.
Initially the recruitment was carried out from Kuram Agency and Hangu regions whose Shiite are believed to be fiercest and strongest in terms of their resilience and physique24 . They were, at first, considered as part of an Afghan contingent but later on other areas were included in the list for Shiite fighters’ contribution.
This enhanced Shiite recruitment base in the country is also the direct consequence of an alliance between Wilaya Khurasan affiliates and anti- Shiite forces in the local sectarian landscape of the country. Interestingly, third largest Shiite population resides in Pakistan followed by India and Iran respectively.
The total Shiite population in the country ranges from 25 to 30 million along with sizable sectarian enclaves in Iraq and Yemen as well. In December 2016, an electronic poster appeared on social media in which Ayatollah Khamenei was greeting the Zainabyoun of Pakistan for their loyalties and services for the security and safety of Shiite cause in Iraq and Syria.
Motivation and Traveling Routes
The principal motivation is based on ideological, sectarian and religious factors. The vernacular language which explains and motivates the locals in their own tongue makes it extremely easy for a local moderator to entice a group of emotionally charged Shiite to travel to a far-flung area for further coaching and training.
The available means of communication is social media, internet based selective websites or local seminaries and places of worship. In many instances, a house converted into religious place becomes an ideal location for such activity.
Majority of these Shiite fighters are believed to have traveled in the garb of pilgrims in groups so that authorities have minimal suspicion on their being involved in any such activities.
A number of infrequent routes exist which are reportedly been undertaken to cross the border and enter into Afghanistan or Iran en bloc. These routes exist on account of large porous border, small number of security forces and lack of effective monitoring mechanism at the international borders.
Sometimes specific groups are involved in human smuggling having wide networking making it quite easier for them to take individuals across the border. The smuggled fighters have been used in Iraq, Syria and Yemen to confront the onslaught of Saudi-backed bloc. These fighters have been equipped to wage a sophisticated irregular warfare and are quite adept in extreme weather to survive.
Moreover, advanced technology manipulation and use of local facilities to construct innovative explosive devices to inflict maximum damage to the adversaries have also been imparted to these fighters.
On October 27, 2016 a two-storied building collapsed in Lahore under mysterious circumstances killing one and injuring six inmates. Later on it was discovered that the building caved in due to explosion and CTD recovered 11 grenades and some explosive material from the site.
The inmates were Shiite and it was believed that the family was involved in supplying ammunition to either a group or individuals for transportation abroad [1]. The important thing is that these Shiite were apparently businessmen involved in scrap transportation but were reportedly involved in providing explosive to different Shiite groups for a wide spectrum of
reasons.
The seemingly secretive way to hide real purpose and inability of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) along with intelligence networks to detect it speaks volumes about the success of such small Shia groups.
Incentives and Packages
The fighters get training on foreign soil through experienced men who impart important techniques and exercises for survival in tough situation.
Those who agree to join the group are given different packages which vary in terms of financial benefits as the intensity in war theatre increases.
These packages include monthly stipends that runs in thousands of foreign currency notes, a considerable number of layoff period after every quarter, free visits of shrines and sacred places in holy cities and provision of assistance to a fighters’ family members or children in case someone loses vital organs or is incapacitated or even perished during the conflict.
In some of the cases, if a fighter survives multiple tasks he might be promoted and used as a recruiter and/or an assistant trainer for running training camps on foreign soil. Such a fighter turned trainer or recruiter has three advantages over the other fighters.
First, he is an experienced person who knows how to deal with different tasks and targets. Second, he understands the local language and the ordeal through which a person has to go through while being transported from his hometown to a foreign land.
He can judge well who can fare well under these circumstances. Third, he can explain the new recruits the art of survival in battlefield. Moreover, as he is promoted, he gets more incentives and financial assistance for his persistent motivation and contribution.
Numbers: Estimation and Assessment
The numbers of the Shiite fighters is still not exactly known. We can make a rough guess on the basis of annual pilgrim data and the deportation ratio of Shiite persons a certain assessment about number of foreign fighters traveling to and for the country can be made.
A rough estimate cited in one of the newspapers indicated that 150 – 160 pilgrims went missing who were on a spiritual journey to foreign lands and did not return back in last few years [2] . In 2015 a report published in Reuters cited that 53 pictures of Shiites posted on a twitter account who were reportedly perished while fighting in Syria and were believed to be from Pakistan.[3]
Whereas a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) report cited that nearly 1,000 - 1600 Pakistani Shiite were fighting alongside Asad regime in Syria. The report also quoted that within a span of two years (2016-18) nearly 140 Shiite pilgrims went missing and nearly 100 died in the war zones whose families were receiving financial assistance from foreign countries[4].
Sunni Fighters
The fighters who participated in Afghan jihad came from Sunni sect with predominantly belonging to Deobandi school of thought. After the withdrawal of USSR from Afghanistan, the Taliban regime which swept through length and breadth of the country belonged to the same sectarian leanings.
By the end of 1980, a wide range of these fighters, also known as mujahideen, belonging to a wide spectrum of nationalities and ethnic groups became part and parcel of Afghan War. These included Uzbeks, Hazaras (Shiites), Pashtuns, Tajiks, Turkmen, Baluch, Kyrgyz, Pamiri, Aimak, Nurustani, Arabs, Ughurs, Philiphines and others. All of these fighters belonged to the same Sunni branch of Islam pegged strongly at the ideology of Saudi Arabia.
As Taliban extended their stronghold in Afghanistan in the fall of 1994, they controlled the whole territory with few pockets of resistance by the end of 1996. As the Taliban regime established its
stronghold the number of Sunni fighters kept on coming and joining them from time to time for multiple purposes [5].
As the 9/11 dawned on United States, it retaliated and the Taliban regime was dismantled within days and converted into classical insurgency format. The template of such irregular warfare was complex and based on human resource contributed by foreign fighters especially those from neighboring countries.
Many foreign fighters returned to their home countries after the US attacked Afghanistan to dislodge the regime. According to estimation, nearly four times as many Sunni fighters are operating in different theatres of war than at the time of twin tower incident in 2001.
Moreover, an independent study conducted in 2018 estimates nearly 230,000 Sunni fighters battling in 70 countries across the globe [6] .
Three findings are indicated in the study. First, the groups of these Sunni fighters are quite potent and have capability to inflict damage at hotspots. Second, the social media-based activities generate quite an appreciable avenue of funding and monetary assistance to these Sunni fighters.
Third, the resilience of these fighters is such that they can withstand difficult environment for a long period of time as can be seen in Iraq and Syria 7 .
Motivation and Traveling Routes
The porous Pak – Afghan border provides the easiest route of travel for an ordinary person from Pakistan to Afghanistan and vice versa. It was used by majority of the Sunni fighters during the peak of Afghan war. Moreover, the Durand Line has divided many tribes and even villages and as a result the border crossing becomes a normal practice.
Here the structure of motivation is based on psychological coaching and encouragement. Each person in the structural composition has a designation which is linked to an Islamic ideology.
For example, individuals who guide and teach such fighters in the art of practical warfare skills are commonly known as ‘ustaad’ and those responsible to instruct them to migrate to another land are termed as ‘mohtamim hijra’ or supervisor of migration.
Similarly, a set of individuals are given the mandate to extend security and safety of these fighters while migrating from a place within the country to a place located outside
Pakistan.
Unlike Shiite fighters, the maximum benefit of these fighters is accrued by area supervisor who arranges for a number of such individuals and then sends them to mohtamim hijra for further transportation.
There exist three important routes which have been commonly used by majority of these fighters. The first route meanders through Peshawar, Jamrood, Landi Kotal, Torkum and from there they enter into Afghanistan.
The most frequent destination of these fighters is Nanghar and other adjoining Taliban controlled areas inside Afghanistan. In case of transnational Sunni organizations like Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda in Indian Sub-Continent (AQIS) the mode of transfer is very secretive and even their messages on different social media based chat rooms and applications are very difficult to decipher or decode.
Moreover, the number of security providers to these fighters may also run into pluralistic structures. Each local area ‘ameer’ may be activated to supervise the safe transfer of these fighters to their destination.
Sometimes when a very sensitive transportation is to be made then even ameers of adjoining areas are not aware about any such movement. Whereas in case of local groups movement such as members of Tehreek-e- Taliban Pakistan the level of secrecy and security mechanism is of lower or moderate level.
The second route is frequently being used by ISIS affiliated Sunni fighters who intend to travel to Iraq and Syria to fight against the elements who are at loggerheads with ISIS. This route starts from any part of Punjab and snakes through different areas till it ends up at Dalbadeen in or near Quetta.
From there it goes to Iranian border at Taftan and crosses over into Iran and reaches Mirjawah. It then leads to Shiraz, Urmia and then reaches the Turkish border and crosses into Dogo Bias which assists them in reaching at the Syrian border. Most of these fighters enter Turkey in garb of illegal migrants vying to reach Greece and from there to other European cities for
better and brighter future.
The city Dogo Bias also teems with Syrian refugees and it becomes quite easy for these fighters to mingle with them and enter Syria. The third most popular route goes through Karachi. Once a set of fighter reaches at the port city they are transported to Jiwani or Gawadar, whichever is easier to access, and from there proceed to Bandar Abbas or Chahbahar then to Shiraz, Urmia and eventually crosses in Turkey at Dogo Bias and finally reach in Syria.
Such fighters take both land and water routes to reach at their destination in Syria. The second and third routes are predominantly used by ISIS affiliated fighters. These routes were also used by the families of these fighters as well at the height of Syrian crisis in 2015-1735[8] .
The chief motivation to these fighters ranges from family protection, religiosity connected with eternal reward and monetary assistance as well. Among these factors perhaps the religiosity feeling is the most important one since it provides an easy way out to the current difficulties such individuals experience physically and psychologically.
We have seen how young men from well off or financially stable families have participated in acts of terrorism which have expanded the length and breadth of reach of ameers of these fighters who can manipulate their thinking patterns and convince them to take up arms for a higher purpose and cause.
The incident of Safoora Goth has already highlighted how these elements operate in a highly polarized society to goad a mind suffering from psychological ailments and personal issues [9].
All transnational terror organizations are very secretive and utilize social media selectively unlike ISIS who have emerged as the most potent users of social media.
It appears that Al Qaeda and other such like organizations have been looked upon as fore-runners in the utilization of social media by other localized groups Among Taliban the local attachment is perhaps the most important reason for a person to become part and parcel of the force.
Many secondary fighters join the main Taliban force on account of external intervention to dislodge the clandestine networks of insurgents operating at district and village level[10] .
Among the principal intrinsic factors for IS fighters include spiritual cause and purity of purpose, whereas extrinsic motivational factors range from financial benefit to security and safety of their family members at home or in conflict zones.[11]
Training and Incentives
There exists both structural and non-structured recruitment and training of ISIS fighters. The structured recruitment includes schooling, enlistment and indoctrination. The training sessions encompass weapon handling, aiming and shooting practices, strength and endurance exercises, tactics on engagement in the battlefield, specialization of tasks and conducting starvation practice.
An evaluator is constantly monitoring the progress of each trainee and those he thinks are not up to the mark are directed to undergo the process again [12] .
Many other groups experience un-structured training sessions which are carried on need basis as and when an imminent requirement arises due to battlefield demand.
The graph indicates how fighters belonging to different groups go through a range of training matrix which involves simplex and complex training mechanisms pivoting on structural and non-structural phases.
The groups having physical spaces at their disposal engage in structural training courses whereas those devoid of any such luxuries perform simplex training modules and depend upon the expertise, resilience, endurance and knowledge of the recruit instead of following a complex mechanism.[13]
The Challenge of Returnees
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) guidelines on foreign fighters are a set of codal formalities which each member state may adhere to and take proportionate action where a member country deems it essential and necessary.
These guiding principles are based on the UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014) which endorses rising threat of Foreign Fighters in post ISIS formation period. These guidelines can be divided into three categories including detection and prevention of travel of foreign fighters through or
from a member country.
Second, strengthening border control measures of a country along with dissemination of advance information to a destination country (if such a travel is by air) as it provides ample reaction time to that country to take action against such an individual. Moreover, regularly share and update intelligence collation with other regional countries.
Third, criminalizing and prosecuting the returnees and devise and share successful strategies with other regional countries [14] .
In order to evaluate the returnee challenge we have devised a model based on four variables (4Ps) prosecuting, pursuing, penalizing, and parenting.
For convenience we have divided these returnees into four categories including those who successfully return and are detected in Pakistan, those who return unnoticed and are not detected, those who are apprehended in the conflict zones and later on retuned to Pakistan and those who are intercepted during the course of their quest to join fighting in a theatre of war and are deported in garb of illegal migrants.
Each set of fighters has different remedial measures and planning for their physical reintegration and psychological restructuring into the society.
a) Prosecuting
Those who have returned and held up by local Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) should be subjected to prosecution under the local law. If there is a possibility that these fighters can be tried under International Law then we can hand them over as prisoners of war for imposition of penalty of participating in an international conflict in another country.
It is an important step since the act of prosecuting such individuals will certainly deter other people to join rank and file of ISIS or any other groups encouraging youth to become fighters for different purposes.
b) Pursuing
Those who have returned and not detected should be traced out without any further loss of time. Since undetected Foreign Fighters have the ability to develop their own narratives of battlefield experiences so as to reach out and seek attention of the audience in cyber or physical space.
Once they gain a high-level attention, they can start conversation with their audiences. Such predominantly unidirectional discourses push these individuals into social excommunication and incarcerate them psychologically and mentally.
Such isolation makes the receptive minds to radicalize and make them susceptible to follow the instructions of the returnees.
Sometimes these fighters directly approach a person on basis of their observation as they feel that the particular individual or a group of individuals may have the similar penchant or thinking pattern as their own.
Such an acquaintance may lead these individuals to isolation and finally they are exposed to verbal instructions and discussions.
Under such situation intelligence-based actions and operations need to be conducted to take out such fighters and penalize them with impunity. Whereas those who voluntarily give up their identity and reveal it to the local authority should be dealt with a degree of leniency and humaneness.
c) Penalizing
Once a foreign fighter is nabbed at home or abroad and is prosecuted and sentenced, he or she should have an in-prison de-radicalization program and initially such a person should be isolated from other inmates.
Once it has been observed by the visiting psychologists that he has normalized mentally and psychologically the individual may be allowed a limited access to other inmates under intense monitoring.
We have seen how contagiousness of radicalization spreads like virus among the members of overcrowded prisons. As a result of it, Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) Sindh, in 2017, launched a de-radicalization program in prison targeting 300 terrorists incarcerated therein. This initiative not only helped prepared a psychological profile of these fighters but also earmarked psychiatrists of Karachi University and other educational institutions to read them mentally and document them properly [15] .
Those who show good behavior and their mannerism is amenable to social benchmarks may be set free on parole.
d) Parenting
Once such fighters are freed from the prisons or any incarceration, he or she may be placed at a suitable position so that he or she can live his or her live peacefully and without feeling any social stigma attached to him or her on account of the past history.
In case a social positioning cannot be provided to such a fighter, we may provide monthly stipend so that he can sustain himself or herself along with the family members [16] . Such parenting may assist the erstwhile fighter to regain psychological balance and become a productive citizen of the country.
One real-life example of parenting was showcased in the ISPR Telefilm: INKAAR - See below:
Conclusion:
As Pakistan weighs its options of any action against the TTA and hostile sponsored militant elements inside Pakistan. The state must remain cognizant that the foreign fighter phenomenon has many shades and layers. Underneath each shade and every layer there lie two distinct motivational characteristics that borders on financial assistance and personal religiosity.
The sectarian and social divides are the two prime motivating factors that have pushed many individuals to undergo training and participate in conflict zones for a larger strategic purpose. A country like Pakistan ill affords to participate in a conflict or take sides in any issue having sectarian undercurrents as it will surely alienate a large segment of sectarian population living in the geographical boundary of the country.
Moreover, strengthening of institutions and improving intelligence collection for per-emptive action- based detection against such individuals or groups are important steps in the right direction.
References:
[1] https://www.dawn.com/news/1292563
[2] https://www.dw.com/en/why-are-pakistani-shiites-disappearing/a-49524026
[3]https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0TT2CV/
[4] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44280552
[5] N.Nojumi,”The Rise of Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass mobilization, Civil War and the
Future if the Region”, (Palgrave Macmillan US: 2016), 7-30
[6]Eric Schmitt, “Number of Sunni militants have quadrupled since 9/11 terror attacks, US
think-tank claims”, The Independent, November 21, 2018.
[7] Ibid.
[8]
The data of Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) indicates that an abnormally high
numbers of illegal migrants use the second and third routes for human transportation and
smuggling. All three routes including air, water and land have been utilized for human
trafficking. There are 14 air routes available through which a person first travels to United
Arab Emirates or Istanbul or Central Asian Republics (CARs) or South America and finally
ends up in European Union (EU) territory (such as Italy) or Unites States of America.
Similarly 1196 kilometers long Pak – Iran border provides ample spaces or points or routes
to such travelers to enter into Iran and from there they are transported to the Turkish border.
Once they are in Turkey they cross over into Greece and from there they can enter into EU
countries other than Greece. Here Izmir, Athens, Peloponnese, Limnos and Siirt are the
favorite destination cities of these illegal migrants wherefrom they move towards their
destination of choice.
[9] https://www.dawn.com/news/1243094
[10] David Kilcullen, “The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting small wars in the midst of a big
one”, (Oxford University Press: 2011). 23-30
[11] https://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/04/health/isis-fighters-human-behavior-study/index.html
[12] Asaad Almohammad, “ISIS Child Soldiers in Syria: The Structural and Predatory
Recruitment,Enlistment, Pre-Training Indoctrination, Training, and Deployment”,
International Center for Counter Terrorism (The Hague), 20 – 17.
[13]
Four groups have been discussed here on account of their training mode and type and
then try to distinguish them from one another. These four groups include Islamic State in
Iraq & Syria (ISIS), Al Qaeda and its transnational affiliates, localized primary groups like
Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) along with different Shia factions. The last category of
such grouping is secondary and tertiary localized organizations. Here a simplex structure
involves limited or no availability of space along with unimpressive trainers at the disposal
of the group. Whereas, a complex format involves readily availability of physical space
along with specialized trainers according to their expertise and the training is conducted in
a highly secret and clandestine way.
[14] “Security Councils Guiding Principles on Foreign Terrorist Fighters: A practical tool for
Member States to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters”, United Nations Security
Council Counter Terrorism Committee, (United Nations: 2019), 1-3.
[15] https://www.dawn.com/news/1305848
[16] https://www.dawn.com/news/797860/the-softer-option
It is important to differentiate between a home grown terrorist and foreign fighters. An insurgent is a person who is fighting against a state or a government and frequently resorts to violence which in majority of cases is directed towards Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) or state institutions without any or semi-religious base to achieve the political objectives. Whereas, a terrorist is person who may have a political motive but should contain shades of ideological or religious penchant and uses public centric violence as a means to achieve the aim.
A militant is an individual who often fights for a political or ideological cause and can resort to violence anytime anywhere. This clearly indicates that a militant has a level of training in weapon usage and handling and knows how to fire ammunition with appreciable consistency.
The words like ‘radical’ and ‘extremist’ can now be explained on the basis of definitions of the three terms. A radical or an extremist is a person who is in a dynamic state since such an individual is constantly accepting and negating certain ideas or beliefs psychologically and metastasizing concepts during an evolutionary phase through different means of experiences and impressions.
Once we have explained these terms it may now become quite easy to enunciate the terminology of ‘foreign fighter’. The term ‘foreign fighter’ can therefore be applied to a person who travels abroad through different means to participate in a conflict for multiple reasons. These may be financial, ideological, religious or sectarian to name the few. Moreover, a foreign fighter may also pass through a dynamic phase of extremism and radicalization to arrive at a stage where he or she is mentally ready to participate in a journey of active battlefield experience.
The diagram indicates political-ideological-religious leaning along x-axis whereas different violence trends are depicted along y-axis. Thus, we have the whole spectrum of Ideological – Religious - Political, Non-Ideological – Secular - Apolitical, Violence-against-State-Institutions and Public- Centric-Violence spectrum along the axes. These definitions have been graphically represented in the format below.
The domain of the foreign fighters therefore rests on all four quadrants. Hence, we have different shades of foreign fighters including one who may not have active experience of battlefield but is surely susceptible to radical views.
Such category of foreign fighters is most often used as the battleground fodder or is utilized for technical expertise if they have a skill or a set of skills at their disposal.
Before we discuss the numbers of these foreign fighters, it is important that we classify different streams of fighters traveling from Pakistan and participating in an active war theatre to foreign lands. We have therefore categorized it into three groups namely (i) Shiite Fighters (ii) Sunni fighters other than those affiliated with ISIS (iii) Sunni fighters attached with ISIS.
Shiite Fighters
The sectarian turf in Pakistan was intensified in the fall of 1979 as Iran braced for the Islamic Revolution brought about by Ayatollah Khomeini.
The incident was synchronized with invasion of USSR in Afghanistan thus sending ripples of nervousness in the power corridors of Pakistan. The country was literally sandwiched between the Shiite Islam on the one hand and rise of communist ideology on the other.
As the Saudi Arabia and USA stepped into the Afghan cauldron, the sectarian landscape in Pakistan underwent a drastic change. The statistics indicate that number of sectarian incidents peaked during the period stretching from 1984 till the end of the last century. A sharp peak can also be observed in post 2001 phase as USA attacked Afghanistan to take out Taliban regime in the back drop of 9/11 attacks on American soil.
The intensification of sectarian warfare was also coupled with rise of many sectarian organizations in the country. This has probably enhanced Shiite funding and assistance in Pakistan since they largely view it as a corollary of Shia-Sunni animosity in Af-Pak region.
As a large number of foreign fighters started pouring in to join Afghan jihad, the Shiite faction saw it as a legitimate cause of concern and they began working on mobilization and raising of informal cadres of diehard militants to fight for their co-sects.
These fighters were deployed for multipurpose including protection of Shiite sites, securing places of worships, acting as razakars or volunteers for safety of shia processions and religious ceremonies, fighting for shia ideology in conflict zones especially in Iraq and Syria.
The initial reported incidents in early 2011-12 highlighted two distinct groups who were believed to include fighters recruited from shia majority areas in Pakistan to protect the shrines of Hazrat Zainab and other revered personalities buried in Iraq and Syria.
These groups were called Zainabyoun and Fatimeyoun. In July 2013, a rocket attack near the shrine of Hazrat Zainab killed many pilgrims including Pakistanis along with the security guards deputed at the place.
Initially the recruitment was carried out from Kuram Agency and Hangu regions whose Shiite are believed to be fiercest and strongest in terms of their resilience and physique24 . They were, at first, considered as part of an Afghan contingent but later on other areas were included in the list for Shiite fighters’ contribution.
This enhanced Shiite recruitment base in the country is also the direct consequence of an alliance between Wilaya Khurasan affiliates and anti- Shiite forces in the local sectarian landscape of the country. Interestingly, third largest Shiite population resides in Pakistan followed by India and Iran respectively.
The total Shiite population in the country ranges from 25 to 30 million along with sizable sectarian enclaves in Iraq and Yemen as well. In December 2016, an electronic poster appeared on social media in which Ayatollah Khamenei was greeting the Zainabyoun of Pakistan for their loyalties and services for the security and safety of Shiite cause in Iraq and Syria.
Motivation and Traveling Routes
The principal motivation is based on ideological, sectarian and religious factors. The vernacular language which explains and motivates the locals in their own tongue makes it extremely easy for a local moderator to entice a group of emotionally charged Shiite to travel to a far-flung area for further coaching and training.
The available means of communication is social media, internet based selective websites or local seminaries and places of worship. In many instances, a house converted into religious place becomes an ideal location for such activity.
Majority of these Shiite fighters are believed to have traveled in the garb of pilgrims in groups so that authorities have minimal suspicion on their being involved in any such activities.
A number of infrequent routes exist which are reportedly been undertaken to cross the border and enter into Afghanistan or Iran en bloc. These routes exist on account of large porous border, small number of security forces and lack of effective monitoring mechanism at the international borders.
Sometimes specific groups are involved in human smuggling having wide networking making it quite easier for them to take individuals across the border. The smuggled fighters have been used in Iraq, Syria and Yemen to confront the onslaught of Saudi-backed bloc. These fighters have been equipped to wage a sophisticated irregular warfare and are quite adept in extreme weather to survive.
Moreover, advanced technology manipulation and use of local facilities to construct innovative explosive devices to inflict maximum damage to the adversaries have also been imparted to these fighters.
On October 27, 2016 a two-storied building collapsed in Lahore under mysterious circumstances killing one and injuring six inmates. Later on it was discovered that the building caved in due to explosion and CTD recovered 11 grenades and some explosive material from the site.
The inmates were Shiite and it was believed that the family was involved in supplying ammunition to either a group or individuals for transportation abroad [1]. The important thing is that these Shiite were apparently businessmen involved in scrap transportation but were reportedly involved in providing explosive to different Shiite groups for a wide spectrum of
reasons.
The seemingly secretive way to hide real purpose and inability of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) along with intelligence networks to detect it speaks volumes about the success of such small Shia groups.
Incentives and Packages
The fighters get training on foreign soil through experienced men who impart important techniques and exercises for survival in tough situation.
Those who agree to join the group are given different packages which vary in terms of financial benefits as the intensity in war theatre increases.
These packages include monthly stipends that runs in thousands of foreign currency notes, a considerable number of layoff period after every quarter, free visits of shrines and sacred places in holy cities and provision of assistance to a fighters’ family members or children in case someone loses vital organs or is incapacitated or even perished during the conflict.
In some of the cases, if a fighter survives multiple tasks he might be promoted and used as a recruiter and/or an assistant trainer for running training camps on foreign soil. Such a fighter turned trainer or recruiter has three advantages over the other fighters.
First, he is an experienced person who knows how to deal with different tasks and targets. Second, he understands the local language and the ordeal through which a person has to go through while being transported from his hometown to a foreign land.
He can judge well who can fare well under these circumstances. Third, he can explain the new recruits the art of survival in battlefield. Moreover, as he is promoted, he gets more incentives and financial assistance for his persistent motivation and contribution.
Numbers: Estimation and Assessment
The numbers of the Shiite fighters is still not exactly known. We can make a rough guess on the basis of annual pilgrim data and the deportation ratio of Shiite persons a certain assessment about number of foreign fighters traveling to and for the country can be made.
A rough estimate cited in one of the newspapers indicated that 150 – 160 pilgrims went missing who were on a spiritual journey to foreign lands and did not return back in last few years [2] . In 2015 a report published in Reuters cited that 53 pictures of Shiites posted on a twitter account who were reportedly perished while fighting in Syria and were believed to be from Pakistan.[3]
Whereas a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) report cited that nearly 1,000 - 1600 Pakistani Shiite were fighting alongside Asad regime in Syria. The report also quoted that within a span of two years (2016-18) nearly 140 Shiite pilgrims went missing and nearly 100 died in the war zones whose families were receiving financial assistance from foreign countries[4].
Sunni Fighters
The fighters who participated in Afghan jihad came from Sunni sect with predominantly belonging to Deobandi school of thought. After the withdrawal of USSR from Afghanistan, the Taliban regime which swept through length and breadth of the country belonged to the same sectarian leanings.
By the end of 1980, a wide range of these fighters, also known as mujahideen, belonging to a wide spectrum of nationalities and ethnic groups became part and parcel of Afghan War. These included Uzbeks, Hazaras (Shiites), Pashtuns, Tajiks, Turkmen, Baluch, Kyrgyz, Pamiri, Aimak, Nurustani, Arabs, Ughurs, Philiphines and others. All of these fighters belonged to the same Sunni branch of Islam pegged strongly at the ideology of Saudi Arabia.
As Taliban extended their stronghold in Afghanistan in the fall of 1994, they controlled the whole territory with few pockets of resistance by the end of 1996. As the Taliban regime established its
stronghold the number of Sunni fighters kept on coming and joining them from time to time for multiple purposes [5].
As the 9/11 dawned on United States, it retaliated and the Taliban regime was dismantled within days and converted into classical insurgency format. The template of such irregular warfare was complex and based on human resource contributed by foreign fighters especially those from neighboring countries.
Many foreign fighters returned to their home countries after the US attacked Afghanistan to dislodge the regime. According to estimation, nearly four times as many Sunni fighters are operating in different theatres of war than at the time of twin tower incident in 2001.
Moreover, an independent study conducted in 2018 estimates nearly 230,000 Sunni fighters battling in 70 countries across the globe [6] .
Three findings are indicated in the study. First, the groups of these Sunni fighters are quite potent and have capability to inflict damage at hotspots. Second, the social media-based activities generate quite an appreciable avenue of funding and monetary assistance to these Sunni fighters.
Third, the resilience of these fighters is such that they can withstand difficult environment for a long period of time as can be seen in Iraq and Syria 7 .
Motivation and Traveling Routes
The porous Pak – Afghan border provides the easiest route of travel for an ordinary person from Pakistan to Afghanistan and vice versa. It was used by majority of the Sunni fighters during the peak of Afghan war. Moreover, the Durand Line has divided many tribes and even villages and as a result the border crossing becomes a normal practice.
Here the structure of motivation is based on psychological coaching and encouragement. Each person in the structural composition has a designation which is linked to an Islamic ideology.
For example, individuals who guide and teach such fighters in the art of practical warfare skills are commonly known as ‘ustaad’ and those responsible to instruct them to migrate to another land are termed as ‘mohtamim hijra’ or supervisor of migration.
Similarly, a set of individuals are given the mandate to extend security and safety of these fighters while migrating from a place within the country to a place located outside
Pakistan.
Unlike Shiite fighters, the maximum benefit of these fighters is accrued by area supervisor who arranges for a number of such individuals and then sends them to mohtamim hijra for further transportation.
There exist three important routes which have been commonly used by majority of these fighters. The first route meanders through Peshawar, Jamrood, Landi Kotal, Torkum and from there they enter into Afghanistan.
The most frequent destination of these fighters is Nanghar and other adjoining Taliban controlled areas inside Afghanistan. In case of transnational Sunni organizations like Al Qaeda or Al Qaeda in Indian Sub-Continent (AQIS) the mode of transfer is very secretive and even their messages on different social media based chat rooms and applications are very difficult to decipher or decode.
Moreover, the number of security providers to these fighters may also run into pluralistic structures. Each local area ‘ameer’ may be activated to supervise the safe transfer of these fighters to their destination.
Sometimes when a very sensitive transportation is to be made then even ameers of adjoining areas are not aware about any such movement. Whereas in case of local groups movement such as members of Tehreek-e- Taliban Pakistan the level of secrecy and security mechanism is of lower or moderate level.
The second route is frequently being used by ISIS affiliated Sunni fighters who intend to travel to Iraq and Syria to fight against the elements who are at loggerheads with ISIS. This route starts from any part of Punjab and snakes through different areas till it ends up at Dalbadeen in or near Quetta.
From there it goes to Iranian border at Taftan and crosses over into Iran and reaches Mirjawah. It then leads to Shiraz, Urmia and then reaches the Turkish border and crosses into Dogo Bias which assists them in reaching at the Syrian border. Most of these fighters enter Turkey in garb of illegal migrants vying to reach Greece and from there to other European cities for
better and brighter future.
The city Dogo Bias also teems with Syrian refugees and it becomes quite easy for these fighters to mingle with them and enter Syria. The third most popular route goes through Karachi. Once a set of fighter reaches at the port city they are transported to Jiwani or Gawadar, whichever is easier to access, and from there proceed to Bandar Abbas or Chahbahar then to Shiraz, Urmia and eventually crosses in Turkey at Dogo Bias and finally reach in Syria.
Such fighters take both land and water routes to reach at their destination in Syria. The second and third routes are predominantly used by ISIS affiliated fighters. These routes were also used by the families of these fighters as well at the height of Syrian crisis in 2015-1735[8] .
The chief motivation to these fighters ranges from family protection, religiosity connected with eternal reward and monetary assistance as well. Among these factors perhaps the religiosity feeling is the most important one since it provides an easy way out to the current difficulties such individuals experience physically and psychologically.
We have seen how young men from well off or financially stable families have participated in acts of terrorism which have expanded the length and breadth of reach of ameers of these fighters who can manipulate their thinking patterns and convince them to take up arms for a higher purpose and cause.
The incident of Safoora Goth has already highlighted how these elements operate in a highly polarized society to goad a mind suffering from psychological ailments and personal issues [9].
All transnational terror organizations are very secretive and utilize social media selectively unlike ISIS who have emerged as the most potent users of social media.
It appears that Al Qaeda and other such like organizations have been looked upon as fore-runners in the utilization of social media by other localized groups Among Taliban the local attachment is perhaps the most important reason for a person to become part and parcel of the force.
Many secondary fighters join the main Taliban force on account of external intervention to dislodge the clandestine networks of insurgents operating at district and village level[10] .
Among the principal intrinsic factors for IS fighters include spiritual cause and purity of purpose, whereas extrinsic motivational factors range from financial benefit to security and safety of their family members at home or in conflict zones.[11]
Training and Incentives
There exists both structural and non-structured recruitment and training of ISIS fighters. The structured recruitment includes schooling, enlistment and indoctrination. The training sessions encompass weapon handling, aiming and shooting practices, strength and endurance exercises, tactics on engagement in the battlefield, specialization of tasks and conducting starvation practice.
An evaluator is constantly monitoring the progress of each trainee and those he thinks are not up to the mark are directed to undergo the process again [12] .
Many other groups experience un-structured training sessions which are carried on need basis as and when an imminent requirement arises due to battlefield demand.
The graph indicates how fighters belonging to different groups go through a range of training matrix which involves simplex and complex training mechanisms pivoting on structural and non-structural phases.
The groups having physical spaces at their disposal engage in structural training courses whereas those devoid of any such luxuries perform simplex training modules and depend upon the expertise, resilience, endurance and knowledge of the recruit instead of following a complex mechanism.[13]
The Challenge of Returnees
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) guidelines on foreign fighters are a set of codal formalities which each member state may adhere to and take proportionate action where a member country deems it essential and necessary.
These guiding principles are based on the UNSC Resolution 2178 (2014) which endorses rising threat of Foreign Fighters in post ISIS formation period. These guidelines can be divided into three categories including detection and prevention of travel of foreign fighters through or
from a member country.
Second, strengthening border control measures of a country along with dissemination of advance information to a destination country (if such a travel is by air) as it provides ample reaction time to that country to take action against such an individual. Moreover, regularly share and update intelligence collation with other regional countries.
Third, criminalizing and prosecuting the returnees and devise and share successful strategies with other regional countries [14] .
In order to evaluate the returnee challenge we have devised a model based on four variables (4Ps) prosecuting, pursuing, penalizing, and parenting.
For convenience we have divided these returnees into four categories including those who successfully return and are detected in Pakistan, those who return unnoticed and are not detected, those who are apprehended in the conflict zones and later on retuned to Pakistan and those who are intercepted during the course of their quest to join fighting in a theatre of war and are deported in garb of illegal migrants.
Each set of fighters has different remedial measures and planning for their physical reintegration and psychological restructuring into the society.
a) Prosecuting
Those who have returned and held up by local Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) should be subjected to prosecution under the local law. If there is a possibility that these fighters can be tried under International Law then we can hand them over as prisoners of war for imposition of penalty of participating in an international conflict in another country.
It is an important step since the act of prosecuting such individuals will certainly deter other people to join rank and file of ISIS or any other groups encouraging youth to become fighters for different purposes.
b) Pursuing
Those who have returned and not detected should be traced out without any further loss of time. Since undetected Foreign Fighters have the ability to develop their own narratives of battlefield experiences so as to reach out and seek attention of the audience in cyber or physical space.
Once they gain a high-level attention, they can start conversation with their audiences. Such predominantly unidirectional discourses push these individuals into social excommunication and incarcerate them psychologically and mentally.
Such isolation makes the receptive minds to radicalize and make them susceptible to follow the instructions of the returnees.
Sometimes these fighters directly approach a person on basis of their observation as they feel that the particular individual or a group of individuals may have the similar penchant or thinking pattern as their own.
Such an acquaintance may lead these individuals to isolation and finally they are exposed to verbal instructions and discussions.
Under such situation intelligence-based actions and operations need to be conducted to take out such fighters and penalize them with impunity. Whereas those who voluntarily give up their identity and reveal it to the local authority should be dealt with a degree of leniency and humaneness.
c) Penalizing
Once a foreign fighter is nabbed at home or abroad and is prosecuted and sentenced, he or she should have an in-prison de-radicalization program and initially such a person should be isolated from other inmates.
Once it has been observed by the visiting psychologists that he has normalized mentally and psychologically the individual may be allowed a limited access to other inmates under intense monitoring.
We have seen how contagiousness of radicalization spreads like virus among the members of overcrowded prisons. As a result of it, Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) Sindh, in 2017, launched a de-radicalization program in prison targeting 300 terrorists incarcerated therein. This initiative not only helped prepared a psychological profile of these fighters but also earmarked psychiatrists of Karachi University and other educational institutions to read them mentally and document them properly [15] .
Those who show good behavior and their mannerism is amenable to social benchmarks may be set free on parole.
d) Parenting
Once such fighters are freed from the prisons or any incarceration, he or she may be placed at a suitable position so that he or she can live his or her live peacefully and without feeling any social stigma attached to him or her on account of the past history.
In case a social positioning cannot be provided to such a fighter, we may provide monthly stipend so that he can sustain himself or herself along with the family members [16] . Such parenting may assist the erstwhile fighter to regain psychological balance and become a productive citizen of the country.
One real-life example of parenting was showcased in the ISPR Telefilm: INKAAR - See below:
Conclusion:
As Pakistan weighs its options of any action against the TTA and hostile sponsored militant elements inside Pakistan. The state must remain cognizant that the foreign fighter phenomenon has many shades and layers. Underneath each shade and every layer there lie two distinct motivational characteristics that borders on financial assistance and personal religiosity.
The sectarian and social divides are the two prime motivating factors that have pushed many individuals to undergo training and participate in conflict zones for a larger strategic purpose. A country like Pakistan ill affords to participate in a conflict or take sides in any issue having sectarian undercurrents as it will surely alienate a large segment of sectarian population living in the geographical boundary of the country.
Moreover, strengthening of institutions and improving intelligence collection for per-emptive action- based detection against such individuals or groups are important steps in the right direction.
References:
[1] https://www.dawn.com/news/1292563
[2] https://www.dw.com/en/why-are-pakistani-shiites-disappearing/a-49524026
[3]https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0TT2CV/
[4] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44280552
[5] N.Nojumi,”The Rise of Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass mobilization, Civil War and the
Future if the Region”, (Palgrave Macmillan US: 2016), 7-30
[6]Eric Schmitt, “Number of Sunni militants have quadrupled since 9/11 terror attacks, US
think-tank claims”, The Independent, November 21, 2018.
[7] Ibid.
[8]
The data of Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) indicates that an abnormally high
numbers of illegal migrants use the second and third routes for human transportation and
smuggling. All three routes including air, water and land have been utilized for human
trafficking. There are 14 air routes available through which a person first travels to United
Arab Emirates or Istanbul or Central Asian Republics (CARs) or South America and finally
ends up in European Union (EU) territory (such as Italy) or Unites States of America.
Similarly 1196 kilometers long Pak – Iran border provides ample spaces or points or routes
to such travelers to enter into Iran and from there they are transported to the Turkish border.
Once they are in Turkey they cross over into Greece and from there they can enter into EU
countries other than Greece. Here Izmir, Athens, Peloponnese, Limnos and Siirt are the
favorite destination cities of these illegal migrants wherefrom they move towards their
destination of choice.
[9] https://www.dawn.com/news/1243094
[10] David Kilcullen, “The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting small wars in the midst of a big
one”, (Oxford University Press: 2011). 23-30
[11] https://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/04/health/isis-fighters-human-behavior-study/index.html
[12] Asaad Almohammad, “ISIS Child Soldiers in Syria: The Structural and Predatory
Recruitment,Enlistment, Pre-Training Indoctrination, Training, and Deployment”,
International Center for Counter Terrorism (The Hague), 20 – 17.
[13]
Four groups have been discussed here on account of their training mode and type and
then try to distinguish them from one another. These four groups include Islamic State in
Iraq & Syria (ISIS), Al Qaeda and its transnational affiliates, localized primary groups like
Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) along with different Shia factions. The last category of
such grouping is secondary and tertiary localized organizations. Here a simplex structure
involves limited or no availability of space along with unimpressive trainers at the disposal
of the group. Whereas, a complex format involves readily availability of physical space
along with specialized trainers according to their expertise and the training is conducted in
a highly secret and clandestine way.
[14] “Security Councils Guiding Principles on Foreign Terrorist Fighters: A practical tool for
Member States to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters”, United Nations Security
Council Counter Terrorism Committee, (United Nations: 2019), 1-3.
[15] https://www.dawn.com/news/1305848
[16] https://www.dawn.com/news/797860/the-softer-option
Source:
Cited in references.
Cited in references.
