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Image 1: Map of Pakistan with province of Balochistan highlighted in red. [Image (C) Creative Commons. Attributed****]
1. Introduction
Pakistan is a federal parliamentary republic, a federation made up of many different units. Pakistan has confronted the challenge of nationalist dogma based in the ethnic identities within its provinces of Balochistan, KP, GB and Sindh between issues of agency, political autonomy, resource allocation and economic inequality. Ever mounting governance issues, political instability, discrimination, enfeebled social development have also been among key issues. The national economic pressure, growing financial insecurity and income disparity and a sense of deprivation in less developed regions, particularly Balochistan have indeed remained threats to Pakistan's internal security.
Image 2: Ethno-linguistic map of Baloch people [Author's Own Work - Map Adopted from copyright free academic literature***]
The Baloch people are a unique ethno-linguistic group spread between Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. Infested with several insurgents, religious extremist and sectarian groups, the security landscape of Balochistan has become exceedingly complex over the last few years. The death of Nawab Akbar Bugti on August 26, 2006 in a military operation had instigated the current phase of the Baloch insurgency, the fourth one since the creation of Pakistan.
Baloch insurgents have launched attacks on state institutions, security forces, gas and power installations and on non-Baloch individuals in the province since Nawab Bugti’s death. The role of Baloch insurgents in compounding Balochistan’s law and order woes notwithstanding, several religiously motivated militant and sectarian groups have also grown in strength and expanded their areas of operation across Balochistan.
Quetta, the provincial capital, is becoming a hub of local and foreign religious militant groups and sectarian outfits. There have been numerous media reports of attacks on barbershops, music shops and on other “un-Islamic” businesses by religious extremists including the Taliban in Quetta in the recent past. Meanwhile, the Shia Hazara community in Balochistan, with a population of around 300,000 people, is currently facing unprecedented attacks and violence, mainly from sectarian militant groups.
Terrorist attacks and targeted killings, mainly perpetrated by Baloch insurgents and religious extremists, have gradually increased in the province, particularly after 2006. Around 110 attacks have killed 229 people and injured another 282 in Balochistan in the year 2023. This marks a 116% increase in the number of terrorist attack related casualties in the province when compared with the previous year.1 [PIPS report 2023]
Government of Pakistan initiated a number of steps to build confidence which in the past have included Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan in 2009, Financial commission awards and the 18th Constitutional amendment in 2010 these which include concessions and benefits for the Baloch people. The most recent of which has been the Governance and Policy Project for Balochistan funded by the World Bank costing US$ 19 Million and will aim to strengthen the capacity for revenue mobilization and improve public financial management and accountability for public service de livery in Balochistan.[ https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P156411]
The federal government also initiated several mega development projects in the province as highlighted in Table 1:
Table 1: Megaprojects in Balochistan
| Name of Scheme | Cost in Million |
| Kachhi Canal | 31,204 |
| Mirani Dam | 5,861 |
| Sabakzai Dam | 1,010 |
| Balochistan effluent disposal into RBOD(ROBOD-III) | 4,485 |
| Coastal Highway | 15,010 |
| Gwadar-Khuzdar Highway | 16,640 |
| Gwadar Deep Sea Water Port Ph-1 | 16,380 |
| Greater Quetta Water Supply & Environmental Project | 7,965 |
| National program for improvement of water courses in Pakistan Balochistan Share | 5,060 |
| Access to Justice Program (Provincial) | 1,000 |
| Total | 104,615 |
However, Baloch nationalists and insurgents continue to dismiss the government’s acquiescence, labelling them a continuation of previous discriminatory policies. [2] https://www.dawn.com/news/1801371/baloch-protesters-give-govt-7-day-ultimatum-to-meet-demands
Jan Achakzai the Caretaken minister for Balochistan and other political leaders who are part of the government have also remained cautious in issuing any statement or taking any initiative on CMBs. However, all are still advocating the need for confidence-building measures to persuade the Baloch towards reconciliation.[3] https://www.dawn.com/news/1807102/b...protest-in-islamabad-a-flop-dawn-news-english
In addition to its direct human cost, the poor law and order in Balochistan has a negative impact on development and stability in the province, in Pakistan and in the wider region. Although the nature of political grievances felt by many Baloch towards Islamabad are reasonably well described in the available literature, and the Government of Pakistan seems to have made unprecedented efforts since the 2018 elections to address these grievances, many aspects of the conflict and the insecurity in the province are not as well understood.
Most research and commentary on Balochistan is focused primareily on the insurgency, accounts of lack of security in Balochistan come mainly from the media, which is just a day-to-day coverage or analysis of incidents of violence and terrorism in the province.
Serious questions exist, for example, about the extent, causes and trends of insecurity; the sub-conflicts contributing to that insecurity; the nature of Baloch insurgent groups (including their capacity, organization, leadership, objectives, funding, recruitment and locations); the extent of criminal violence, smuggling and drug trafficking; the degree to which the TTP or religious extremist groups are now active and entrenched in certain parts of Balochistan, Pakhtun-majority areas in particular; dynamics of conflict and risks of a spike in violence; and the ways to achieve peace and security.
My post intends to advance an understanding of the causal factors, key players, and dynamics of the conflict in Balochistan which have a direct bearing on national and regional security. An attempt has been made to explore the strategies and options of programmatic and policy interventions which are practicable and effective in reducing the risk of violence and insecurity in Balochistan.
Analysing the conflict:
The ongoing conflict in Balochistan has almost all the attributes of a complex conflict system rather than a simple two-party clash or dispute. This section tries to explore the conflict lines or structures that exist in the province at the social, political, economic and security levels.[3] https://www.usip.org/sites/default/...rism-in-Pakistan-The-Civil-Military-Nexus.pdf
Geographical overview
Image 3: Map of Pakistan with province of Balochistan highlighted in red. [Image (C) Creative Commons. Attributed****]
Balochistan lies at the cultural and geographical crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, which makes it an ideal candidate for a hub for inter-regional transport and trade. It is located on the northern tip of the Strait of Hormuz, which marks the entry point into the Persian Gulf through which much of the world’s oil supply passes. Straddling Pakistan’s 900- kilometre western border with Iran, Balochistan offers unique access to these mineral-rich areas.
It shares a 1,002-kilometre border with Afghanistan, presenting its north-western neighbour as well as Central Asian States viable sea access. The development of a deep-sea port at Gwadar creates opportunities for trade connections for the resource-rich land-locked provinces of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The proposed gas pipelines from Iran and Turkmenistan to Pakistan, through Afghanistan, and further to India or China will also pass through Balochistan.2[Original reference sheet]
Political:
There is a strong sense of political deprivation among the Baloch people, which emanates from a number of factors. First, at the national level, government decisions and policies are formulated and implemented by a small elite, be it the political elite, military or bureaucracy. Pakistan’s political culture, which has been decidedly undemocratic, is essentially a factor in the conflict and deprives some of the social strata of their political rights.
Balochistan is one of the prime examples of the sense of disempowerment and alienation spawned by this political culture. Secondly, the political culture in Balochistan is the weakest among all the provinces of Pakistan. Tribal bondages and Nawabs/Sardars (chiefs of tribes and clans) play a prominent role in politics, and local and provincial administration. There are internal divisions within and among Baloch nationalist political parties which make them least responsive to realising people’s aspirations. The central government has also consistently remained part of consolidating the traditional Baloch political system by strengthening the Baloch tribal elders.3
Thirdly, lack of education and absence of social development continues to keep the Baloch people trapped in the political structures offered to them at the national, political and local levels. Fourthly, the intelligence agencies and armed forces hold great sway over Baloch politics. This control has a long history and the Baloch believe that it is likely to continue in the future. “They don’t want the political parties in Balochistan empowered beyond the limits they have set for them”.4
Relations with the Federal Government
The nature of Balochistan’s ties with the centre appears to be a patron-client relationship. This relationship has remained uneasy and skewed in favor of the centre throughout the history of Pakistan. The federal government ensures that the province only has a limited capacity and mandate to raise its own revenues, and to set and implement provincial policies.5 There is over-centralisation of functions, planning and even the authority to make decisions for development expenditures which creates a huge gap between planning and implementation.6
Political analyst Zafarullah Khan believes that military and democratic regimes in Pakistan have been imposing an authoritative version of federalism on Balochistan instead of relying on cooperative federalism. As long as the Baloch were raising their voice for their rights neither the state nor
the other provinces listened to them. Now, when they talk of independence or self-rule, the available options of federalism are not sufficient enough to resolve the conflict.7
The Baloch see the federal government with suspicion and lack confidence in the centre and in institutions of the state. Some believe that if the current political and administrative structures in which the centre-Balochistan relations are rooted are revisited and reconstructed on the basis of the
principles of the 1948 agreement signed between Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Mir Ahmad Yar Khan—the then Khan of Kalat, a princely state which is now part of Balochistan—the conflict in the province would be resolved.8
The agreement had stipulated that all subjects except defence, external affairs and communication would be the domain of the state of Kalat. The agreement was never honoured after Jinnah’s death. That was the first breach of trust between Balochistan and the centre.
Then there are issues of representation of the Baloch in federal institutions and appointments made by the centre. According to former Balochistan chief secretary Abdul Hakeem Waja, 60 percent of the provincial services are appointed by the central government. Citing some of the key postings, he says, “The chief justice of the Quetta High Court is appointed by the president in consultation with the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Balochistan cannot appoint its own chief secretary. The inspector general of Frontier Corps does not listen to the provincial government while maintenance of law and order is a provincial subject.”9
The Baloch are underrepresented in almost all federal institutions as well. “No Baloch heads any of more than 200 corporations in Pakistan. Not a single federal secretary is Baloch. You will not find any Baloch employee in the President House or among the 700-strong staff at the Prime Minister’s House.
There is not a single Baloch among Pakistan’s ambassadors all over the world today. There is no Baloch among the 10 directors of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA). Sixteen Baloch parliamentarians represent their province in the lower house of parliament, or the National Assembly, comprising of 342 members. The upper house, the Senate, where they have more representation does not have much power.” 10
Under-representation of the Baloch people at the federal level has remained a catalyst for their thinking in regional and ethno-nationalist terms,11 and their grievances towards the centre have increased over time.
Governance
The major governance issues in Balochistan include incompetence in the political and administrative institutions, weak writ of the government and absence of rule of law. Most of the political leaders, analysts, nationalist leaders and journalists believed that those sitting on the treasury benches in Balochistan are busy in making money and are least interested in providing facilities and services to the people.
Some analysts see the Balochistan government as weak and ineffective by its very design. It is perhaps the only example of a government in the world where all legislators are part of the executive, apart from two or three members.12
There is a complete absence of the opposition in the legislature which is supposed to guide the rulers on governance and performance issues. The provincial civil services and the local cadre are either not competent or not interested in working efficiently. Federal civil servants assigned to Balochistan do not share the province’s priorities. Therefore, provincial aspirations eventually remain unfulfilled.13
According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), the decision-making for Balochistan is still firmly in the hands of the elements that were in command before the February 2008 elections.14 HRCP says that there is a brazen hold of the army over Balochistan and that law and order and major governance issues are totally in its control.
Others, however, think that although the provincial government cannot take ‘strategic decisions’ on issues related to the conflict in Balochistan and to law and order, it is free to plan and implement development projects in the territory in the provincial domain under the Constitution. However, they say that the provincial government lacks political will, resources, and capability.15
Keeping in context the sparsely distributed population clusters in Balochistan, some analysts argue that district-level government and administration system could be much more effective and responsive than a provincial government in Quetta. But the government of Balochistan abolished the local government system in Balochistan in August 2010. The system was established by former president Pervez Musharraf under the Local Government Ordinance 2001.
Inter-tribal rivalries, infighting, and exercise of power and money at the local level to win elections are stated to be some of the reasons that make the local government system ineffective.16 Abolition of the local government system means reversion to centralization instead of devolution of powers.
More in general, the governance challenges in Balochistan have deep social roots. Political leaders at all levels are more likely to secure their position of formal authority through social networks and patronage, rather than through free and fair processes. The citizens are more likely to access basic services through personal networks of kin and biradri (clan/caste), informal intermediaries and facilitation payments, than through formalized procedures and processes.
Policy and legislation in many key areas is not followed through with the essential enabling legislation, rules, and procedures to make them workable. Public attitudes toward political processes and service delivery reveal deep distrust and low expectations. Voter turnout in Balochistan, for instance, is among the lowest in Pakistan. People have little faith in public services, and they are more likely to turn to informal systems of adjudication and service delivery, administered by local tribal elders.17
At another level of state-society relations, service delivery in Balochistan has almost ground to a halt partly because of security issues, but also on account of utter neglect.
Economic:
Pakistan’s economic system is widely believed to contain inherent discriminations. Economic development and modernisation have also been uneven. As a result, the mounting economic pressures, growing economic inequalities and a sense of deprivation and disempowerment in the least developed region of Balochistan have triggered conflicts at the socio- economic and political levels.
The Baloch consider the current revenue collection and allocation mechanisms, as well as economic development and economic opportunities discriminatory in a comparative context. They harbour grievances of not getting their due share in resources. The most heightened form of this concern relates to the ownership of and control over the mineral resources of Balochistan.
It is worthy to note that Dr. Pasha has wrote “Balochistan is the smallest province of Pakistan, with a share of 6.2% in the national population, according to the 2023 Population Census. However, it is geographically the largest province with a share in the national land area of 43.6%.”
https://www.brecorder.com/news/40262658
In his research Dr. Pasha provides insights into the extent to which Balochistan has fallen behind since 1999-2000.
Table 2 : Ratio of Per Capita GDP by Province to National GDP per Capita (National per Capita GDP = 100.0)
| 1999-2000 | 2014-2015 | 2021-2022 | |
| Punjab | 98.6 | 99.5 | 99.8 |
| Sindh | 128.8 | 129.9 | 129 |
| KP | 71.3 | 77 | 86.2 |
| Balochistan | 75.3 | 51.3 | 44 |
Dr Pasha explains further that the worrying finding is the big decline in the ratio of per capita GRP of Balochistan with respect to the national per capita GDP. The former was approximately 75% of the national average in 1999-2000. However, it is estimated to have fallen to only 44% by 2021-22.
Table 3: Provincial GRP Growth Rates 1999-2000 to 2018-19
| Punjab | 4.2 |
| Sindh | 4.5 |
| KP | 5 |
| Balochistan | 2.1 |
Development
Balochistan is the poorest and the least developed of the provinces of Pakistan. Around 58 percent of the province’s population lives below the poverty line. If poverty is considered an index of human deprivation comprising limited opportunities and social exclusion, a much larger portion of population in Balochistan would fall below the poverty line. In addition to low income, poor households are characterized by low levels of education, lack of drinking water and dearth of health and welfare services. As many as 92 percent of Balochistan’s districts are classified as ‘high deprivation’ areas, compared to 50 percent in Sindh and 29 percent in Punjab.18 Less educated and less urbanised than the rest of the country, the province also has far greater dependency ratio.19
Balochistan has the lowest literacy rate of all the provinces, fewest educational institutions, and the lowest ranking in the Gender Parity Index (GPI) across the country. The literacy rate in Balochistan is 29.81 percent, compared to the national average of 39.69 percent. The literacy ratio for males is 18.3 percent and for females in the rural areas of the province it is less than 10 percent. Regarding lowest net primary enrolment, 11 out of the 16 districts, including the four districts with the worst record, in 2004-05 were in Balochistan.2
Table 4 key statistics for Balochistan
| Universities in public sector | 4 |
| Universities for boys | 5 |
| Universities for girls | 1 |
| Primary schools (boys) | 7,566 |
| Primary schools (girls) | 2,876 |
| Middle schools (boys) | 583 |
| Middle schools (girls) | 137 |
| High schools (boys) | 418 |
| High schools (girls) | 122 |
| Intermediate colleges (boys) | 32 |
| Intermediate colleges (girls) | 21 |
| Degree colleges (boys) | 23 |
| Degree colleges (girls) | 7 |
| Technical colleges (boys) | 1 |
| Technical colleges (girls) | 1 |
| Commerce colleges | 1 |
| College for physical studies | 1 |
| Number of students in boys’ schools | 570,032 |
| Number of students in girls’ schools | 364,887 |
| Number of students in boys’ colleges | 23,139 |
| Number of students in girls’ colleges | 20,991 |
| Number of hospitals, rural health centers and dispensaries | 1,400 |
| Doctors | 3,000 |
| Nurses, paramedical staff and allied health workers | 2,900 |
| Length of metalled and shingled roads | 22,000kms |
| Village provided electricity | 25% |
| Access to safe drinking water | 20% |
| Access to sanitation | 7% |
Table 5: Incidence of Poverty in Pakistan.
| % of population | |
| Punjab | 31.4 |
| Sindh | 43.1 |
| KP | 49.2 |
| Balochistan | 71.2 |
Disparities in access to education in the province are stark. Punjab has 111 vocational institutions for women; Balochistan has only one. Only 23 percent of the girls in rural areas are fortunate enough to be enrolled in primary schools in Balochistan, compared to twice that ratio in rural Punjab. Similarly, unemployment is alarmingly high and young people in Balochistan are twice as likely to remain unemployed as their counterparts elsewhere in the country.22
In terms of Human Development Index (HDI), Balochistan is the most backward province of the country. According to a recent UN human development report about Pakistan, there is considerable variation across provinces with respect to HDI. Among the districts, Jhelum (Punjab) has the highest HDI rank at 0.703, while Dera Bugti, the resource-rich district of Balochistan, is the lowest at 0.285. Balochistan and its districts were assessed to be the worst off in Pakistan. Amongst the top 31 districts with the highest HDI, Punjab had by far the largest share at 59 percent, while Balochistan lagged far behind at nine percent.23
The UNDP Human Development Report has also quantified the Human Development Index of each province. The estimates are presented in Table 6.
Table 6: Human development index by province.
| 2006-2007 | 2019-2019 | Growth Rate % | |
| Punjab | 0.527 | 0.572 | 0.7 |
| Sindh | 0.529 | 0.574 | 0.7 |
| KP | 0.491 | 0.546 | 0.9 |
| Balochistan | 0.47 | 0.473 | 0.1 |
| Pakistan | 0.529 | 0.57 | 0.6 |
Besides continued neglect and inconsistent policies by the central government,24 there are certain structural problems associated with Balochistan’s political, administrative and developments crises. Before August 1, 1970—the day Balochistan got the status of a province within the federation of Pakistan—its administrative position was much different from the rest of the federating units.
Its structure was that of a State Union on the one hand and on the other a sort of federally administered tribal area also existed in the province. That meant that Balochistan remained excluded from the administrative setup and political dispensation that prevailed in other provinces for about 22 years. The impact is visible in today’s least developed Balochistan.25
The violence and the security crisis in the province have also had an exceedingly negative impact on its development, particularly on education.
Professor Abdul Nabi, vice chancellor of Balochistan University, does not see a bright future for the Baloch youth as far as educational development is concerned. He laments that the youth do not have institutions and teachers, and if some of them succeed in completing some level of education they do not have jobs. “They cannot compete with the youth of other provinces. Their frustration can even force them to join the nationalist insurgents,” said Professor Nabi.26
Some analysts question the control of the central government over formulation of development policies for Balochistan. They argue that local knowledge and expertise, and cultural considerations are ignored while doing this. This is a structural factor in failure of development projects in Balochistan.27
Secondly, over-centralisation of development expenditures, as mentioned earlier, is reflected in the large number of schemes in the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) that are regional in nature but are orchestrated through federal funds.
Control and Distribution of Resources:
The question of provincial and fiscal autonomy is directly linked to the problem of control over and distribution of resources. The extraction of natural/mineral resources and allocation of the revenues that the province generates plays a central role in its problematic relationship with the federal government.
Balochistan has huge natural reserves of minerals, and its gas fields supply about 45 percent of Pakistan’s total gas requirements (down from 70 percent about a decade earlier), generating US $1.4 billion in revenues annually.28 Coal reserves are believed to be sufficient to cover to a great extent the country’s future energy requirements. Other important mineral reserves in the province include gold, copper, chromite, marble, and granite.29
Regarding control and distribution of resources, some of Balochistan’s long-standing complaints towards the federal governments, which emerged during field interviews, were as follows:
- The centre owes the province billions of rupees in gas revenue arrears.
- The province’s share from the divisible tax pool is meagre compared to its size, given its contribution to national energy needs as well as its level of underdevelopment.30
- Disparity in the price of gas extracted from Balochistan and from other parts of the country.
- The gas sector and gas fields have been under strict central government control.
- The Baloch are the last people to utilize their ‘own’ gas resources.
However, many of these and other concerns of Balochistan regarding control and allocation of resources, and development have been addressed by three major initiatives of the government that took power after the 2008 elections: the Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan package, the 7th NFC Award and the 18th Constitutional Amendment. The Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan package presented a set of recommendations for a joint sitting of parliament on November 4, 2009.31
It recommended transfer of subjects on the concurrent list to the provinces, a lingering issue related to provincial autonomy.32 On economic matters, the package deals with three sets of issues: job creation, royalties and share of Balochistan in the development and exploitation of oil and gas resources and shared power over decision-making in launching new mega development projects and managing the existing ones. At the outset, the federal government promised to create 5,000 jobs primarily to employ the educated youth of the province and to provide more funds for poverty alleviation and rehabilitation of internally displaced people (IDPs) from Dera Bugti with a grant of 1 billion rupees.33
Ethnicity and Culture
Balochistan is a multicultural province divided into regions dominated by Baloch, Barohi, Pakhtun, Jaat and small clusters of other ethnic minorities. Ethno-cultural factors of conflict revolve around language, culture and ethnicity.
The Baloch have a ‘psychological issue with centralization of their province’ and consider that the survival of their identity, land, language and culture is
under threat.34 Their strong sense of inheriting a unique cultural identity compels them to counter any threat of absorption or assimilation into the
surrounding cultures. As Selig S. Harrison has put it, it is the vitality of this ancient cultural heritage that explains the tenacity of the present demand for
the political recognition of Baloch identity.35
For centuries the Baloch oral literature has been an important source to preserve and transmit language,
culture and national feelings of the Baloch people. Much of the literature, with its rich oral folklore, songs, and folk poetry, is explicitly nationalist in
content. The common features include the glorification of the deserts and mountains of Balochistan and the bravery, pride and honor of the Baloch people.36
Incidents of cultural discrimination have been reported from Balochistan where the Frontier Corps personnel manning the security checkpoints are
said to have insulted the people by shaving their moustaches, tearing the traditional Baloch shalwar (trousers) and making other gestures derogatory to
their culture.37
Some problematic group histories based on ethnicity and language in Balochistan are discussed below.
Baloch-Barohi: The Baloch trace their origin to Halb in Syria, while the Barohi call themselves an indigenous race. The Baloch-Barohi ethnic division continued for some time after the establishment of Pakistan. Both held on to their distinct ethnic identities until the 1970 elections. But the Barohis then merged with the Baloch not only politically but also ethnically. According to Balochistan Intellectual Forum member Abdul Basit Mujahid, military operations and repressive policies of the centre towards Balochistan brought the two groups together. Now any reference to the Baloch and the Barohi as ethnically distinct annoys both groups.3
Pakhtun-Baloch: The Baloch and the Pakhtun are two major ethnic entities in Balochistan. There is great inconsistency between the population figures that both the Baloch and Pakhtun nationalists claim and the official census of the two groups’ population in Balochistan. According to the 1981 census, the Balochi language was spoken by 3.02 percent in the province.39 In the 1980s, the province received a large number of Afghan refugees, which tilted the demographic and social balance towards Pakhtuns in the northern and central districts.40
It is estimated that the Baloch make up between 40 to 60 percent of the province’s population, while the Pakhtun are believed to form between 28
and 50 percent. Whatever the actual figures, there is a substantial and growing intolerance among the Baloch regarding the presence of Pakhtun
refugees from Afghanistan. The provincial capital, Quetta, is currently believed to have a Pakhtun majority, with the numbers varying between 800,000 and 1.4 million.41
At present, two-third of the electoral constituencies in the province have a Baloch majority. As many as 12 administrative districts of the province are dominated by Pakhtuns, while in 18 districts the Baloch population is in majority.42
There are claims and counter-claims from both communities regarding their population ratio in Balochistan. According to Usman Kakar, president of Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP) Balochistan chapter, the leading Pakhtun nationalist party in the province, Balochistan is a bi-ethnic province, or Baloch-Pakhtun shareek (shared) province, where the Pakhtun have very low representation in the provincial set-up due to miscalculation of their population. For the last five years, the governor, chief minister, and speaker of the provincial assembly have been Baloch. Kakar believes that the size of the Pakhtun population of Balochistan is about the same as the Baloch population and the Pakhtuns should therefore get a proportionate number of seats in the legislature, and a share in proportion to the population in the education institutions. He says the current 80-20 ration for the Baloch and the Pakhtun, respectively, is not is justified.43
Other related issues include provincial financial allocations and job opportunities, etc. The Pakhtun community in Balochistan and other parts of the country had condemned military operations in Balochistan during the Ayub, Bhutto, Musharraf and Zardari regimes. The Pakhtun think that the solution to the conflict in Balochistan lies in dialogue and not in military operations or repression. They do not favor the Baloch insurgency and instead support a peaceful political struggle for the demands of the Baloch.
On the other hand, Baloch nationalists also acknowledge the right of Pakhtun people to their land and resources in Balochistan. They do not include
Pakhtun areas in the territory they seek for an “independent Balochistan”.44
Jameel Bugti, son of late Nawab Akbar Bugti, says that if the Pakhtun demand Southern Balochistan or Pakhtunkhwa, they are entitled to do so, but
adds that it is imperative to first redraw the provincial borders and include the Rajanpur, Jacobabad and Dera Ghazi Khan districts of Punjab into
Balochistan.45
Settlers: Some Baloch nationalists and politicians view Punjabi settlers as non-Baloch people who they allege are settled there only to earn money while
they invest and make properties in Punjab and other parts of Pakistan outside Balochistan. Others however think that the settlers have a significant role in
Balochistan’s development, particularly in the education sector and labour.
Nawab Akbar Bugti had introduced the term ‘Balochistani’ for those settlers who had been living in Balochistan since 1970 and whose forefathers were
buried in Balochistan.46 Syed Fasih Iqbal, an expert on Balochistan, calls them non-tribal Baloch.47
Target killings of Punjabi and other non-Baloch settlers in parts of Balochistan first began with the murders of Nawab Akbar Bugti in August 2006 and Baloch nationalist leader Khair Bux Marri’s son Balach Marri in November 2007. Such killings have continued since then. However, the scope and intensity of such killings has grown alarmingly in the last few years. These attacks have spread to Noshki, Khuzdar, Mastung, Gwadar, Turbat and Kech, where this anti-settler violence was relatively low in the past.48 As many as 252 Punjabi settlers had been assassinated in targeted killings in Balochistan in 2010 by the end of late July alone.49
There are multiple views on who could be involved in the target killings of the settlers. Most of the Baloch interviewed for this study said that it was highly unlikely that Baloch insurgents were involved. Some of them argued that the insurgents’ involvement would not only damage their movement but also undermine the development of the province.50 At the same time, not all Baloch are comfortable with the settlers. Some view them as informers or spies for the establishment.
Others complain that the settlers have never raised their voice to condemn the excesses against the Baloch.51 Some even accuse the Pakistani intelligence agencies of involvement in target killing of the settlers, particularly private security guards, teachers, and laborers, to malign the Baloch.52
It also merits a mention here that land mafia have exploited this situation to make money. One prevailing trend of forcing the Punjabis out of the province is by marking their residences with red crosses, which is considered a warning by Baloch insurgents for the settlers to vacate their homes. Some people say that several land mafia groups, most of them allegedly from Punjab, have done such acts themselves to force the settlers to sell their properties at throwaway prices.53
Hazara: The Hazara community of Balochistan has been affected the most by target killings in the province. According to Hazara Democratic Party, more than 250 Hazara people have been killed in sectarian-related target killing while more than 1,000 have either been injured or physically harassed and beaten.54 Hussain Ali Yousafi, chairman of Hazara Democratic Party, was killed in one such incident in Quetta in January 2009.
Muhammad Musi Kashani, an executive member of Hazara Students Federation, does not think that Baloch insurgents are involved in target killings of members of the Hazara community: “Religious extremist groups are involved in targeting the Hazaras; the Baloch are seriously focused on their movement. There are many local and international players, who are supporting and using sectarian groups in Balochistan for their vested interests, but the Baloch are not one of them.”55
The Hazara community subscribes to Shia sect of Islam but disassociates itself from Shia religious and political movements and groups in Pakistan. They think such an association can make them target of further sectarian-related violence.56 The orientation of organizations of the Hazaras, such as Hazara Democratic Party or Hazara Students Federations, is ethno-political rather than religious.
Religion:
Based on existing academic litrature, the Baloch do not believe in mixing religion with politics.57 While most Baloch are Hanafi Sunni Muslims, there is a Zikri community among the Baloch in Makran region, which is non-Hanafi. Some Shia communities among the Baloch can also be found in Sindh and Punjab.58 On the whole, the Baloch are liberal, secular and forward looking in their sociocultural outlook.
They do not buy into sectarian-related interpretations of Islam. On the other hand, they are extremely sensitive about their traditions, culture and
language.59 The general view of the majority of the people interviewed for this study was that the Baloch do not have any religious tension with any
other ethnic or sectarian community in Balochistan.
Most of the Pakhtun community, mainly living in the Pakhtun belt of Balochistan and in the provincial capital Quetta, subscribes to Deobandi
school of Islamic thought. Two factors are critical with regard to religious structures within the Pakhtun community in Balochistan: the large number of
Deobandi religious seminaries in Pakhtun-dominated areas of the province; and the arrival and settlement in Balochistan of the overwhelmingly Pakhtun
refugees from Afghanistan following the Soviet-Afghan war. Leaders of the Hazara community express apprehensions that these two factors can create
religious tensions by injecting a conservative Islamic ethos among the liberal, although tradition-bound, tribal communities. They refer to Taliban’s
sectarian-related killing of Hazaras in Mazar-i-Sharif and Bamiyan, in Afghanistan, during their reign in that country.60
There are around 300,000 Hazaras in Balochistan, based in Quetta, Khuzdar, Zhob, Loralai and Dera Murad Jamali districts. One of Pakistan's army chiefs,
General Musa Khan, was a Hazara. Most army officers inducted from Balochistan are also ethnic Hazaras.61 As mentioned earlier, the Hazara
community is worst affected by the target killings in Balochistan, believed to be perpetrated largely by Sunni sectarian groups.
Security Landscape
Image 4: Map of provinces of Pakistan and the impact of militancy and terrorism [Author's Own Work - Map Adopted from copyright free academic literature***]
The security landscape of Balochistan is punctuated by a combination of nationalist insurgency, sectarian-related militancy, Taliban presence in the
northern part of the province, politically motivated target killings, attacks on Pakistan military and government assets, Kidnap for Ransom and activities of drug cartels and the land mafia hand in glove with criminal syndicates.
At the level of human security, acute deprivation, underdevelopment, abject poverty, illiteracy, chronic unemployment and continuous deterioration in the law and order situation have forced the non-Baloch to migrate to the relatively safer Pakhtun localities. The Punjabi settlers, who may have lived in Quetta for generations, are being forced to leave for other provinces.
Similarly, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, use of excessive by state agencies against political rallies, illegal detentions, torture of political activists during interrogation and uncalled for house raids and searches have sowed the seeds of deep insecurity among the masses, especially the Baloch.
According to Pak Institute for Peace Studies’ (PIPS) annual security report, 2023 witnessed a sharp rise in attacks perpetrated by nationalist insurgents and religious/sectarian extremists.
Table 7: Terrorist attacks by province 2023[63]
| Region | No. of Attacks | Killed | Injured |
| KP | 174 | 422 | 782 |
| Balochistan | 110 | 229 | 282 |
| Punjab | 6 | 16 | 8 |
| Karachi | 14 | 16 | 26 |
| Sindh (Excluding Karachi) | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| GB | 1 | 10 | 26 |
| Total | 306 | 693 | 1124 |
Nationalist Insurgency Despite the public apology extended to the Baloch people by the incumbent federal government for the mistakes of the past, release of detained Baloch nationalist leaders such as Sardar Akhtar Mengal and Shahzain Bugti—a grandson of late Nawab Akbar Bugti—and other political initiatives such as the announcement of the Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan package and the NFC Award, the security situation has deteriorated in the insurgency-hit Balochistan. There has been no let-up in violence since the current insurgency began in January 2005 after the alleged rape of a lady doctor Shazia—an employee of Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL) in Sui.
Three secterian attacks occured in Balochistan during 2023. The country has a whole witnessed an uptick of secterian violence last year, in total 43 people were killed and 61 injured in 12 secterian-related attacks across the country.
Image 5: Mapping historic attack types across Balochistan [Author's Own Work - Map Adopted from copyright free academic literature***]
Since 2005 the province has been simmering with a steady increase in the number of insurgent attacks and the resultant casualties. Quetta and Khuzdar are two of the most volatile districts affected by this nationalist insurgency.
Besides proliferation of Islamist radical groups, another worrisome aspect is the widening scope of targets hit by nationalist insurgents and religious
extremists. The insurgents attack a wide array of targets ranging from security forces’ convoys, check posts, government offices, electricity pylons, railway tracks, bridges and the communication infrastructure in general, in almost all districts of the province. Available informaiton compiled in public databases suggest that RCIED's are the weapon of choice for insrugent groups operating in the province.
Actors: Agendas, Capacities and Locations
Nationalist Insurgents
In September 2010, the government banned five Baloch insurgent organizations: Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), Baloch Republican Army (BRA), Lashkar-e-Balochistan and Baloch Musallah Difai Organization (BMDO). Their accounts and other assets were also
frozen.75
The BLA is spearheaded by the Marri tribal elders and has traditionally enjoyed strong support in Kohlu, Khuzdar, Quetta, Sibi, Ziarat, Mand, Mastung, Kalat, Makran and Hub districts. The BRA is led by the Bugtis with influence in areas such as Dera Bugti, Quetta, Mastung, Kalat, Noshki, Naseerabad, Jaffarabad and Chagi.
The BLF is led by Mengal tribes and is strong in areas of Awaran, Makran and Quetta, whereas Lashkar-e-Balochistan, dominated by a sub-tribe of Mengals,77 operates in Lasbela, Makran, Khuzdar, Kalat and Quetta. The BMDO, which came to the fore after the murder of Balochistan National Party (BNP-Mengal) secretary-general Habib Jalib, is seemingly active in Quetta and Khuzdar districts.78
At present various Baloch insurgent groups do not have mutual harmony. Neither their leadership, nor tactics and goals speak with one voice. The BLA, BRA, BLF and BLUF have separatist and secessionist agendas. They no longer subscribe to moderate nationalist view of attaining political autonomy and possession of Baloch resources while remaining within the framework of the federation.
Though Lashkar-e-Balochistan also has anti-state agenda but it was formed to counter the growing ambitions of the BLA and the BLF, and to maintain the influence of Mengal Sardars in the area. The BDMO is an anti-separatist organization which does not consider the use of violence by the aforementioned organizations against the state legitimate. A son of Naseer Mengal, chief of a sub-clan of Mengal tribe, founded the BMDO to curtail the influence of Sardar Ataullah Mengal and his sons. Naseer Mengal had developed differences with Ataullah Mengal over electoral politics.79
Strategic and counter-insurgency experts classify the current Baloch insurgency as a low-level guerrilla warfare or low-intensity conflict.80 The intensity of violence fluctuates from low to medium and occasionally high levels.81 Waging of such low-level guerrilla warfare does not require heavy weaponry or huge sums of money. Though traces of foreign involvement are there but so far no heavy weapons have been discovered by the law enforcement agencies.82 However, some analysts believe that Baloch insurgent groups not only receive funds from Baloch Diaspora but some regional countries, particularly India, are also funnelling money to Baloch separatists.
Two discourses prevail regarding the nature and level of the current insurgency in Balochistan. One school of thought considers it violent anarchism instead of classical insurgency. It opines that the present insurgent movement not only lacks a charismatic leadership unlike past insurgencies but it is also divided with frequent infightings, and lacks coordination.
The Baloch insurgency in 1958 was led by Nawab Nauroz Khan, who was highly revered by his followers. Similarly, the second insurgency from 1963-69 was led by Sher Muhammad Marri. The Parari guerilla movement of the 1970s was led by Nawab Khair Bux Marri, who also enjoyed the support of notable Baloch leaders such as Sardar Ataullah Mengal, Sher Muhammad Marri and Nawab Akbar Bugti. The present conflict is hardly a comparison by any standard, as Nawab Akbar Bugti’s grandson Brahamdagh Bugti is hiding in Afghanistan while Baloch nationalist leader Khair Bux Marri’s son Harbiyar Marri is based in London.83
The other school of thought categorizes the insurgency as a manifestation of the legitimate cause of disenchanted Baloch segments, which has all the
makings of becoming a mass movement of young educated middle class. They hold that public support for the movement is increasing by the day. Proponents of this view believe that frustrated and unemployed young Baloch, who feel relatively deprived, left out and neglected, are joining the insurgents irrespective of tribal divisions and internal differences.84
They believe that the young segments of Baloch society especially student organizations such as Balochistan Student Organization (BSO) have now risen above their historical feuds and internal differences. They consider all their slain leaders martyrs and are collectively waging a struggle for a common cause.85 When they see ruthless killings of their forefathers, enforced disappearances of Baloch, the abysmal state of educational institutions, absence of institutional development and of employment opportunities, they revolt against the state. Globalization and modern communication tools such as the Internet and mobile phones have also played their role in creating awareness among young minds about the poor state of affairs in Balochistan.
Religious/Sectarian Extremists
Local militant outfits such and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, sectarian outfits like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Imamia Student Organization (ISO) and Sipah-e-Muhammad, and ethno-sectarian group Jundullah are present and active in the province in one way or another. These organizations are pursuing their parallel agendas while the Baloch movement continues to occupy central stage in the broader Balochistan conflict.
Four factors for support and recruitment for the Afghan Taliban in Balochistan stand out: free cross-border movement along Durand Line since the Soviet-Afghan war; presence of a large Pakhtun community in Balochistan that shares the ethnicity and religion of a substantial part of the population in Afghanistan; an extensive network of Deobandi madrassas, particularly those run by the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam; and the Afghan refugee camps in the province.
The religio-political parties and some Baloch nationalists term reports of presence of Taliban Shura in Quetta, or Quetta Shura, nothing more than baseless propaganda while others maintain that Taliban keep on travelling to Balochistan in the same manner as they do to other parts of the country but they may or may not be based in Quetta.88 What reinforces the international view of presence of Taliban Shura in Quetta can be this unchecked movement of Afghan Taliban across the Pak-Afghan border on a daily basis.89
Quetta, the provincial capital, is just 100 kilometers from the Afghan frontier and this proximity has attracted Afghan refugees to the city for over two decades. The cross-border movement of Taliban between Pakistan and Afghanistan continues throughout the year. They have their hideouts in Afghan refugee camps in Balochistan from where thousands of refugees cross the border on a daily basis, making it difficult to distinguish between Afghan refugees and Afghan Taliban. Quetta’s localities of Nawankilli, Khurtabad, Pakhtunabad, Killi Khotik Chashma and Killi Raiti Bulledi have significant numbers of Afghan nationals.90
Taliban leaders have been killed or captured in the province in the past. For instance, in April 2009 an Afghan Taliban commander codenamed ‘Khattab’ was detained at a checkpoint on the northern suburban fringes of Quetta. He was carrying important documents for his high command.91
Pakistani Taliban surfaced in Balochistan in 2009. However, they disassociate themselves from Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the outlawed umbrella organization of Pakistani Taliban. Engineer Asad, the spokesperson for Pakistani Taliban in Balochistan, asserts that members of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Balochistan (TTB), as he names his organization, are all Pakistanis. “The struggle of the TTB is against non-Muslims and Western forces that have attacked and occupied Islamic countries. The TTB is opposed to fighting the Pakistani security forces and law-enforcement agencies and turning Pakistan into a battlefield. The TTB is committed to fighting the enemies of Islam.”99
Jundullah has emerged as a new phenomenon in Pakistan, blending the religious sectarian agenda with a nationalist separatist ideology. It is an anti- Shia and anti-Iran militant outfit which operates in the Iranian province of Seistan-Balochistan, bordering Pakistani districts of Chagi, Kharan, Panjgur, Kech and Gwadar. The number of Jundullah activists is estimated to be around 800. According to an ABC report, the group is also getting financial support from US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 100 Jundullah’s activities are growing in Iran and have already proved to be an irritant in Pakistan-Iran relations. A further upsurge in violence orchestrated by Jundullah can strain relations between the two countries. The group can also align itself with anti-Shia outfits in Balochistan such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan to target the Shia Hazara community.
Sectarian outfits also have a significant presence in Balochistan. Sectarian-related target killings, especially of members of Hazara community, have become a regular feature of Balochistan’s security landscape.101
Jundullah have two known offshoots which are known as Harakat Ansar Iran and Jaish ul-Adl.
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) is another anti-Shia Sunni outfit which operates in and around Quetta. Two splinter groups of the LeJ known as Usman Kurd group and Qari Hai group are active in Balochistan. The LeJ concentrated in Balochistan and other parts of Pakistan after its terrorist camps in Kabul and Kandahar were destroyed when the US forces invaded Afghanistan in 2001.
The SSP, the parent organization of the LeJ remains a silent supporter of the latter. The SSP has a big support base in Balochistan. The SSP has been banned twice by the government but in Balochistan it remains intact and provides ground support for LeJ terrorists.105
Imamia Students Organization (ISO) is a well-structured group which has an influential role among Shia youth as well as mainstream Shia politics. Its president Nasir Shirazi claims that the ISO is not a sectarian organization but it has always played an important role in sectarian-related violence.106 Outlawed Shia sectarian group Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP) has former ISO members in its fold. In Quetta, the ISO has remained engaged in sectarian-related clashes with other sects. Like other major Shia parties in Pakistan, it also has support from Iran.107
Smugglers and Criminal Syndicates
Almost all Afghan refugee camps along Quetta-Chaman Highway are used by criminal gangs. Drug mafia, land mafia, car thieves and other criminal elements use these camps as their hideouts.108 Afghan refugees are allegedly involved in crimes like robberies, car theft, kidnapping for ransom, drug peddling and gun running.109
At some level the insurgent groups have links with crime syndicates and gangs. Several criminal gangs and groups from Sindh are also active in Balochistan.110 They are involved in crimes along RCD Highway—which passes through Mastung, Kalat, Khuzdar and Lasbela before entering Sindh— and Northern Bypass in Karachi.111 Insurgents from the coastal cities of Balochistan such as Hub and Makran take refuge in Lyari in Karachi.
Smuggling is now virtually a parallel economy in Balochistan. It has become an invincible trade which is being run by big barons, Sardars, public representatives and influential people of the province for many decades. Human trafficking, gun running, drug smuggling and illegal trade of contraband items are rampant in the Pak-Iran and Pak-Afghan border regions. Around 150 gangs of drug and weapons smugglers and human traffickers operate in Balochistan along these borders. The area is known as South Asia golden triangle for drug smuggling since 1979.112
Balochistan’s long and porous border with Afghanistan is the biggest reason for the growth of smuggling and illegal trade in the province. Cross-border trade relations are strong and most Afghan importers and traders have their offices and establishments in Quetta. There are two main cross-border trade routes through Balochistan, one is via Chaman to Afghanistan and the other is via Taftan/Zahedan to Iran. However, dozens of official and semi-official crossing points also exist. The difficult terrain that characterizes the border region has made these areas major crossroads for smuggling and illegal trade.
A common feature of the Pak-Afghan and Pak-Iran border areas is the homogeneity of demography. Tribes that share the same language and kinship are settled on both sides of the border and frequently cross over to the other side. There are approximately 35 truckable and 250 unfrequented routes along the border. The remoteness of these areas and inability of the government to provide efficient governance contributes to involvement of
local population in such illegal activities.113
In the recent past, smuggling and stockpiling of illegal weapons has also increased manifold in Balochistan. The province is a hub of weapons trade.
Illicit weapons of all types and sizes are available, including guns, grenades, rockets and even landmines and surface-to-air missiles. Smugglers of heavier
weapons are broadly known to have the backing of government officials across the border and influential tribal leaders in the tribal areas.114
The weapons smuggled into Balochistan from Afghanistan subsequently find their way to all parts of Sindh and southern districts of Punjab. The districts of Pishin, Zhob and Qila Abdullah, which includes the town of Chaman, have become well known for weapon smuggling. Small towns of Khurtabad and Gulistan on the outskirts of Quetta are also famous for illicit weapons trade.
Similarly, Mirjawa, a town on the Iranian side of the Pak-Iran border is another key transit point for weapons smuggling.115 The weapons trafficking to Sindh is done through the Sariab-Sukkur section of National Highway; while the weapons headed for Karachi are transported through RCD Highway. In addition to Baloch militants/insurgents, other potential buyers of these illegal weapons include different tribes of Jacobabad, Kashmor, Larkana, Khairpur, Usta Muhammad and Kandhkot areas of Sindh and Balochistan where these weapons are used in tribal feuds and clashes.
Smuggling of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is also on the rise. The IEDs are smuggled via the Pak-Afghan border. In Balochistan, South Waziristan and in other tribal areas, militants now frequently use IEDs against military or government targets. The growth in casualties caused by IEDs has been a source of anxiety for Pakistan and the data monitored from the media and other sources shows that IEDs explosions have caused 70 percent of casualties in terrorist attacks since start of 2010. 116
Most of the IEDs explosions in Balochistan have been caused by the insurgents and 907 IED blasts have been reported in the province in the past eight years. According to Balochistan Bomb Disposal Squad, the IEDs used by rebels in Balochistan are mostly detonated by a transmitter such as a mobile phone set or a hand-held radio, while others are triggered by washing- machine timers.117
Drug and crime syndicates have outreach to almost all parts of Balochistan, from the bordering areas to the provincial capital, and from coastal area to
industrial cities like Hub. Their role in the overall Baloch conflict is an implicit but significant one. They not only enjoy close collaboration with Afghan Taliban for smuggling of drug and weapons from Afghanistan into Pakistan but at some level coordinate with Baloch insurgents as well—who are their potential customers for smuggled weapons and provide them safe passage within Balochistan.
Relations and Nexuses
Formal linkages between Baloch insurgents and sectarian outfits like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jundullah were termed as highly unlikely by many of the stakeholders interviewed for this study. However some of them did not rule out the possibility of personal relations between individuals of different insurgent and religious/sectarian groups. According to the Quetta Capital City Police Officer (CCPO), there have been some instances when the LeJ and the BLA helped each other by sharing information and infrastructure in carrying out terrorist attacks.118
The nexus between Afghan Taliban and Baloch insurgents is also unlikely because the two movements are the ideological anti-thesis of each other. The former champions the cause of nationalism while the latter has its discourse grounded in religion.119 Meanwhile, hints of cooperation between drug mafia/ criminal syndicates and Baloch insurgents exist. Baloch militants provide safe passage and cover to drug cartels and criminal syndicates in return for money and weapons.120
A greater level of cooperation is present between Taliban militants and drug mafia of Afghanistan. In fact, Afghan refugee camps situated along the Pak-Afghan border serve as forward operating bases for the criminal syndicates.121
