SolarWarden
Trusted Member
Lol. Am I going to have to copy and paste again why Chino is a paper tiger like Russia? I guess I am so here we go...
-Over the past 5 years, China has undertaken radical reform of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This modification is sweeping in its scope (encompassing changes to strategy, force structure, and technology) and clear in its purpose to create, in the words of Xi Jinping, a joint force that can “fight and win.”1 If this reform succeeds, China’s regional neighbors and the United States could find that the People’s Republic, whose leadership is already demonstrating an increased assertiveness, will be emboldened further still. Successful reform is not assured—indeed, many of China’s previous attempts at military transformation have failed—but Xi does wield near-unprecedented power to force change. It is therefore prudent to assume this reform will succeed and understand both its consequences and how best to respond.
This article analyzes PLA reforms and identifies vulnerabilities in China’s new joint force. The first section analyzes the changes to the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest level of the PLA, set in the context of China’s model of national decisionmaking and civil-military relations. The second section considers the restructuring of the PLA, focusing particularly on its new Strategic Support Force (SSF) and revised theater-level organization. The third section explores the measures that could disrupt and defeat this new joint force via targeting the vulnerabilities identified in sections one and two.
The article anticipates that four key vulnerabilities will exist within the reformed PLA. First, the joint force will embrace a model of highly centralized decisionmaking, which could prove ill-suited to the demands of major combat operations. Second, the reformed PLA force will struggle to integrate multidomain operations at the joint theater level. Third, the reformed PLA will lack the capabilities to project, sustain, or command its forces across the spread of China’s global interests. And last, the PLA is currently hindered by a lack of meaningful operational experience.
-Over the past 5 years, China has undertaken radical reform of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This modification is sweeping in its scope (encompassing changes to strategy, force structure, and technology) and clear in its purpose to create, in the words of Xi Jinping, a joint force that can “fight and win.”1 If this reform succeeds, China’s regional neighbors and the United States could find that the People’s Republic, whose leadership is already demonstrating an increased assertiveness, will be emboldened further still. Successful reform is not assured—indeed, many of China’s previous attempts at military transformation have failed—but Xi does wield near-unprecedented power to force change. It is therefore prudent to assume this reform will succeed and understand both its consequences and how best to respond.
This article analyzes PLA reforms and identifies vulnerabilities in China’s new joint force. The first section analyzes the changes to the Central Military Commission (CMC), the highest level of the PLA, set in the context of China’s model of national decisionmaking and civil-military relations. The second section considers the restructuring of the PLA, focusing particularly on its new Strategic Support Force (SSF) and revised theater-level organization. The third section explores the measures that could disrupt and defeat this new joint force via targeting the vulnerabilities identified in sections one and two.
The article anticipates that four key vulnerabilities will exist within the reformed PLA. First, the joint force will embrace a model of highly centralized decisionmaking, which could prove ill-suited to the demands of major combat operations. Second, the reformed PLA force will struggle to integrate multidomain operations at the joint theater level. Third, the reformed PLA will lack the capabilities to project, sustain, or command its forces across the spread of China’s global interests. And last, the PLA is currently hindered by a lack of meaningful operational experience.






